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1.
Dyuti S. Banerjee 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2011,40(2):160-176
The literature on piracy has questioned the role of regulatory enforcement in the form of monitoring in deterring piracy.
This article shows that for a wide range of penalty levels the equilibrium monitoring rate is such that it is optimal for
the copyright holder to prevent piracy by expanding his output beyond the monopoly output level rather than producing the
monopoly output level and investing in an anticopying technology. This result holds even when the monitoring cost is “sufficiently”
high relative to the cost of investing in anti-copying technology. 相似文献
2.
Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas 《Spanish Economic Review》2006,8(4):271-283
We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between a firm and a monitoring agency in the presence of “green” consumers when compliance payoffs are contingent on monitoring and monitoring costs are shared by the monitoring agency and the firm. When the amount paid by the firms if monitored is exogenously fixed, we find that full compliance is implemented with a finite fine. If there is an upper bound for the fine and the regulator determines endogenously the fine and the amount paid by the firms if monitored, we find that full compliance is also achieved, although the optimal fine is now set at its maximum level. The optimal amount paid by the firms if monitored is lower than the environmental premium the compliant firm gets.The author thanks two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions 相似文献
3.
Social Desirability of Earnings Tests 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Abstract. In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual's benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two 'endings': an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before. We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before. 相似文献
4.
The role of market forces in EPA enforcement activity 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
As corporate concern regarding environmental issues grows, recent studies have debated the stock market's role as an enforcer of environmental regulation. We examine stock market reactions to EPA judicial actions on a sample of publicly traded firms from 1972–91. Specifically, we find that (a) there is a significant decline of 0.43% in violator firm value during the week of settlement; (b) the market penalty is unrelated to fine size, (c) more pronounced for citations under the Clean Air Act, (d) for repeat violators, and (e) for more recent EPA actions. These stock market reactions appear to reinforce the intent of EPA enforcement efforts.Funding from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (Grant #818496-01-0) is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank John Dennis, Tom Adams, V. Denise Saunders, and Robert Papetti for helpful discussions and Bill Lewellen for his insightful comments. The research assistance of Dan Hillis, Nick Wade, and Chris Munger was invaluable. Suggestions by anonymous referees at this journal have greatly improved this paper. 相似文献
5.
In this paper we argue that tax enforcement is an additional contextual factor affecting tax morale, one of the most important determinants of tax compliance. By using a unique dataset that merges a representative sample of Italian households with administrative data on tax enforcement, we first find that tax morale is positively correlated with tax enforcement. Second, to deal with possible endogeneity of tax enforcement, we show that results are confirmed in an IV specification using the change in the tax gap at the provincial level as an instrument for tax enforcement. Finally, we provide evidence that the impact of tax enforcement and social environment is stronger at low quantiles of tax morale. Our results show that besides that of lowering the expected value of tax evasion, tax enforcement has an additional and indirect effect on tax compliance through its effect on tax morale. 相似文献
6.
Policymakers seeking to raise more tax revenues from multinational enterprises have two alternatives: to raise tax rates or to devote more resources to improve tax compliance. Tougher tax enforcement increases the cost of profit shifting, and thus mitigates tax competition. We present a tax-competition model with two policy instruments (the corporate tax rate and the tightness of tax enforcement). In line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, we analyze the scope for enforcement cooperation among asymmetric countries, considering that taxes are set noncooperatively. We show that the low-tax country may fail to cooperate if asymmetry is large enough and that tax havens would never agree to cooperate. Then we identify two drivers for enforcement cooperation. The first driver of cooperation is the complementarity of enforcement actions across countries. This is because the efficiency loss from enforcement dispersion is greater under complementarity. The second driver of cooperation is tax leadership by the high-tax country, which acts as a level-playing field in the tax competition and reduces the extent of disagreement on enforcement. 相似文献
7.
I present an infinitely repeated game model where a monopolist seller has a contractual obligation with several buyers in each period. If a contract is violated the buyer can collect some compensation and impose a penalty on the seller. There are an infinite number of subgame perfect equilibria in this model, but I employ the concept of e-validated equilibrium to pick out a unique equilibrium outcome for the game where the seller is able to dominate the buyers. This model is clearly applicable to supply problems of Soviet-type economies, but it can explain certain phenomena of Western economies as well. 相似文献
8.
We investigate the problem of simultaneously characterizing various classes of simple games in three different ways: (i) the existence of “quasi-weightings” in which smaller numerical values are assigned to losing coalitions than are assigned to winning ones, (ii) the robustness of “winningness” with respect to trades involving groups of players, and (iii) the acyclicity of certain strict “orderings” that intuitively correspond to the idea of one player being more desirable than another.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C71. 相似文献
9.
Barry J. Seldon Euel Elliott James L. Regens Charles G. Hunter 《Applied economics》2013,45(10):949-955
The paper estimates the effects of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforcement budget upon the demand for pollution-control equipment in the private sector. There are two possible effects. A direct effect occurs when the enforcement budget is used for inspections that result in enforced compliance requiring additional pollution control equipment. A second effect is anticipatory, and arises from the private sector's objective of minimizing expected costs due to fines imposed by the EPA for infractions of pollution-control requirements. This component of demand depends, in part, on the EPA enforcement budget. We find that increases in the EPA budget increase the demand for pollution-abatement equipment. This in turn implies that increases in the EPA enforcement budget have been effective in mitigating pollution. 相似文献
10.
Randolph Sloof 《Economics & Politics》1999,11(1):83-107
In a signaling game model of costly political campaigning in which a candidate is dependent on a donor for campaign funds it is verified whether the electorate may benefit from campaign contributions being directly observed. By purely focusing on the informational role of campaign contributions the model seems somewhat biased against the potential benefits of direct observation. Still, the conclusion can be drawn that directly observable contributions allow for more information being revealed in equilibrium. Using this result, from an informational perspective a case can be built for the desirability of full disclosure laws. 相似文献
11.
Tito Boeri 《European Economic Review》2005,49(8):2057-2077
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is not enforced uniformly across the board. There are a number of exemptions to the coverage of these provisions: firms below a given threshold scale and workers with temporary contracts are not subject to the most restrictive provisions. This within-country variation in enforcement allows us to make inferences on the impact of EPL which go beyond the usual cross-country approach. In this paper we develop a simple model which explains why these exemptions are in place to start with. Then we empirically assess the effects of EPL on dismissal probabilities and on the equilibrium size distribution of firms. Our results are in line with the predictions of the theoretical model. Workers under permanent contracts in firms with less restrictive EPL are more likely to be dismissed. However, there is no effect of the exemption threshold on the growth of firms. 相似文献
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13.
Alan de Brauw 《Applied economics》2013,45(18):2169-2178
The Kyoto Protocol aims to limit aggregate carbon emissions by participating countries to 1990 emissions levels in aggregate. It also allows for the creation of a permit market in which countries will be able to buy and sell the right to emit carbon dioxide. This paper investigates how market power, held by the countries of the former Soviet Union, and enforcement of the carbon emission limits might affect the abatement and the cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. To do so, it uses a modified version of the van Egteren–Weber (1996) model to investigate a permit market in the presence of both market power and enforcement difficulties. It then simulates the model, finding that if meeting abatement targets is the goal, regulating the supply side of the market and convex fine schedules are the most effective tools. 相似文献
14.
Medieval Japanese governments only haphazardly enforced claims to scarce resources. Necessarily, this presented landholders with a void. To obtain the enforcement they needed, many turned to institutions affiliated with the fractious Buddhist faith instead. Temples and monasteries enjoyed an exemption from tax on their lands and controlled an array of financial and human resources with which they could adjudicate and enforce claims to scarce resources. To obtain access to that exemption and those resources, landholders “commended” their rights in land to them, and paid them a share of the harvest. In exchange, the temples and monasteries exempted them from tax, adjudicated disputes internal to the estate and protected their estates against external threats. Effectively, the temples and monasteries competed in a market for basic governmental services.By helping to secure basic claims to property, the temples and monasteries helped to promote investment and growth; by competing against the government itself, they helped to forestall the crippling effect of a predatory monopolistic state. 相似文献
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17.
Ilan Maoz 《Journal of economic behavior & organization》1983,4(4):395-410
Recently I proposed a general notion of equilibrium for n-person games which is based on mutual threats and promises (responses), and which leads, in general, to a determinate solution with respect to the order of choice moves. The nature of the solution set in our model is a function of the action sets, the payoff functions, and the cost of ‘communication and enforcement of agreements’ (C&E). The main concern of this paper is to show that the Cournot duopoly solution, for the case of a linear demand function facing two identical firms, can be regenerated by our solution concept under a certain assumption about a high cost C&E. On the other hand, it is shown that under a relatively low cost of C&E the Cournot/Nash solution does not belong to our solution set, because it is Pareto inferior for both duopolists relative to some solutions in our set, among them, the standard monopoly solution. 相似文献
18.
In a credit market with enforcement constraints, we study the effects of a change in the outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of the credit contract, as well as on borrower payoffs. The results crucially depend on the allocation of “bargaining power” between the borrower and the lender. We prove that there is a crucial threshold of relative weights such that if the borrower has power that exceeds this threshold, her expected utility must go up whenever her outside options come down. But if the borrower has less power than this threshold, her expected payoff must come down with her outside options. In the former case a deterioration in outside options brought about, say, by better enforcement, must create a Lorenz improvement in state-contingent consumption. In particular, borrower consumption rises in all “bad” states in which loans are taken. In the latter case, in contrast, the borrower's consumption must decline, at least for all the bad states. These disparate findings within a single model permit us to interpret existing literature on credit markets in a unified way. 相似文献
19.
If a firm can contest the enforcement of an environmental regulation, neither increasing the probability nor severity of the fine will guarantee a reduction in a firm's illegally dumped waste. A policy that can unambiguously decrease illegal dumping is lowering the cost of legal disposal. This result occurs because the use of monitoring and fines to increase the probability or severity of enforcement triggers investment to evade enforcement, while a decrease in the costs of legal disposal does not. Investment in the resources to evade enforcement decreases the attractiveness of monitoring by significantly increasing the costs of environmental audits, administrative hearings, and judicial procedures. This occurs even with a high degree of regulator information about the firm's cost structure and no monitoring errors. In addition, if the regulator can only imperfectly monitor a firm's behavior so the firm can be accused of another firm's behavior, observable commitment to challenge enforcement will lead to overinvestment in resources to evade enforcement, an increased level of illegal dumping, and an overall increase in total costs relative to the unobservable case. 相似文献
20.
We consider a market for vertically differentiated goods where firms enter over time, after having developed innovations characterised
by different quality levels. We show that patent height and length interact to determine the ultimate emergence of duopoly.
In general, imposing quality improvements on later entrants entails the persistence of monopoly, while a duopoly equilibrium
emerges when the second innovator is allowed to produce a sufficiently inferior quality and the patent protection granted
to the first innovator is not too long-lasting. 相似文献