Payoff-Improving Competition: Games with Negative Externalities

We demonstrate that more intense competition in games with production and negative externalities may be payoff-improving, and therefore welcomed by incumbents. In games that feature equilibria with strategic complements, increased competition may give rise to a new equilibrium where aggregate effort is lower, and the resulting reduced levels of externalities ultimately leaves all players better off. This setting applies to models of Cournot oligopoly, of common pool resources, and contests with endogenous prizes.

     

Consumption Externalities and Diffusion in Pharmaceutical Markets: Antiulcer Drugs

We examine the role of consumption externalities in the demand for pharmaceuticals at both the brand level and over a therapeutic class of drugs. Externalities emerge when use of a drug by others affects its value, and/or conveys information about efficacy and safety to patients and physicians. This can affect the rate of market diffusion for a new entrant, and can lead to dominance of one drug despite the availability of close substitutes. We use data for H₂-antagonist antiulcer drugs to estimate a dynamic demand model and quantify these effects. The model has three components: an hedonic price equation that measures how the aggregate usage of a drug, as well as conventional attributes, affect brand valuation; equations relating equilibrium market shares to quality-adjusted prices and marketing levels; and diffusion equations describing the dynamic adjustment process. We find that consumption externalities influence both valuations and rates of diffusion, and that they operate at the brand and not the therapeutic class level.     

Differentiation and Competition in HMO Markets

This paper examines how differentiation among Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) affects local market competition. Most markets for HMOs appear sufficiently unconcentrated; however, differences among HMOs may make competition less intense than the number of competitors would suggest. To investigate this possibility, we distinguish HMOs that serve only local markets from those that operate regional or national networks. We analyze how HMOs of one type affect the profitability of the other using an equilibrium model of entry and product choice. While the two types of HMOs have strong competitive effects within segments, the competitive effect of differentiated firms is negligible.     

From Network Externalities to Broadband Growth Externalities: a Bridge not yet Built

Quantifying the impact of new technologies on economic activity has proven notoriously difficult. Indeed, it has taken decades of research to understand confidently the linkages between the advances in information, communications, and technology (ICT) spawned by the personal computer and aggregate economic activity. Today, the rapid deployment of broadband technology presents economists with this same challenge. In this paper, we explore the foundations of network and growth externalities that are associated with broadband deployment. We find that both theoretical and empirical models that better specify the micro-transmission paths in which broadband are likely to enhance economic output, employment and productivity are needed.     

Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets

We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.     

Real-Time Pricing and Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets*

We analyze the effects of the adoption of real-time pricing (RTP) of electricity when generating firms have market power. We find that an increase in consumers on RTP contracts decreases peak prices and increases off-peak prices, increases consumer surplus (both for switching and non-switching consumers) and welfare, while decreasing industry profits, with these effects being magnified by the extent of market power. We illustrate these results by calibrating our model to the New Zealand electricity market, and find that taking into account the market power of generating firms increases the efficiency gains from RTP adoption by 41%.     

Deregulation,Entry, and Competition in Local Banking Markets

Review of Industrial Organization - By applying the Bresnahan-Reiss empirical entry threshold model on Census data for the waves 1981 to 2011, we study the evolution of entry conditions in Italian...     

Multihospital Chain Acquisitions and Competition in Local Health Care Markets

This paper examines the determinants of multi-hospital acquisitions in California during a period of increased competition, 1984–1993. Evidence is examined for differences by chain type in acquisition preferences in the face of increased competitive pressure. Significant differences are found among chain types (for-profit, non-profit, and church). All three types appear to position themselves through acquisitions to obtain multiple-hospital holdings within local markets, with the non-profit type exhibiting the greatest tendency. Such positioning may enhance efficiency in payor contracting and increase market power, lowering competition in the long run.     

Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities

This paper provides an analysis of a non‐cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non‐cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non‐cooperative surplus. The resulting division is related to the Myerson‐Shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining buyer‐seller networks and vertical foreclosure.     

Incorporating Network Externalities into the Technology Acceptance Model*

Research on network externalities has identified a number of product categories in which the market performance of an innovation (e.g., unit sales and revenues) is an increasing function of that innovation's installed base and the availability of complementary products. Innovation scholars have attributed these findings to the positive impact of network externality variables on consumer perceptions of innovation attributes. This paper provides the first empirical examination of these perceptual linkages by extending the Technology Acceptance Model to include consumer perceptions of network externality variables. The authors hypothesize that, when direct and indirect network externalities exist, consumer purchase intentions and consumer perceptions of an innovation's usefulness and ease of use will positively reflect perceptions of installed base size and the availability of complementary products. To test this reasoning, the authors developed new measures of consumer perceptions of network externality variables. These measures were incorporated into a survey that explored the attitudes in Japan of potential adopters toward digital music (DM) players at an early stage in the product life cycle. Findings reveal a direct positive relationship between ease of use and the perceived availability of digital music. The authors also find positive and significant relationships between both purchase intention and perceived usefulness and (1) the perceived size of the DM player installed base and (2) the perceived availability of digital music. An application of the Baron‐Kenny test for mediating variables reveals that (1) ease of use partially mediates the relationship between the perceived availability of digital music and perceived usefulness and (2) perceived usefulness partially mediates the relationship between the perceived availability of digital music and purchase intention. The research has important implications for future research on new product adoption and for the management of innovations that involve network externalities. The conceptual model provides a framework for testing alternative explanations of observed variations in the impact of network externalities within and across product categories. The empirical analysis provides guidance for managers who wish to manage the impact of network externalities on adoption. In addition to stimulating the size of the installed base and the variety of complementary products, executives must also manage consumer awareness of network externality variables and consumer understanding of the relationship between those variables and innovation attributes. Finally, traditional adoption models link consumer adoption decisions to perceptions of innovation attributes. The findings provided here imply that predictive accuracy of these models can be improved by including consumer perceptions of network externality variables.     

Experimental Evidence on Product Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities

The benefits accruing to a purchaser of a product due to the existing base of consumers of the same or compatible products are known as network externalities. This paper studies Katz and Shapiro's (1986) model of network externalities in an experimental setting. Two sellers choose prices for competing technologies sold to two groups of four buyers purchasing sequentially in two stages. The results are qualitatively consistent with Katz and Shapiro's equilibrium predictions. In certain sessions over three-quarters of first stage buyers purchase the more expensive technology anticipating that later arriving buyers will also buy this technology. In periods where a strong network has been established for a technology in the first stage, over 80 percent of second stage buyers buy that technology, even though in most cases it is priced higher. The data, however, differ from the point predictions of the model.     

How Do Capital Markets Influence Product Market Competition?

This article is the written version of the author's keynotepresentation to the inaugural International IndustrialOrganization Conference held in Boston on April 4–5, 2003.It summarizes selectively a literature on the interaction betweenthe capital and product markets at the nexus of industrialorganization and corporate finance, and develops two key insights.First, capital market constraints on an individual firm aredetermined at the level of the industry and depend on productmarket competition. Second, capital markets constrain the productstrategy of firms and thereby influence product market performance.     

Flawed Competition Policies: Designing ‘Markets’ with Biased Costs and Efficiency Benchmarks

Rather than the endogenous, tournament-type regulation based on mean costs proposed by Shleifer almost twenty years ago, regulators have opted for market designs based on exogenously determined efficiency comparisons reflected in fixed productivity adjustments. These productivity assessments are based only on estimates of technical efficiency improvements derived from estimated production frontiers. Utilities’ prices and potential profits are driven by this externally determined market. This paper examines the impacts on utility efficiency rankings from variations in peer group frontier regulation in Europe and Australia as well as in its use in the U.S. Despite the potential for distortions caused by long periods with non-market prices, these regulatory applications measure only technical efficiency, leaving moot the assessment of optimal input selection. We examine both technical and allocative efficiency variations among firms from the different cost specifications employed by regulators involving output, factor inputs, and costs. How are rankings impacted when only subsets of total costs (e.g., O&;M, not capital or system losses) are used to gauge efficiency? Does the use of partial measures of capital relying on physical specifications impact efficiency rankings? Are rankings affected when comparisons are made independently one input at a time? Is the efficiency frontier stable? Finally, we compare alternative yardstick measures to a simple ranking on relative (total) cost per unit.     

网络竞争与网络产业改革

本文运用博弈分析,论证了在不触动网络垄断的情况下,网络产业的纵向结构分离或开放接入会产生内在的提高下游产品或服务价格的驱动力量,从而对近年来我国网络产业下游产品或服务的价格上涨给出了新的解释。建立有管理的竞争机制,允许绕道、开放用户选择权,是网络产业实现有效竞争并使竞争惠及最终用户的可行途径。     

竞争机制与网络产业的规制改革

能否以及如何在铁路运输、电信力、城市公用事业等网络产业引入竞争机制是我国经济体制改革攻坚阶段面临的一个重大而富有挑战性的课题。本文分析了我国网络产业现行体制的弊病以及垄断对其规模经济和范围经济的损害，就该类产业引入竞争机制，弱化其对特定传输网络的依赖，从而通过强化市场机制和厂商内在激励改进其供给效率提出了政策建议。     

Access Pricing and Network Expansion in Natural Gas Markets

In this paper, we discuss different indirect approaches to cope with local market power in natural gas markets, in particular the extension of pipeline capacity as an instrument to combat nodal market power. One perspective, as expressed in Cremer and Laffont (Eur. Econ. Rev. 46:928–935, 2002) is that a discriminatory access price can correct for market failure and induce an increase in output. We argue, on the contrary, that the opposite holds: non-discriminatory access to the pipeline system will lead to overcapacity, and is thus the preferable strategy.     

Competition in Local Markets: Some Evidence from the Spanish Retail Banking Market

Using the entry threshold concept developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (Brookings Pap Econ Act 3:833–882, 1987), this paper examines how competitive conditions vary in independent local banking markets when the number of depository branches grows. With data on the Spanish retail banking sector in 2003, I estimate a discrete choice model to calculate the entry thresholds. The empirical evidence suggests that the entry of a new branch implies competition on a local level. Local branches seem to have some scope for changing prices fixed on national and regional levels. Moreover, the entry of new branches increases the competition among branches with instruments other than price (e.g., advertising, location, and promotion).      

Adoption of Product and Process Innovations in Differentiated Markets: The Impact of Competition

The paper examines the effects of the degree of competition on firms'decisions to innovate in differentiated markets. Firms favor productinnovations if they produce close substitutes (so competition is severe) andfavor process innovations if products are differentiated (so competition isless severe). Assumptions on the strategic complementarity of product andprocess innovations and on the decreasing returns of a product innovationare found to be the critical assumptions in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1994).     

An Anticompetitive Effect of Eliminating Transport Barriers in Network Markets

This paper examines the welfare effects of physically interconnecting two (network) markets that were previously separated. In each market a different set of capacity-constrained firms operate. Firms engage in a supergame and collude whenever it is rational for them to do so.We find that, under certain parametric restrictions, interconnection of the two markets reduces total welfare. The collusive horizon may extend from a single market to the overall integrated market. In such case, interconnection can be viewed as “exporting” collusion, rather than competition.