Why do investors discount earnings announced late?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Holding earnings surprises constant, investors react negatively to delayed earnings announcements. One standard deviation of delay (5 days)...     

How well do investors understand loss persistence?

This paper examines investors’ expectations of loss persistence. I develop a model to forecast loss firms’ future earnings based on Joos and Plesko, The Accounting Review 80: 847–870, (2005). This model produces smaller forecast errors than two random walk models and a model that assumes losses are transitory. The results suggest that investors do not fully distinguish the differences in loss persistence captured by the model and instead appear to assume that all losses are transitory. Consequently, investors are surprised by future announcements of negative earnings for firms with predicted persistent losses, and these firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns over the following four quarters. Additional results indicate that the future negative returns of firms with predicted persistent losses are smaller in magnitude when these firms are followed by analysts. The results are robust to controls for various price anomalies and are not driven by short sale constraints.     

Discussion of “How well do investors understand loss persistence?”

Li (Rev Acc Stud, 2011) proposes a quarterly earnings prediction model for loss generating firms, shows that it produces better specified future earnings estimates relative to naïve quarterly forecast models, and that it can be used to form a trading strategy that produces economically significant annual hedge returns. I discuss alternative perspectives on Li’s empirical results and suggest directions for future research.     

Do analysts and investors fully understand the persistence of the items excluded from Street earnings?

Previous research has found that the items that are included in GAAP earnings but excluded from Street earnings to allow the firm to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts (“MBF exclusions”) are more persistent than the other excluded items. In this study, I find that the difference in the levels of persistence between MBF and non-MBF exclusions declined after the introduction of Regulation G, which requires public companies that disclose non-GAAP earnings to also present GAAP earnings and a reconciliation of the two. Analysts underestimate the persistence of non-MBF exclusions, but the degree of this underestimation is lower in the post-regulation period. In contrast, there is little evidence to indicate that analysts underestimate the persistence of MBF exclusions in either time period. I also find strong (weak) evidence that investors underestimate the persistence of Street exclusions in the pre- (post-) regulation period. These results suggest that Regulation G constrains the practice of excluding recurring expenses from Street earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts and helps analysts and investors to understand the persistence of Street exclusions.     

Does the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance reduce investors’ short-termism?

The practice of providing quarterly earnings guidance has been criticized for encouraging investors to fixate on short-term earnings and encouraging managerial myopia. Using data from the post–Regulation Fair Disclosure period, we examine whether the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance reduces short-termism among investors. We show that, after guidance cessation, investors in firms that stop quarterly guidance are composed of a larger (smaller) proportion of long-term (short-term) institutions, put more (less) weight on long-term (short-term) earnings in firm valuation, become more (less) sensitive to analysts’ long-term (short-term) earning forecast revisions, and are less likely to dismiss chief executive officers for missing quarterly earnings targets by small amounts, relative to investors in firms that continue to issue quarterly earnings guidance. Our study provides new evidence of the benefit of stopping quarterly earnings guidance, that is, the reduction of short-termism among investors.     

Automatic summarization of earnings releases: attributes and effects on investors’ judgments

Review of Accounting Studies - Firms often include summaries with earnings releases. However, manager-generated summaries may be prone to strategic tone and content management, compared to the...     

Within-industry timing of earnings warnings: do managers herd?

An earnings surprise can be caused by a combination of firm-specific factors and market or industry factors. We hypothesize that managers have an incentive to time their warnings to occur soon after their industry peers’ warnings to minimize their apparent responsibility for earnings shortfalls. Using duration analysis, we find that firms accelerate their warnings in response to peer firms’ warnings. We conduct several tests to control for alternative explanations for warning clustering (for example, common shocks and information transfer) and conclude that the observed clustering is primarily due to herding. Our study is one of the first to empirically examine managers’ herding behavior and the first to document clustering of bad news. Moreover, we provide a multi-firm perspective on managers’ disclosure decisions that alerts researchers to consider or control for herding when they examine other determinants of managers’ disclosure decisions.     

Regulation FD and analysts’ vs. investors’ weightings of the cash components of earnings

This paper investigates whether investors’ bias in processing the information contained in the cash components of annual earnings has been reduced, and whether the difference in bias between financial analysts and investors has decreased subsequent to Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter, Reg FD). We compare analysts’ and investors’ weightings of the three cash flow components of earnings, defined by Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2008), from 1985 to 2008, using historical weightings as benchmarks. Our results show that, in the post Reg FD period, the magnitude of investors’ (analysts’) mis-weightings has decreased (increased), and the differences between analysts’ and investors’ mis-weightings have become smaller. Overall, these results suggest that financial analysts’ information advantages over investors declined after Reg FD took effect, and that investors consequently are less biased in assessing the persistence of the cash flow components of earnings following the implementation of Reg FD.     

Detailed management earnings forecasts: do analysts listen?

We provide archival evidence on how a particular type of supplementary information affects the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Managers often provide detailed forecasts of specific income statement line items to shed light on how they plan to achieve their bottom-line earnings targets. We assess the effect of this forecast disaggregation on the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Based on a relatively large hand-collected sample of 900 management earnings forecasts, we find that disaggregation increases analysts’ sensitivity to the news in managers’ earnings guidance, suggesting that analysts find the guidance more credible. More importantly, we identify several factors that influence this relation. First, disaggregation plays a more important role when earnings are otherwise more difficult to forecast. Second, disaggregation is more important after Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibited selective disclosure, especially for firms that were more affected because they had previously provided more private guidance. Finally, in contrast to common assertions in the prior literature, we find that, in more recent years, disaggregation matters more for guidance that conveys bad news. Managers as well as researchers should be interested in evidence suggesting that financial analysts find disaggregation especially helpful in contexts where managers’ credibility is particularly important.     

Why do accruals predict earnings?

Higher accruals are associated with lower subsequent earnings. We show this phenomenon can be explained by the way sales, profits, and working capital respond to changes in a firm's product markets. Empirically, high accruals predict high subsequent sales growth but a long-lasting drop in both profits and profitability. Accruals also predict an increase in future competition, suggesting that accruals are correlated with abnormally high—and, in equilibrium, transitory—true profitability that attracts new entrants to the industry. Overall, the predictive power of accruals is better explained by product-market effects than by measurement error in accruals or diminishing returns from investment.     

Where do firms manage earnings?

Despite decades of research on how, why, and when companies manage earnings, there is a paucity of evidence about the geographic location of earnings management within multinational firms. In this study, we examine where companies manage earnings using a sample of 2,067 U.S. multinational firms from 1994 to 2009. We predict and find that firms with extensive foreign operations in weak rule of law countries have more foreign earnings management than companies with subsidiaries in locations where the rule of law is strong. We also find some evidence that profitable firms with extensive tax haven subsidiaries manage earnings more than other firms and that the earnings management is concentrated in foreign income. Apart from these results, we find that most earnings management takes place in domestic income, not foreign income.     

How do individual investors trade?

This paper examines how high-frequency trading decisions of individual investors are influenced by past price changes. Specifically, we address the question as to whether decisions to open or close a position are different when investors already hold a position compared with when they do not. Based on a unique data set from an electronic foreign exchange trading platform, OANDA FXTrade, we find that investors’ future order flow is (significantly) driven by past price movements and that these predictive patterns last up to several hours. This observation clearly shows that for high-frequency trading, investors rely on previous price movements in making future investment decisions. We provide clear evidence that market and limit orders flows are much more predictable if those orders are submitted to close an existing position than if they are used to open one. We interpret this finding as evidence for the existence of a monitoring effect, which has implications for theoretical market microstructure models and behavioral finance phenomena, such as the endowment effect.     

How do stock-for-stock acquirers manage earnings? The accruals feature of real earnings management

This paper investigates whether stock-for-stock acquirers undertake real activities to manage earnings before merger announcements. Our results show that stock-for-stock acquirers present unusually high levels of credit sales and overproduction in the quarter immediately before the merger announcement. We also find that the accruals feature of real earnings management can explain the stock-for-stock acquirers’ high discretionary current accruals. In addition, stock-for-stock acquirer firms that accelerate their credit sales experience subsequent market underperformance. Overall, we provide a novel insight into the accruals feature of real earnings management.     

The impact of CSR performance and CSR disclosure readability on investors’ earnings estimates

We investigate how the valence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and the readability of CSR disclosure impact investors’ earnings estimates. Ninety-seven part-time MBA students participate in an experiment, in which we manipulate the valence of CSR performance (positive versus neutral) and the readability of CSR reports (high versus low), while holding financial information constant. Our findings reveal that investors make more positive earnings estimates when CSR performance is positive. The readability level of CSR reports also influences investors’ decision-making process. Moreover, by using an eye-tracking device, we are able to observe investors’ different reading behaviours upon the different levels of readability.     

Do investors trade uniformly through time?

This study tests whether investors trade uniformly through time by analyzing the quarter-by-quarter trading decision of individual shareholders in one no-load mutual fund family over nearly six years. These shareholders' trading probabilities change dramatically through time. Time has a larger economic effect on the shareholders' trading decisions than data commonly used in prior research, including fund performance. This effect is larger among shareholders who have more prior transactions, and it is robust to controls for unobserved heterogeneity.     

How do investors react under uncertainty?

It has long been accepted that risk plays an important role in determining valuation where risk reflects that investors are unsure of future returns but are able to express their prior expectations by a probability distribution of these returns. Knight (1921) introduced the concept of uncertainty where investors possess incomplete knowledge about this distribution and so are unable to formulate priors over all possible outcomes. One common approach for making uncertainty tractable is to assume that investors faced with uncertainty will base their decisions on the worst case scenario (i.e. follow maxmin expected utility). As a consequence it is postulated that investors will become more pessimistic as uncertainty increases, upgrading bad news and downgrading good news. Using Australian data, we find evidence that investors react to bad news at times of high market uncertainty but largely ignore good news which is consistent with them taking on a pessimistic bias. However, we also find evidence of the reverse when market uncertainty is low with investors taking on an optimistic stance by ignoring bad news but reacting to good news. We also find that the impact that market uncertainty has on the reaction of investors to new information is modified by the prevailing market sentiment at the time of the announcement. Besides throwing light on the question of how uncertainty impacts on investor behaviour, our findings seriously challenge the common assumption made that investors consistently deal with uncertainty by applying maxmin expected utility.     

What do analysts do? Discussion of “Information interpretation or information discovery: which role of analysts do investors value more?”

Three decades of accounting and finance research has extensively studied the outputs from financial analysts. However, there is sparse systematic evidence on what analysts do to generate their outputs in the form of forecasts, recommendations, and research reports. Livnat and Zhang (Rev Account Stud, 2012) provide interesting new evidence regarding the relative amount of value added that analysts produce by examining investors?? reaction to analysts?? forecast revisions issued promptly after firms?? public disclosures compared with those issued at other times. Their analysis shows that prompt revisions are associated with larger returns, which the authors interpret as evidence that analysts?? ability to interpret public disclosures is more valuable to investors. Three issues bear consideration in the interpretation of these findings.     

How do bond investors perceive dividend payouts?

We explore how bond investors view corporate cash distributions through dividends and how that view influences corporate cost of debt. Explaining between 45 and 67 percent of variance in credit spreads at the time of issuance, our model reveals a non-linear association between dividend payouts and investment return expected by bondholders. In particular, while bondholders view cash disbursements in small amounts as a positive signal, large dividend payouts are viewed negatively. Our results thus provide support for both the signaling hypothesis and for the agency-cost-of-debt hypothesis. The results are robust even after controlling for firm size, growth opportunities, profitability, leverage, business risk, asset tangibility, and term structure. Exploiting the 2003 dividend tax cut as an exogenous shock, we demonstrate that our results are not vulnerable to endogeneity problems. Finally, we find no evidence of corporations timing the payouts strategically to influence the cost of debt.     

Information interpretation or information discovery: which role of analysts do investors value more?

This study provides evidence that a significant percentage of analyst forecast revisions are issued promptly after a broad set of corporate public disclosures and that investors perceive these prompt revisions as more valuable than nonprompt revisions. These results hold for all revisions, revisions outside of the earnings announcement window, or revisions in weeks preceding the earnings announcements and are also robust to various sensitivity tests. Investors particularly value analysts?? prompt interpretation of earnings announcements, Form 8-K filings, or certain qualitative news. To the extent that prompt revisions are more likely to reflect analysts?? information interpretation role, our results suggest that investors value more highly analysts?? ability to interpret public disclosures, especially less structured or non-financial disclosures, than their ability for information discovery.     

Death and jackpot: Why do individual investors hold overpriced stocks?

Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) show that firms with a high probability of default have abnormally low average future returns. We show that firms with a high potential for default (death) also tend to have a relatively high probability of extremely large (jackpot) payoffs. Consistent with an investor preference for skewed, lottery-like payoffs, stocks with high predicted probabilities for jackpot returns earn abnormally low average returns. Stocks with high death or jackpot probabilities have relatively low institutional ownership and the jackpot effect we find is much stronger in stocks with high limits to arbitrage.