Competitive Bidding and Regional Development in the UK

This article examines competitive bidding among development agencies. Some commentators argue that English regions are at a disadvantage compared with Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The authors look at the evidence on the attraction of FDI to the regions of the UK and discuss some of the arguments about unfair advantage. The impact of the Regional Development Agencies on FDI and the need for a concordat are also discussed.     

自主研发者“说”——专访河北省财政厅信息中心副主任刘福盈

《新理财》:在您看来,财政信息化建设为什么会处于一个越来越重要的地位?刘福盈:我们认为,财政信息化建设和应用水平,已成为衡量财政管理水平的一个重要标准。在当前时期,开展财政信息化建设     

Heterogeneity and Option Pricing

An economy with agents having constant yetheterogeneous degrees of relative risk aversion prices assetsas though there were a single decreasing relative risk aversion``pricing representative' agent. The pricing kernel has fattails, and option prices do not conform to the Black-Scholesformula. Implied volatility exhibits a ``smile.' Heterogeneityas the source of non-stationary pricing fits Rubenstein's (1994)interpretation of the ``over-pricing' as an indication of ``crash-o-phobia'.Rubinstein's term suggests that those who hold out-of-the moneyput options have relatively high risk aversion (or relativelyhigh subjective probability assessments of low market outcomes).The essence of this explanation is investor heterogeneity.     

论中外银行业的竞争优势与竞争效应

文章分析了我国加入ＷＴＯ后中外银行业竞争的比较优势，认为国家支持并不能提高中资银行的竞争力，反会加大风险累积，ＷＴＯ带给我们的不仅是业务技术层面的挑战，更重要的引入外在竞争因素对制度的冲击，我们应当住机遇，利用竞争推动我国银行业的制度变迁。     

招标拉锯战

(一) 世行贷款城市环境项目城市污水处理设备更新改造国际竞争性招标,采用世行设备和生产线供货和安装一阶段招标的标准招标文件范本编制,合同估价为200万美元.     

Package Bidding in Thrift Resolutions

We evaluate the practice of package bidding used to resolve the large number of failed thrifts in 1988. Our results, based on a data set from the Class of 1988 that includes details of the bidding process, suggest that package bidding produces a reduction in resolution costs to the government insuring agency. Package bidding also appears to produce more qualified bidders (JEL G21, G28). These results suggest that policy makers should consider packaging failed depository institutions as a resolution option in dealing with future failures.     

Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review

I review recent empirical research documenting offer premiums and bidding strategies in corporate takeovers. The discussion ranges from optimal auction bidding to the choice of deal payment form and premium effects of poison pills. The evidence describes the takeover process at a detailed level, from initial premiums to bid jumps, entry of rival bidders, and toehold strategies. Cross-sectional tests illuminate whether bidders properly adjust for winner's curse, whether target stock price runups force offer price markups, and whether auctions of bankrupt firms result in fire-sale discounts. The evidence is suggestive of rational strategic bidding behavior in specific contexts.     

招标选聘审计师、审计质量与审计收费

本文研究国资委招标选聘审计师政策的实施效果。以2000年至2011年政府控股的A股上市公司为样本,研究发现:首先,经国资委通过招标选聘的审计师审计后,公司财务重述的情况显著减少。其次,通过招标选聘审计师能降低审计收费。这表明通过招标选聘审计师总体上能得到"质优价廉"的审计服务。并且中央国资委实施招标选聘审计师的效果好于各级地方国资委。最后,进一步分析发现,中央国资委招标选聘审计师时,所选聘的会计师事务所规模比较大,而地方国资委选聘的审计师则更多是本地小事务所。本文研究表明,限制央企管理层影响审计师的招标选聘审计师政策,能够提高审计质量和降低审计费用。     

Heterogeneity and Lotteries in Monetary Search Models

We introduce ex ante heterogeneity into the Berentsen, Molico, and Wright monetary search model with lotteries. We show that their three main results regarding lotteries do not survive this modification of the environment.     

资金异质性与负利率趋势

本文从资金异质性的角度来分析负利率现象产生的原因。在一国金融市场中异质性资金市场的供求状况,以及异质性资金市场之间的相互作用和结构变化,是决定和影响市场利率的重要因素。以日本为例,发现低能力、低预期收益的资金供给随经济增长而不断扩大,信贷需求却因经济放缓、风险投资、直接融资等因素而缩减,导致利率不断下行并进而滑向负利率。我们认为,资金市场的结构性变化将使负利率最终成为一种全球性趋势,政府和居民都应做好负利率时代到来的准备。     

Screening, Bidding, and the Loan Market Tightness

Bank loans are more available and cheaper for new and small businesses inthe U.S. in concentrated banking areas than in competitive banking areas. Weexplain this anomaly by analyzing banks' decisions to screen projects andtheir competition in loan provisions. It is shown that, by exacerbating thewinner's curse, an increase in the number of banks can reduce banks'screening probability by so much that the number of banks that activelycompete in loan provisions falls and the expected loan rate rises. This isthe case when the screening cost is low, which induces all active bidders tobe informed. The opposite outcome occurs when the screening cost is high, inwhich case there are sufficiently many uninformed banks in bidding toattenuate the winner's curse. We also examine the social optimum     

评估业务招标面面观

近年来．有些政府部门、金融机构和其他组织．在选择资产评估公司提供评估服务的过程中，越来越多的采用招标方式．并且在评标中以价格作为重要依据，结果往往是报价最低者中标。采用招标的方式选择资产评估公司．尤其是“唯最低价是从”的选择标准．给资产评估市场正常秩序造成了很大的冲击和负面影响．也引起了资产评估师及其行业的极大关注和反响。采用招标的方式选择资产评估机构．既没有法律依据也不合乎国际惯例；更不适合评估业务的专业特点。     

The Economics of Director Heterogeneity

We investigate the potential costs and benefits of firms constituting a heterogeneous pool of directors relative to more homogeneous boards. We measure director heterogeneity along six separate dimensions and divide board heterogeneity into occupational and social components. Our empirical analysis indicates that corporate complexity and managerial control exhibit significant influence on board heterogeneity. Using the heterogeneity of the county population of the firm's headquarters as an instrument, we also find that investors place valuation premiums on heterogeneous boards in complex firms but discount heterogeneity in less complex firms. Overall, our analysis indicates greater heterogeneity may not necessarily improve board efficacy.     

Heterogeneity effects from market interventions

The aim of this paper is to test whether the European Commission activities generate a heterogeneity effect on the merging parties. A sample of 74 firms involved in 45 contested merger and acquisition operations during the years 1990 to 1999 is used. The methodology is based on the GARCH framework. The main result is that, globally, the DGC interventions seem not to reduce significantly the heterogeneity among investors, except for the operations where it takes strong decisions like prohibition. In these last cases, the signal coming from the DGC encompasses valuable information and is well understood by market participants.     

Land Prices and Land Assembly in the CBD

There is substantial empirical evidence of price concavity in the parcel-size dimension across land-use types and across urban regions. This article examines the degree to which concavity varies between the Central Business District (CBD) and the rest of the urban area. The article provides strong empirical support that the degree of concavity within the CBD is lower than in the rest of the county. Although concavity may be the dominant pricing relationship throughout most urban areas, there is some evidence of the presence of a convex price structure within the urban center.     

土地要素、土地资本化与经济增长——基于重庆统筹城乡视角的实证研究

统筹城乡土地是统筹城乡建设的重要内容。土地要素在经济增长中的作用是通过资源和资本两方面来发挥的。通过土地资本化实现土地资源的集约化、规模化,以及土地城市化、工业化。利用土地资本化,加速土地资源向土地资本转化,促进消费、投资、政府支出等,进而带动经济增长。作者利用1997～2008年重庆市统计数据进行实证分析发现,土地资本化与经济增长存在着长期均衡,而短期均衡调整力度不大。土地资本化在经济增长中的作用存在时滞性,而且存在着弱化的现象。在统筹城乡过程中,实现土地要素的资源和资本功能,要从土地制度改革、土地市场交易平台、市场机制与宏观调控等方面提出政策建议。     

迪拜危机警示地方融资平台风险

要争取尽早出台《境外投资条例》及配套管理办法,为我国企业境外投资创造有利的法律环境和条件。此外还将修订境外投资项目核准管理办法,进一步落实企业投资决策自主权,推动有关部门减少审批范围,简化审批程序,为企业境外投资创造宽松环境     

Heterogeneity of Funds and Information Disclosure: Evidence

Institutional investors, especially public funds, play an important role in governing listed firms as they grow in Chinese stock markets. We classify each fund as “dedicated,” “transient,” or “mixed,” according to the concentration, turnover, and profit sensitivity of their stock holdings. We find that listed firms with more shares held by dedicated funds have a higher disclosure quality, while firms with more shares held by transient funds have a lower disclosure quality. These findings are consistent in different model settings. In addition, dedicated funds improve the disclosure quality of non-state-owned enterprises more than state-owned enterprises. Dedicated funds can benefit from the lower debt-financing cost and higher stock liquidity of firms with better disclosure quality.     

Frictions, Heterogeneity and Optimality in Mortgage Modeling

The purpose of this article is to provide a unified framework for incorporating frictions into a theoretical options-pricing model (OPM) for mortgages. This article presents formulation for a frictions-adjustable mortgage model that integrates borrower heterogeneity while simultaneously preserving prepayment and default financial decisions. Our model demonstrates the flexibility of the OPM by simulating separate and concurrent effects of three categories of frictions on the mortgage and mortgage components. Researchers can use our example formulation to determine the effects of specific borrower characteristics on mortgage values without destroying the options theoretic framework.     

Incomplete Information, Heterogeneity, and Asset Pricing

We consider a pure exchange economy where the drift of aggregateconsumption is unobservable. Agents with heterogeneous beliefsand preferences act competitively on financial and goods markets.We discuss how equilibrium market prices of risk differ acrossagents, and in particular we discuss the properties of the marketprice of risk under the physical (objective) probability measure.We propose a number of specifications of risk aversions andbeliefs where the market price of risk is much higher, and theriskless rate of return lower, than in the equivalent full informationeconomy (homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences) and thuscan provide an(other) answer to the equity premium and risk-freerate puzzles. We also derive a representation of the equilibriumvolatility and numerically assess the role of heterogeneityin beliefs. We show that a high level of stock volatility canbe obtained with a low level of aggregate consumption volatilitywhen beliefs are heterogeneous. Finally, we discuss how incompleteinformation may explain the apparent predictability in stockreturns and show that in-sample predictability cannot be exploitedby the agents, as it is in fact a result of their learning processes.