EXTREME EVENTS AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

This article studies the implication of extreme shocks for monetary policy. The analysis is based on a small‐scale New Keynesian model with sticky prices and wages where shocks are drawn from asymmetric generalized extreme value distributions. A nonlinear perturbation solution of the model is estimated by the simulated method of moments. Under the Ramsey policy, the central bank responds nonlinearly and asymmetrically to shocks. The trade‐off between targeting a gross inflation rate above 1 as insurance against extreme shocks and targeting an average gross inflation at unity to avoid adjustment costs is unambiguously decided in favor of strict price stability.     

Monetary policy and commodity terms of trade shocks in emerging market economies

Commodity terms of trade shocks have continued to drive macroeconomic fluctuations in most emerging market economies. The volatility and persistence of these shocks have posed great challenges for monetary policy. This study employs a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to evaluate the optimal monetary policy responses to commodity terms of trade shocks in commodity dependent emerging market economies. The model is calibrated to the South African economy. The study shows that CPI inflation targeting performs relatively better than exchange rate targeting and non-traded inflation targeting both in terms of reducing macroeconomic volatility and reducing the losses of a non-benevolent central bank. However, macroeconomic stabilisation comes at a cost of increased exchange rate volatility. The results suggest that the appropriate response to commodity induced exogenous shocks is to target CPI inflation.     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

Identifying monetary policy shocks with changes in open market operations

In this paper, we reexamine the effects of monetary policy shocks by exploiting the information contained in open market operations. A sticky price model is developed where money is the counterpart of securities deposited at the central bank. The model's solution reveals that a rise in central bank holdings of open market securities can be interpreted as a monetary expansion. Estimates of vector autoregressions for US data are further provided showing that reactions to an unanticipated rise in open market securities are consistent with common priors about a monetary expansion, i.e., a decline in the federal funds rate, a rise in output, and inertia in price responses. Compared to federal funds rate shocks, prices do not exhibit a puzzling behavior and a larger fraction of the GDP forecast error variance can be attributed to open market shocks. However, the explanatory power of the latter has decreased since federal funds rate targets have been announced.     

Productivity Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Two-Country Model

In this paper, we examine the effects of foreign productivity shocks on monetary policy in a symmetric open economy. Our two-country model incorporates the New Keynesian features of price stickiness and monopolistic competition based on the cost channel of Ravenna and Walsh (2006). In particular, in response to asymmetric productivity shocks, firms in one country achieve a more efficient level of production than those in another economy. Because the terms of trade are directly affected by changes in both economies’ output levels, international trade creates a transmission channel for inflation dynamics in which a deflationary spiral in foreign producer prices reduces domestic output. When there is a decline in economic activity, the monetary authority should react to this adverse situation by lowering the key interest rate. The impulse response function from the model shows that a productivity shock can cause a real depreciation of the exchange rate when economies are closely integrated through international trade.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

International monetary policy coordination under asymmetric shocks

This paper analyzes whether international monetary policy coordination is the best response to economic interdependence. The paper develops a macroeconomic model in which countries show different preferences regarding objectives when faced with asymmetric disturbances and analyzes in strategic terms how monetary policy can deal with real, monetary, and supply-side shocks. It further shows how the desirability of monetary policy coordination depends on the presence of asymmetric shocks and also on the nature of disturbances, the channel of transmission, and the asymmetry of preferences. Finally, the paper derives the conditions under which monetary policy coordination proves to be desirable.     

Monetary Policy in Low Income Countries in the Face of The Global Crisis: A Structural Analysis

We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a banking sector to analyse the impact of the financial crisis in developing countries and the role of the monetary policy response, with an application to Zambia. We view the crisis as a combination of three related shocks: a worsening in the terms of the trade, an increase in the country's risk premium and a decrease in the risk appetite of local banks. Model simulations broadly match the path of the economy during this period. We derive policy implications for central banks, and for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelling of monetary policy, in low‐income countries.     

Optimal price‐level drift under commitment in the canonical New Keynesian model

Abstract In both the canonical and many extended versions of the New Keynesian model, optimal monetary policy under commitment implies price‐level stationarity as long as expectations are rational. We show that this is no longer the case if the central bank and private agents make decisions before observing current shocks. The optimal amount of price‐level drift in response to unexpected innovations to inflation is quantitatively important. This result has important implications for monetary policy, including the design of the optimal loss function for the central bank if it cannot commit to its future policies.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

SHOULD CENTRAL BANKS CARE ABOUT REGIONAL IMBALANCES?

Regional imbalances may arise both as a result of asymmetric shocks and of divergent responses to symmetric shocks, such as monetary policy shocks. This paper analyses flexible inflation targeting when regional imbalances are included in the loss function. By adding regional imbalances, the time‐inconsistency problem in monetary policy becomes more complex. The paper analyses alternative institutional arrangements designed to improve the discretionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an over‐ambitious output target, it is shown that the outcome of monetary policy is improved if the central bank places less weight on regional imbalances than the political authorities.     

Estimating the effects of monetary policy shocks: does lag structure matter?

This paper examines the implications of lag structure for estimating the effects of monetary policy shocks in a VAR. A symmetric lag structure in which all variables have the same lag length and an asymmetric lag structure in which the lag length differs across variables but is the same for a particular variable in each equation of the model are examined. This is important in light of the fact that the true lag structure is generally not known. Four commonly used identification schemes are employed to identify monetary policy shocks. Monte Carlo simulations strongly indicate that the lag structure of a VAR model does matter when assessing the quantitative effects of monetary policy shocks. Given the inherent uncertainty about the true lag structure in practice, it is thus important that one compare the impulse response functions from both symmetric lag and asymmetric lag VARs in assessing the effects of monetary policy shocks.     

人民币汇率波动与货币政策调控难度

文章采用动态随机一般均衡（DSGE）模型研究了中国货币政策实施时不能忽略的人民币汇率波动特征。文章构建了人民币汇率波动与中国货币政策及其宏观经济系统影响机制的理论模型,并在模型参数校准的基础上进行了政策模拟。研究结果表明,较大的人民币汇率波动会在一定程度上减弱中国货币政策的调控效果,但是对每个变量冲击响应的影响程度有所不同。较大的人民币汇率波动将显著干扰货币政策对宏观经济需求的调控,人民币汇率升值波动幅度较大时,货币政策对需求变量的调控作用会减弱,但不会影响相关需求变量在不同时点的冲击响应走势特征。较大的汇率波动会减弱利率上行对出口的负面影响,有利于缓解货币政策对出口的负面冲击,但会导致贸易条件（出口价格和进口价格的比值）进一步恶化。     

The Implications of Uncertainty for Monetary Policy

This paper uses a simple model of the Australian economy to empirically examine the consequences of parameter uncertainty for optimal monetary policy. Optimal policy responses are derived for a monetary authority that targets inflation and output stability. Parameter uncertainty is characterised by the estimated distribution of the model coefficient estimates. Learning is ruled out, so the monetary authority can commit to its ex ante policy response. For certain shocks, taking account of parameter uncertainty can recommend more, rather than less, activist use of the policy instrument. While this finding is specific to the model specification, parameter estimates and the shocks analysed, it contrasts with the widely held belief that the generic implication of parameter uncertainty is more conservative policy.     

Cooperative Design for Central Banks versus Cooperative Implementation of Monetary Policy

The game-theoretic literature on monetary policy in open economies has traditionally concluded that central banks should implement monetary policy in a cooperative fashion. This paper considers an alternative mechanism for internalizing the external effects: in the first stage, governments cooperatively design central banks' objective functions; in the second stage, central banks implement monetary policy without cooperation. Although this regime lacks flexibility to deal with asymmetric shocks, it presents important advantages in relation to the former scenario: first, it enjoys more credibility; second, it entails lower coordination and information costs; and finally, it hampers unilateral manipulation of central banks' objectives.     

The asymmetric effects of investor sentiment and monetary policy on stock prices

We examine the impact of investor sentiment and monetary policy on the stock prices under different market states based on the Markov-switching vector autoregression (MS-VAR) model. The results show that the sentiment shocks, more than monetary policy shocks, lead to not only much larger fluctuations of stock prices but also much longer duration in the stock market downturn than in the stock market expansion, which shows obvious asymmetric effect. Moreover, the responses of stock prices to the sentiment shocks present an immediate effect, while the responses of stock prices to the monetary policy shocks show one-period lag effect.     

Asymmetric effects of monetary policy shocks on economic performance: empirical evidence from Turkey

This study investigates the asymmetric effects of monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomic variables of exchange rate, output and inflation for an emerging economy ? Turkey ? by using monthly data between 1990 and 2014. We employ the innovative nonlinear vector autoregressive model of Kilian and Vigfusson (2011), which allows us to observe the effect of different stances (tight or loose) and different sizes (small or large) of monetary policy actions. Our empirical evidence reveals that tight monetary policy, which, in this case, is captured with a positive shock to interest rate, decreases exchange rate, output and prices, as economic theory suggests. Loose monetary policy, which is captured with a negative shock to interest rate, has the opposite effect on these variables. However, the effects of loose monetary policy are weaker than the effects of tight monetary policy because loose monetary policy shocks are less effective than tight monetary policy shocks. Moreover, as the magnitude of a shock increases, the difference between the effects of tight and loose monetary policy policies also increases.     

Do asymmetries matter for European monetary policy?

In this paper we analyze the impact of economic and institutional (ECB decision rules) asymmetries on the effectiveness of monetary policy in Euroland. We consider a model where asymmetric shocks and divergent propagation of shocks in output and inflation are potential causes of tensions within the ECB concerning the conduct of common monetary (interest rate) policy. Welfare implications of the alternative decision procedures are discussed.     

Vertically Integrated North–South Trade and the Redux Model

The paper uses the framework of Obstfeld and Rogoff's Redux model to study the impact of monetary shocks on exchange rate, terms of trade, and welfare in the context of a North–South trade. The authors show that a relative Northern monetary expansion can depreciate or appreciate its currency depending on whether the consumption elasticity of money demand and the degree of monopolistic distortion are low or high enough. This shock has asymmetric effects on welfare in such a way that “beggar‐thyself” or “beggar‐thy‐neighbor” effects always occur.     

Credibility and commitment of monetary policy in open economies

We study the delegation of monetary policy to independent central bankers in a two-country world with monetary spillovers. It is shown that, under the hypotheses of imperfect commitment and private information, the equilibrium degree of commitment depends on the correlation structure of the shocks hitting the economies. When the correlation is negative (as when the variance of output depends mainly on shocks to the terms of trade) there is strategic complementarity in the degree of commitment in the two countries. When the correlation is positive (common technological or demand shocks) there is strategic substitutability. In this latter case, the degree of commitment is shown to be increasing in the correlation among shocks. Common components in the international business cycle have been shown in several studies to be relatively more relevant in developed countries. Therefore, our results may contribute to explaining why the institutional solution to the inflationary bias has been adopted in the most advanced countries.