FINANCIAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND IRREGULAR GROWTH CYCLES

In this paper we analyze the generation of endogenous growth and irregular fluctuations in a simple New Keynesian model whose background assumptions are borrowed from a class of asymmetric information models popularized by Greenwald and Stiglitz. We extend the framework put forward by Greenwald and stiglitz taking explicitly into account technological progress as the engine of growth. We show how irregular endogenous fluctuations can arise around an endogenous trend: the traditional view of fluctuations as 'short run' phenomena must be abandoned in favour of models of fluctuating growth.     

Price Scissors and Economic Growth: The Role of Openness

The present paper examines how the reduction in the price scissors impacted economic development during the early stage of China's reform period (i.e. 1981–1998). It is found that an increase in agriculture's terms of trade had a significant complementary effect with exportation on China's economic growth. Moreover, our data supports the results of Sah and Stiglitz (1987), who suggest that a reduction in the price scissors is associated with a decrease in physical capital accumulation in an open economy.     

Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance

Sah (1991) conjectured that more centralized societies should have more volatile economic performances than less centralized ones. We show in this paper that this is true both for cross–country and within–country variability in growth rates. It is also true for some measures of policies. Finally, we show that both the best and worst performers in terms of growth rates are more likely to be autocracies. We argue that the evidence in the paper is consistent with the theoretical implications in Sah and Stiglitz (1991) and Rodrik (1999a).     

Whence reform? A critique of the stiglitz perspective

This paper discusses the key hypotheses which Joseph Stiglitz proposed, in his wide-ranging critique of the “Washington Consensus”, with regard to transition reforms and economic policies in China and Russia. The primary purpose is to evaluate the Stiglitz perspective in the light of empirical evidence, including the experience of countries outside China and Russia. Although some of the points Stiglitz makes are important for understanding what has happened in the transition, this paper argues that his perspective mis-interprets the key facts of the Chinese transition, mis-describes the facts of the Russian transition and fails to consider the theoretical and policy implications of the success of a “third model”, which is represented by some Central European and Baltic transitions.     

The stiglitz-ellerman rejoinder: Our main criticisms remain unanswered

The rejoinder by the US economists Joseph Stiglitz and David Ellerman (S and E) is welcome above all as a clear acknowledgement that our interpretation of what we called the "Stiglitz Perspective" (but what we apparently should now call the "Stiglitz-Ellerman Perspective") is correct. However, S and E make a determined attempt to belittle the differences between their and our perspectives. This they do by emphasising broad agreement between us on the drawbacks of voucher privatization while largely ignoring our main criticisms: that they overlook the critical role of new non-state, mainly private, firms in successful transitions'; that they underplay the pre-transition causes of the transformational recession in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central Europe (CE); and that they chose China rather than Central European and Baltic countries, for the purpose of assessing reforms and performance in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). S and E continue to argue as if the choice of methods for privatising state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been crucial for the success or otherwise of transition - hence their singular preoccupation with privatisation to insiders. We wish to change the terms of this debate by drawing attention to the evidence which shows that what really matters are de novo firms and therefore the reforms and policies which foster their growth.     

A Nobel Prize for Asymmetric Information: The economic contributions of George Akerlof,Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz

This paper reviews the research related to the asymmetric information of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, for which they jointly received the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics. After recounting their overall careers, the history of the asymmetric information idea is presented and their key papers are discussed. This is followed by an examination of various applications of the concept, including in industrial organization and microeconomic dynamics, efficiency wage theories of unem ployment, credit market rationing theory, and issues of economic development and global stability. The degree to which these latter theories can be considered to be truly Keynesian is also considered.     

Absolute and Comparative Advantage, Reconsidered: The Pattern of International Trade with Optimal Saving

The paper obtains new results about absolute and comparative advantage, by introducing international technological differences into the three–sector Findlay–Komiya and two–sector Oniki–Uzawa–Stiglitz models of open–economy growth with optimal saving. For example, if a country has the same Hicks–neutral advantage in all industries, it exports the capital–intensive tradable, even though the technological advantage is only absolute rather than comparative. Alternatively, even a small comparative advantage in some good is sufficient for the advanced country to export this product, regardless of relative factor supplies. In either case, the fundamental reason for trade is technological superiority rather than factor abundance.     

A Note on the 'Invariance of Market Innovation to the Number of Firms'*

This note disputes the claim by Sah and Stiglitz ( Rand Journal of Economics , 1987, pp.  98–108) that their strong invariance result holds in a wide range of situations.     

Koopmans recursive preferences and income convergence

Stiglitz (Econometrica 37 (1969) 382) shows income convergence in a many-agent Solow growth model with integrated capital markets (ICM). The many-agent Ramsey model (MARM) without ICM also gives income convergence. With a MARM, equal discount rates, and ICM, convergence of incomes (as opposed to product per capita) cannot occur. These results depend upon fixed saving propensities (Stiglitz) or separable additive preferences (Ramsey). Non-convergence of incomes is shown when preferences are identical Koopmans separable (KS). Endogenous discount rates may violate KS. A model for that case is developed when, even under favourable assumptions, oscillations or chaotic dynamics may result.     

Unemployment and Growth in the Long Run: an Efficiency‐Wage Model With Optimal Savings*

An efficiency‐wage model of steady‐state equilibrium with labor‐augmenting technical progress is developed to explore the long‐run relationship between unemployment and growth. The rate of productivity growth is either specified exogenously or determined endogenously. In both cases, we preserve key results of the Shapiro–Stiglitz efficiency‐wage analysis without growth. Our model, however, also yields some striking new results. For instance, an exogenous increase in the growth rate may raise the rate of efficiency‐wage unemployment, and a once‐for‐all rise in the labor force may reduce the unemployment rate in the endogenous‐growth case.     

Rethinking Globalization in the Trump Era: US-China Relations

The global economic and political order that was created in the aftermath of World War II is under attack by President Donald Trump. In this article, Nobel Prize Laureate Joseph Stiglitz discusses the scope for protectionist actions by President Trump and suggests how countries such as China could and should respond. In particular, he proposes a set of ten principles that should guide China’s response, principles designed to enhance a more stable and efficient multi-polar system of global governance that can contribute to a stronger global economy.     

A sequential stochastic tree problem

We consider here the owner of a plot of land upon which he sequentially plants and harvests trees. The trees' growth paths follow a stochastic process, and the owner must decide when to harvest and replant, given knowledge of the process and each tree's growth history. The results of this analysis are compared with the non-repeated case derived by Brock, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1979) (hereafter B.R.S.) and found to be qualitatively similar.     

Financial deepening and economic growth

The core of Shapley–Shubik games and general equilibrium models with a Venn diagram is applied for a theory on the role of real finance in economic growth among advanced economies. Then the dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) models for Germany, France, the UK, Japan and the USA are constructed to assess the validity of the over-financing hypothesis that has reappeared after the financial crisis of 2008. Actual financial deepening ratios observed in the nonconsolidated balance sheet of the OECD exceeded by factors of 3.5, 2.4, 5.1, 11.6 and 4.8 than the optimal financial deepening ratios implied by DCGE models, respectively, in these countries because of excessive leveraging and bubbles up to 19 times of GDP which were responsible for this great recession. Containing such massive fluctuations for macroeconomic stability and growth in these economies are not possible in conventional fiscal and monetary policy models and require a DCGE analysis like this along with adoption of separating equilibrium strategy in line of Miller–Stiglitz–Roth mechanisms to avoid problem of asymmetric information in the process of financial intermediation so that the gaps between actual and optimal ratios of financial deepening remain as small as possible.     

Financial Deepening and Economic Growth in Advanced and Emerging Economies

While over‐financing caused crises and slow growth in advanced economies including Germany, France and the UK after 2008, more prudent financial deepening sustained higher economic growth in China and India—two major emerging economies in the world. The actual financial deepening ratios (AFDR) observed in the non‐consolidated balance sheet from the OECD exceeded by factors of 3.5, 2.4 and 5.1 the optimal financial deepening ratios (OFDR) obtained from the solutions of dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models of those three advanced economies. The corresponding factors were 2.3 and 0.49 for China and India respectively. Labor intensive production technology and a low OFDR relative to a high AFDR in China allowed it to grow at 10% between 1990 and 2010 period that ended with the global financial crisis. With a reasonable OFDR and low AFDR India also managed to grow at 6.5%. Thus huge gaps between the optimal and actual financial deepening ratios led to massive macroeconomic consequences as observed after the crises in 2008. Smooth, sustainable and efficient economic growth requires adoption of strategies for separating equilibria in line of Miller–Stiglitz–Roth mechanisms avoiding problems of asymmetric information in the process of financial intermediation with as narrower gaps as possible between the AFDRs and OFDRs.     

Internalizing the Social Costs of a Small Number of Powerful,Overindebted Firms

Extraordinary debt-to-capital ratios (leverage) and the compression of markets to very few, large companies (concentration) are economic risk factors. They have contributed to vast social costs during the current economic crisis in the USA and in Europe. This theoretical study internalizes these social costs via two market-based policy instruments for the first time in a real-economy Dixit–Stiglitz framework: a tax on firms' debt capital use and a subsidy for market entrants. It helps understand the complex real-economic mechanisms that these policy instruments cause, it derives intuitive rules of thumb for setting the tax rate and the subsidy level so that they elevate welfare, and it suggests ways to practically implement the policies.     

Risk and risk aversion when states of nature matter

When uncertainty is associated with some intrinsically relevant states of nature, there is no reason for an agent to base his or her preferences only on probability distribution of claims. We propose a new concept of risk for state-contingent claims that, unlike the standard concept of Rothschild–Stiglitz, does not identify state-contingent claims with their probability distribution. This concept is called mean-independent risk, and we provide a simple characterization in terms of marginal utilities of (non-expected) utility functions that exhibit aversion to mean-independent risk. We study implications of aversion to mean-independent risk on agents’ choices under uncertainty. This research has been supported by the NSF under Grant SES-0099206. I have benefited from numerous conversations with Rose-Anne Dana and illuminating discussions with Tadeusz Miłosz about the theory of subgradients.     

Stochastic technical change,non-renewable resource and optimal sustainable growth

We develop a stochastic endogenous growth model involving a non-renewable resource, in which innovation arrivals are governed by a non-stationary Poisson process. Using a CRRA analytical example, we characterize the optimal trajectories of the model and analyze the effects of uncertainty in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz by computing a mean-preserving spread. We show that increased variability in the innovation process always implies a smaller optimal R&D effort, since this leads to a reduced marginal rate of return. Effects on the other variables of the model may also be unambiguously identified depending upon the relative risk aversion of agents, the social discount rate and the marginal arrival rate of innovations. Finally, we investigate the conditions under which, on average, the economy reaches a sustainable growth path.     

Optimal redistributive taxation when government's and agents' preferences differ

Paternalism, merit goods and specific egalitarianism are concepts we sometimes meet in the literature. The thing in common is that the policy maker does not fully respect the consumer sovereignty principle and designs policies according to some other criterion than individuals' preferences. Using the self-selection approach to tax problems developed by Stiglitz [Stiglitz, J.E., 1982. Self-selection and Pareto-efficient taxation. Journal of Public Economics 17, 213–240] and Stern [Stern, N.H., 1982. Optimum taxation with errors in administration. Journal of Public Economics 17, 181–211], the paper provides a characterization of the properties of an optimal redistributive mixed tax scheme in the general case when the government evaluates individuals' well-being using a different utility function than the one maximized by private agents.     

On Rothschild–Stiglitz as Competitive Pooling

Dubey and Geanakoplos (Q J Econ 117:1529–1570, 2002) have developed a theory of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. By recasting the Rothschild–Stiglitz model of insurance in this framework, they find that a separating equilibrium always exists and is unique. We prove that their uniqueness result is not a consequence of the framework, but rather of their definition of refined equilibria. When other types of perturbations are used, the model allows for many pooling allocations to be supported as such: in particular, this is the case for pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.     

Engines of Growth in China: The Limits of Informal Institutions

Abstract:

Since the 1978 reforms, China has experienced rapid economic and social development. GDP growth has been in the double digits on average yearly, creating the fastest sustained economic growth recorded by a major economy in history. Not only did this transform the economy and society at large, China reached important milestones in terms of reducing poverty and creating prosperity in a short period of time. This article uses the conceptual framework of new institutional economics to examine China’s economic growth and how growth has been achieved largely by ‘informal institutions’ that are grounded in culture, customs, and private interactions that emerge spontaneously. The trajectory by which these informal institutions left their imprint on China’s complex economic landscape and how they can constrain future economic growth are also of central importance. After examining decentralization and risk management practices, property rights, and the legal system, we emphasize the importance of creating formal institutions necessary for long-term growth, most importantly innovation. Preliminary evidence shows total factor productivity is tapering off which may reflect the constraints of China’s institutional environment. This ought to be reversed if China is to enjoy long-term sustained growth.