年报柔性监管与股价同步性——基于年报问询函语调的研究

本文选择2015-2020年在深圳证券交易所上市的公司为研究样本,从年报问询函负面语调的角度考察年报柔性监管与股价同步性之间的关系。实证结果表明,年报柔性监管的效果显著,问询函语调的负面程度与股价同步性呈显著的负相关关系。进一步讨论发现,在媒体关注度较低和内部控制质量较低的公司里,年报问询函负面语调与股价同步性的负向关系更加显著;此外,中介效应检验结果表明,年报问询函语调负面程度通过降低应计盈余管理和提高信息披露质量,显著降低了股价同步性。     

财务背景董秘能否减少监管问询?——基于交易所年报问询函的经验证据

随着我国资本市场的发展和完善,沪深交易所不断加强事后监管力度,其发放年报问询函的数量呈逐年增加趋势。以信息披露直接负责人——董事会秘书的财务背景为切入点,本文详细探讨了这一专业背景是否会对监管问询产生影响。研究结果显示：(1)董秘财务背景不仅显著降低了上市公司收到年报问询函的概率、次数和字数,也使其延期回函概率显著降低;(2)区分信息质量需求,董秘财务背景的影响主要存在于非国有企业;(3)区分治理环境,董秘财务背景的影响主要集中在内外部治理环境较差的公司;(4)区分董秘组织地位,董秘财务背景的影响在董秘兼任CFO、董秘早于CFO或CEO上任的公司更显著。作用机制检验结果显示,财务背景董秘通过降低公司的应计盈余管理程度,从而对监管问询产生影响。本文研究不仅从董秘背景视角揭示了高管特征对上市公司监管问询的影响,同时对理解董事会秘书在改善上市公司年报信息披露质量方面发挥的作用具有重要现实意义。     

交易所年报问询函与独立董事主动辞职行为研究北大核心CSSCI

本文基于2015—2020年我国A股上市公司数据,实证检验了年报问询函对独立董事主动辞职行为的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,相较于未被问询公司,被问询公司的独立董事出于风险规避和声誉保护的动机,更有可能选择“明哲保身”而主动辞职;同一年内被问询的次数越多,存在延期回函,以及问询函中问题数量越多、字数越多、语气越负面,或要求审计师出具意见时,独立董事主动辞职的概率越高。机制检验表明,会计信息质量越低、媒体报道力度越弱,被问询公司独立董事主动辞职的概率越高。此外,年报问询函对不同特征和职业背景的独立董事辞职选择的影响亦具有差异性,被问询公司中年轻的独立董事以及具有财务背景的独立董事主动辞职的概率更高。本文的结论表明,独立董事作为理性经济人,同样追求个人利益最大化,具有明显的风险规避特征。监管部门和上市公司应充分正视这一问题,并建立相应的激励约束机制,促使独立董事尽职履责。     

年报问询函与公司策略性媒体披露管理行为北大核心

本文以年报问询函为切入点,探究非处罚性监管措施对公司策略性媒体披露管理行为的影响及其经济效应。研究发现,在回函期间,相较于未被问询公司,被问询公司具有更多数量及更正面情感的媒体报道,且发声媒体多为长期交好媒体。进一步研究发现,该媒体披露管理行为能促进股价平稳回升,且择时披露和重复披露正面报道构成主要的媒体披露管理策略。本文丰富了年报问询函对公司信息披露策略的影响研究,也扩展了策略性媒体披露管理行为的研究场景。     

交易所问询与企业过度投资 ——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的经验证据

基于证券交易所问询函件频发以及重点关注企业投资行为的背景,采用2015-2018年A股上市公司年报及其年报问询函数据,探讨交易所年报问询函对企业过度投资的影响效力.研究发现:年报问询函监管能够在一定程度上抑制公司的过度投资;且当上市公司收到的问询函中涉及"投资"事项问题时,对公司过度投资的抑制作用更明显;管理层权力对问询函监管与过度投资关系具有调节作用.     

非处罚性监管与公司税收规避——基于财务报告问询函的证据

本文基于税收规避视角研究中国制度背景下问询函性质非处罚性监管的经济后果。实证结果发现:财务报告问询函可以抑制公司税收规避行为,且财务报告问询函总数越多、针对同一财务报告问询次数越多、财务报告问询函问题数量越多,意味着问询函监管强度越高,公司税收规避降低幅度越大。同时,从细分特征来看,当财务报告问询函涉及税收或研发相关内容时,公司税收规避程度更低。进一步地,在融资约束程度较低和税收征管强度较高的公司中,税收规避程度较低,问询函的监管效果较好。     

监管信息披露与债权人定价决策——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的证据

本文检验交易所监管问询函及其公开披露与否对公司债务资金成本的影响。实证结果发现,交易所监管问询函显著提升了被问询公司的债务资金成本,并且问询函包含问题个数越多、需要第三方出具专业审核意见以及问询内容涉及相关风险事项时,债务资金成本上升程度越大,而当问询函未向市场公开披露时,被问询公司的债务资金成本不会受到影响。横截面测试发现,上市公司所在地市场化水平强化了风险与债务资金成本的正向关系,而国有产权属性、银企关系背景以及集团化经营模式则削弱了风险与债务资金成本的正向关系。本文从信息效应视角补充了监管问询函经济后果的相关研究,也揭示了半强式市场中监管信息公开披露的重要性。     

Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations

We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms' financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new information potentially benefits peers by helping to tacitly coordinate actions in product markets. Indeed, changes in disclosure are associated with higher future profitability. Our results highlight the potential conflict between securities and antitrust regulations.     

Corporate governance in family firms,learning and reaction to recession: Evidence from Italy

This paper focuses on the interaction between internal and external factors explaining performance of small and medium-sized family firms. We used framework foresight to suggest how learning and internal factors such as CEO’s origin, tenure and turnover, could affect the firm’s reactions to one particular external factor, economic recession. The paper draws on empirical observations of a large sample of small and medium family firms operating in Italy between 2002 and 2011 to identify the baseline future, an expected future for these firms. This analysis may be of interest to both management scholars and practitioners. We hope to contribute to the debate on how internal and external factors interact to affect firm success, measured as sales growth. The implications for the future viability of an economic system based on family businesses are straightforward, as the turbulence and instability of the economic environment has grown significantly in the last decade, especially in more developed countries. Whether the ability of a company to adapt and survive to negative shocks depends on its governance provides a rationale for exploring alternative perspectives on the competitiveness of the economic system and the ability of different owners to cope with future negative events.     

法律环境、公司治理与利益侵占——基于中、美股票市场的比较分析

本文主要研究法律环境、公司治理与利益侵占的关系。我们以在美国上市的50家中国公司为研究对象,并按照同行业、同规模的标准选取在国内上市的50家中国公司作为配比样本,考察在中、美不同的法律环境下,两组样本在公司治理结构和利益侵占程度方面是否存在差异,以及法律环境和公司治理结构的不同是否能够解释利益侵占程度的差异。实证研究发现,与在中国上市的同类公司相比,在美国上市的中国公司具有更有利于投资者保护的治理结构安排,且利益侵占程度更小,法律环境和公司治理结构安排的不同都能够解释利益侵占程度的差异,但是法律环境的解释能力更强。     

全要素生产率、产能利用率与企业金融资源配置——基于中国上市企业委托贷款公告数据的经验分析

基于手工收集整理的2007-2015年沪深证券市场A股上市企业公告的委托贷款数据,运用理论模型和实证检验相结合的方法考察全要素生产率、产能利用率与企业金融资源配置之间的关系。结果发现:在控制了与委托贷款发放相关的企业其他内外部特征影响后,全要素生产率、产能利用率越低的企业,发放委托贷款的概率越大、数量越多,这说明,全要素生产率、产能利用率低的企业,更可能(或更多地)从事类金融业务活动。进一步分析发现,交易双方的关联程度越强,贷款企业与政府的关系越紧密,全要素生产率、产能利用率与委托贷款发放概率和发放数量之间的负向关系越明显。     

公司治理与IPO抑价——来自中国股票市场的经验证据

Jensen与Meckling(1976)认为,代理成本是投资者愿意支付的价格与公司内在价值之间的差异。投资者对公司代理成本的预期也会体现在IPO定价过程中,良好的公司治理结构有助于降低公司IPO抑价。本文以我国2002—2003年的133家IPO公司为研究样本,研究样本公司治理结构特征对IPO抑价的影响。结果发现,控制权结构特征以及关联交易性质对IPO抑价有显著的影响,而董事会独立性对IPO的抑价影响则不显著。本文的结果表明,良好的公司治理结构可以显著地降低IPO抑价,降低公司股权融资成本。     

Corporate Fraud and Corporate Bond Costs: Evidence from China

This study investigates the relationship between corporate fraud and four typical components of costs associated with corporate bonds. Based on data from a booming corporate bond market in China, we confirm that fraudulent issuers have higher corporate bond costs. Specifically, they are more likely to push upward price revisions, pay higher issue fees and coupon spreads, and encounter larger underpricing after issuance. Moreover, we demonstrate that severe corporate fraud is also significantly related to the costs of corporate bonds. Furthermore, we find that investors pay more attention to fraud in accounting information and disclosure. These results remain robust to a strand of endogeneity and through the robustness tests. In additional research, we find that bonds issued by fraudulent firms tend to receive lower ratings and show inferior performance after issuance. We also demonstrate that the effects of corporate fraud on bond costs erode as time passes, although the mitigation speed is slow. Finally, we find that hiring reputable financial intermediaries can partially mitigate the negative effects of corporate fraud.     

Corporate fraud and bank loans: Evidence from china

Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank, as both the firm’s credit risk and information risk increase after punishment. By focusing on Chinese firms’ borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud, we find that firms’ bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower, but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms. In addition, loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before, but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts. In addition, we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the “performance-bank loan” relationship. Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm’s ability to source debt financing, which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.     

Idiosyncratic Risk and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Jordan

ABSTRACT

This article offers evidence in support of the hypothesis that when investors have weak protection, small investors can suffer expropriation by large shareholders. In this kind of situation, a stock’s idiosyncratic risk is found to be negatively related to ownership concentration, which indicates that the cost of controlling ownership may outweigh its benefits. This is consistent with the view that minority investors have less incentive to invest in companies with weak protection for investors. When this is accompanied by low-quality information disclosed to the public, private information is not likely to be reflected in stock prices, resulting in lower idiosyncratic risk.     

Common ownership and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from China

This study focuses on the impact of common ownership on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity using a sample of A-share listed firms in China from 2008 to 2020. We find common ownership significantly improves executive pay-for-performance sensitivity and plays a monitoring and governance role. Meanwhile, the impact of common ownership on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity is more significant in non-state-owned firms (non-SOEs) and when a firm faces a highly competitive product market. The mechanism tests indicate that common ownership affects executive pay-for-performance sensitivity through the information and governance mechanisms. Further analyses show that the portion of compensation explained by common ownership significantly enhances future firm performance. Overall, our findings validate the positive role of common ownership in corporate governance.