Following the money: The political determinants of E-fiscal transparency in US states

ABSTRACT

This research utilizes a unique panel data set (2009 to 2013) on the evolution of US state fiscal transparency websites and explores the political determinants of E-fiscal transparency. The dynamic panel data analysis reveals that divided government and Democratic governor exert a positive effect on state e-fiscal transparency, while the effect of political polarization is shown to be negative. Furthermore, there is some evidence to show that the fiscal variable of debt stock moderates the relationship between democratic political ideology and state E-fiscal transparency. Finally, there is a positive spillover effect in state E-fiscal transparency.     

Party alternation,divided government,and fiscal performance within US States

The literature on US state government fiscal performance has examined the role of institutional factors such as budget rules and divided government, but has largely ignored the impact of party alternation. This paper primarily focuses on whether party alternation in the governor’s office affects fiscal performance. Our hypothesis is that frequent party changes create a political environment that impacts fiscal performance. To further assess the impact of party alternation on fiscal performance, we consider our primary hypothesis in conjunction with the degree of division that exists between the governor’s office and the legislature. Using panel data from 37 states between 1971 and 2000 we test the hypothesis that frequent party alternation can be expected to affect fiscal performance and find strong support for the hypothesis. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 Public Choice Society Meetings. The authors would like to thank the conference participants, William Shughart, Charles Register, Jocelyn Evans, John D. Jackson, Amihai Glazer, and two anonymous referees for their comments. We would also like to thank Craig R. Stiller for his help in the collection of data. Any remaining errors remain the responsibility of the authors.     

Political determinants of fiscal transparency: a panel data empirical investigation

The investigation of the determinants of fiscal transparency has been mostly performed on cross-sectional data, and it has produced mixed results. This paper improves the existing literature by performing a static and dynamic panel analysis of the effect of a set of political variables on the level of fiscal transparency in 36 democratic countries. By using a recent measure of fiscal transparency based on IMF Governance Finance Statistics and available from 2003 to 2013, we find strong links between political environments and the dynamics of fiscal disclosure. Our results show that government control over the legislature exerts some negative effect on fiscal transparency, while the effect of government ideology is shown to be at least fragile. Furthermore we find that legislature fragmentation exerts a negative effect on fiscal transparency, which suggests that competition within the parliaments does not increase fiscal transparency, but instead it induces governments to react by reducing accessibility to information.     

The efficacy and efforts of interest groups in post elections policy formation

This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of un-enforced or enforced party discipline as well as to two-party and multi-party (proportional representation) electoral systems. The interest groups’ objective is to influence the outcome in their favor by engaging in a contest that determines the final decision in the legislature. Our first result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideologically closer party and, in general, the coalition/opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced party or coalition/opposition discipline. Such dominance is defined in terms of ideological inclination weighted by power. Our second result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideology in the ruling coalition (party) in a majoritarian system with enforced coalition (party) discipline. We then clarify under what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced discipline rather than to the members of the ruling coalition (party) under enforced discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of ideological predispositions and power on the efforts of the interest groups.     

Developed stock market reaction to political change: a panel data analysis

This paper utilized panel data to examine the effects of political change in developed stock market. According to Hausman test, we capture the stock return by the fixed-effect model to fit the stock market. Political change was originally intended as an incumbent party impetus to create opportunities for progress. However, this has caused great political party distress, creating political change with an inverse stock return relationship in developed countries.     

The Political Implications of State Political Ideology: A Measure Tested

A bstract Four different state political ideology measures are estimated and evaluated on the basis of their reliability and consisteny. The state political ideology measure accounting for constituency economic interest, legislator shirking , and political party loyalty is found to be the one with the most predictive power. Using this preferred ideology measure states were classified according to their political ideology along a conservative-liberal continuum. The state rankings showed there are distinct regional differences in ideology. The Northeast and Pacific regions are very liberal, the South and Mountain regions are very conservative, and the Midwest region is relatively moderate. States in the Mountain region are found to be the most ideologically homogeneous, while the more heavily populated states tend to be more liberal. In addition, the United States citizens are found to have a moderately conservative political philosophy . Finally, the results suggest that a Democratic candidate would need to win Illinois, California, and Ohio plus all the liberal states to become President of the United States. The 1996 presidential note sustains the analysis herein.     

Does economic performance affect officials’ turnover? Evidence from municipal government leaders in China

As is well known, Chinese central government has full authority to determine the provincial and local officials’ turnover. However, China has not in detail interpreted the standards of officials’ promotions so far. In this paper, the latest database of city-level leaders for the period between 2002 and 2013 is utilized to investigate the influences of economic performance on party secretaries’ odds of being promoted. The estimation results by a panel multinomial logit method indicate that municipal annual GDP per capita is significantly positively associated with leaders’ chances of promotion. Specifically, the average GDP growth rates during leaders’ tenures have much higher effects. Moreover, some important factors of leaders’ personal characteristics also affect the political turnover. For instance, party secretaries’ connection with China’s Communist Youth League, political experience, educational level and professional expertise all have positive impacts on their chances of obtaining a promotion. In contrast, leaders’ ages and tenures are found to be negatively related to their promotion possibilities.

     

Formal models of the political resource curse

By surveying formal models, I demonstrate that the political resource curse is the misallocation of revenues from natural resources and other windfall gains by political agents. I show that the curse always exists if political agents are rent-seeking, since mechanisms of government accountability, e.g. electoral competition, the presence of political challengers, and even the threat of violent conflict, are inherently imperfect. However, the scope for rent-seeking becomes more limited as the competition over political power that threatens the incumbent government becomes more intense.     

Do liberal cities limit new housing development? Evidence from California

Traditional explanations for why some communities block new housing construction focus on incumbent home owner incentives to block entry. Local resident political ideology may also influence community permitting decisions. This paper uses city level panel data across California metropolitan areas from 2000 to 2008 to document that liberal cities grant fewer new housing permits than observationally similar cities located within the same metropolitan area. Cities experiencing a growth in their liberal voter share have a lower new housing permit growth rate.     

Do political parties matter for local land use policies?

Despite interest in the impact of land use regulations on housing construction and housing prices, little is known about the drivers of these policies. Conventional wisdom holds that homeowners have an influence on restrictive local zoning. In this paper, we contend that the party controlling local government might make a major difference. We draw on data from a large sample of Spanish cities for the 2003–2007 political term and employ a regression discontinuity design to document that cities controlled by left-wing parties convert much less land from rural to urban uses than is the case in similar cities controlled by the right. The differences between governments on the two sides of the political spectrum are more pronounced in places with greater population heterogeneity and in those facing higher housing demand. We also present evidence suggesting that these partisan differences might ultimately impact on housing construction and housing price growth.     

The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party Control for Telecommunications Pricing

While the economic approach to the politics of regulation emphasizes the importance of organized economic interests in shaping policies, political institutions in which regulatory agencies are embedded may also have significant effects. By including both economic influences and characteristics of political institutions in a model of price setting by state regulators, this paper demonstrates that both shape regulatory behavior in the telecommunications industry. Whether commissioners are elected or appointed, whether they face confirmation by a legislature, and whether a single party controls both executive and legislative branches of state governments influence the level of prices charged for basic services.     

Do Politics or Mayors' Demographics Matter for Municipal Revenue Expansion?

Abstract

This study examines whether political factors and mayors' demographics influence municipal success in expanding revenue. Data from forty Colombian municipalities over a 7-year period (1999–2005) are used to explore the relationship between mayoral demographics (age, sectorial experience and education level and type) and revenue expansion through state and national grants. Results reveal that the factors affecting approval of state grants differ from those influencing approval of national grants. When a mayor's political party is aligned with that of the governor, municipalities tend to secure more state, but not national, grants. Municipal features, such as population, local revenues and divided government, positively influence national, but not state grants. Not surprisingly, the stressful municipal context (presence of illegally armed guerrillas) negatively moderates the impact of mayors' demographics on approval of grants. If obtaining greater revenues implies greater social investment, this study suggests the importance of candidates' backgrounds when electing mayors, at least in the Colombian context.     

The response of decentralized health services to demand uncertainty and the role of political parties in the Spanish public health system

Decentralization of the public health system should lead to health resources being managed more in line with citizens’ preferences. A decentralized system is more flexible in that it can better adapt resources to local needs. Moreover, if regional political parties have responsibility for public health policies, citizens will be able to elect those parties whose positions are more in line with their preferences. However, the role of political parties in public health management has received little attention in the literature. Focusing on the decision to provide reserve service capacity to deal with demand uncertainty, we analyse whether there have been differences between central and decentralized health authorities in Spain and whether these can be explained to some extent by the way different political parties manage the trade-off between being able to cover demand and the economic costs involved. Using data on Spanish public hospitals for the period 1996–2006, we model the difference between observed and potential output using an output-oriented distance function. Reserve capacity is modelled as a function of demand uncertainty, economic costs and the political party in power. We find differences in the way resources are managed by central government and decentralized authorities, even within the same political party. We also find differences between the decentralized authorities themselves according to the political party in power. We conclude that decentralization of public health in Spain has provided regional political authorities with greater flexibility to manage reserve capacity in line with citizens’ needs and preferences.     

Alternation of parties in power and economic volatility: testing the rational partisan hypothesis and policy learning hypothesis

Right and left parties have distinct macroeconomic preferences that could create different levels of volatility during their executive tenures. But rational partisan theory argues that, because actors in the economy anticipate ruling party behavior, partisan differences only matter when election outcomes are uncertain. We argue that policy risk from ruling parties extends beyond elections, leading to important variation in growth volatility that occurs during a ruling party’s tenure. Building on theories of policy risk and learning, we argue that after elections, economic actors still face uncertainty about the policies of new ruling parties. With time in power, new ruling parties build policy track records, reducing policy risk and, thus, volatility. We estimate a learning curve model of ruling party duration’s effect on the variation in quarterly GDP growth rates. Using data from 44 democracies between 1981 and 2009, we find that learning processes extend beyond the conclusion of uncertain elections.     

Election outcomes and economic conditions: An application of a logit model

In this paper the author examines the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the probability of the incumbent party winning a gubernatorial election. Using a sample of 265 gubernatorial elections held during the 1970–1988 period, the findings of this study indicate that the incumbent party’s probability of victory is not significantly affected by either state or national macroeconomic conditions. The author also finds that neither the unemployment rate nor per capita income growth affect the incumbent party’s probability of winning an election.     

Appeasement and compromise under a referendum threat

Standard legislative bargaining models assume that an agreed-upon allocation is final, whereas in practice there exist mechanisms for challenging passed legislation when there is lack of sufficient consensus. Such mechanisms include popular vote requirements following insufficient majorities in the legislature. This paper analyzes a one-period legislative bargaining game whose outcome can be challenged through a referendum. I study the effects of this institution on the bills passed in the legislature and analyze the incentives it provides for reaching legislative deals. The proposer party’s trade-off between a larger winning prize and a more threatening opponent in the referendum summarizes the bargaining problem. The results indicate that measures of post-bargaining power do not necessarily translate into higher equilibrium payoffs and that the equilibrium bill may include no concessions from the majority to the minority party. Moreover, caps on campaign spending may incentivize a costly referendum over unanimity in the legislature. These results carry policy implications for regulating various forms of post-bargaining power, such as campaign finance laws for referenda.     

Political ideology,social capital,and government innovativeness: evidence from the US states

We use the number of finalists and winners recognized by the Innovations in American Government Awards (IAGA) programme to measure state government innovativeness from 1986 to 2013. The measure is moderately related to two existing state policy innovativeness indexes. The fifty states vary remarkably and persistently in government innovativeness, which is more driven by internal antecedents than external ones. We find that between-state effects outperform within-state effects in explaining government innovativeness. We also reveal that government ideology, citizen ideology, and social capital are positively related to government innovativeness. The index developed in this study can be used in pertinent studies, and the findings contribute to the literature on public sector innovation.     

Affect versus cognition: Wishful thinking on election day: An analysis using exit poll data from Belgium

Citizens tend to overestimate the electoral success of their preferred party. We investigate the extent to which Belgian voters overestimate the result of the party that they vote for and the factors that explain which voters do so more than others. Our focus is on the impact of educational attainment and partisan attachment on the overestimation of one’s party’s result. Previous research in this field has relied on data gathered in the months before the elections, which introduces a substantial amount of uncertainty and variation over time into the measurements of citizens’ vote share estimations. As an alternative, we investigate voters’ estimations of their party’s electoral success by means of data gathered in an exit poll survey. Our results show partisan attachments to have a strong impact on overestimations, which suggests that a wishful thinking mechanism is in play. Furthermore, we find that the extent to which partisan attachments increase citizens’ overestimations depends on a voter’s level of education.     

新时期思想政治工作方法有机结合应用的探讨

党的十一届三中全会开启了改革开放的历史新时期，从此人们的思想观念实现了从束缚、封闭到解放、进步、务实，再到开放、科学、创新的历史性跨越，要求我党的思想政治工作方法要与时俱进。新时期的思想政治工作，是为党的中心工作服务的，政治工作者通过一定的方法，让工作对象在思想、观点、政治立场上保持先进，具有鲜明的党性、实践性和群众性。思想政治工作的方法有很多，如何将现有的方法与工作对象有机地结合起来，是提高思想工作效率的关键，也是值得思想政治工作者探讨的新课题。     

The earnings of state government employees in the United States

This paper has presented a theoretical and empirical analysis of wage determination in the state government sector. The theoretical model is based on the assumption that the state government's objective is to maximize its political support. This objective function leads to predictable behavior regarding how state government employment policies react to changes in the state's wealth, income inequality, composition of constituency groups, and voting behavior.The empirical analysis, conducted on the 1970 U.S. Census Public Use Sample, showed that the wage of state government workers shifts as a result of changes in these political factors. In fact, the results indicated that over three-fourths of the interstate variation in the state government wage rate could be explained by the relatively small vector of political variables introduced in this paper.It should be clear, however, that the analysis conducted in this paper is but a first step in the systematic study of state government behavior. There are several areas where further research may lead to useful results. For example, an important determinant of state government behavior is the composition and power of the various constituency groups. In this paper, the empirical analysis concentrated on three obvious constituencies and ignored the power coalitions in the rest of the population. A more complete accounting of all constituencies may uncover additional results regarding the nature of the income redistribution policies conducted by state governments. Such an accounting could, of course, use the large volumes of available data which divide the state budgets into particular functions. Thus a more general framework could match the data available on the composition of the various constituencies with the data available on expenditures in specific functions. It is not unreasonable to expect that such generalizations of the analysis conducted in this paper will lead to important insights into the labor economics of political markets.