股票市场定价有效性与股东价值最大化实践

问题提出 自现代公司财务理论创建以来,所有的公司财务教科书开宗明义都写着"公司经营的财务目标是股东价值最大化".     

我国会计目标定位的思考:基于利益相关者理论

公司利益相关者理论认为,公司是一系列与公司活动相关者契约组合体.但是,现代公司契约理论中"受托责任观"和"决策有用观"的会计目标都偏于,向所有者披露相关财务信息,却忽视了公司其他与公司经营管理活动相关的参与者.本文探讨的基础是,在公司利益相关者契约理论之上,公司的会计目标应定位于,向各利益相关者契约主体提供财务、经营管理信息.     

上市金融公司的资本结构和财务分析

分析现代公司的财务状况,需要财务理论的支持,在财务理论中,最核心的内容是资本结构理论,它是金融理论的基础。对于上市金融公司而言,其面临的市场环境较为复杂,公司的财务状况、资本结构等呈现出不同的特点。本文主要探讨上市金融公司的资本结构与财务状分析,并在此基础上,为财务分析提供合理建议。     

上市金融公司的资本结构和财务分析

分析现代公司的财务状况,需要财务理论的支持,在财务理论中,最核心的内容是资本结构理论,它是金融理论的基础。对于上市金融公司而言,其面临的市场环境较为复杂,公司的财务状况、资本结构等呈现出不同的特点。本文主要探讨上市金融公司的资本结构与财务状分析,并在此基础上,为财务分析提供合理建议。     

现代公司财务治理理论的形成与发展

随着现代经济学的发展,尤其是新制度经济学的发展,促进了现代财务治理理论的发展。本位以现代经济学基础,以财权配置为核心对现代公司财务治理进行研究,对现代公司财务治理理论的形成与发展进行研究。     

实施财务预算 合理规避风险

财务风险存在于绝大多数企业之中，这不仅是理论更是事实。近年来，国内外一些知名企业纷纷破产倒闭，忽视财务风险与投资决策失误是大多数公司倒闭的重要原因之一。近至巨人集团、沈阳飞龙，远及安然和世通公司，无不最终都是由于财务风险而导致破产或破产保护。实际上，像美国这样发达国家的企业平均寿命也不过7     

公司财务理论研究的新视角

随着相关基础理论的发展 ,公司财务理论的研究也将增添许多新的视角。本文针对管家理念的影响、公司财务“企业本位论”的局限性 ,讨论了公司理论、信息不对称理论、道德风险、交易成本和所有权成本、人力资本等理论对公司财务的影响 ,分析了现代公司财务及其理论研究中出现的新问题。最后 ,本文提出现代公司财务是股东和人力资本的财务。     

关于公司金融的理论框架

公司金融是西方微观金融理论的重要部分，随着其在现代公司经济活动中愈显重要，近年来受到了诸多学派的关注和研究。它是以公司融资为主干，公司财务为核心，公司治理和公司理财为两翼，以公司为载体，资本市场为基本背景，讨论在基于金融市场下，如何进行有效融资，实现公司财富的最大化。     

探讨公司金融学的理论框架与研究边界

作为主要经济主体的公司,其金融行为是一个社会重要的经济活动.尽管公司金融实践的历史悠久,但现代公司金融理论的形成却只有半个世纪的历程,这表明公司金融学是一门非常年轻的学科.因此,探讨公司金融学的理论框架和研究边界具有重要的理论意义和现实意义.本文从微观和宏观两个层面上探讨了公司金融学的理论框架,并进一步讨论了公司金融学未来的发展方向.     

股权结构、公司治理与财务管理

在现代公司财务管理中,人们比较关注资本结构,往往忽视了股权结构.但从公司治理的角度看,股权结构及其变化的影响更大、更深远.财务管理以股东价值最大化为目标,而公司治理则强调保护股东权利、确保所有股东受到平等待遇并确认利益相关者的合法权利等.无论是财务管理还是公司治理,落脚点都在股东身上.两者从根本上说,有许多相通之处.本文以精艺股份为例,说明股权结构变化的公司治理意义,目的在于引起财务理论研究者和实务工作者对股权结构及其变化的认识,充实财务理论,丰富财务实践.     

极端风险事件下股票市场与公司债券市场的尾部风险溢出研究——基于MVMQ-CAViaR模型

构建MVMQ-CAViaR模型,结合金融市场内部极端风险事件和外部极端风险事件,考量股票市场与公司债券市场的尾部风险溢出问题。结果表明,在金融市场内部极端风险事件下,股灾期间仅存在股票市场对公司债券市场单向的尾部风险溢出。公司债券违约潮期间,股票市场与公司债券市场之间存在双向不对称的尾部风险溢出,且公司债券市场对股票市...     

公司债市场是新常态下证券市场的风险信号标吗？——基于公司债与股票市场间风险溢出的研究

以发行债券的上市公司为样本,分别编制公司债指数与股票指数,据此运用Copula-CoVaR模型测度公司债与股票市场间风险溢出的方向与强度。结果发现：股票市场的风险大于公司债市场;公司债与股票市场间存在双向不对称的正向风险溢出,公司债市场对股票市场的风险溢出强度显著强于股票市场对公司债市场的风险溢出强度。经济新常态下,公司债市场成为证券市场的风险指示标,具有较强的风险信号作用。     

企业价值与并购交易定价

企业价值是一个不断发展的概念,而企业价值理论也随之处在变化之中.在现代企业中企业价值代表了企业股权和债权价值,具有特殊的性质.并购交易定价实际上就是并购双方不同企业价值理念动态博弈的结果.中国国有企业的并购定价存在许多问题,根源在于对企业价值认识得不准确、不清晰.     

基于MSV与CoVaR模型的公司债市场与股票市场间风险溢出效应研究

依据2015—2017年中证公司债指数与沪深300指数的日收益数据,运用GC-t-MSV模型,检验中国公司债市场与股票市场间的风险溢出效应,并通过条件在险价值(CoVaR)模型度量两市场间风险溢出效应。结果表明：公司债市场与股票市场间存在不对称的双向风险溢出效应,且公司债市场对股票市场的风险溢出效应强于股票市场对公司债市场的风险溢出效应;公司债市场与股票市场的波动受其自身波动的影响较大,鉴此,监管部门和投资者应增强对公司债市场的关注,根据公司债市场的风险变化及时采取应对措施,充分发挥其风险信号作用。     

Financial Management Association Roundtable on Stock Market Pricing and Value‐Based Management

A group of academics and practitioners addresses a number of questions about the workings of the stock market and its implications for corporate decision‐making. The discussion begins by asking what the market wants from companies: Is it mainly just steady increases in earnings per share, which are then “capitalized” by the market at the current industry P/E multiple to produce a higher stock price? Or does the market pay attention to the “quality,” or sustainability, of earnings? And are there more revealing measures of annual corporate performance than GAAP earnings—measures that would provide investors with a better sense of companies' future cash‐generating capacity and returns on capital? The consensus was that although many investors respond uncritically to earnings numbers, the most sophisticated and influential investors consider far more than current earnings when pricing stocks. And although the stock market is far from omniscient, the heightened scrutiny of companies resulting from the growth of hedge funds, private equity, and investor activism of all kinds appears to be making the market “more efficient” in building information into stock prices. The second part of the discussion explored the implications of this view of the market pricing process for corporate strategy and the evaluation of major investment opportunities. For example, do acquisitions have to be “EPS‐accretive” to be value‐adding, or is there a more reliable means of assessing an investment's value added than pro forma EPS effects? Does the DCF valuation method always offer a better guide to value than the method of comparables used by many Wall Street dealmakers? And under what circumstances are the relatively new real options valuation approaches likely to provide a significant advantage over conventional methods? The main message offered to corporate practitioners is to avoid letting cosmetic accounting effects get in the way of value‐adding investment and operating decisions. As the corporate record on acquisitions makes painfully clear, there is no guarantee that an accretive deal will turn out to be value‐increasing (in fact, the odds are that it will not). As for choosing a valuation method, there appears to be a time and place for each of the major methods—comparables, DCF, and real options—and the key to success is understanding which method is best suited to the circumstances.     

Employee‐friendly practices,product market competition and firm value

In this paper, we examine whether employee‐friendly practices are associated with product market competition, and whether firm value is related to employee‐friendly practices and product market competition. Using a large sample of US firms, we find positive and significant associations between employee friendliness and product market competition, and between firm value and employee friendliness when product market competition is high, consistent with the value creation theory. Both positive relations hold when we account for corporate governance. In addition, using the list of Fortune's ‘100 Best Companies to Work For’ as an alternative measure of employee‐friendly policies, we find firms in more competitive industries are more likely to treat their workers favourably. Furthermore, we find that the market reaction is more positive when firms in more competitive industries are selected for the Fortune list.     

企业财权安排的几个基本理论问题:基于利益相关者理论研究

长期以来,人们研究企业所有权安排的基本思路是"股东至上"逻辑。然而,在现代市场经济条件下,随着企业对人力资本和外部资源的日益重视以及世界各国对企业的社会责任和各利益相关者在企业治理中的作用越来越关注,"股东至上"逻辑受到了愈益强烈的挑战,利益相关者理论已成为企业治理理论的重要组成部分。本文着重运用利益相关者理论对企业财权安排的基本前提、客观基础、主要特征和实现机制等基础性问题进行了研究,以期拓展企业治理理论的研究领域和应用价值。     

内在投资价值理论在中国股市的有效性检验

用F-O模型对深发展1991～2010年的内在价值进行测算,然后实证分析股价和内在价值之间的协整关系,发现在过去的20年中,两变量间并不存在协整关系。这说明中国股市是无效市场。通过计算泡沫值发现,20世纪90年代,深发展的泡沫值非常高,进入21世纪后泡沫值逐渐降低,反映出中国股市逐渐走向价值回归之路。     

Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function

This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. I argue that since it is logically impossible to maximise in more than one dimension, purposeful behaviour requires a single valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that in the absence of externalities and monopoly (and when all goods are priced), social welfare is maximised when each firm in an economy maximises its total market value. Total value is not just the value of the equity but also includes the market values of all other financial claims including debt, preferred stock, and warrants. In sharp contrast stakeholder theory, argues that managers should make decisions so as to take account of the interests of all stakeholders in a firm (including not only financial claimants, but also employees, customers, communities, governmental officials and under some interpretations the environment, terrorists and blackmailers). Because the advocates of stakeholder theory refuse to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests they leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no way to keep score, stakeholder theory makes managers unaccountable for their actions. It seems clear that such a theory can be attractive to the self interest of managers and directors. Creating value takes more than acceptance of value maximisation as the organisational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximisation is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers to create value. Seen in this light, change in long‐term market value becomes the scorecard that managers, directors, and others use to assess success or failure of the organisation. The choice of value maximisation as the corporate scorecard must be complemented by a corporate vision, strategy and tactics that unite participants in the organisation in its struggle for dominance in its competitive arena. A firm cannot maximise value if it ignores the interest of its stakeholders. I offer a proposal to clarify what I believe is the proper relation between value maximisation and stakeholder theory. I call it enlightened value maximisation, and it is identical to what I call enlightened stakeholder theory. Enlightened value maximisation utilises much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximisation of the long run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders. Managers, directors, strategists, and management scientists can benefit from enlightened stakeholder theory. Enlightened stakeholder theory specifies long‐term value maximisation or value seeking as the firm’s objective and therefore solves the problems that arise from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. I also discuss the Balanced Scorecard, the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory. The same conclusions hold. Balanced Scorecard theory is flawed because it presents managers with a scorecard which gives no score—that is, no single‐valued measure of how they have performed. Thus managers evaluated with such a system (which can easily have two dozen measures and provides no information on the tradeoffs between them) have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. The solution is to define a true (single dimensional) score for measuring performance for the organisation or division (and it must be consistent with the organisation’s strategy). Given this we then encourage managers to use measures of the drivers of performance to understand better how to maximise their score. And as long as their score is defined properly, (and for lower levels in the organisation it will generally not be value) this will enhance their contribution to the firm.     

商业信用、融资约束与公司价值

以我国 A 股非金融类上市公司为样本,就商业信用变动对公司价值的影响进行分析,并以投资效率损失作为融资约束程度分类标准,对融资约束程度不同公司的商业信用变动的边际价值进行对比分析。研究发现：商业信用有利于提高公司价值;融资约束公司的商业信用变动的边际价值小于非融资约束公司;对于融资约束类公司,商业信用变动的边际价值会随着商业信用存量的增加而增加;而对于非融资约束类公司,商业信用变动的边际价值会随着商业信用存量的增加而减小。