自然垄断产品价格规制的福利效应分析

作为市场主体的自然垄断企业，并不必然会采取基于社会福利最大化的产品定价方式，而需要对其进行价格规制。价格规制可分为投资回报率规制与激励性规制两大类，两类规制方法会产生不同的福利效应；同时．由规制引起的寻租行为也会影响福利水平。我国自然垄断产品价格规制对社会福利的影响，主要表现为由垄断企业侵占消费者剩余，并导致内部低效率。     

居民消费视角下的北方地区农村清洁取暖定价机制研究

电、气能源替代散煤的清洁取暖定价政策的核心是协同实现节能、减排、农户福利三重目标。我国目前在北方农村地区实施的清洁取暖价格主要为分时电价、峰谷电价和阶梯气价。通过对典型城市农户的实地调研,获得农户用能行为、需求和意愿数据,基于清洁取暖的需求价格弹性设置了多种清洁取暖用能与相应价格情景,以确定农村清洁取暖定价机制的改进策略。研究结果显示,合理划分基本生活类、改善类和奢侈类的用能需求,并在此基础上制定反映清洁能源需求价格弹性的价格,能够有效减少用能支出、改进取暖福利。同时,政府补贴在清洁取暖定价机制处于核心地位,影响清洁取暖价格政策目标的实现。为改进清洁取暖定价机制,建议对农户冬季取暖的需求和价格弹性开展充分调研,更好发挥阶梯价格的作用,并基于大气污染物持续减排的原则制定适度补贴水平。     

中国上市公司IPO定价方式分析

文章通过对我国上市公司IPO定价制度、定价方式的分析,指出我国现行定价方式的实质及存在的问题,在此基础上提出现行IPO定价的改进方向。     

消费者寻求多样化、拥塞效应和厂商歧视 定价竞争

在一些同时存在消费者寻求多样化购买和拥塞效应的行业,寡头厂商广泛使用基于消费者购买历史进行歧视定价的商业模式,文章建立了动态博弈模型针对这类行业和商业模式进行了深入研究.研究结果表明厂商实施歧视定价源于消费者寻求多样化购买,而且消费者寻求多样化和拥塞效应会导致厂商每一期产生"默契合谋".与统一定价相比,歧视定价会增加消费者福利,降低社会总福利.进一步的定价策略选择研究发现,寡头厂商都会选择获利较少的歧视性定价策略,陷入"囚徒困境"的境地.对于文章所研究的行业,厂商应该利用信息技术,积极使用这种定价策略,而公共政策不应过多地干预.     

不确定性与宏观经济波动——基于企业预防性定价和居民失业风险视角

新冠肺炎疫情暴发使宏观经济不确定性达到历史新高,不确定性对宏观经济的影响不断加大,保就业、保市场主体和保物价稳定成为当前经济工作的重点。文章通过构建TVP-SVVAR和DSGE模型,从企业预防性定价和居民失业风险两个角度出发,分析了不确定性影响宏观经济的机制。研究表明：第一,不确定性冲击会导致经济在短期内进入滞胀状态,而长期陷入通缩。其中,短期通胀上升主要是因为企业预防性定价在不确定性对宏观经济的影响中起主导作用,而长期通缩则是因为失业风险所导致的居民有效需求下降。第二,模型模拟显示,在遭遇不确定性冲击后,存在失业风险的居民消费复苏得慢,没有失业风险的居民消费复苏得快。第三,总量上,宽松的货币政策能够有效减缓不确定性对经济的负面影响,但同时存在明显的边际递减效应；结构上,搭配不同的财政政策能够有效缓解异质性居民之间的福利损失。     

递增阶梯定价政策评价与优化设计——基于充分统计量方法

本文通过求解阶梯定价下福利损失与再分配效应的充分统计量,构建评估与优化阶梯定价的半结构式充分统计量模型。利用从国家电网随机抽取的2003—2011年杭州市5000户居民的月度电量消费数据,评估样本期内实施与调整阶梯定价的政策效果;在此基础上对最优阶梯定价机制进行优化设计,进一步评价了杭州市2012年最新阶梯定价调整政策。研究发现:(1)2004年与2006年杭州市实施与调整阶梯定价的福利损失分配效应转化率逐步上升,阶梯定价再分配的边际福利损失与初次分配的税收边际福利损失相当;(2)分时阶梯定价分配效应转化率比纯阶梯定价低,嵌入分时定价的阶梯定价不能有效地实现阶梯定价目标;(3)与最优阶梯定价机制相比,2012年的最新阶梯定价调整方向正确,但第一阶梯长度扩展过多、第二阶梯扩展不足,而阶梯加价太小;(4)较之结构与缩减式模型,充分统计量方法极大节约数据信息量并能进行福利分析。本文的研究为评估与优化我国各类政府公用事业改革开拓了一条新思路。     

公共管理视角下“福利腐败”的本质及其治理

两会期间,不少委员提出在我国垄断行业中长期存在着的"垄断福利",实质上就是一种"福利腐败"。政府部门和公营企业应该如何转变其观念,采取何种方式来治理垄断行业存在的"福利腐败"成为我们关注的话题。文章从公共管理的视角下,通过对"福利腐败"现象的分类分析,探讨这一严重危害社会公正现象之成因及危害,并探寻如何治理遏制"福利腐败"的对策。     

浅谈建筑工程造价的工程量清单计价法

随着我国市场经济体制的逐步完善,预算定额计价与市场经济已不相适应,激烈的市场竞争要求有一种能够体现建筑产品市场价格的计价方法来确定工程造价.实行工程量清单计价是一种新的市场定价,这种计价方式要求企业自主报价,由市场交易形成建筑产品的价格,能适应市场经济发展的要求,为建设市场主体创造一个与国际管理接轨的市场竞争环境.     

关税冲击下人民币国际化的宏观经济影响——基于汇率管理和资本管制视角

本文通过建立引入中间品生产贸易、出口品定价方式变动、资本不完全流动以及冲销干预的开放新凯恩斯模型,在外国进口关税冲击环境中,在不同程度的汇率管理和资本管制下,研究人民币国际化对中国经济和社会福利的差异性影响.结果表明:(1)货币国际化通过提高出口品本币定价比例,降低了因外国关税冲击导致的本国经济波动和福利损失;(2)在货币国际化进程中,逐步放松汇率管理和资本管制能够提升货币国际化对本国经济的改善效果;(3)随着汇率管理的不断放松,相较于最终品,出口中间品本币定价比例提升对本国经济的改善效果更显著.因此在不确定性增加的全球贸易环境中,应坚持推进人民币国际化,同时不断深化人民币汇率形成机制,逐步放松汇率管理和资本管制,并重视出口中间品人民币结算比例的提升.     

小麦全产业链价格形成机制及改革趋势研究

小麦全产业链定价主体主要由生产者、贸易商、政策储备库和加工饲料厂构成,而这四大主体形成了三条价格链,分别为"规模户直售价格链""小农户间接价格链""政策储备粮拍卖链"。在这三条价格链中,主要有市场和政策两种价格形成机制,其中贸易商"收、储、销"价格形成机制分别为模糊定价、预期定价和标准定价;"国储、地储、托市"价格形成机制分别为财政补贴自负盈亏、财政补贴或兜底、托市收购顺价销售。对此,应在小麦最低收购价改革的同时,培育多元市场主体,引导农户调整生产结构,提高政策性小麦定价灵活性。     

Bertrand versus Cournot competition in a downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists.     

When redistribution makes personalized pricing of externalities useless

We consider a standard optimal taxation framework in which consumers' preferences are separable in consumption and labor and identical over consumption, but are affected by consumption externalities. For every nonlinear, income-dependent pricing of goods there is a linear pricing scheme, combined with an adjusted income tax schedule, that leaves all consumers equally well-off and weakly increases the government's budget. The result depends on whether a linear pricing scheme exists that keeps the aggregate amount of consumption at its initial level observed under nonlinear pricing. We provide sufficient conditions for the assumption to hold. If adjusting the income tax rate is not available, personalized prices for an externality can enhance social welfare if they are redistributive, that is, favor consumers with a larger marginal social value of income.     

双边市场、不完全信息与二级价格歧视

本文研究了双边市场二级价格歧视问题。本文构建了包括广告商、消费者、垄断平台在内的两阶段博弈模型，研究了在最优与次优情况下平台的定价机制，分析了二级价格歧视对平台利润、社会福利等的影响。研究表明：（1）“顶部无扭曲”或“底部无扭曲”并不严格成立；（2）平台对观众提供的节目质量、广告插播量均可能出现类型逆转的情况；（3）二级价格歧视会增加社会总福利；（4）“会员制”是平台可能的占优定价机制之一。     

ON THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS

This article studies the welfare effects of credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, credit arrangements can be welfare reducing, because high consumption by credit users drives up the price level, reducing consumption by money users who are subject to a binding liquidity constraint. By adopting an optimal trading mechanism, however, these welfare implications can be overturned. Both price discrimination and nonlinear pricing are essential features of an optimal mechanism.     

银行监管中的最优市场约束研究

基于社会利润最大化的视角,本文研究了银行监管中的最优市场约束问题.研究发现:在银行监管中实施最优的市场约束不仅可以提高银行监管帕累托效率,而且可以给社会带来最大的利润;最优市场约束水平受到银行"额外价值",无市场约束时贷款失败的概率、贷款成功的收益、市场约束的成本弹性等因素的影响,且与这些因素呈正相关;最优市场约束水平对银行"额外价值"、贷款成功的收益这两个因素的变化敏感性较强,对无市场约束时贷款失败的概率的变化敏感性较弱,对市场约束的成本弹性的敏感性呈现出由强变弱的趋势.     

On the Regulation of a Vertically Differentiated Market

The aim of this paper is to investigate a vertically differentiated market served either by a multiproduct monopolist or by duopolists, in which a public authority aiming at increasing the welfare level can choose among two instruments, namely, quality taxation/subsidisation, and minimum quality standard. In the monopoly case they are equivalent as to the social welfare level, in that both allow the regulator to achieve the second best level of social welfare he would attain if he were to set qualities under the monopoly pricing rule, while they are not equivalent in terms of the distribution of surplus. In the duopoly regime, we show that there exists a taxation/subsidisation scheme inducing firms to produce the socially optimal qualites.     

Competition for exclusive customers: comparing equilibrium and welfare under one-part and two-part pricing

Abstract.  This paper compares one-part and two-part pricing in a discrete-continuous choice model, providing more extensive welfare results than prior literature. Under two-part pricing, firms may set fixed fees with or without 'unit-price commitment,' where the lack of unit-price commitment is consistent with 'after-market monopolization.' We find that two-part pricing with unit-price commitment is firms' dominant unilateral and joint pricing policy. Two-part pricing without unit-price commitment is the least desirable policy from a welfare standpoint. Under appropriate conditions, one-part pricing produces the highest consumer and social welfare, but the lowest profits.     

Utility Regulation and Risk Allocation: The Roles of Marginal Cost Pricing and Futures Markets

The effects on consumer welfare of requiring a utility facing cost or demand risk to use either a fixed retail price or marginal cost pricing are assessed. With marginal cost pricing and cost volatility an efficient futures market allows consumer welfare to be at least as high in every state as with the fixed price. With demand risk marginal cost pricing can benefit the consumer in every state without harming the firm if the profit difference is transferred to the consumer. A futures market can act as a partial replacement for the transfer.     

THE WELFARE PERFORMANCE OF SEQUENTIAL PRICING MECHANISMS*

Consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved. Since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous, this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers. Results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits. Furthermore, evidence suggests that a menu of optional two‐part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective.     

Peak-load pricing in duopoly

In this paper, we consider peak-load pricing by duopolists that maximize profit (not social welfare). We compare price levels and profits across peak-load versus uniform pricing regimes. Our main result is that the introduction of peak-load pricing can plausibly reduce prices by making price competition more severe and thereby reducing profits. This result suggests that competing firms may engage in collusion by not committing to peak-load pricing. Therefore, from the regulator's perspective, it will be desirable to encourage firms to engage in peak-load pricing to intensify competition.