Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines

Do remittances sent by overseas migrants serve as insurancefor recipient households? In a study of how remittances fromoverseas respond to income shocks experienced by Philippinehouseholds, changes in income are found to lead to changes inremittances in the opposite direction, consistent with an insurancemotivation. Roughly 60 percent of declines in household incomeare replaced by remittance inflows from overseas. Because householdincome and remittances are jointly determined, rainfall shocksare used as instrumental variables for income changes. The hypothesiscannot be rejected that consumption in households with migrantmembers is unchanged in response to income shocks, whereas consumptionresponds strongly to income shocks in households without migrants.     

Is There Market Discipline in the European Insurance Industry? An Analysis of the German Insurance Market

Economists often argue in favour of market discipline as a means to distribute resources effectively and efficiently. These same arguments likely influence decision-makers as they incorporate market discipline as the third pillar of Solvency II, the European insurance regulatory scheme currently being implemented. Success for Solvency II, then, is dependent in part on the strength of influence found in market discipline. Our research indicates that the German insurance market demonstrates the existence of such discipline, although the actual effect appears smaller than previously found in the U.S. insurance market. Solvency II, therefore, seems to be following an appropriate path, although further research is needed to evaluate whether or not enhancements to market discipline within the European market are warranted.     

Insurance markets and unisex tariffs: is the European Court of Justice improving or destroying welfare?

We analyze the effects of mandatory unisex tariffs in insurance contracts, such as those required by a recent ruling of the European Court of Justice, on equilibrium insurance premia and equilibrium welfare. In a unified framework, we provide a quantitative analysis of the associated insurance market equilibria in both monopolistic and competitive insurance markets. We investigate the welfare loss caused by regulatory adverse selection and show that unisex tariffs may cause market distortions that significantly reduce overall social welfare.     

Survival of the Fittest or the Fattest? Exit and Financing in the Trucking Industry

This paper studies the impact that capital market imperfections have on the natural selection of the most efficient firms by estimating the effect of the prederegulation level of leverage on the survival of trucking firms after the Carter deregulation. Highly leveraged carriers are less likely to survive the deregulation shock, even after controlling for various measures of efficiency. This effect is stronger in the imperfectly competitive segment of the motor carrier industry. High debt seems to affect survival by curtailing investments and reducing the price per ton-mile that a carrier can afford to charge after deregulation.     

Taking stock or cashing in? Shareholder style preferences,premiums and the method of payment

We develop and test hypotheses on the impact of target shareholders' investment style preferences on the method of payment and premiums in acquisitions. Stock offers (unlike cash offers) allow target shareholders to defer capital gains taxes. This deferral value, however, depends on target shareholders' willingness to retain acquirer stock. The empirical findings support our hypotheses. Bid premiums in stock offers are negatively and jointly related to target shareholder tax liabilities and to variables proxying for target shareholder willingness to hold acquirer stock. Moreover, the difference between predicted cash and stock premiums due to these factors significantly explains the method of payment choice.     

Race to the top or bottom? Corporate governance,freedom of reincorporation and competition in law

Summary This paper investigates the governance structure choices of firms when there is competition between legal systems. We study the impact of the allocation of control over choice of governance and reincorporation on firms’ technologies and technological specialization of countries in the context of a model of the firm in which there are agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. We show that the allocation of control over firms’ reincorporation decisions determines the corporate governance choice ex ante and the outcome of the competition between legal regimes ex post. When managers have control over reincorporation then competitive deregulation and “runs to the bottom” ensue. When shareholders have partial or full control then there is diversity in governance structures. Runs to the bottom are not necessarily socially undesirable but they have a feedback effect on firms’ choices of technologies that may make the party in control worse off ex ante. We show that it is impossible for any country to achieve social welfare maximization of its existing and new enterprises. With competition between legal regimes, start-up and mature companies incorporate in different jurisdictions even when reincorporation is correctly anticipated.     

Intermediation and (Mis‐)Matching in Insurance Markets—Who Should Pay the Insurance Broker?

This article addresses the role of independent insurance intermediaries in markets where matching is important. We compare fee‐based and commission‐based compensation systems and show that they are payoff equivalent if the intermediary is completely honest. Allowing for strategic behavior, we discuss the impact of remuneration on the quality of advice. The possibility of mismatching gives the intermediary substantial market power, which will not translate into mismatching if consumers are rational. Furthermore, we offer a rationale for the use of contingent commissions and address whether or not the ban of any commission payments is an appropriate market intervention.     

Does the Medium Matter? The Relations among Bankruptcy Petition Filings,Broadtape Disclosure,and the Timing of Price Reactions

Drawing on a comprehensive sample of 330 bankruptcy petition filings from 1980 to 1993, we find that most of the market reaction does not occur on the bankruptcy petition filing date when the information becomes publicly available. Rather, most of the reaction occurs when news of the bankruptcy filing is more widely disseminated via the Broadtape. This Broadtape announcement effect persists after controlling for firm size, exchange listing, and predisclosure information. These are primarily timing differences since abnormal returns cumulated over an 11-day window centered on the filing date do not differ significantly across Broadtape disclosure date classifications.     

Sand in the wheels or wheels in the sand? Tobin taxes and market crashes

The recent economic crisis revived interest in financial transaction taxes (FTTs) as a means to offset negative risk externalities. However, up-to-date academic research does not provide sufficient insights into the effects of transaction taxes on financial markets as the literature has here-to-fore been focused too narrowly on Gaussian variance as a measure of volatility. In this paper, we argue that it is imperative to understand the relationship between price jumps, Gaussian variance, and FTTs. While Gaussian variance is not necessarily a problem in itself, the non-normality of return distribution caused by price jumps affects not only the performance of many risk-hedging algorithms but directly influences the frequency of catastrophic market events. To study the aforementioned relationship, we use an agent-based model of financial markets. Its results show that the relationship between FTTs and price jumps is intricate. This result implies that regulators may face a trade-off between overall variance and price jumps when designing optimal tax.     

Insurance and Endogenous Bankruptcy Risk: When is it Rational to Choose Gambling,Insurance, and Potential Bankruptcy?

We examine the coexistence of insurance and gambling in the context of limited liability. We develop a model where actuarially fair insurance is available to a risk-averse decision maker for a liability risk with non-bankrupting severity. The remaining wealth may be invested in a zero expected value risky project (i.e., gambled). The risk of bankruptcy is endogenous since either fully insuring or forgoing the project will guarantee solvency. We show that, for a range of parameters, it is optimal to both insure and gamble. The amounts insured and invested are chosen to create the potential for bankruptcy. Our results are robust to the cases where the risky project can cause bankruptcy without a liability loss and where the risky project’s expected return is nonzero.     

SME financing and the choice of lending technology in Italy: Complementarity or substitutability?

This paper investigates SME financing in Italy. The literature distinguishes between two main different lending technologies (LTs) for SMEs: transactional and relationship LTs. We find that banks lend to SMEs by using both LTs together, independently of the size and proximity of borrowers. Moreover, we show that the use of soft information decreases the probability of firms being credit rationed. Finally, we find that more soft information is produced when the bank uses relationship LT as primary technology individually or coupled with transactional LT. Our results support the view that LTs can be complementary, but reject the hypothesis that substitutability among LTs is somehow possible for outsiders by means of hardening of soft information.     

What determines the financing decision in corporate takeovers: Cost of capital,agency problems,or the means of payment?

How is a takeover bid financed and what is its impact on the expected value creation of the takeover? An analysis of the sources of transaction financing has been largely ignored in the takeover literature. Using a unique dataset, we show that external sources of financing (debt and equity) are frequently employed in takeovers involving cash payments. Acquisitions with the same means of payment but different sources of transaction funding are in fact quite distinct. Acquisitions financed with internally generated funds significantly underperform those financed with debt. The takeover financing decision is influenced by the bidder's pecking order preferences, its growth potential, and its corporate governance environment, all of which are related to the cost of external capital. The choice of equity versus internal cash or debt financing also depends on the bidder's strategic preferences with respect to the means of payment.     

Tourism in the future: Cycles, waves or wheels?

Those who have studied tourism over the last few decades will be well aware that the pace of change in some areas has been phenomenal, while in other aspects of the field, there has been relatively little change. The rather confused pattern of tourism development and growth illustrates a major dichotomy which exists in tourism, namely, that between its dynamism and its inertia, and the tension between these two attributes accounts in part for a general difficulty in being able to predict the future patterns of tourism. This paper reviews some of the approaches used to describe and predict the future nature and scale of tourism and argues that few have been effective or accurate, and that this is due in part to the heterogeneous nature of tourism, in both its demand and supply, and that the role of external agents is constantly altering the anticipated pattern of growth and development. Particular attention is paid to the life cycle model which has been used for a quarter of a century to describe the process of development of tourist destinations, whether such a model can be used to predict future patterns, and whether cycles, waves or wheels are suitable analogies for the pattern of tourism growth. The paper argues for a blending of both evolutionary and revolutionary predictions in the case of tourism destinations, an approach which allows for the incorporation of ideas such as chaos theory and chance into the equation of growth, in order to reflect both the inertia and dynamism that are inherent in tourism.     

Between the State and the Market: Can Informal Insurance Patch the Safety Net?

Most households in low-income countries deal with economic hardshipsthrough informal insurance arrangements between individualsand communities rather than through publicly managed programsor market-provided insurance schemes. Households may, for example,draw on savings, sell physical assets, rely on reciprocal giftexchanges, or diversify into alternative income-generating activities.These mechanisms can be highly effective in the right circumstances,but most recent studies show that informal insurance arrangementsare often weak. Poor households, in particular, have substantialdifficulties coping with even local, idiosyncratic risks. Publicpolicy can help reduce vulnerability by encouraging private,flexible coping mechanisms while discouraging those that arefragile or that hinder economic and social mobility. Promisingpolicies include creating self-regulating workfare programsand providing a supportive setting for institutions workingto improve access to credit, crop and health insurance, andsafe and convenient saving opportunities.      

Does Bancassurance Reduce the Price of Financial Service Products?

I assess the impact of bancassurance on the price of retail financial services. I find that service fees in a product bundle increase less than proportionally to the number of services; that an increase in the number of clients in each product bundle market reduces fees by 1.5%; that the degree of competition in the markets of each bundle also reduces fees; that premium products have higher average costs; and finally, that cross-holdings reduce prices by about 5% and bancassurance reduces prices by just over 6%. The price reduction declines if both strategies are combined.

Insurance Protection Funds in the European Union—Quo Vadis?

Contrary to the development in other major insurance markets in the world only 13 out of 27 EU member states have introduced until now some type of insurance protection funds (IPF). As a result around a third of the market is without any collective protection. There is also a continuous debate since 2001 among the member states on the need for such a system at the community level. The experiences of the latest financial crisis have raised new arguments for reorganizing the existing system to avoid regulatory arbitrage and to strengthen consumer security. Even the prospective implementation of provisions strengthening supervisory bodies, and the new solvency directive (so‐called Solvency II) are not fail‐safe solutions. This article is an attempt to review the current situation as regards IPF in the EU and to discuss possible development scenarios.