A profit-maximizing model of Federal Home Loan Bank behavior

In this article the price-setting behavior of the district Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) is investigated. Previous studies have viewed the FHLB system as a policy authority that sets the interest rate on FHLB advances in an attempt to stabilize mortgage and housing markets. In this study a profit-maximizing model of FHLB behavior is developed and empirically tested, and the results compared to a model of the FHLB system as a policy authority. The empirical results offer support for the hypothesis of profit-maximizing behavior and indicate that, in addition to the FHLB's cost of funds, factors that influence thrift demand for FHLB advances, deposits, and capital stock are important in explaining FHLB choice variables.     

Do Federal Home Loan Bank membership and advances increase bank risk-taking?

Since the early 1990s, commercial banks have turned to Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) advances to plug the gap between loan and deposit growth. Is this trend worrisome? On the one hand, advances implicitly encourage risk by insulating borrowers from market discipline. On the other, advances give borrowers greater flexibility to managing interest rate and liquidity risk. And access to FHLBank funding encourages members to reshape their balance sheets in ways that could lower credit risk. Using quarterly financial and supervisory data for banks from 1992 to 2005, we assess the effect of FHLBank membership and advances on risk. The evidence suggests liquidity and leverage risks rose modestly, but interest-rate risk declined somewhat. Credit risk and overall failure risk were largely unaffected. Although the evidence suggest FHLBank membership and advances have had, at best, only a modest impact on bank risk, we caution that our sample period constitutes one observation and that moral hazard could be pronounced if leverage ratios revert to historical norms.     

Bank CEO materialism: Risk controls,culture and tail risk

We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives’ behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively around government intervention during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that banks with materialistic CEOs have significantly more downside tail risk relative to banks with non-materialistic CEOs.     

Two Extensive Margins of Credit and Loan‐to‐Value Policies

We analyze a model of mortgage markets, housing tenure choice, heterogeneous agents, and default with closed form solutions. We uncover new insights which may inspire empirical work, and we ground already established insights in a series of tractable expressions. Then we study optimal loan‐to‐value (LTV) regulation and show that the choice of an LTV cap should balance the opposing forces of access to homeownership and the negative externalities associated with default. Homeownership affordability concerns induce procyclical elements into optimal regulation which attenuate the countercyclical regulation justified by the negative default externalities.