Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

We consider a principal who is keen to induce his agents to work at their maximal effort levels. To this end, he samples n days at random out of the T days on which they work, and awards a prize of B dollars to the most productive agent. The principal’s policy (B, n) induces a strategic game Γ(B, n) between the agents. We show that to implement maximal effort levels weakly (or, strongly) as a strategic equilibrium (or, as dominant strategies) in Γ(B, n), at the least cost B to himself, the principal must choose a small sample size n. Thus less scrutiny by the principal induces more effort from the agents.The need for reduced scrutiny becomes more pronounced when agents have information of the history of past plays in the game. There is an inverse relation between information and optimal sample size. As agents acquire more information (about each other), the principal, so to speak, must “undo” this by reducing his information (about them) and choosing the sample size n even smaller.     

Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and linear individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is nonobservable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, the two incentive schemes need to be combined to serve both incentive and selection purposes. If harder working agents respond less to intensified effort incentives, we find that the principal puts less emphasis on individual performance pay when selection becomes more important. Thus, we provide a possible explanation as to why, in practice, individual performance pay is less prevalent than promotion‐based incentives.     

Bribery and inspection technology

The e-government movement advocates increased use of technology to improve government efficiency and reduce corruption by reducing the discretionary power of government officials. This paper studies the relationship between improvements in inspection technology within a Principal-Supervisor-Agent model, where the supervisor is an inspector who is hired by the principal to investigate the agent’s potentially illegal actions. We show that when technology increases the marginal or total productivity of the supervisor’s effort, improvements in inspection technology encourage some types of bribery. Although such technological improvements induce an equilibrium with bribery, compliance and social welfare can still rise. However, when technology and supervisory effort are sufficiently substitutable, improvements in technology may reduce compliance when bribery occurs in equilibrium even when those same technological improvements would have raised compliance in the absence of bribery. We also characterize the relationship between the principal’s socially optimal technology and the anti-corruption policy available to the principal and find that the socially optimal inspection technology may be a substitute for or a complement to the anti-corruption policy. Finally, we show that for any set of policies that optimally induces a no-bribe equilibrium, there exists another set of policies that induces an equilibrium with bribery that is pareto superior to it.     

On the Performance of Linear Contracts

We examine the ability of linear contracts to replicate the performance of optimal unrestricted contracts in the canonical moral hazard setting with a wealth constrained, risk averse agent. We find that in a broad class of environments, the principal can always secure with a linear contract at least 95% of the profit that she secures with an optimal unrestricted contract, provided the productivity of the agent's effort is not too meager.     

Information Management and Incentives

We ask how the incentives of an agent are affected by an information management system that lets the agent receive information about the performance of a colleague before (“transparent firm”) rather than after he provides effort (“nontransparent firm”). Transparency is detrimental for incentives if the performance of the colleague provides information on the relative impact of the agent’s effort on his success probability. The findings imply that firms in which comparisons between employees play a minor role for compensation are transparent. Firms in which they play a major role sometimes choose to be nontransparent despite the flexibility gains transparency provides.     

Alternative Methods of School Finance: An Empirical Analysis of Cities in San Diego County

. Two alternatives to the local school property tax are explored using a simulation model: a power equalizing property tax and a state-wide property tax. The effects on residents’tax burdens and service levels are estimated and compared for residents of 13 cities in San Diego County. Under each of the available options shifts in tax burdens would occur. One high income city is a major beneficiary. Three others which would be required to contribute more to education are otherwise dissimilar; one is already taxing itself heavily. When tax effort is considered, cities intended to be prime beneficiaries do benefit but not greatly. The principal gainer is a city with high income and high property values. This analysis does not indicate that these alternative programs are more equitable than the present property tax.     

Optimal Loyalty‐Based Management

We study an agency model in which an entrepreneur selects a manager from a candidate set. The selected manager's effort improves the project's potential environment, and is a hidden action. The realized project environment is the entrepreneur's private information. A manager's utility has two components—(i) loyalty, with which the manager values the organization's profit, and (ii) selfishness, with which the manager values the monetary transfer he receives from the entrepreneur. We find that if the manager's task is easy enough, it is optimal to use a purely loyal manager. Otherwise, it can be optimal to use a manager with mixture of loyalty and selfishness—the manager's mixed motivation alleviates the entrepreneur's misrepresenting incentive, and as a result, the output distortion in the optimal contract can be reduced. In addition, when it is optimal to use a manager with mixed motivations, the entrepreneur selects someone who is more selfish than loyal.     

Whistle‐Blowing and Incentives in Firms

Whistle‐blowing is an important mechanism of corporate governance. We show that whistle‐blowing has negative effects on productive efficiency by undermining the incentives within a corporate hierarchy. In our model, a top manager intends to overreport earnings; a division manager may have evidence about the intended overreporting. We show that the division manager is more likely to have such evidence when the performance of his own division is low. Top management may offer a bribe to prevent the manager from blowing the whistle. This provides the division manager with an additional payoff when his division’s output is low. Therefore, potential whistle‐blowing undermines the division manager’s incentives to exert effort, which results in a less efficient outcome.     

The revision frequency of earnings forecasts and firm characteristics

This study investigates how the revision frequency of earnings forecasts affects firm characteristics. Previous studies generally focus on the number of analysts following a firm to measure a firm's information environment. The frequency with which news is updated is often defined as an analyst's effort. Analysts provide more information to investors if they update news more frequently. This study examines whether the frequency of information updating for a particular firm affects the firm's performance. We apply three proxies for firm performance: stock liquidity, the cost of equity capital, and firm value. Our findings indicate that the analysts’ effort as measured by the frequency of news updating is effective in providing additional power beyond the number of analysts to represent the information environment of a firm. Therefore, this study suggests that combining both the number of analysts following a firm and the frequency of news updating can be a better proxy for assessing a firm's information environment.     

The Effect of Aggregation of Accounting Information via Segment Reporting on Accounting Conservatism

In a sample of U.S. multiple-segment firms, we document a negative association between aggregation via segment reporting and timely loss recognition. A higher level of aggregation, as reflected in a firm’s reported organizational structure (the definition and characteristics of its segments), causes a multiple-segment firm to exhibit less cross-segment variation in profitability than a matched control portfolio of single-segment firms. We find that firms that engage in more aggregation report accounting numbers that provide less timely information about economic losses. We also observe that firms that provide more disaggregated segment data subsequent to adopting SFAS 131 experienced an increase in timely loss recognition. This result implies that higher quality segment reporting leads to an increase in timely loss recognition, which, per extant research, is associated with better governance. Our results complement results in Berger and Hann [2003. The impact of SFAS No. 131 on information and monitoring. Journal of Accounting Research, 41, 163–223] that show a decline in inefficient internal-capital-market transfers subsequent to the adoption of SFAS 131. Overall, we provide evidence supporting Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther’s [2010. The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, 296–343] contention that accounting conservatism is, in part, a function of managers’ aggregation choices.     

Optimal effort in the principal-agent problem with time-inconsistent preferences

This paper incorporates an agent’s time-inconsistent preferences into the Sannikov (2008) contract model to explore the effects of an agent’s preferences on his own behaviors: the incentive effort choice, the optimal retirement time and the consumption flow during his whole career life. We find the agent’s time inconsistency makes it difficult for him to be motivated and makes him need more compensation. An agent’s time-inconsistency erodes both the principal and his own income. The time-inconsistent agent will choose a lower incentive effort level, retire at an earlier time and have a lower consumption flow compared with his time-consistent peer. The time-inconsistent preference exactly influences the agents behavior and makes the agency problem more serious. Therefore, the firm has to cost more to stimulate such a time-inconsistent agent, which will damage the firms profits, as well as the efficiency.     

Seniority bias in a tournament

The paper presents a model where the probability of promotion tends to increase with seniority (overall labor market experience) without relying on the accumulation of general human capital. To this end, we consider the optimal design of a tournament (a relative compensation scheme) between two agents with different time horizon, the young and the old, in an overlapping generations framework. When the principal can only imperfectly monitor each agent’s effort level, the difference in time horizon leads to the ex post difference in the marginal value of effort between the two agents. In this case, the optimal tournament necessarily involves a bias towards the old agent. Within this framework, we also examine the relationship between: (1) the monitoring accuracy and the optimal bias; and (2) the value of outside options and the optimal bias.     

On the way to Ithaka[1]: Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Publication of Karl E. Weick’s The Social Psychology of Organizing

Karl E. Weick’s The Social Psychology of Organizing has been one of the most influential books in organization studies, providing the theoretical underpinnings of several research programs. Importantly, the book is widely credited with initiating the process turn in the field, leading to the ‘gerundizing’ of management and organization studies: the persistent effort to understand organizational phenomena as ongoing accomplishments. The emphasis of the book on organizing (rather than on organizations) and its links with sensemaking have made it the most influential treatise on organizational epistemology. In this introduction, we review Weick’s magnum opus, underline and assess its key themes, and suggest ways in which several of them may be taken forward.     

Supply chain finance and impacts of consumers’ sustainability awareness

Several new methods have been proposed for supply chain finance (SCF) with bank credits, but none of them mentions how to solve the borrowers’ moral hazard problems in SCF. This paper examines the moral hazard problem in supply chain financing with procurement contract (or purchase order). We show that since supply chain is an up-down directed structure, when financing with the procurement contract, the supplier’s effort monitoring task can be rendered to the procurement contract, which can secure the supplier’s optimal effort and capital choices in production. Hence, compared to separate lending, the supplier’s credit rationing problem can be mitigated, and most importantly, banks’ under-estimation on the supplier’s default risk and the over-estimation on the retailer’s default risk will both decrease. We further show that the retailer’s corporate social responsibility expenditure can increase consumers’ brand recognition, thus when facing demand shocks arising from consumer’s unexpected concerns, the retailer can better stabilize the firm value.     

Locally robust contracts for moral hazard

We consider a moral hazard problem in which the principal has a slight uncertainty about how the agent’s actions translate into output. An incentive contract can be made robust against an $ϵ$ amount of uncertainty, at the cost of a loss to the principal on the order of $\sqrt{ϵ}$, by refunding a small fraction of profit to the agent. We show that as $ϵ$ goes to zero, this construction is essentially optimal, in the sense of minimizing the worst-case loss, among all modifications to the contract that do not depend on the details of the environment.     

CONTRACTS,ENTREPRENEURS, MARKET CREATION AND JUDGEMENT: THE CONTEMPORARY MAINSTREAM THEORY OF THE FIRM IN PERSPECTIVE

This survey gives an overview of the theory of the firm as it is formulated within the contemporary ‘mainstream’ of economics. Two groupings of theories are briefly discussed: principal–agent and incomplete contract models. Next, three of the most recent contributions regarding firms are considered. The reference point approach is looked at first followed by a discussion of Spulber's book The Theory of the Firm. Last, we consider the entrepreneurial judgement perspective.     

Viceroys or Emperors? An Institution‐Based Perspective on Merger and Acquisition Prevalence and Shareholder Value

We study how cross‐country variance in institutions that aim to address core agency problems influences consequential strategic decisions of firms around the world. Scholars frequently argue that the interests of minority shareholders are threatened by merger and acquisitions (M&As) due to principal‐agency problems. Rather than acting in shareholders’ best interests, managers potentially act as viceroys, using M&As to cushion themselves from risk and extract more pay. Yet equally salient is the issue of principal‐principal agency, where controlling shareholders can behave as emperors who use M&As to siphon off assets and profits, and appropriate wealth of shareholders with fewer control rights. Taking an institution‐based perspective on these ‘viceroy’ and ‘emperor’ problems, we conjecture that institutions aimed to address these agency problems can generate the desired outcome regarding M&A prevalence, but may also produce unintentional negative consequences for shareholder value as a side‐effect. Empirical evidence covering M&As from 73 countries supports our hypotheses.     

Efficient Consumer Altruism and Fair Trade Products

Consumers have shown a willingness to pay a premium for products labeled as “FT” and a preference for retailers that are seen to be more generous to their suppliers/employees. A FT product is essentially a bundle of a base product and a donation to the supplier (e.g., a coffee farmer). An altruistic rational consumer will only choose this bundle if doing so is less expensive than buying the base product and making a direct donation. For FT to be sustainable either in a competitive equilibrium or in a monopolistic environment this bundling must yield an efficiency. This efficiency is generated in the following context. A supplier’s investment reduces the retailer’s cost or boosts the final product’s quality, but this investment is not immediately observable and cannot be enforced, hence there exists a moral hazard problem. In this environment, the altruism of the consumer can facilitate a more efficient contract: by paying the supplier more the retailer can both extract more consumer surplus and increase the level of contracted investment, while preserving the supplier’s incentive compatibility constraint. We assess our model in the context of the coffee industry.     

Measuring workplace internationalization: incorporating self-reported measures of international engagement

This paper constructs a multi-criterion index to assess the degree of workplace internationalization in Canadian workplaces in a major nationally representative dataset – the Workplace and Employee Survey. The measure, referred to as the degree of workplace internationalization (DWI) index, is designed to capture an inclusive representation of internationalization consistent with globalization. It is made up of two parts: an observed measurement component and a self-reported component. The observed measurement component is the sum of two ratios: ‘foreign sales to total sales’ and ‘foreign ownership to total ownership’. The self-reported component is the summed result of two scale measurements: ‘importance of international competition’ and ‘importance of expanding into new geographic markets’. The value-added of the DWI index is the self-reported component, which integrates the consequences (importance of international competition) and opportunities (importance of expanding into new geographic markets) of globalization. The index is developed and verified in three stages. The first describes an effort to ensure measurement validity. The second stage examines the index's measurement reliability by subjecting the DWI index to statistical tests common to psychometric theory of index building. In the third stage, the index is decomposed into an observed measurement component and a self-reported component. In separate tests, these components, along with the DWI index as a whole, are regressed against two sets of measures with known relationships with internationalization: the propensity to innovate, and the use of conceptual training programmes. The main result is that the index as a whole serves as the better proxy of workplace internationalization. Finally, it is argued to be an improvement on existing measures of internationalization.     

Task assignment,incentives and technological factors

In this paper, we examine the allocation of tasks between a principal and an agent considering their incentives to provide effort, their different abilities in handling tasks, and transmission costs. We focus our attention on two tasks: the first may be handled by the principal or by the agent, whereas the second is necessarily carried out by the agent. Under a fully decentralised organisation, the agent performs both tasks, whereas, under partial delegation, the principal handles the first task and transfers the outcome to the agent who handles the second task. Assuming technological complementarities, from our analysis it emerges that, if there is imperfect observability of effort, full delegation is better at eliciting effort by the agent in the second task, whereas, in comparison with partial delegation, it lowers effort in the first task. Although with contractible effort, the choice between the two organisational forms depends only on transmission costs and on the relative ability of its members, when moral hazard problems are taken into account, the organisational choice is related to the relative importance played by the two tasks in production. If the agent's task is relatively important in production, full delegation, encouraging a higher level of effort in this task, may be optimal, even if technological factors favour partial delegation. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.