FURTHER EVIDENCE ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE MERITS OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

To provide further evidence on the merits of securities class actions, we examine insider transactions immediately before and during the class period, using a larger and newer data set. We show that insiders reduce their stock sales by an abnormal amount immediately before the class period. Alternative measures of insider transactions and analysis of data before the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provide consistent results. These new findings indicate that class actions, on average, have merit. Our data also reestablish a previous empirical result that there is no abnormal selling during the class period.     

INSIDER TRADING,REGULATION, AND THE COMPONENTS OF THE BID–ASK SPREAD

In this article we investigate the relation between insider trading regulations and the bid–ask spread. We decompose the spread into its components before and after the enactment of strict new insider trading rules in New Zealand. We find that the enactment led to a significant decrease in the information asymmetry component of the spread, which is observed mainly in illiquid and high prechange information asymmetry companies. These findings are robust to model specification. In addition, we find a decrease in the contribution of information asymmetry to price volatility.     

INSTITUTIONAL TRADING AND OPENING PRICE BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM A FAST‐EMERGING MARKET

Using daily and intraday data, we investigate the cross‐sectional relation between stock prices and institutional trading in the Taiwan stock market. Consistent with the investigative herding hypothesis, we find that institutional herding exists because of institutional positive feedback trading behavior rather than following trades made by other institutions, as suggested by the information cascade hypothesis. Moreover, the positive correlation between institutional trade imbalance and stock returns mainly comes from institutional positive feedback trading. The institutional trading decisions rely on returns measured not only over the lagged trading day but also over the opening session during the same day.     

THE CHOICE OF TRADING VENUE AND RELATIVE PRICE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL TRADING: ADRs VERSUS THE UNDERLYING SECURITIES IN THEIR LOCAL MARKETS

We address two important themes associated with institutions’ trading in foreign markets: (1) the choice of trading venues (between a company's listing in its home market and that in the United States as an American Depositary Receipt [ADR]) and (2) the comparison of trading costs across the two venues. We identify institutional trading in both venues using proprietary institutional trading data. Overall, our research underscores the intuition that the choice of institutional trading in a stock's local market or as an ADR is a complex process that embodies variables that measure the relative adverse selection and liquidity at order, stock, and country levels. Institutions route a higher percentage of trades to more liquid markets, and these trades are associated with higher cumulative abnormal returns. We also find that institutional trading costs are generally lower for trading cross‐listed stocks on home exchanges even after controlling for selection bias.     

TRADING COSTS AND QUOTE CLUSTERING ON THE NYSE AND NASDAQ AFTER DECIMALIZATION

We examine execution costs and quote clustering on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ using 517 matching pairs of stocks after decimalization. We find that the mean spread of NASDAQ stocks is greater than the mean spread of NYSE stocks when spreads are equally weighted across stocks, and the difference is greater for smaller stocks. In contrast, the mean NASDAQ spread is narrower than the mean NYSE spread when spreads are volume weighted, and the difference is statistically significant for large stocks. Both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks exhibit high degrees of quote clustering on nickels and dimes, and quote clustering has a significant effect on spreads in both markets.     

MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP CHANGE AND FIRM VALUE: EVIDENCE FROM DUAL-CLASS RECAPITALIZATIONS AND INSIDER TRADING

We explore the relation between managerial ownership and firm value by examining a sample of firms that announce dual-class recapitalizations and the insider trading activity that precedes these announcements. Insider trading activity, unlike recapitalization, requires managers to commit their personal wealth and therefore serves as an indicator of the motivation behind the recapitalization. The recapitalization, in effect, allows managers to magnify the increase in vote ownership that results from insider buying and offsets the decrease in vote ownership that results from insider selling. This study adds to our understanding of dual-class recapitalizations by linking the wealth effects and changes in ownership concentration with ***manager-shareholder agency issues that follow from recapitalization and insider trading activity. Results show a positive relation between the change in firm value and ownership for recapitalizations before the 1984 New York Stock Exchange moratorium on delisting dual-class firms when ownership was high and control was firmly established. Results show a negative relation for recapitalizations since 1984 when ownership levels were lower and voting control was not assured. These results support the notion that more recent recapitalizations entrench managers.     

EXCHANGE LISTINGS AND DELISTINGS: THE ROLE OF INSIDER INFORMATION AND INSIDER TRADING

We examine whether insiders systematically exploit their private information before exchange listings and delistings they are likely to know about before outsiders/investors. Analyzing a comprehensive sample of over-the-counter (OTC) firms, which listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or American Stock Exchange (AMEX) during 1977–93, we find evidence that insiders act on their private information of an impending exchange listing by purchasing or postponing the sale of stock on private account. For firms delisting from the NYSE or AMEX, we find that insiders of these firms sell stock on private account before delisting. Overall, the evidence indicates that insiders act on their private information before exchange listings and delistings.     

THE FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF TRADING VOLUME REACTION TO FINANCIAL INFORMATION: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH

Prior empirical research indicates that trading volume reaction to new information increases with the heterogeneity of investors’ prior beliefs. We examine three potential factors that theoretical models of financial economists show determine trading volume reaction to new information: heterogeneous prior beliefs, differential interpretation, and the consensus effect—the extent to which the information causes their beliefs to converge or diverge. We find that these three factors have a distinct and significant incremental effect on trading volume, thereby suggesting that empirical trading volume models that exclude or fail to control for any of these determinants are misspecified with biased estimated coefficients.     

THE EFFECT OF CROSS‐LISTING ON TRADING VOLUME: REDUCING SEGMENTATION VERSUS SIGNALING INVESTOR PROTECTION

We examine the relation between cross‐listing on the U.S. and UK regulated and unregulated exchanges and trading volume for a sample of 500 foreign firms from 34 countries. We find that the increase in trading volume is a function of both reducing segmentation and signaling investor protection. In addition, we find that home market trading volume, firm size, firm returns, and analyst forecast accuracy are the major determinants of a firm's trading volume. We also show that U.S. and UK investors trade foreign securities that originate from low‐investor‐protection countries more than they trade those from high‐investor‐protection countries, which is consistent with the bonding hypothesis.     

ON THE INFORMATIONAL EFFECT OF SHORT‐SALES CONSTRAINTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE

Using a database of stock lending fees for Japanese centralized margin transactions, I show that short‐sales constraints reduce the adjustment speed of stock prices to negative information before the announcements of revised earnings forecasts disclosed by firms in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from July 1998 to December 2001. I find that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the stocks with high short‐sales costs are insensitive to negative information on pre‐announcement days, but the CARs of these stocks become significantly lower than the CARs of the stocks with low short‐sales costs when the announcements reveal negative information to the public.     

SLIPPAGE AND THE CHOICE OF MARKET OR LIMIT ORDERS IN FUTURES TRADING

Retail futures traders face uncertainty regarding the price they will obtain when trading. This price "surprise," known as slippage, can be substantial. Using unique data from an introducing brokerage for Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) wheat, corn, and soybean futures contracts, we quantify time-to-clear and the magnitude of slippage. We then identify factors that affect these trade quality measures. Finally, we analyze individual trader choice between market and limit orders and find that the likelihood of placing limit orders, where regulations protect traders from slippage, is greater when order and market characteristic indicate that adverse slippage is likely.     

THE BROKERAGE FIRM EFFECT IN HERDING: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA

We examine herding behavior of domestic and foreign investors in the Indonesian stock market. We document that both domestic and foreign investors from a particular brokerage firm tend to herd. The foreign investors exhibit a greater propensity to herd than domestic investors. However, when examining investor trading across brokerage firms, we find only weak evidence of herding by domestic investors and no herding by foreign investors. Our overall findings suggest a strong brokerage firm effect on herding but a weak marketwide effect. Moreover, we find evidence that the strong brokerage effect on herding is likely driven by acting on common information.     

THE EFFECT OF THE TRADING SYSTEM ON IPO UNDERPRICING: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1997 ORDER‐HANDLING RULES

We use a natural experiment resulting from the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission rule mandating a change in the order‐handling rules (OHR) for all NASDAQ stocks to test whether secondary market structure affects initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. We find that the increase in liquidity that the OHR represent led to a decrease in underpricing for cold NASDAQ IPOs, suggesting that when liquidity is lowest, changes in market liquidity display a negative relation to initial returns.     

INFORMATION AND NOISE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM THE E‐MINI INDEX FUTURES

I examine the informational contributions and effects on transitory volatility of trades initiated by different types of traders in three actively traded index futures markets. The results show that trades initiated by exchange member firms account for more than 60% of price discovery during the trading day. These institutional trades appear to be more informative than trades of individual exchange members or off‐exchange traders. I also find that off‐exchange traders introduce more noise into the prices than do exchange members. My findings provide new evidence on the role of different types of traders in the price formation process.     

THE ECONOMIC GAINS OF TRADING STOCKS AROUND HOLIDAYS

I assess the economic gains of strategies that account for the effect of holiday calendar effects on the daily returns and volatility of the 30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average index. The dynamic strategies use forecasts from stochastic volatility models that distinguish between regular trading days and different types of holidays. More important, I assess the economic value of conditioning on holiday effects and find that a risk-averse investor will pay a high performance fee to switch from a dynamic portfolio strategy that does not account for the effect of holidays on daily conditional expected returns and volatility to a strategy that does. This result is robust to reasonable transaction costs.     

SHORT SELLING AND PRICE DISCOVERY: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS

The underlying shares of some American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) can be short sold in their home markets, and others cannot. This institutional feature offers a unique opportunity to investigate the relation between short selling and price discovery. We hypothesize and confirm that ADR short selling on a U.S. exchange is more informative when the ADRs’ underlying shares cannot be short sold in the home market. These and related results suggest that short sellers make a significant contribution to price discovery. Short sellers’ trading activity, representing more than 20% of total ADR share volume, increases the benefits of cross‐listing on U.S. exchanges.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF DIVIDEND INCREASES ON STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY: THE EVIDENCE FROM THE OPTIONS MARKET

This paper examines the impact of the announcements of dividend increases on the volatility of underlying stock returns implied by option prices, and analyses whether the impact is related to the label associated with the dividend increase. The results suggest that the announcements of labelled dividend increases are accompanied by a decrease in implied volatility, while the announcements of unlabelled increases in dividends are associated with no change in implied volatility. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that signal implicit in the announcements of dividend increases provides noisy information about the firm's volatility.     

SENSITIVITY OF INVESTOR REACTION TO MARKET DIRECTION AND VOLATILITY: DIVIDEND CHANGE ANNOUNCEMENTS

We examine whether investor reactions are sensitive to the recent direction or volatility of underlying market movements. We find that dividend change announcements elicit a greater change in stock price when the nature of the news (good or bad) goes against the grain of the recent market direction during volatile times. For example, announcements to lower dividends elicit a significantly greater decrease in stock price when market returns have been up and more volatile. Similarly, announcements to raise dividends tends to elicit a greater increase in stock price when market returns have been normal or down and more volatile, although this latter tendency lacks statistical significance. We suggest an explanation for these results that combines the implications of a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model with behavioral considerations that link the responsiveness of investors to market direction and volatility.