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1.
This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re‐election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings. 相似文献
2.
Working with Sen social welfare functions (meaning explicit separability between mean income and income dispersion), we develop a generalized dual approach to tracking household inequality aspects of social welfare in general equilibrium. We highlight how household equity can be examined analytically alongside production efficiency in duality-based models, using our dual framework to explore potential trade-offs between efficiency and equity effects of trade policy. Our results complement the set of standard inequality results in trade theory focused on functional rather than household inequality. We also find that the relative distributional impact of tariffs on welfare is conditional on the initial level of inequality. 相似文献
3.
This paper focuses on the potential trade distorting effect of state trading enterprises, an issue that is likely to receive greater attention than hitherto in the context of the current agricultural negotiations in the WTO. Although state trading enterprises can arise in both exporting and importing countries, the emphasis here is on the importing country case. Our results show that state trading enterprises do distort trade, though the nature of the distortion (i.e., whether it is equivalent to an import tariff or import subsidy) depends on the nature of exclusive rights bestowed by government on the state enterprise. We also consider state trading enterprises in both developed and developing economies, the main difference being the nature of the government's pay-off function. The theoretical framework allows us to derive the tariff equivalent effects for various types of STEs, the results suggesting that the trade distorting effect is likely to vary considerably dependent on the type of STE that arises in particular circumstances. 相似文献
4.
Abstract. This paper introduces infant-industry considerations in political economy determination of trade protection. I build a model where the government cares about both political contributions and national welfare. A potentially beneficial high-tech industry is not viable in the country whose initial human capital is low. In the political economy equilibrium, we find that the tariff schedule will be V-shaped: it decreases initially to maintain the viability of the industry but increases thereafter as the industry expands and gains political power. We use the model to explain both China's tariff offers in WTO negotiations and GATT/WTO rules regarding developing countries. 相似文献
5.
Abstract . This is the first empirical study to examine Congressional support of a new law that distributes antidumping duties to protected firms. Because the law produces a transparent measure of how much each firm was rewarded for its efforts to secure the bill's passage, it provides researchers with a unique opportunity to study the link between the expected financial returns to firms, campaign contributions, and Congressional behaviour. Our results indicate that campaign contributions from beneficiaries increased the likelihood that lawmakers would sponsor the law, while contributions from the law's beneficiaries increased with the rewards they expected to receive. 相似文献
6.
While the mainstream of economic development theory focuses on the efficiency of policy measures, the role of the credibility of these measures is rarely analyzed. In this paper we argue that in less developed countries the problem of establishing the credibility of policy measures is at least as important as the problem of choosing the efficient policy solution. We claim that many of the difficulties less developed countries face can be understood in terms of lack of effective control on the discretionary power of governments, which ultimately leads to policies that are not credible. The private sector anticipates large swings in policies and reacts by withholding its resources. Symptoms of these credibility problems in less developed countries include the size of the informal sector, capital flight, and the reluctance of investors to commit capital. All of these reactions contribute to the slow economic growth in these countries. This paper concludes that establishing strategies for the control of state discretionary power is a crucial precondition for overcoming these problems and generating long term economic growth. 相似文献
7.
Arnaud Dellis 《Journal of Economic Theory》2009,144(2):772-801
We investigate whether letting people vote for multiple candidates would yield policy moderation. We do so in a setting that takes three key features of elections into account, namely, strategic voting, endogenous candidacy and policy motivation on the part of the candidates. We consider two classes of voting rules. One class consists of the voting rules where each voter casts several equally-weighed votes for the different candidates. The other class consists of the voting rules where each voter rank-orders the candidates. We identify conditions under which these voting rules yield policy moderation. We also show that these voting rules may yield policy extremism instead of policy moderation if one (or several) of the conditions is not satisfied! Finally, we find that amongst these voting rules the extent of policy moderation is maximal under the Borda Count if we consider only equilibria where all candidates are serious contenders. However, this result does not carry over to spoiler equilibria, where Approval Voting can yield more moderate policy outcomes than the Borda Count. 相似文献
8.
The current consensus on indirect tax reform in developing countries favors a reduction in trade taxes with an increase in VAT to raise revenue. The theoretical results on selective reform that underlie this consensus are, however, derived from partial models that ignore the existence of an informal economy. Once the incomplete coverage of VAT due to an informal economy is acknowledged, we show that, contrary to the current consensus, the standard revenue-neutral selective reform of trade taxes and VAT reduces welfare under plausible conditions. Moreover, a VAT base broadening with a revenue-neutral reduction in trade taxes may also reduce welfare. The results raise serious doubts about the wisdom of the indirect tax reform policies pursued by a large number of developing countries. 相似文献
9.
KOICHI KAGITANI 《The Japanese Economic Review》2009,60(2):236-252
This paper investigates the effect of a home firm's lobbying on a strategic export policy in a third market with a differentiated duopoly. We focus on its effect on domestic welfare under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Regardless of the mode of competition, the strategic export policy cannot improve domestic welfare in the presence of lobbying if the degree of product differentiation is high or the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. Moreover, for the same degree of product differentiation, the lobbying‐induced export policy is more likely to deteriorate domestic welfare relative to free trade under Cournot competition. 相似文献
10.
This paper proposes an empirical analysis to provide new insight into the trade diversion effects of antidumping (AD) policy. Trade diversion is the shift in trade from named countries in an AD investigation to non-named countries. Previous studies have concluded that AD action causes a considerable drop in exports from named countries, however the extent to which trade is diverted to non-named countries is still an open debate. This paper examines to see whether AD action on named countries can have signaling effects on non-named countries. To examine the trade effects on non-named countries, a time series data at an 8-digit product level is constructed for all cases initiated between 1997 and 2003 in the European Union. The paper provides evidence that antidumping policy has signaling effects on non-named imports. 相似文献
11.
In an important step forward Maskin [E. Maskin, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23–38] showed that two properties – monotonicity and no veto power – are together sufficient for Nash implementation. In contrast to the vast literature that followed, this characterization has two major advantages: First, it is often easy to verify, and second, it has an elegant and simple interpretation. However, there does not exist a similar condition for social choice correspondences that are implementable in strong equilibrium. All existing characterizations are either hard to verify or apply only to comprehensive preference domains. In this paper we improve the situation by giving one such condition. Moreover, using well-known examples we show that this is a practical tool. 相似文献
12.
We construct a bilateral trade model incorporating two physical goods and a financial asset (inside money) to discuss the optimal trade policy that countries would choose to maximize their respective utilities. In this Nash tariff game, the trade of physical commodities only occurs geographically across countries, and the trade of inside money allows for intertemporal allocation of consumptions. When the preferences, present and future endowments for each country are given, according to our numerical analysis, trade surplus or deficit (inside money) and optimal tariff rates are endogenously determined when general equilibrium conditions hold. One country may purchase inside money to shift current consumption to the future, and the other may be willing to issue inside money for smoothing its consumptions in two periods. This imbalance trade contradicts traditional trade models which imply a balanced trade policy. We further find that the price of inside money as an implied interest rate also is determined by the trade intervention policies. 相似文献
13.
Abstract. We investigate the limits of a mechanism for free trade area (FTA) formation that simultaneously satisfies internal industrialization targets. For arbitrary targets, we find necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee that the mechanism is efficient for member countries individually, even if other members do not implement the efficient policy. When the objective is conservative – designed to protect the level of industrialization previously achieved by the target industry – member countries are guaranteed gains from the efficient policy and their FTA participation. The analysis covers cases with transportation costs and explains why minimally restrictive rules of origin support efficiency and policy independence. 相似文献
14.
We analyze the costs of trade restrictions for a small developing economy (LDC). Intermediate goods invented elsewhere are only introduced on the LDC market if it is profitable to do so. The LDC economy evolves to a balanced growth path in which income, welfare, and the share of available goods increase if trade restrictions fall. The adjustment path is asymmetric: an increase in trade restrictions leads to a slow-down of economic growth, while a decrease may lead to a rapid catch-up process. The dynamic costs of trade restrictions are in general substantially larger than the static costs. 相似文献
15.
16.
In this paper, virtual implementation is restricted to deliver, on the equilibrium path, either a socially optimal outcome or a status quo: an outcome fixed for all preference profiles. Under such a restriction, for any unanimous and implementable social choice function there is a dictator, who obtains her most preferable outcome as long as all agents prefer this outcome to the status quo. Further restrictions on the lottery space and the range of social choice functions allow the dictator to impose her most preferred outcome even when other agents prefer the status quo to this outcome. 相似文献
17.
Jan I. Haaland 《Empirica》1993,20(2):107-127
In this paper production, trade and welfare effects of European integration are discussed, with particular emphasis on the effects for the EC and EFTA. Insights from previous partial and general equilibrium analyses of the internal market are reviewed, and new model simulations are presented. In addition to the standard experiments of 1992 — as reduced trade costs and as full market integration — for the EC alone, and for the European Economic Area (EEA), an intermediate case, with full integration in the EC but only lower trade costs between the EC and EFTA, is analysed. All cases show that EFTA will benefit significantly from freer trade and closer integration with the EC. With regard to non-European regions, the simulations of European integration show some degree of trade diversion, but stylized model experiments indicate that a successful outcome of the Uruguay-round may more than offset the trade-diverting effects of 1992. 相似文献
18.
Pranab Bardhan 《Journal of public economics》2005,89(4):675-704
We study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program. While governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture, centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption, owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic performance. Decentralizing the delivery system promotes cost-effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales. But interregional targeting may deteriorate, as central grants to high-poverty regions shrink, owing to high capture of local governments by local elites in such regions. 相似文献
19.
Abstract . We study U.S. agricultural antidumping and countervailing duty cases from 1980 to 2005, and gauge the effectiveness of trade remedy law as a form of protection. The purpose is to measure the resulting investigation and trade diversion effects. Previous research on trade in manufactured products has shown that the domestic protection offered by AD and CV duties is largely offset by trade diversion. In contrast, we find that for agriculture, trade diversion is relatively unimportant. So AD and CVD cases are very effective forms of protection for U.S. agriculture. 相似文献
20.
Rene Saran 《Journal of Economic Theory》2011,146(4):1712-1720
We extend the set of preferences to include menu-dependent preferences and characterize the domain in which the revelation principle holds. A weakening of the well-known contraction consistency is shown to define a subset of this domain. However, we show that minimax-regret preference can be outside the domain. 相似文献