Understanding the market reaction to shockwaves: Evidence from the failure of Lehman Brothers

The spectacular failure of the 150-year-old investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15th, 2008 was a major turning point in the global financial crisis that broke out in the summer of 2007. Through the use of stock market data and credit default swap (CDS) spreads, this paper examines investors’ reaction to Lehman's collapse in an attempt to identify a spillover effect on the surviving financial institutions. The empirical analysis indicates that (i) the collateral damage was limited to the largest financial firms; (ii) the institutions most affected were the surviving “non-bank” financial services firms; and (iii) the negative effect was correlated with the financial conditions of the surviving institutions. We also detect significant abnormal jumps in CDS spreads that we interpret as evidence of sudden upward revisions in the market assessment of future default probabilities assigned to the surviving financial firms.     

雷曼兄弟蒙难记

美国当地时间9月14日晚8点，纽约中心区曼哈顿人流如织。在第七大道雷曼兄弟公司总部门口挤满了记者和好奇的行人．警察小心翼翼地用隔离栏围住大门，以防不测。一位路人踮着脚尖往大门方向张望，“发生什么事情了，雷曼公司真的要倒闭     

雷曼兄弟申请破产1周年

摘自叶檀博客 9月15日，雷曼兄弟申请破产1周年。     

雷曼兄弟公司破产对中国QDII的影响

2008年9月14日,在美国政府接管"两房" (房地美和房利美)仅过一周,美国五大投行之一的雷曼兄弟控股集团公司(简称"雷曼兄弟")因陷入财务危机而无奈地宣布申请破产.受此利空消息的打击,当天全球主要股市出现普遍重跌,法兰克福、伦敦、纽约、巴黎等地股指跌幅一度超过4%,引发投资者对美国金融业的担忧和恐慌.     

雷曼迷你债券风波及其启示

本文介绍了雷曼迷你债券的特点以及造成这次雷曼迷你债券风波的原因,原因包括监管体系不适应金融创新的步伐;零售产品的投资者保护监管薄弱,具有系统性风险的投资产品的流动性以及透明度都很缺乏,最后得到一些对于中国的启示,包括建立以监管目标来划分的监管机构体系;在一些投资产品具有系统性风险之后,促进该产品公开二级市场的形成,提高市场的流动性和透明度;加强私募基金的监管;衍生工具的创造不能脱离实体经济.     

Analyst Impartiality and Investment Banking Relationships

This study examines whether investment banking ties influence the speed with which analysts convey unfavorable news. We hypothesize that affiliated analysts have incentives to respond promptly to good news but prefer not to issue bad news about client companies. Using duration models of the time between an equity issue and the first downgrade, we find affiliated analysts are slower to downgrade from Buy and Hold recommendations and significantly faster to upgrade from Hold recommendations, in both within‐analyst and within‐issuer tests. We also find affiliated analysts issue recommendations sooner and more frequently after an offering than unaffiliated analysts, and that unaffiliated analysts are more likely than affiliated analysts to drop coverage of sample firms. Our findings indicate that banking ties increase analysts' reluctance to reveal negative news, and that reform efforts must carefully consider the incentives of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts to initiate coverage and convey the results of their research.     

雷曼垮塌与融资之失

2008年9月15日,拥有158年历史的美国第四大投资银行——雷曼兄弟控股公司申请破产保护。华尔街“债券之王”的覆灭究竟能带来哪些启示     

The Value of Market Information in Banking Supervision: Evidence from Italy

We examine the potential use of signals arising from financial markets as a complement to the information set available to banking supervisors. We provide empirical evidence on Italian banks, using a unique dataset matching accounting ratios, market variables, and supervisory ratings. To verify what type of signal they are able to convey, we analyze the behavior of four equity-based indicators for the Italian banks listed on the Milan stock exchange. We then investigate whether the same indicators provide additional information for supervisors. Econometric results confirm the informative content of market variables and their complementarity with supervisory information.JEL Classification: Bank, banking supervision, early warning, market discipline     

The Demise of Investment Banking Partnerships: Theory and Evidence

In 1970 the New York Stock Exchange relaxed rules that prohibited the public incorporation of member firms. Investment banking concerns went public in waves, with Goldman Sachs the last of the bulge bracket banks to float. We explain the pattern of investment bank flotations. We argue that partnerships foster the formation of human capital and we use technological advances that undermine the role of human capital to explain the partnership's going‐public decision. We support our theory using a new data set of investment bank partnership statistics.     

On the Riskiness of Universal Banking: Evidence from Banks in the Investment Banking Business Pre- and Post-GLBA

We explore whether an economically significant differential exists in market-based risk measures between universal banks and traditional banks. Using a three-asset portfolio regression model, we find that between 1990 and 2007—a period of gradual deregulation culminating in passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999—an increased participation in investment banking was associated with higher total and unsystematic risks and no significant change in systematic risk. Small risk-reduction benefits emerged in the post-GLBA era, but such benefits were likely the result of the particular sample period rather than a fundamental change in bank structure following the GLBA. Our results cannot justify the GLBA on risk-reduction grounds, though the Act may be defensible for other reasons.     

Multiple versus Single Banking Relationships: Theory and Evidence

A theory of the optimal number of banking relationships is developed and tested using matched bank-firm data. According to the theory, relationship banks may be unable to continue funding profitable projects owing to internal problems and a firm may thus have to refinance from nonrelationship banks. The latter, however, face an adverse selection problem, as they do not know the quality of the project, and may refuse to lend. In these circumstances, multiple banking can reduce the probability of an early liquidation of the project. The empirical evidence supports the predictions of the model.     

Hedge funds as liquidity providers: Evidence from the Lehman bankruptcy

Hedge funds using Lehman as prime broker faced a decline in funding liquidity after the September 15, 2008 bankruptcy. We find that stocks held by these Lehman-connected funds experienced greater declines in market liquidity following the bankruptcy than other stocks; the effect was larger for ex ante illiquid stocks and persisted into the beginning of 2009. We find no similar effects surrounding the Bear Stearns failure, suggesting that disruptions surrounding bankruptcy explain the liquidity effects. We conclude that shocks to traders' funding liquidity reduce the market liquidity of the assets that they trade.     

雷曼破产检查报告揭示的主要问题及借鉴意义

此次国际金融危机中,雷曼兄弟是唯一一家申请破产的大型投行。美国破产法院对其进行了深入检查,揭示出其破产既有自身原因,如采取高风险的商业模式,实施逆势而动的经营策略,以及风险管理松懈等,同时也暴露出监管制度、外部约束、会计准则等方面仍存在很大不足。我国金融机构在制定经营策略、监管部门在进行风险判断时,应有更长远的对经济周期规律的认识;监管部门应就上市公司信息披露制定更严格、更详尽、更全面的规则;在风险控制方面要坚持发挥市场的基础性作用,监管应积极查找市场漏洞、弥补市场不足。     

Evidence of Information Spillovers in the Production of Investment Banking Services

We provide evidence that firms attempting IPOs condition offer terms and the decision whether to carry through with an offering on the experience of their primary market contemporaries. Moreover, while initial returns and IPO volume are positively correlated in the aggregate, the correlation is negative among contemporaneous offerings subject to a common valuation factor. Our findings are consistent with investment banks implicitly bundling offerings subject to a common valuation factor to achieve more equitable internalization of information production costs and thereby preventing coordination failures in primary equity markets.     

Bank Relationships and the Value Relevance of the Income Statement: Evidence from Income-Statement Conservatism

Abstract:  This study examines the effects of a firm's debt financing decision on the informativeness of the income statement. This study specifically examines the association between a firm's bank dependence and the value relevance of the income statement by investigating the income-statement conservatism of firms with bank loans. Focusing on relatively small businesses, this study finds that income-statement conservatism, measured as timely loss recognition, is increasing in a firm's bank dependence. This study also finds that the value relevance of the income statement is increasing in a firm's bank dependence. The findings of this paper suggest that the usefulness of the income statement varies with a firm's bank dependence, indicating that the value relevance of the income statement is a function of a firm's debt financing decision. The findings further suggest that bank relationships affect the value relevance of the income statement through their influence on income-statement conservatism.     

Insider Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

Real estate investment trust (REIT) provides a unique laboratory to study the relation between insider ownership and firm value. One, a REIT has to satisfy special regulations which weaken alternative mechanisms to control agency problems. Empirically, I find a significant and robust nonlinear relation between Tobin's Q and REIT insider ownership that is consistent with the trade-off between the incentive alignment and the entrenchment effect of insider ownership. Two, many REITs are Umbrella Partnership REITs (UPREITs) which have dual ownership structure. They have both common shares and Operating Partnership Units (OP units). Property owners can contribute their properties to the UPREIT in exchange for OP units. Their capital gains taxes remain deferred as long as they hold onto their OP units and the UPREIT does not sell the properties they contributed. OP units owners are locked in with the firm and have incentive to monitor firm management, but their interests diverge from the common shareholders because their tax bases are much lower. Consistent with the trade-off between positive monitoring effect of OP units and tax-induced agency costs, I find that UPREIT's firm value increases with the fraction of OP units, but the effect is significantly weaker for the UPREITs where insiders hold OP units.     

The Gains from Takeover Deregulation: Evidence from the End of Interstate Banking Restrictions

This paper uses interstate banking deregulation to explore the benefits of takeover deregulation and how these benefits are distributed across different firms. We find large and significant abnormal returns around the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 which imply it created $85 billion of value in the banking industry. Consistent with an active market for corporate control allowing beneficial consolidation and providing needed discipline, there is a strong negative relationship between banks' abnormal returns and their prior performance. Consistent with managerial entrenchment limiting takeover discipline, banks with higher insider ownership, lower outside block ownership, and/or less independent boards have lower abnormal returns.     

Banking Deregulation and Industry Structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985

We investigate how the deregulation of the French banking industry in the 1980s affected the real behavior of firms and the structure and dynamics of product markets. Following deregulation, banks are less willing to bail out poorly performing firms and firms in the more bank‐dependent sectors are more likely to undertake restructuring activities. At the industry level, we observe an increase in asset and job reallocation, an improvement in allocative efficiency across firms, and a decline in concentration. Overall, these findings support the view that a more efficient banking sector helps foster a Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction.”     

财务分析师盈利预测的投资价值:来自深沪A股市场的证据

本文研究了中国股票市场上财务分析师的盈利预测信息对投资者是否有价值。我们发现,可以利用公开的盈利预测制定可获利的套头交易策略。套头交易的回报率不仅在统计意义上显著大于零,而且在经济意义上也是显著的。这些结果不受不同的检验方法影响,也无法为我们所考虑到的风险因素所解释。本文的发现说明了中国的股票市场尚未达到Fama(1970)意义上的半强式有效,投资者在投资决策时可以利用分析师的盈利预测以提高其投资的回报。此外,本文的结果也有助于回答中国的财务分析师是否具有专业胜任能力这一颇有争议的问题。     

Credit Contagion Channels: Market Microstructure Evidence from Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy

Immediately after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, many firms disclosed their financial exposure (or lack thereof) to Lehman. This offers a clean setting to test two credit contagion channels through which a financial firm's bankruptcy can affect other firms—“counterparty risk” and “information transmission” channels. Using market microstructure variables to measure the various dimensions of contagion effects, we provide robust evidence supporting the significance of counterparty risk. Firms with exposure to Lehman suffered more severe negative effects—wider bid‐ask spread, higher price impact, greater information asymmetry, and greater selling pressure—than unexposed firms. We find mixed evidence regarding the information transmission hypothesis.