信息不对称下私募股权投资金融契约的选择

本文在金融契约理论基础上,分析了金融契约的要素,对不同国家私募股权投资的金融契约进行了对比分析,强调私募股权投资金融契约的动态设计,最后分析了中国的制度框架对私募股权投资金融契约设计的约束。     

金融期货合约规模设计研究

金融期货合约规模的大小会对市场交易造成影响。过小的合约规模将增加交易者的交易成本，而过大的合约规模却会阻止一些小额交易者进入市场，使得成交量减小，买卖价差价值扩大，市场交易效率降低。合约规模是否合理可通过比例法和合约风险价值法来判断。我国开展金融期货，可采用先大合约规模、后小合约规模方式进行。     

Optimal Loss Mitigation and Contract Design

This work examines the interaction between the premium rates set by an insurer and the incentives of an individual to purchase market insurance and undertake mitigation to reduce the size of a potential loss. A risk‐neutral monopolistic insurer prices insurance according to the price‐elasticity of demand for coverage. The elasticity of demand is affected by the presence of both mitigation and government intervention. The availability of loss reduction activities increases the consumer's elasticity of demand and lowers the optimal rate charged by the monopolist. Government intervention reduces both expenditures on mitigation and the rate charged by the monopolistic insurer.     

信息不对称下订单农业合约设计

基于绿色成本信息不对称,运用博弈方法,构建二级绿色订单农业供应链,考量订单农业合约设计.结果表明:信息不对称下,采用批发价合同,公司利润可能受损,当公司高估绿色成本时,农户获利;采用收益分享合同,公司利润可能受损,但有利农户.无论信息是否对称,当农户的保留收益、绿色努力成本系数或产出不确定性较小时,公司宜选择收益分享合同;反之,宜选择批发价合同.与批发价合同相比,菜单合同可以降低信息不对称性和供应链的"双边际"效应,激励农户增加绿色投入,促进优质绿色农产品供给和各主体增收.     

The Impact of a Rating Agency's Private Information and Disclosed Causes of Rating Downgrades on Insurer Stock Returns

Existing studies document that bond and insurer rating downgrades are associated with negative abnormal returns but generally do not consider the reasons for the downgrade disclosed or implied in the downgrade announcement. Using hand-collected press releases (downgrade announcements) of A.M. Best Company (Best) for a sample of publicly traded insurance firms during the period 1996–2012, we classify and analyze downgrades based on the disclosed causes of the downgrades and whether the rating agency has implied reliance upon unfavorable private information or opinion. We find that during the three-day event window (?1, +1), rating downgrades overall generate a statistically significant cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of negative 7.76%. A significantly more negative CAAR of negative 11.46% is found for “financial-prospects-deterioration” downgrades with the perceived presence of Best's private information or opinion. For downgrades without any indication of Best's private information or opinion, the CAAR is negative 3.35%, which is significantly different from zero but significantly less negative than the CAAR of downgrades where private information or opinion is indicated. Downgrades with reported causes other than deterioration of a firm's fundamental financial performance or condition, such as increases in financial leverage and increased business risk taking, produced statistically significant CAAR of negative 3.19% during the (?1, +1) three-day event window, which is also significantly less negative than the CAAR of downgrades where private information or opinion is indicated. Our results provide evidence that downgrades where private information or opinion is likely and downgrades due to a decline in fundamental financial profiles contain more value-relevant information than other types of downgrades.     

Political Cost Incentives for Managing the Property-Liability Insurer Loss Reserve

This paper examines the effect of rate regulation on the management of the property-liability insurer loss reserve. The political cost hypothesis predicts that managers make accounting choices to reduce wealth transfers resulting from the regulatory process. Managers may under-state reserves to justify lower rates to regulators. Alternatively, managers may have an incentive to report loss inflating discretionary reserves to reduce the cost of regulatory rate suppression. We find insurers over-state reserves in the presence of stringent rate regulation. Investigating the impact along the conditional reserve error distribution, we discover that a majority of the response occurs from under-reserving firms under-reserving less because of stringent rate regulation.     

Asymmetric Information Problems in Taiwan's Automobile Insurance Market: The Effect of Policy Design on Loss Characteristics

This article investigates asymmetric information problems for the automobile insurance market in Taiwan. Using panel data for the comprehensive automobile insurance coverage from 1995 to 1999, this article analyzes how types of coverage, deductible amounts, and experience ratings have affected the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in Taiwan's automobile insurance market. The empirical results provide partial evidence to demonstrate that the loss frequency and loss ratio were reduced by the addition of self-selection mechanisms in policies with different levels of coverage. In addition, the deductible amounts, experience ratings, and better control of underwriting and claims processing were shown possibly to have decreased potential losses from adverse selection and moral hazard problems.     

The Design of an Optimal Area Yield Crop Insurance Contract

This article focuses on the design of a crop insurance contract when the indemnity is based on the aggregate yield of a surrounding geographical area. Coinsurance under a critical yield often provides an efficient sharing of systemic risk. Under a linear relationship between individual yield and aggregate yield, the optimal form depends on the individual beta coefficient, which measures the sensitivity of individual yield to aggregate yield. The optimal hedging position of the producer on the yield options market is to buy put options or call options depending upon whether his beta coefficient is positive or negative.     

Disappointment and the Optimal Insurance Contract

This paper studies the optimal insurance contract under disappointment theory. We show that, when the individuals anticipate disappointment, there are two types of optimal insurance contract. The first type contains a deductible and a coinsurance above the deductible. We find that zero marginal cost is just a sufficient but not a necessary condition for a zero deductible. The second type has no deductible and the optimal insurance starts with full coverage for small losses and includes a coinsurance above an upper value of the full coverage.     

Security Design with Investor Private Information

I study the security design problem of a firm when investors rather than managers have private information about the firm. I find that it is often optimal to issue information‐sensitive securities such as equity. The “folklore proposition of debt” from traditional signaling models only goes through if the firm can vary the face value of debt with investor demand. When the firm has several assets, debt backed by a pool of assets is optimal when the degree of competition among investors is low, while equity backed by individual assets is optimal when competition is high.     

Effects of Competition on Insurance Contract Formation

For an insurance transaction between a single risk-averse buyer and single risk-neutral seller with positive transaction costs, it is well known that the buyer will prefer a policy contract with an ordinary deductible. More detailed results demonstrate the Pareto optimality of an insurance contract characterized by a deductible (followed by coinsurance) for a single risk-averse buyer and single risk-averse seller. In the present work, we employ a market-game model to solve for the equilibrium insurance contract. This formulation, which approximates the behavior of excess property insurance and property catastrophe reinsurance markets, reveals that the equilibrium policy is described by full insurance up to a given policy limit, with no deductible or coinsurance. Our analysis shows further that this solution persists regardless of the numbers of buyers and sellers in the market, and in particular that the market-game equilibrium does not converge to a Pareto-optimal result because of boundary constraints on the number of sellers. Finally, we test our price-formation mechanism against an important generalization, and find that the policy-limit contract persists.     

不确定性、信息不对称与风险投资契约工具选择

现代契约理论认为，契约结构在很大程度上由信息分布决定。由于人力资本内生不确定性导致的信息不对称，使得可转换优先股在风险投资契约中被广泛使用。本文认为，其原因在于可转换优先股隐含了更多的选择权，可以更好地适应风险投资过程中的不确定性。     

On the Revelation of Private Information in the U.S. Crop Insurance Program

The crop insurance program is a prominent facet of U.S. farm policy. The participation of private insurance companies as intermediaries is justified on the basis of efficiency gains. These gains may arise from either decreased transaction costs through better established delivery channels and/or the revelation of private information. We find empirical evidence suggesting that private information is revealed by insurance companies via their reinsurance decisions. However, it is unlikely that such information will be incorporated into subsequent premium rates by the government.     

合同无效,保险公司为何赔偿

案情介绍 梁某通过保险代理人张某(系韩某的侄子)为其夫韩某购买了一份保险。据张某介绍,该险种保费低,保障高,如果交了10年保费,没有风险就可以转为养老险。梁某当场缴纳了700余元的首期保费,张某给梁某出具了一张临时收据,说正式保单随后拿来。因为是亲戚,张某又曾为其办过几份保险,梁某也没有考虑太多,从缴纳首期保费直到韩某身亡近1年的时间里,梁     

私人秩序:合约理论视角解析

不同语境下的私人秩序的概念、类型、维度等基本问题构成了整个微观制度研究的图景。在单张合约视角下,私人秩序实质是一种化解交易冲突的治理结构;在互联合约视角下,私人秩序实质是合约间的互联机制。私人秩序的理论类型从二元划分转变到了多元划分,但依然难以概括经验中的契约多样性,因此需要对其维度化处理。鉴于比较经济组织视角的私人秩序结构维度在分析层面、维度化依据、内部效度上存在严重问题,基于文本视角重新进行私人秩序的结构维度化分析,私人秩序由激励、协调、权威三个维度构成。这些关于私人秩序的概念界定与维度化处理都是未来微观制度测量与计量分析的基础。     

揭开保险合同准备金计量的面纱——对IASB保险合同会计准则征求意见稿的述评

国际会计准则理事会(IASB)于今年7月30日发布了保险合同会计准则征求意见稿,提出了履约现金流现值加剩余边际的保险合同准备金计量模式。本文系统介绍了该模式的主要内容及相关研究观点,分析了该模式存在的问题,并提出了改进建议。本文认为,该模式虽然能够提高保险公司准备金信息的有用性,但依然受到了传统精算理论的影响,没有完全遵循会计基本原则和方法。只有彻底摆脱精算理论的束缚,才能揭开保险合同准备金计量的面纱。     

Examining the Marginal Access Value of Private Health Insurance

According to a new theory advanced by Nyman (1999, 2003) , an important access motivation underlies the demand for health insurance. However, little empirical research has attempted to quantify and explain changes in the access value of health insurance. By assuming the demand for health insurance is derived from the demand for good health, this article shows mathematically that the marginal access value of private health insurance can be reasonably indexed by dividing the price of health insurance by a composite measure of medical prices. For the period from 1960 through 2002, national data for the United States suggests that the marginal access value of private health insurance has tended to increase over time. Based upon multiple regression analysis, marginal access value is shown to have increased over time in response to rising income, more generous benefit coverage, new medical technologies, and, in recent years, the backlash against health maintenance organizations (HMOs). In addition, expansions in the Medicaid program are shown to have slowed the growth of the marginal access value of private health insurance.     

Empirical Evidence on the Value of Group‐Level Financial Information in Insurer Solvency Surveillance

The existing empirical research on insurer insolvency relies almost exclusively upon individual insurance company financial data, even though the insurance industry is dominated by group‐affiliated firms. This is the first study to evaluate the benefit of using group‐level data to predict insurer insolvencies for group‐affiliated insurers. The study uses financial ratios from the NAIC FAST scoring system, measured at both the company level and group level, as potential predictor variables. The results indicate that group‐level financial information substantially improves the predictive power of an insolvency prediction model relative to a model that uses only the analogous company‐level variables. In fact, the group‐level variables are found to often be substantially more powerful than company‐level variables in predicting individual insurer insolvencies. These results suggest that future insolvency analysis should, whenever feasible, include group‐level information to obtain higher predictive accuracy.