Intra- and international risk-sharing in the short run and the long run

We investigate empirically how industrialized countries and US states share consumption risk at horizons between 1 and 30 years. US federal states share about 50% of their permanent idiosyncratic risk through cross-state capital income flows. While insurance against transitory fluctuations in output is virtually complete, OECD countries do not share any of their permanent idiosyncratic risk. Our results suggest that purely transaction cost based theories cannot explain the home bias, since the potential welfare gains from insurance against permanent shocks would by far outweigh that of insuring against transitory variation. We conclude that permanent and transitory shocks constitute two qualitatively different kinds of risk and that various forms of endogenous market incompleteness may render permanent shocks a lot harder to insure, in particular at the international level.     

Income and consumption smoothing and welfare gains across Pacific Island Countries: The role of remittances and foreign aid

We examine the potential welfare gains and channels of income smoothing for Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and find that, under full risk sharing overall welfare gains across all PICs (particularly, Kiribati, Palau, and Papua New Guinea) are at desirable levels. However, for Australia, the potential welfare gain from risk sharing is almost similar to the gain it obtains if Australia attains full risk sharing with the rest of the OECD countries or with New Zealand alone. We also break down output using the framework of Sørensen and Yosha (1998) to quantify the extent and channels of risk sharing across PICs. For PICs, income-smoothing channels (net factor income and current transfers) play a significant role in buffering the output shock compared to the performance of those channels on smoothing the output shock for OECD countries. Domestic savings also smooth a fair portion of shocks to output, but the extent is much lower compared to that of OECD countries. Further, we analyze the effect of remittances and foreign aid on income smoothing for the PICs excluding Australia and New Zealand. Income smoothing via remittances is highly volatile and significant in recent years, while foreign aid seems to be a stronger and more stable channel for smoothing domestic output shocks for PICs.     

Risk sharing in the Middle East and North Africa

This study investigates welfare gains and channels of risk sharing among 14 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, including the oil‐rich Gulf region and the resource‐scarce economies such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. The results show that for the 1992–2009 period, the overall welfare gains across MENA countries were higher than those documented for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations. In the Gulf region, the amount of factor income smoothing does not differ considerably when output shocks are longer lasting rather than transitory, whereas the amount smoothed by savings increases remarkably when shocks are longer lasting. In contrast, both factor income flows and international transfers respond more to permanent shocks than to transitory shocks in the non‐oil MENA countries. The results also show that a significant portion of shocks is smoothed via remittance transfers in the economically less‐developed MENA countries, but not in the oil‐rich Gulf and OECD countries. Finally, for the overall MENA region, a large part of the shock remains unsmoothed, suggesting that more market integration is needed to remedy the weak link of incomplete risk sharing.     

The effect of the euro on foreign direct investment

In this paper the recent effect of the European Monetary Union on inward FDI-flows is examined using a difference-in-differences approach. The estimated results show that the introduction of the euro raised inward FDI flows by approximately 16% within the euro area, by approximately 11% to non-members and weakly by around 8% from non-member countries into the euro area. Moreover, the geographical effects of the euro are explored. The results show partial agglomeration tendencies for the euro area. There are also some indications of increased importance of vertical specialization in the sample.     

Corporate transparency, cream-skimming and FDI

We develop a simple information-based model of Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. On the one hand, the relative abundance of “intangible” capital in specialized industries in the source countries, which presumably generates expertise in screening investment projects in the host countries, enhances FDI flows. On the other hand, host-country relative corporate-transparency diminishes the value of this expertise, thereby reducing the flow of FDI. The model also demonstrates that the gains for the host country from FDI [over foreign portfolio investment (FPI)] are reflected in a more efficient size of the stock of domestic capital and its allocation across firms. These gains are shown to depend crucially (and positively) on the degree of competition among FDI investors. We provide also some evidence on the effects of corporate transparency indicators, such as accounting standards, on bilateral FDI flows from a panel of 24 OECD countries over the period of 1981-1998.     

Does financial globalization promote risk sharing?

In theory, one of the main benefits of financial globalization is that it should allow for more efficient international risk sharing. In this paper, we provide an empirical evaluation of the patterns of risk sharing among different groups of countries and examine how international financial integration has affected the evolution of these patterns. Using a variety of empirical techniques, we conclude that there is at best a modest degree of international risk sharing, and certainly nowhere near the levels predicted by theory. In addition, only industrial countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization. Developing countries have, by and large, been shut out of this benefit. Even emerging market economies, many of which have reduced capital controls and all of which have witnessed large increases in cross-border capital flows, have seen little change in their ability to share risk. We find that the composition of flows may help explain why emerging markets have not been able to realize this presumed benefit of financial globalization. In particular, our results suggest that portfolio debt, which had dominated the external liability stocks of most emerging markets until recently, is not conducive to risk sharing.     

Debt Crises and Risk‐Sharing: The Role of Markets versus Sovereigns

Using a variance decomposition of shocks to gross domestic product (GDP), we quantify the role of international factor income, international transfers, and saving in achieving risk‐sharing during the recent European crisis. We focus on the subperiods 1990–2007, 2008–2009, and 2010 and consider separately the European countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. We decompose risk‐sharing from saving into contributions from government and private saving, and show that fiscal austerity programs played an important role in hindering risk‐sharing during the sovereign debt crisis.     

东亚消费风险分担的度量及潜在福利分析

文章利用1970-2004年的相关数据,度量了东亚13个经济体的消费风险分担的程度以及东亚地区在实现完全风险分担后带来的潜在福利收益.实证结果表明:东亚区域资本市场在平滑GDP冲击方面的作用非常小,对区域借贷市场虽有一定的作用,但较为有限,这说明东亚的消费风险分担程度还相当低;相比OECD国家和欧盟国家,东亚各经济体风险分担的福利收益是比较高的.     

European monetary union, adjustment, and exchange rate variability

This paper uses a three-country, three-good, factor-specific model of trade with wage rigidities to investigate how European Monetary Union is likely to affect exchange rate variability. Focusing on international macroeconomic adjustment under both exogenous and optimizing monetary policies, it shows that the relative variability (against external currencies) of the euro and a basket of predecessor currencies depends on the relative sizes and specialization patterns of countries and the relative importance of different shocks. Monetary union is likely to decrease (increase) aggregate European exchange rate variability for shocks to industries in which large (small) euro area countries specialize.     

Rigid labour markets with trade and capital mobility: theory and evidence

Abstract We develop a multi‐country model with imperfect labour markets to study the effect of labour market frictions on bilateral trade flows. We use a framework that allows for goods trade and capital mobility and show that labour market imperfections exert opposite effects in the absence of capital mobility (the short run) and its presence (the long run), respectively. In the short run, a higher degree of labour market rigidity decreases the value of total trade, but increases the share of intra‐industry trade for a country that is larger than its trading partner. The reverse effects are observed when capital is allowed to cross country borders. Using data on unemployment and income distribution for 23 OECD countries, we compute the central parameter in our theoretical model that describes the degree of labour market rigidity. We use this new empirical concept to provide evidence for our theoretical findings by means of reduced‐form regressions as well as simulation results of a calibrated general equilibrium model.     

Trade effects of monetary agreements: Evidence for OECD countries

This paper analyses the effects of monetary agreements on trade flows using a sample of 25 OECD countries over the period 1950-2004. We find that these agreements have boosted intra-bloc trade. This result especially applies to the case of the euro. More importantly, in contrast to regional trade agreements, all monetary agreements analysed show evidence of trade-creating effects with third countries. Finally, only the euro shows a symmetric impact for the trade-creating effect with non-members, that is, using the euro promotes both the Eurozone's exports and its imports to non-Eurozone markets to a similar extent.     

Foreign portfolio diversification and risk-sharing

We investigate income smoothing associated with international portfolio diversification by decomposing the net factor income (NFI) channel into interests, dividends and retained earnings, for OECD and EU countries. We find that interest receipts and equity dividend payments contribute significantly to absorb domestic income shocks. Geographically concentrated portfolios and, in particular, biases toward EU markets have a strong negative effect on the degree of risk-sharing.     

Social capital, innovation and growth: Evidence from Europe

This paper investigates the interplay between social capital, innovation and per capita income growth in the European Union. We model and identify innovation as an important mechanism that transforms social capital into higher income levels. In an empirical investigation of 102 European regions in the period 1990-2002, we show that higher innovation performance is conducive to per capita income growth and that social capital affects this growth indirectly by fostering innovation. Our estimates suggest that there is no direct role for social capital to foster per capita income growth in our sample of European Union countries.     

The effects of company taxation in EU accession countries on German FDI1

This article investigates how company taxation affects German foreign direct investment (FDI) in European Union (EU) accession countries. In 2004 and 2007, 10 former socialist eastern European countries joined the EU. Although the EU integration is associated with increasingly favourable investment conditions, accession countries also pursue active strategies to attract foreign firms. In particular, taxes on corporate income have been significantly reduced during the last decade. We analyse whether corporate tax policies of eastern European countries affect three aspects of multinational activity: the location decision, the investment decision and the capital structure choice. The results suggest that local taxes are negatively related to both location and investment decisions. The analysis of the capital structure confirms that higher local taxes imply higher debt‐to‐capital ratios.     

International Comparisons of Living Standards by Equivalent Incomes*

We propose a measure of living standards for international comparisons. Based on GDP per capita, the measure incorporates corrections for international flows of income, labor, risk of unemployment, healthy life expectancy, household demography and inequalities. The method for comparing populations that differ in some non‐income dimension consists of computing the equivalent variation of income that would make each population indifferent between its current situation and a reference situation with respect to the non‐income dimension. This is applied to 24 OECD countries. The obtained ranking of countries differs substantially from the GDP ranking.     

Capital Mobility—Resource Gains or Losses? How,When, and for Whom?

This paper investigates which of the two types of countries—resource‐rich or resource‐poor—gains from capital market integration and capital tax competition. We develop a framework involving vertical linkages through resource‐based inputs as well as international fiscal linkages between the two types of countries. Our analysis shows that capital market integration causes capital flows from resource‐poor to resource‐rich countries and improves global production efficiency. However, such gains accrue only to resource‐poor countries, and capital mobility might even negatively affect resource‐rich countries. Furthermore, we show that resource‐rich countries can exploit the gains when taxes on capital are available.     

Sudden stops in a currency union – some lessons from the euro area

During the Great Financial Crisis several euro area Member States with current account deficits were subject to sharp reversals of private capital flows. We examine how the specific policy rules of the euro area's payments system TARGET2 affects the macroeconomic adjustments to sudden stops. We find that – in the short run – public capital flows in form of TARGET2 help euro area‐deficit countries to stabilize output, consumption, and investment after a sudden stop of private capital inflows. In the long run, however, euro area countries suffer under a prolonged economic recovery and accumulated large public debt as well as higher welfare losses relative to euro peggers.     

Income insurance and the determinants of income insurance via foreign asset revenues and foreign liability payments

We document that the net factor income smoothing channel in OECD countries is primarily driven by net financial asset income, while the other two sub‐components (net compensation of employees and net taxes on imports) turn out to be ineffective. Once factor income inflows are distinguished from outflows, empirical evidence suggests a non-significant effect of inflows in terms of income smoothing as opposed to a positive and significant role of factor income outflows. Factor income outflows also appear to be robust with respect to positive output shocks, while neither factor inflows nor factor outflows provide insurance against negative output shocks. In terms of the determinants of income smoothing, results indicate that an increase in foreign equity and debt liabilities positively affect the extent of smoothing via factor income outflows. Whereas, contrary to the current literature, an increase in foreign asset holding does not have a positive impact on smoothing via factor income inflows. European investors' tendency of allocating a sizeable portion of their assets within the Euro zone is shown to undermine income smoothing.     

Donor ideology and types of foreign aid

We examine how donor government ideology influences the composition of foreign aid flows. We use data for 23 OECD countries over the period 1960–2009 and distinguish between multilateral and bilateral aid, grants and loans, recipient characteristics such as income and political institutions, tied and untied aid, and aid by sector. The results show that leftist governments increased the growth of bilateral grant aid, and more specifically grant aid to least developed and lower middle-income countries. Our findings confirm partisan politics hypotheses because grants are closely analogous to domestic social welfare transfer payments, and poverty and inequality are of greatest concern for less developed recipient countries.     

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the currents of trade

This paper examines how criminalizing the act of bribing a foreign public official affects international trade flows using a watershed global anti-corruption initiative — the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. I exploit variation in the timing of implementation by exporting countries and in the level of corruption of importing countries to quantify the Convention's effects on bilateral exports. I use a large panel of country pairs to control for confounding global and national trends and shocks. I find that, on average, the Convention caused a reduction in exports from signatory countries to high corruption importers relative to low corruption importers. In particular, we observe a 5.7% relative decline in bilateral exports to importers that lie one standard deviation lower on the Worldwide Governance Indicators corruption index. This suggests that by creating large penalties for foreign bribery, the Convention indirectly increased transaction costs between signatory countries and high corruption importers. The Convention may have induced OECD firms to divert their exports to less corrupt countries; while non-OECD firms not bound by the Convention may have increased their exports to corrupt countries. I also find evidence that the Convention's effects differed across product categories.