Team Incentives and Reference‐Dependent Preferences

We investigate a multi‐agent moral‐hazard model where agents have expectation‐based reference‐dependent preferences à la K?szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We show that even when each agent's probability of success in a project is independent, a principal may employ team incentives. Because the agents are loss averse, they have first‐order risk aversion to wage uncertainty. This causes the agents to work harder when their own failure is stochastically compensated through other agents' performance. In the optimal contract, agents with high performance are always rewarded, whereas agents with low performance are rewarded if and only if other agents' performance is high.     

Team Incentives under Relative Performance Evaluation

This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives in the repeated setting with many agents under the restriction that only relative performance evaluation is feasible for contracting. We show that the optimal contract in the repeated setting may take a different form than that in the static setting. In the repeated setting, it may be optimal for the principal to arbitrarily divide the agents into teams and compensate them based on team ranking, as it allows the principal to motivate the agents through peer sanctions. The situation draws a clear contrast to the static setting where such a strategy is never optimal. The result indicates that the concept of team plays an important role in the repeated setting even when performances can only be evaluated in relative terms.     

Self‐managed work teams: An efficiency‐rationale for pay compression

This paper uncovers a novel mechanism through which pay dispersion can have a negative effect on firm performance, even in the absence of equity or fairness considerations. We use a stylized model of a self‐managed work team to show that, when team‐work involves heterogeneous tasks, the provision of incentives to exert effort conflicts with the provision of incentives to share information relevant for decision‐making. Pay dispersion deteriorates information sharing as it induces workers to conceal “bad news” to maintain their coworkers motivation. The practical implications of our theory are that team empowerment should go hand in hand with pay compression and that empowerment should be avoided when team production involves strongly heterogeneous tasks.     

Incentives in academics: Collaboration under weak complementarities

This paper considers a contracting relationship with multiple agents in a repeated setting under voluntary team formation. In each period, an opportunity to collaborate arrives stochastically but whether this opportunity has arrived is the agents' private information. The principal thus cannot simply tell them when to collaborate; she must instead guide them through incentives. The optimal contract in the repeated setting can drastically be different from that in the static setting and is often characterized as high-powered team incentives complemented with inefficiently low-powered individual incentives, which endogenously raise the cost of shirking. We then argue that low-powered incentives offered for non-collaborative works, as often observed in our profession, can be seen as an important part of optimal incentive schemes in an attempt to endogenously raise the cost of shirking. The mechanism presented here also has implications for internal team competition (team competition within firms) which has become increasingly popular these days.     

Whistle‐Blowing and Incentives in Firms

Whistle‐blowing is an important mechanism of corporate governance. We show that whistle‐blowing has negative effects on productive efficiency by undermining the incentives within a corporate hierarchy. In our model, a top manager intends to overreport earnings; a division manager may have evidence about the intended overreporting. We show that the division manager is more likely to have such evidence when the performance of his own division is low. Top management may offer a bribe to prevent the manager from blowing the whistle. This provides the division manager with an additional payoff when his division’s output is low. Therefore, potential whistle‐blowing undermines the division manager’s incentives to exert effort, which results in a less efficient outcome.     

Broad Cross‐License Negotiations

In many industries, broad cross‐license agreements are considered a useful method to obtain freedom to operate and to avoid patent litigation. In this paper, I study firm incentives to sign a broad cross‐license as well as the duration of broad cross‐license negotiations. I develop a model of bargaining with learning, which predicts that two firms will enter a broad cross‐license agreement only if their capital intensities are large enough. The model also predicts faster negotiations when firms have high capital intensities and when the frequency of future disputes is low. I confirm these predictions empirically using a novel data set on cross‐licensing and litigation in the US semiconductor industry.     

Taxing capital is a good idea: The role of idiosyncratic risk in an OLG model

We investigate an overlapping generations (OLG) model in which agents who live for two periods receive idiosyncratic productivity shocks when they are old. We show that, around zero tax equilibria, we can always construct a combination of a small capital tax and a lump-sum transfer that are Pareto-improving. As Dávila et al. (Econometrica (2012)) show, a capital reduction in one period raises the welfare level of agents who are old in that period, but lowers that of the young agents, because it reduces their wages. We show that the government can compensate for these wage losses by additionally taxing the old agents, such that their welfare gains remain positive. Our result is unchanged when earnings are uncertain at young age.     

Spurious Regression and Trending Variables*

This paper analyses the asymptotic and finite‐sample implications of different types of non‐stationary behaviour among the dependent and explanatory variables in a linear spurious regression model. We study cases when the non‐stationarity in the dependent and explanatory variables is deterministic as well as stochastic. In particular, we derive the order in probability of the t‐statistic in a spurious regression equation under a variety of empirically relevant data generation processes, and show that the spurious regression phenomenon is present in all cases when both dependent and explanatory variables behave in a non‐stationary way. Simulation experiments confirm our asymptotic results.     

Venture Capital Exit Rights

We investigate when and how venture capital contracts use exit rights such as drag‐along and tag‐along rights. Utilizing a data set of venture capital contracts from Germany, we find that almost all contracts allocate exit rights to the venture capitalist (VC) rather than to the entrepreneur. In our data set, the vast majority of exit rights deal with the sale of the entire company to a strategic investors rather than with initial public offerings (IPOs). We show that venture capital contracts include exit rights to mitigate potential hold‐up problems of the VC in the case of exit.     

High‐Performance Work Systems in Professional Service Firms: Examining the Practices‐Resources‐Uses‐Performance Linkage

Professional service firms (PSFs) play an important role in the knowledge‐based economy. Their success is highly dependent on their people, the knowledge resources they possess, and how they use these resources. However, how to systematically manage human resources to attain high performance is not fully understood. This study addresses this issue by investigating the linkage mechanisms through which high‐performance work systems (HPWS) influence the performance of PSFs. We integrate resource‐based and dynamic capability theories in order to identify and investigate two intervening mechanisms that link HR practices to firm performance. The first mechanism is the intellectual capital resources comprising the human, social, and organizational capital that HPWS create. The second mechanism is the uses to which both HPWS and resources can be applied, operationalized as organizational ambidexterity, the simultaneous exploitation of existing knowledge and exploration of new knowledge. These mechanisms are hypothesized to link HPWS to firm performance in the form of a practices‐resources‐uses‐performance linkage model. Results from a longitudinal study of 93 accounting firms support this linkage model. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

DO PEERS AFFECT STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT? EVIDENCE FROM CANADA USING GROUP SIZE VARIATION

We provide the first empirical application of a new approach proposed by Lee (Journal of Econometrics 2007; 140 (2), 333–374) to estimate peer effects in a linear‐in‐means model when individuals interact in groups. Assumingsufficient group size variation, this approach allows to control for correlated effects at the group level and to solve the simultaneity (reflection) problem. We clarify the intuition behind identification of peer effects in the model. We investigate peer effects in student achievement in French, Science, Mathematics and History in secondary schools in the Province of Québec (Canada). We estimate the model using conditional maximum likelihood and instrumental variables methods. We find some evidence of peer effects. The endogenous peer effect is large and significant in Mathematics but imprecisely estimated in the other subjects. Some contextual peer effects are also significant. In particular, for most subjects, the average age of peers has a negative effect on own test score. Using calibrated Monte Carlo simulations, we find that high dispersion in group sizes helps with potential issues of weak identification. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social distance,heterogeneity and social interactions

A crucial ingredient in social interaction models is the structure of peer groups, which link individuals with similar characteristics. We propose and study a dynamic binary choice model with social interactions in which heterogeneity of peer group effects is modeled introducing diversity in individual characteristics and linking pairwise influences to a social distance between individuals. Our framework allows for mimetic as well as anti-mimetic interactions and a heterogeneous structure of peer groups across individuals. Dynamic equilibria are studied in the limit when the number of agents is large. We show that the model exhibits multiple equilibria resulting from conflicts between various group pressures the individuals are subjected to. We study in particular the correlation in the population at equilibrium between the characteristics of the agents and their decisions: this quantity has an interesting empirical interpretation and solves a simple analytical equation when the number of agents is large. Finally we discuss the empirical content of the model and present a consistent estimator for the parameter describing which is consistent for any typical population regardless of the structure of individual characteristics.     

A model of Russia's “virtual economy”

The Russian Economy has evolved into a hybrid form, a partially monetized quasi-market system that has been called the virtual economy. In the virtual economy, barter and non-monetary transactions play a key role in transferring value from productive activities to the loss-making sectors of the economy. We show how this transfer takes place, and how it can be consistent with the incentives of economic agents. We analyze a simple partial-equilibrium model of the virtual economy, and show how it might prove an obstacle to industrial restructuring and hence marketizing transition.     

Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and linear individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is nonobservable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, the two incentive schemes need to be combined to serve both incentive and selection purposes. If harder working agents respond less to intensified effort incentives, we find that the principal puts less emphasis on individual performance pay when selection becomes more important. Thus, we provide a possible explanation as to why, in practice, individual performance pay is less prevalent than promotion‐based incentives.     

Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions

Firms appoint CEOs with different types of human capital in order to manage resource dependencies. How CEOs are compensated thus can be conceptualized as a valuation process of how boards view the value of CEOs' human capital. Two types of human capital – international experience and political ties – have emerged as potential drivers of CEO compensation during institutional transitions. But how they impact CEO compensation has remained unclear. We develop a resource dependence‐based, contingency framework to focus on the external and internal factors that enable or constrain human capital to impact CEO compensation. Because of the tremendous regional diversity within China, externally, we focus on the level of marketization of the region in which firms are headquartered. Internally, we pay attention to two corporate governance mechanisms: politically connected outside directors and compensation committee. Data from 10,329 firm‐year observations at 94 per cent of listed firms in China largely support our framework. Overall, our study contributes to resource dependence research by extending this research to the context of institutional transitions with a focus on how human capital impacts CEO compensation.     

Peer Performance Evaluation: Information Aggregation Approach

This paper studies how peer performance evaluation can elicit information on a group of workers when coworkers are competing for promotion. Although raters may have an incentive to game the system and free‐ride on others’ information, the firm can implement the optimal peer evaluation system that induces truth revelation and complements supervisory evaluation. Implications are also drawn for human resource management practices.     

Interaction of human and physical capital in a model of endogenous growth

A model of development is presented where growth is initially driven by physical capital accumulation, as in the neoclassical model. After a critical level of physical capital is reached, the economy takes off and enters a stage of sustained growth driven by human capital accumulation. The link between these two stages is provided by the assumption that private incentives for human capital accumulation increase with the average levels of human and physical capital. At the early stages of development, these incentives are low so the level of human capital stays stagnant until sufficient physical capital is accumulated. Other results are that some economies may reach a steady state of physical capital before a take-off is possible. This is especially likely for economies in which agents have low savings propensities. Such economies remain stuck in a no-growth equilibrium forever. Economies that do grow may experience endogenous cycles if the return to investment in human capital is sufficiently increasing in the level of physical capital.     

Job Design in the Presence of Career Concerns

We reconsider the job design theory of Holmstrom and Milgrom to include career concerns. When agents are motivated by their reputation, the discretion to pursue outside activities plays an integral part in the incentive scheme. Discretion can be a useful instrument to enhance incentives and prevent the adverse selection of low‐ability agents. We argue that these synergies are useful in explaining, among other examples, the employment of US faculty members and of physicians in dual health care systems.     

Project success and project team management: Evidence from capital projects in the process industries

Efficient project execution is a key business objective in many domains and particularly so for capital projects in the process industries, but existing project management research gives little direction about how project team factors influence three important capital project outcomes: cost, schedule, and operability. After an extensive cross-disciplinary review of the general team and project management literatures, we constructed and tested a theoretically based, five-dimensional model of organizational context, project team design, project team leadership, project team processes, and project outcome factors. We examined the model by means of an empirical study of 56 newly completed capital projects executed by 15 Fortune 500 companies in the process industries. The results indicate the value of disaggregating project outcomes for research purposes. Different bundles of project team factors were found to drive project cost, schedule, and operability. Project team efficacy, cross-functional project teams, autonomous project team structure, and virtual office usage were the strongest predictors of project cost effectiveness. Continuity of project leadership, cross-functional project teams, and project manager incentives were the strongest predictors of project construction schedule. In contrast, clear project goals and an office design to facilitate effective communication were the main predictors of plant operability. Implications of these findings for researchers and project practitioners are discussed. One major practical implication of our findings is that project managers need to clearly focus and prioritize their goals for each project so they can adopt the appropriate bundles of project team practices that will facilitate their goal achievement.     

Team leader experience in improvement teams: A social networks perspective

In this research, we disentangle the relationship between several key aspects of a team leader's experience and the likelihood of improvement project success. Using the lens of socio-technical systems, we argue that the effect of team leader experience derives from the social system as well as the technical system. The aspects of team leader experience we examine include team leader social capital (a part of the social system) and team leader experience leading projects of the same type (a part of the technical system).We examine four different, yet related, dimensions of a team leader's social capital, which we motivate based on the social networks literature. One dimension, team leader familiarity, suggests that social capital is created when team leaders have experience working with current team members on prior improvement projects, and that such social capital increases the likelihood of improvement project success. We develop three additional dimensions, using social network analysis (SNA), to capture the idea that the improvement team leader's social capital extends beyond the current team to include everyone the leader has previously worked with on improvement projects. Contrasting our SNA-based dimensions with team leader familiarity enables us to better understand the impact of a team leader's social capital both inside and beyond the team. We also examine the effect of a team leader's experience leading prior projects of the same type, and consider the extent to which organizational experience may moderate the impact of both team leader social capital and same-type project experience.Based on analysis of archival data of six sigma projects spanning six years from a Fortune 500 consumer products manufacturer, we find that two of our SNA-based dimensions of team leader social capital, as well as experience leading projects of the same type, increase the likelihood of project success. In addition, we show that organizational experience moderates the relationship between team leader same-type project experience and project success. However, this is not the case for the relationship between the dimensions of team leader social capital and project success. These results provide insights regarding how dimensions of team leader experience and organizational experience collectively impact the operational performance of improvement teams.