The transparency of the banking system and the efficiency of information-based bank runs

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system. We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit contract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to withdraw. An improvement in the transparency of a bank may reduce depositor welfare by increasing the chance of an inefficient contagious run on other banks. A deposit insurance system in which some depositors are fully insured and the others are partially insured can ameliorate this inefficiency. Under such a system, bank runs can serve as an efficient mechanism for disciplining banks. We also consider bank managers' control over the timing of information disclosure, and find that bank managers may use their influence to eliminate both inefficient and efficient bank runs.     

论存款保险制度下的风险防范

存款保险制度是一种金融保障制度。建立存款保险制度有利于降低金融风险,防止挤兑发生及危机扩散。当个别银行出现流动性风险时,存款人因为有了相关的法律制度作保证,不再产生巨大的恐惧心理,能避免发生挤兑风潮。同时,建立存款保险制度有利于保护存款人的利益。在投保银行面临支付危机时提供救助,在投保银行破产倒闭时依法清偿存款人的存款,从而保护了存款人的利益。     

Impact of regulatory interactions on bank capital structure

This article examines a bank's optimal capital structure and risk-taking decisions in a regulated environment. We focus on the interactive nature of the Fed's collateralized discount window lending and the FDIC's deposit insurance. Such regulatory interactions are shown to have nonlinear and nonuniform impacts on the bank's leverage and risk-taking decisions. Thus, bank moral hazard problems may persist, even when banks are charged risk-adjusted deposit insurance premia and are also subject to market discipline through subordinate debt. Our analysis yields several new policy implications about the design and pricing of bank regulations.     

Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending

A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, which can be either privately or government funded. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries during the period 1985–2016, we study the effect of government involvement in deposit insurance funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. We show that changes from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly funded deposit insurance increase all-in-spread-drawn by approximately 4.6 %, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded deposit insurance schemes.     

Deposit Insurance,Banking Reform,and Financial Sector Development in Several Nations of Southeastern Europe

Deposit insurance has spread to many sections of the world. In the newly formed nations of the former Yugoslavia, this has occurred under conditions of post‐conflict reconstruction, hyperinflation, and several different governmental structures. Three cases are examined; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro. They all have developed deposit insurance programs. The implementation process was compared to “best practice” recommendations. It is found that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was difficult due to the fractured nature of the Dayton Accord government structure on the one hand but easier to the strong international presence supporting required actions. In the case of Croatia, a unified state emerged from the war, but it was somewhat isolated. Its bank restructuring was costly, and a fragmented deposit insurance program was introduced in the middle of a banking crisis. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the bank restructuring process is still underway, and implementation of a functioning deposit insurance program properly awaits its completion.     

On the dynamics and severity of bank runs: An experimental study

This paper presents an experimental investigation of the factors that affect the dynamics and severity of bank runs. Our experiments demonstrate that the more information laboratory economic agents can expect to learn about the crisis as it develops, the more willing they are to restrain themselves from withdrawing their funds once a crisis occurs. Furthermore, our results indicate that the presence of insiders, who know the quality of the bank, significantly affects the dynamics of bank runs and helps mitigate their severity. We also show that deposit insurance, even of a limited type, can help diminish the severity of bank runs.     

Derivatives Activity at Troubled Banks

Because of moral hazard associated with deposit insurance, troubled banks that have a relatively thin capital cushion to absorb losses have an incentive to take speculative positions. Thus, the prevalence of problem banks among those actively engaged in derivatives markets should be of concern to bank supervisors. However, we find no evidence that bank supervisors take into account, either favorably or unfavorably, the derivatives activities of troubled banks in their decisions to downgrade bank ratings or impose regulatory actions. The derivatives activity of troubled banks should raise the same concerns expressed about banks' on–balance-sheet positions, namely, that they may not be fully exploiting hedging opportunities or may be placing their remaining capital at risk, intentionally or unintentionally.     

存款保险的行为金融分析

在银行挤兑和存款保险的理论研究方面,Byrant、Diamond和Gibbons等人提出的模型各有侧重,但都不能解释银行挤兑事件中的非理性行为.本文运用行为金融的期望理论和心理账户对低效率均衡出现的原因以及存款保险制度的作用和银行救助进行了分析,指出我国建立存款保险制度的必要性和意义.     

Governance by depositors,bank runs and ambiguity aversion

We investigate the theoretical relationship between ambiguity aversion and the decision to withdraw early from a deposit contract. We first document and define the concepts to illustrate our results. Then we extend the theoretical framework of Gorton (1985) to implement a model of maxmin expected utility to match the ambiguity aversion hypothesis. We observe that the most ambiguous depositors are more likely to mistakenly withdraw their deposits, reducing bank stability and leading to inefficient bank runs. We also show higher ambiguity levels negatively impact bank equity levels.     

Chinese write-down bonds and bank capital structure

In this paper, we use a structural model to investigate a bank capital structure that contains deposits, straight bonds, Write-Down (WD) bonds and equity. We first explicitly give the default boundaries and the values of a deposit, straight bond, WD bond, equity and bank asset, and then use a numerical example to demonstrate the relations among leverage, deposits, WD bonds and bank value. Our results show that value-maximizing banks select the ratio of deposit, straight bond and WD debt so that endogenous default is consistent with exogenous bank closure. The bank increases its leverage by swapping both deposits and straight bonds for WD bonds. And the issuance of WD bonds not only reduces the expected bankruptcy loss and credit spread of straight bonds, but also improves the bank value. This indicates that WD bonds do help to stabilize banks. We also study the role of deposit insurance and the Chinese Financial Stability Bureau (FSB), and give a closed-form expression for the fair insurance premium. Lastly, to check the robustness of our results, we do the sensitivity analysis and investigate the effect of three sets of exogenous parameters on bank capital structure: WD parameters, bank business features, closure rules and insurance subsidy, and obtain some practically significant implications.     

Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations

The 2007–2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy. We provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. In our model the banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard, which implies that the social benefits of bank monitoring must for incentive reasons be shared between depositors and banks. Consequently, socially too few deposits are made in equilibrium. Deposit insurance – or, equivalently, bank recapitalization – corrects this market failure. We find that deposit insurance should be funded not by banks or depositors but out of general taxation. The optimal level of deposit insurance varies inversely with the quality of the banking system. Hence, when the soundness of the financial sector is uncertain, governments should consider supporting deposit insurance schemes and undertaking subsidized recapitalizations.     

Additional evidence on the information-based contagion effects of bank failures

Recent theoretical models addressed the question of the nature of bank runs and what triggers them. Two competing hypotheses emerged: pure panic and information-based contagion. This study provides additional evidence consistent with the latter hypothesis. Three observable bank characteristics are examined as proxy measures for the interim private information used by rational depositors in assessing the riskiness of a bank's long-lived assets that may trigger bank runs. The three factors are (1) the distance of the solvent banks' headquarters from the headquarters of each failed bank; (2) the size of the solvent banks; and (3) the capital ratio as a proxy for their solvency. The analysis is conducted in the context of the five large bank failures that occurred in the Southwest region of the US during the mid-1980s. Weekly abnormal returns of 33 Southwestern BHCs, in ten critical failure-related event dates are regressed on the three observable bank characteristics. Our findings suggest that distance and capital adequacy are negatively related to the magnitude of the contagion effect, whereas size is positively related.     

Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs

Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that while demand–deposit contracts let banks provide liquidity, they expose them to panic‐based bank runs. However, their model does not provide tools to derive the probability of the bank‐run equilibrium, and thus cannot determine whether banks increase welfare overall. We study a modified model in which the fundamentals determine which equilibrium occurs. This lets us compute the ex ante probability of panic‐based bank runs and relate it to the contract. We find conditions under which banks increase welfare overall and construct a demand–deposit contract that trades off the benefits from liquidity against the costs of runs.     

Institutions and Deposit Insurance: Empirical Evidence

Do banks’ responses to changes in deposit insurance vary across countries even if the countries have comparable institutions? If so, by how much? Using data on the financial performance of large banks in 15 financially and economically developed countries, we find that where deposit insurance has an effect, it is large and varies depending on the level of economic freedom, rule of law and corruption in the bank’s home country. As in prior papers, we show that during stable economic periods, increases in deposit insurance are associated with higher bank risk, both problem loans and leverage. In most, but not all, cases stronger institutions temper these effects. The institutions’ effects are substantial. For example, average changes in the rule of law double the impact of a change in deposit insurance on bank leverage. We contribute to the substantial literature in this area by showing that the institutional effects are significant even across a set of countries with comparable institutions; by conducting a careful calibration of the economic significance of the effects; by providing evidence that during stable periods changes in deposit insurance only affect bank risk and not other measures of performance; and finally by showing that the effects of both deposit insurance and institutions vary across stable and crisis economic periods. The stable period results are consistent with the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance, while the crisis period results are consistent with endogeneity concerns that poor bank performance could drive changes in regulations.     

How Does Information Disclosure Affect Bank Systemic Risk in the Presence of a Deposit Insurance System?

ABSTRACT

This article establishes a dynamic game with incomplete information to theoretically analyze the influence mechanism of information disclosure on systemic risk in the presence of a deposit insurance system. To verify the mechanism, we use panel data on 247 global banks in 41 countries during the period 2006 to 2015 in an empirical analysis. Our article finds that a high degree of information disclosure can reduce deposit insurance premiums and weaken the negative incentive from a bailout by regulatory authorities. Moreover, the effect of deposit insurance on financial stability is not apparent, but the synergistic effect of deposit insurance and information disclosure reduces bank systemic risk. Furthermore, different deposit insurance designs affect bank behavior, so it is crucial for bank supervisors to create proper deposit insurance systems, which are helpful in strengthening market discipline and preventing moral hazard thus contributing to a stable financial environment. Therefore, under the deposit insurance system, regulatory authorities should strive to improve the standard of information disclosure to ensure systemic stability.     

Bank credit default swaps and deposit insurance around the world

We investigate the impact of deposit insurance schemes on banks' credit risk – a predictor of failure and a key element in the current financial crisis. Unlike most studies, which use balance sheet measurements of risk, we adopt a forward-looking and market-based measure of bank credit risk: the credit default swap (CDS) spread. We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance systems have higher CDS spreads, supporting the “moral hazard” view. The results suggest that deposit insurance design features that lessen the adverse impact are risk-adjusted premium, coinsurance systems, government-established systems, “risk-minimizing” systems, and systems with dual-funding sources. Full coverage appears to stabilize bank risk only during the financial crisis period. More stringent bank regulation, such as capital adequacy regulation and independent supervision, could reduce the undesirable impact of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance seems to help stabilize volatile markets, as evidenced during the financial crisis and in countries with greater market volatility. In addition, we find that the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank credit risk is more pronounced for banks with low asset quality and low liquidity.     

The spread of deposit insurance and the global rise in bank asset risk since the 1970s

We construct a new measure of deposit insurance generosity for many countries, empirically model the exogenous international influences on the adoption and generosity of deposit insurance and use a novel econometric method to explore the causal chain from the expansion of deposit insurance generosity to increased overall lending, increased lending to households, increased banking system leverage, and more severe and frequent banking crises. Greater deposit insurance generosity robustly produces greater overall lending relative to bank assets and more lending to households relative to both bank assets and GDP, and results in higher banking system leverage. Our estimates, however, are not conclusive regarding whether greater deposit insurance generosity resulted in greater total loans relative to GDP or in more frequent or severe banking crises.     

Private deposit insurance,deposit flows,bank lending,and moral hazard

We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.     

The use of Hurst and effective return in investing

This study measures the deposit insurance premium under stochastic interest rates for Taiwan's banks by applying the two-step maximum likelihood estimation method. The estimation results suggest that the current premiums—charging 5, 5.5, and 6 basis points per dollar of insured deposits—are too low, but largely reflect the rank orders of the risks of the insured banks. Moreover, the regression results indicate that asset volatility dominates bank size in determining the insurance premium. When the volatility risk is decomposed into two parts, credit risk significantly dominates interest-rate risk. An examination of bank characteristics indicates that privately owned old banks are more likely to have lower levels of credit risk, asset volatility, and deposit insurance premiums than state-owned banks and newly chartered banks.     

Deposit insurance and international bank liabilities

This paper examines the responsiveness of external bank liabilities to deposit insurance policies for a sample of developed countries. External bank liabilities held by non-banks are found to increase after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance. Deposit insurance schemes tend to exclude interbank deposits from coverage and the response of external interbank liabilities to deposit insurance appears to be varied. Neither external non-bank nor external interbank liabilities are found to be materially affected by deposit insurance design. This suggests that international competition in the area of deposit insurance design – as possible under the EU deposit insurance directive of 1994 – would be fruitless.