Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Does the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme Design Reduce Adverse Selection?

The Environmental Stewardship Scheme provides payments to farmers for the provision of environmental services based on foregone agricultural income. This creates a potential incentive compatibility problem which, combined with information asymmetry about farm land potential, can lead to adverse selection of land into the Scheme and therefore a less cost‐effective provision of environmental goods and services. However, the Higher Level Stewardship (HLS) Scheme design includes some features that potentially reduce adverse selection. This paper studies the adverse selection problem of the HLS using a principal‐agent framework at the regional level. It is found that, at the regional level, the enrolment of more land from lower payment regions for a given budget constraint has reduced the adverse selection problem through contracting a greater overall area and thus higher overall environmental benefit. In addition, for landscape regions with the same payment rate (i.e. of the same agricultural value), differential weighting of the public demand for environmental goods and services provided by agriculture (measured by weighting an environmental benefit function by the distance to main cities) appears to be reflected in the regulator’s allocation of contracts, thereby also reducing the adverse selection problem.     

Semi‐Subsistence Farming: An Elusive Concept Posing Thorny Policy Questions

The massive expansion of semi‐subsistence farming in the European Union after the Eastern enlargements poses a real challenge to rural development. The problems of semi‐subsistence farms are low cash incomes and incidence of poverty, sub‐optimal use of land and labour, a lack of capital and poor contribution to rural growth. However, they play an important welfare function in some rural areas in Europe; they manage more than 11 million ha of agricultural land and deliver ecosystem services. The Common Agricultural Policy will have to accommodate this now widespread production system, through existing or new policy packages. Particularly important is support for commercialisation to incentivise and smooth the transition to commercial agriculture, and agri‐environmental payments to compensate the semi‐subsistence farmers for the provision of ecosystem services.     

Equivalence of Input Quotas and Input Charges under Asymmetric Information in Agri‐environmental Schemes

A model of adverse selection and moral hazard in agri‐environmental schemes is developed based on the input quota mechanism of Moxey et al. (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50, (1999) pp. 187–202) and Ozanne et al. (European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347), rather than the input charge mechanism of White (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, (2002) pp. 353–360), but the variable fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al. (European Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347) is used. Incentive‐compatible contracts, including the optimal probabilities of detection (and, therefore, monitoring frequencies and costs) for more and less efficient farmers, are identified. It is shown that the input charge and input quota approaches lead to identical outcomes – in terms of abatement levels, compensation payments, monitoring costs and probabilities of detection – confirming the equivalence of input quotas and input charges under asymmetric information. It is also shown that the optimal contracts are independent of the risk preferences of farmers with regard to being caught cheating.     

Farmers’ Preferences for New Environmental Policy Instruments: Determining the Acceptability of Cross Compliance for Biodiversity Benefits

This paper addresses the issue of farmers’ views concerning the perceived legitimacy of environmental cross compliance as a governance mechanism. Recent work on the theory of regulation emphasises the importance of the legitimacy ascribed to a regulation in determining the effectiveness with which it can be implemented. The current study outlines a rationale for why this motivational question should receive attention in economic studies of policy design and reports the results of a survey of 102 arable farmers in East Anglia, UK, which investigated the level of support for the principle of cross compliance for biodiversity objectives. It was found that two attitudinal factors, referred to as ‘Stewardship Orientation’ and ‘Technological Beliefs’, were by far the most significant in determining the acceptability of cross compliance in the sample, and that structural and socio‐demographic factors were considerably less important. The study also identified clusters of farmers according to their overall attitudinal orientation. Of the five groups thus categorised, four appeared on average likely to reject cross compliance as a general principle, leaving only the most ‘Environmental’ cluster in support. The policy implications are discussed and some conclusions drawn.     

Presidential Address: The Visible or Invisible Hand? The Balance Between Markets and Regulation in Agricultural Policy

The recent crisis in global financial markets has brought into question reliance on markets to determine the conduct of economic affairs and generated pressure for greater regulation and government control. Neither a neoliberal nor a neoregulatory approach is likely to be able to solve pressing problems affecting agriculture and natural resources, such as a deterioration in environmental quality and the challenge of climate change. To find solutions we need to employ a more realistic behavioural model than that typically used in economic analysis, and to recognise the key role played by values in individual and collective decision making. A more devolved approach to policy formation based on collective action seems to offer the greatest chance of success. More effort needs to be directed to understanding the drivers and processes of collective decision making, and how it can be harnessed to address pressing policy issues.     

Re‐evaluating the Harbinson Proposal – Prospects for the EU25: A Note

In this study, we use the Harbinson Proposal and July Framework to compare a ‘likely’ Doha scenario with a realistic baseline. The novelty of this study is that we focus exclusively on the trade‐led welfare impacts in selected EU member states. The important features of this note are the: (i) usage of the latest Global Trade Analysis Project (version 6) data; (ii) focus on EU25 regions incorporating all major Common Agricultural Policy instruments and reforms; and (iii) inclusion of binding tariff overhangs into the Harbinson tariff reductions. Results show the damping effects of tariff‐binding overhangs on welfare outcomes. This and other factors which limit the gains to liberalisation mean that the EU25 only realises 10% of its long‐run welfare gain potential, as defined by complete liberalisation.