不确定性、股权激励与非效率投资

文章在考察环境不确定性对上市公司投资行为影响的基础上,分析了股权激励计划对这一相关关系的影响机制和作用效果,结果发现:企业所面临的环境不确定性会降低企业投资效率,导致过度投资或投资不足。而股权激励措施对不确定环境引起的管理者非效率投资行为有抑制作用。本文研究结果表明,股权激励制度有助于减少环境不确定性导致的代理矛盾,抑制过度投资,也有助于降低企业管理者风险的厌恶程度,缓解投资不足。     

高管持股、经济政策不确定性与企业绿色投资

选取2011-2017年我国沪深A股重污染行业上市公司作为研究样本,考察了高管持股对企业绿色投资的影响.研究发现:高管持股与企业绿色投资间呈现倒U型关系.即高管持股存在一个临界值,当低于临界值时,高管持股能够发挥利益协同效应,促进企业提高绿色投资;当高于临界值时,高管持股会引发壕沟防御效应,削弱企业绿色投资.进一步考察外部环境后发现,经济政策不确定下减少了高管持股对企业绿色投资的利益趋同效应,但政府环境规制下扩大了两者间的利益趋同效应.     

Policy Uncertainty and the Dual Role of Corporate Political Strategies

Firms use active political strategies not only to mitigate uncertainty emanating from legislative activity, but also to enhance their growth opportunities. We find that a firm's systematic risk (beta) can be hedged away by employing various political strategies involving the presence of former politicians on corporate boards of directors, contributions to political campaigns, and corporate lobbying activities. The hedging effect is greater when firms operate in more uncertain industries. In addition, active political strategies are associated with greater firm heterogeneity and make real options more value relevant as potential drivers of competitive advantages in uncertain environments.     

Political/Policy Uncertainty,Corporate Disclosure,and Information Asymmetry*

Political/policy uncertainty causes significant disruption to capital markets around the world. This review synthesizes recent studies on this topic and provides suggestions for future research in this fast-growing area. Specifically, this review focuses on three areas of research: (i) the measurement of political/policy uncertainty, (ii) the impact of political/policy uncertainty on financial analysts' forecasts, and (iii) the impact of political/policy uncertainty on corporate disclosure. We find that political/policy uncertainty affects both corporate disclosures and financial analysts' forecasts and that these effects interact with information asymmetry in capital markets. Furthermore, we find that companies strategically change their disclosure practices during periods of heightened political/policy uncertainty.     

政策不确定性对公司投融资行为的影响研究

本文以2003-2013年中国A股上市公司的财务数据和31个省市自治区地方官员的变动数据为样本,采用地方官员变动率作为地方政策不确定性的代理变量,研究了政策不确定性对企业投融资的影响。研究发现,政策不确定性显著降低企业的债权融资,但是对股权融资影响不显著。政策不确定性对企业投资的影响存在两种渠道,一是通过降低企业融资来影响投资,二是通过企业资本运作降低融资对投资的影响系数,即政策不确定性越高,企业债权和股权融资对投资的正向作用会越小,这种作用机制在国有企业、大企业等与政策联系紧密的企业中作用更为显著。融资可获得性是政策不确定性影响投资的重要前提之一,融资可获得性较小时,政策不确定性显著降低了企业投资;在融资可获得性较大时,政策不确定性影响不显著。加强长期制度建设,降低政策不确定性,对于稳增长具有重要意义。     

Internal Finance and Corporate Investment

This paper examines Pecking Order/Free Cash Flow behavior in small ($25–$50 million), medium ($100–250 million), and large ($1000 million and over) firms. The purpose is to proffer an explanation for the important role of cash flow on the investment expenditure of firms that is more complete than the commonly given accounts. The Pecking order theory (PO) emphasizes the value‐enhancing influence of cash flow, while the free cash flow hypothesis (FCF) underscores its value‐destroying effect. Using the vector error correction model, we find that although the overall behavior of small firms support the pecking order theory, the cash flow of these firms does not have any causal effect on their investment. We further find evidence of free cash flow theory in large firms.     

CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company‐specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity‐dependent firms.     

Corporate Tax Holidays and Investment

Governments of developing countries commonly adopt tax holidaysto encourage investment. This article evaluates the incentivesprovided by company income tax holidays and explains the importanceof the timing of depreciation allowances in determining theeffective tax rates and the cost of capital to firms consideringadditional investment during the holiday. If an asset is long-livedand depreciation allowances for tax purposes are accelerated,the tax holiday, by preventing depreciation deductions duringperiods of peak profits, may actually penalize a company forinvesting during the holiday. The closer the investment to theend of the holiday period, the more severe the penalty. If,instead, depreciation allowances may be deferred until afterthe holiday, this program of incentives is quite generous tothe firm. How these sharply contrasting results may emerge isillustrated through estimation of effective tax rates and usercosts of capital under tax holiday systems in Bangladesh, Côted'lvoire, Malaysia, Morocco, and Thailand.     

联合授信、企业投资行为与公司价值

本文从企业治理的角度实证研究外部联合授信政策如何通过影响企业内部治理,进而影响企业投资行为及企业价值.研究结果表明,联合授信政策通过强化整个银行体系的信贷管理与约束,透过企业内部治理体系,能有效传导至企业内部,抑制企业过度投资行为,缓解企业代理冲突问题,使企业资金合理配置,最终提升企业价值.     

内部控制、企业投资与公司期权价值!

借鉴实物期权理论,本文考察了内部控制质量对企业投资决策和期权价值的影响。研究发现,良好的公司内部控制有助于公司高管层更好地把握投资机会,提高公司投资支出与投资机会的敏感性;良好的公司内部控制可以提高公司的投资效率,减少非效率投资尤其是过度投资。此外,给定净资产的前提下,如果公司的盈利能力较好,公司的内部控制会增加公司价值与净利润之间的凸增关系即增长期权价值;但是,给定净利润的前提下,如果公司的盈利能力较差,内部控制并不会增加公司价值与净资产之间的凸增关系即清算期权价值。本文的研究有助于更好地理解内部控制对公司价值影响的路径与作用机理,对于有关内部控制强制执行的争议也有重要的启示意义。     

Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts

We analyze the likelihood of government bailouts of 450 politically connected firms from 35 countries during 1997–2002. Politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than similar nonconnected firms. Additionally, politically connected firms are disproportionately more likely to be bailed out when the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank provides financial assistance to the firm's home government. Further, among bailed‐out firms, those that are politically connected exhibit significantly worse financial performance than their nonconnected peers at the time of and following the bailout. This evidence suggests that, at least in some countries, political connections influence the allocation of capital through the mechanism of financial assistance when connected companies confront economic distress.     

客户集中度与企业投资效率

本文从企业供应链客户风险的角度,研究了大客户集中度对企业投资效率的影响。研究结果表明客户集中度高会使得企业面临大客户依赖风险,管理层决策会趋于保守进而公司投资效率降低,主要表现为投资不足的程度和概率加大。进一步研究发现当公司失去大客户的风险较低(如大客户为关联企业或重复购买客户)、大客户财务困境风险较小(如上市公司客户的比例较大)或者公司自身议价能力较强(如企业在同行业中市场份额高)时,客户集中度对企业投资不足的正向影响得以缓解。我们发现上述结果并非由于大客户存在使得上市公司面临融资约束所致,反而这类企业为了规避客户集中风险,预防性地持有更多现金;此外,上述结果也并非由于企业缺乏投资机会所致,该结果无论在投资机会多或者少的样本组中均成立。本文为系统性理解大客户集中度对企业运营产生的影响提供了启示。     

Lumpy Investment and Corporate Tax Policy

In the presence of both convex and nonconvex capital adjustment costs in a dynamic general equilibrium model, corporate tax policy generates both intensive and extensive margin effects via the channel of marginal Q. Its impact is determined largely by the strength of the extensive margin effect, which, in turn, depends on the cross‐sectional distribution of firms. Depending on the initial distribution of firms, the economy displays asymmetric responses to tax changes. Moreover, an anticipated increase in the future investment tax credit reduces investment and adjustment rate initially.     

公司的资本成本与投资理性——来自沪深上市公司的证据

本文对我国上市公司的投资行为及其影响因素进行了实证研究。结果表明：（1）上市企业的投资决策受资本成本的约束显著，符合市场理性；（2）企业投资对内部现金流、外部负债融资和股权融资都具有敏感性，但回归系数依序递减，可能说明了不同融资形式的成本差异；（3）产品市场需求增长为企业带来了有价值的投资机会，具有拉动企业投资的显著作用。     

Irreversibility,Uncertainty and Housing Investment

Housing represents a form of “irreversible” investment. Theoretically, increased uncertainty should lower housing investment. Empirically, finding a proxy for uncertainty has proven problematic. Some recent papers have investigated the effect of uncertainty on real estate investment, with varying proxies for uncertainty and mixed results. This paper employs a technique used in modern macroeconomic studies, the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity-in-Mean model, which has been shown to correspond as closely as any known measure to theoretical concepts of uncertainty. Results indicate that uncertainty indeed has a negative impact on housing starts.     

Corporate Investment and Dividend Tax Imputation

The capital investment/dividend decision of the firm is analyzed under alternative assumptions about the system of dividend taxation. Relative to the classical system, imputation can yield (1) more disagreement amongst shareholders as regards the optimal investment plan, (2) less capital investment on aggregate and (3) fewer gains from mergers. Moreover, in contrast to the classical system, shareholders with high marginal tax rates can be more disadvantaged by dividend deferral than shareholders with low marginal tax rates.