Moral Hazard and the Portfolio Management Problem

This paper investigates the significance of nonlinear contracts on the incentive for portfolio managers to collect information. In addition, the manager must be motivated to disclose this information truthfully. We analyze three contracting regimes: (1) first-best where effort is observable, (2) linear with unobservable effort, and (3) the optimal contract within the Bhattacharya-Pfleiderer quadratic class. We find that the linear contract leads to a serious lack of effort expenditure by the manager. This underinvestment problem can be successfully overcome through the use of quadratic contracts. These contracts are shown to be asymptotically optimal for very risk-tolerant principals.     

公司管理中道德风险防范研究

经典的财务金融理论认为公司金融决策的外部市场环境是一个效率市场,不存在委托一代理问题.但现实的市场总是偏离有效市场,公司金融决策需要考虑到代理人的道德风险问题.本文采用回归技术分析了公司资本结构对过度投资和在职消费这两种道德风险的影响作用,为我国公司加强公司治理、防范道德风险提供了依据和借鉴.     

The Valuation of Assets under Moral Hazard

The design of managerial incentive contracts is examined in a setting in which economic agents are risk averse, and the actions of managers can affect asset returns which contain both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. It is shown that in the absence of moral hazard, owners of assets will insure managers against idiosyncratic risks, but with moral hazard, contracts will depend on both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. The traditional recommendation of asset pricing models, namely, to focus only on systematic risks, is thus proved to be valid only when there is no moral hazard. The major empirically testable predictions of the model are (1) managerial incentive contracts will generally depend on systematic as well as idiosyncratic risks, (2) idiosyncratic risks will generally be important in investment decisions, (3) the managers of firms with relatively high levels of idiosyncratic risks will have compensations that are less dependent on their firms' excess returns, and (4) the compensations of managers of larger firms will be relatively more dependent on the excess returns of their firms.     

中国金融资产管理公司不良资产处置的道德风险与防范

财政部和金融资产管理公司之间目标函数不一致是道德风险产生的根本原因,制度设计的一些缺陷加剧了双方之间的信息不对称,外部监管弱化、内部控制不严、外部环境不良使得资产管理公司经营管理中的道德风险更为突出。防范和化解道德风险应同时从内外两方面着手。外部主要是通过宏观制度的重新安排和设计,来协调出资人财政部和代理人资产管理公司及其经营者之间的利益。内部通过进一步健全公司法人治理结构,完善内控,强化监督和约束机制,增加代理人的违约成本。     

Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard

What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors. Absent regulation, originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high. Effort incentives are below first‐best absent regulation. Optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness. Zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort.     

我国企业年金逆向选择和道德风险管理研究

当前形势下我国人口老龄化问题日益凸显,基本养老保险制度面临着巨大的支付压力。企业年金在缓解基本养老保险给付方面起到了重大的补充作用,但是我国现行的企业年金在实际运营管理中存在很多问题。论文从委托代理角度分析企业年金各主体之间的逆向选择和道德风险问题,并提出几点相关政策建议,以完善我国企业年金制度,使其更好地为企业职工提供更安全更实惠的社会福利。     

金融资产处置中的道德风险

不可忽视的道德风险 经济学中的道德风险一般是指代理人为达到自己的目标而从事不利于委托人利益最大化的行为.比如企业的经营者不尽最大努力去实现企业的价值,或者虽然他们不做什么错事,但工作起来不十分卖力.这种行为既不构成法律和行政责任问题,股东又很难追究他们的责任,存在于这些经营者身上的是道德问题.道德风险存在于一切委托代理领域,代理人之所以能够背离委托人的目标,其主要原因是信息的不对称.     

问题银行危机过程中的道德风险分析

本文运用经济学中道德风险普遍存在的观点,分析了问题银行危机过程中道德风险存在的客观内部因素和外部因素。同时结合中国实际情况,指出中国问题银行危机过程中道德风险存在有其特殊性,并结合国外处理问题银行的经验,提出了相关政策建议。     

Trade Credit Management and the Decision to Use Factoring: An Empirical Study

This paper examines the firm's decision to use factoring amongst a cross-sectional sample of 655 manufacturing companies using a rich firm-level database. The paper develops and tests hypotheses that explain this particular choice of credit and financial management policy. We find strong evidence of a 'financing demand' explanation for the use of factoring, and also some support for theories which relate the decision to use a factor to the firm's product characteristics, to market characteristics and to the preferences of the factor (supply constraints). The motivation to use factoring, however, appears to be related more to a demand for asset-based finance from small companies than to firm-level choices about organisational structure.     

On Optimal Insurance in the Presence of Moral Hazard

This paper expounds on the importance of identifiabilty of subjective probabilities in agency theory with moral hazard. An application to insurance is examined.     

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Question of Financial Structure

This paper looks at the moral hazard and adverse selection problems confronting an entrepreneur offering securities to an uninformed, but competitive financial market. The adverse selection aspect of the problem is generated by the unobservable entrepreneur's ability to transform effort into value. Moral hazard arises because the investment decision is made subsequent to financing. We consider the joint use of both debt and equity, and characterize the equilibrium relation between capital structure and unobservable attributes. It is shown that: (1) investment and financing are not separable; (2) there is an underinvestment problem for “better” firms; and (3) simultaneous use of both debt and equity can resolve this difficulty. We also establish a connection between expected terminal firm value and debt-promised payment level and between share retention and standard deviation.     

责任保险道德风险防范问题研究

本文主要研究责任保险的道德风险防范问题。首先,介绍责任保险的道德风险是如何产生的,以及该类风险的特点;其次,对责任保险中道德风险的常见表现进行分析;第三,指出主要责任保险险种的道德风险防范中所存在的问题;在上述分析的基础上,最后提出了包括强调损失补偿原则、完善侵权方面相关法律政策、甄别第三方索赔者的类型、提高法庭判决的公平性、提高业务员综合素质以抑制承保风险、合理设计责任保险合同条款等有关建议。     

司法决策中的“父爱主义”管制逻辑

在包括赵春华案在内的诸多引发舆论关注的争议案件中,法官或许并非不是不懂得如何利用社科法学的判断能力与法教义学的裁判技术去弥合司法标准与公众认知之间的巨大断裂,而更可能是基于其“父爱”式的社会“管制”取向而对司法后果的实质合理性问题做出了“爱之深,责之切”的价值决断。在中国特色社会主义法律体系已经形成的历史背景下,为了保证良法的颁行能够导向预期的善治,法律必须以其作为“社会交往机制”的系统潜力而彰显其公理性与司法的合理性。只有首先确立基于交往原则和承认社会自主性的权力逻辑与法律决策结构,那种体现“人性化”“人文化”和“人权化”的方法论逻辑才有可能在法律的运作中获得国家体制官僚无法武断拒斥的实效。     

金融机构多层委托——代理关系的道德风险模型分析

道德风险问题是我国金融业普遍存在的问题,许多金融案件的发生无不与金融从业人员的职业道德水平有关.而目前金融系统实行的多层级委托代理经营管理模式存在制度缺陷和道德风险隐患.     

道德风险与信用担保:博弈论视角的分析

在信息不对称前提下，中小企业融资的主要阻碍之一就是极其严重的道德风险问题。在信用担保机构的介入下，部分地解决了中小企业的融资难问题，但信用担保机构也将会面临中小企业的道德风险问题。信用担保机构可以通过设立负激励机制来对出现道德风险的中小企业处以重罚，增加其违约成本，使其违约行为无利可图，甚至得不偿失；也可以采用正激励机制，来引导中小企业进行符合信用担保机构期望的投资。     

农业供应链金融道德风险的放大效应研究

农业生产的规律和广泛存在的信息不对称容易触发由偶然事件引发的金融道德风险,这些道德风险经农业供应链的规模经济性、范围经济性、羊群效应和合成谬误集聚并放大,可能引致系统性金融风险。基于这一论点,本文采用序贯博弈方法以及实证方法证明了基于龙头企业决策的农业供应链金融道德风险放大的可能性。为了防范农业供应链金融引致的系统性风险,商业银行可与农业龙头企业合力推行订单模式,强化农业供应链金融的封闭式管理,积极融入农业供应链文化价值体系,并加强农业供应链金融的宏观审慎与微观审慎的协调监管。     

利用决策支持系统提高农业项目投资决策效果

本文对农业项目投资评估的研究进行了简要综述 ,并对农业项目投资评估的研究领域进行了划分 ,分析了当前决策支持技术的发展动态 ,认为将决策支持技术应用于农业项目投资评估中可解决项目投资决策问题的结构不良问题、决策方案的模糊性、目标的冲突性等问题 ,进而提高项目决策效果。     

实行显性存款保险制度的必要性和可行性分析

无论隐性和显性存款保险制度,在增强公众信心,维护金融体系稳定的同时,都增加了银行的道德风险。从隐性存款保险制度向显性存款保险制度转变是否具有可行性?本文从银行的特许权价值、显性存款保险的可信性、被保险存款占负债总额的比例、“大而不倒”的现实性、不良贷款水平等角度分析这一转变过程中银行道德风险的变化。     

农险市场中的保险公司道德风险研究

在过往十余年我国农业保险的跨越式发展中,保险公司的道德风险问题日益凸显。本文通过微观案例界定保险公司道德风险的内涵与类别,基于博弈视角分析其产生机理,结果发现:在政府和保险公司的委托代理关系中,由于二者的目标诉求不同,若政府对保险公司的农业保险业务不能给予有效监管,则保险公司不遵守经营规范所得收益要大于其遵守经营规范所得收益,从而导致保险公司出现违规经营业务的道德风险问题;相关部门可以通过完善监管政策、整合监管资源、优化协办机制、加大监管力度、设置差异化保险合约等措施来减少农业保险市场中保险公司的道德风险。