The Impact of Corporate Governance on Closed‐end Funds

This study uses a large sample of UK‐listed closed‐end funds to examine whether governance has an impact on two indicators of fund performance: the level of fund‐management fees and the discount at which a fund trades. Fees are under the control of the directors, and we find that they are inversely related to fund returns, even after allowing for differences across investment sectors. Fees are, on average, higher if a fund has a large board, few directors from outside the fund‐family, many directors from within the fund‐family, and low ownership by the management company. Discounts for funds are wider if the management company or any blockholder has a significant long‐term stake, suggesting that investors are wary of entrenched management. The results suggest that boards are frequently compromised in their duty to shareholders by their dependence on fund‐management companies.     

董事会委员会有效性与治理溢价——基于中国上市公司的经验研究

本文从投资者角度出发,以是否存在治理溢价作为衡量标准,对董事会专业委员会的有效性进行了分析。通过对沪深两市2002～2005年间面板数据的分析发现,在董事会中设立提名委员会、战略委员会和审计委员会,能够为投资者带来显著的治理溢价,这与麦肯锡公司在2000年和2002年两次对投资者所作调查得出的结论相一致。这些研究结论为我国公司治理改革提供了重要启示,即在资源和时间有限的情况下,应优先解决那些关键治理环节和要素;与此同时,对于尚未发挥应有效力的分委员会,应该分析并克服限制其作用发挥的消极因素,在既有的资源及禀赋约束下,充分发挥董事会专业委员会的积极治理作用。     

Credit ETFs in Mutual Funds and Corporate Bond Liquidity

We show that high yield (HY) mutual funds own and trade ETFs to manage liquidity needs driven by fund flows, whereas investment grade (IG) funds do not. The use of ETFs by HY mutual funds to manage liquidity shifts some trading away from bonds and into ETFs, which reduces the liquidity of the underlying bonds. This substitution effect outweighs the better-understood inclusion effect, whereby bond liquidity benefits from increased ETF ownership, such that the net effect of ETFs is to reduce HY liquidity. In IG, the substitution effect is not significant and ETFs result in increased bond liquidity.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance Press News on Stock Market Returns

Stock market prices reflect information regarding firms’ business environments, operations and, in general, their fundamentals. Recently, various studies have analysed the link between news coverage and stock prices but no evidence exists on how channels and ways of communication of information affect investors’ behaviour. We analyses these aspects focussing on a large sample of corporate governance news published between 2003 and 2007 in ‘Il Sole 24 Ore’, Italy's major financial newspaper. We show that before news is made public investors are only able to assess the type of corporate governance event underlying it. After publication, investors are influenced by the content (positive or negative) and the tone of communication (strong or weak) of the news.     

Social Networks and Corporate Governance

We analyse frameworks that link corporate governance and firm values to governing boards' social networks and innovations in technology. Because agents create social networks with individuals with whom they share commonalities along the dimensions of social status and income, among other attributes, CEOs may participate in board members' social networks, which interferes with the quality of governance. At the same time, social connections with members of a board can allow for better evaluation of the members' abilities. Thus, in choosing whether to have board members with social ties to management, one must trade off the benefit of members successfully identifying high ability CEOs against the cost of inadequate monitoring due to social connections. Further, technologies like the Internet and electronic mail that reduce the extent of face‐to‐face networking cause agents to seek satisfaction of their social needs at the workplace, which exacerbates the impact of social networks on governance. The predictions of our model are consistent with recent episodes that appear to signify inadequate monitoring of corporate disclosures as well as with high levels of executive compensation. Additionally, empirical tests support the model's key implication that there is better governance and lower executive compensation in firms where networks are less likely to form.     

Corporate Raiders,Performance and Governance in Europe

I analyse 136 block purchases made by corporate raiders in Europe between 1990 and 2001. Contrary to the hypothesis that these investors expropriate the target companies, there is a positive market reaction to the first public announcement of these purchases. In the long‐run, raiders earn an abnormal profit when they sell their stakes. When they still held their positions at the end of the sample period, abnormal returns were insignificant. Raiders' activities do not improve operating performance. The findings are consistent with superior stock picking ability among these investors, but do not support the hypothesis that raiders are governance champions.     

Lease Financing and Corporate Governance

Lease financing is a well‐recognized mechanism for reducing the agency costs of debt. This study examines whether firms that attempt to control the agency costs of equity through strong governance structures, including Chief Executive Officer compensation alignment and board structure, are more likely to use an agency cost reducing debt structure, such as leasing. For a sample of large firms, we find that firms who use more incentive compensation and have more outside directors also tend to use more lease financing, suggesting these agency cost reducing measures are complements.     

Corporate Governance in China: a Step Forward

Recently, the presumed benefits of corporate governance have become one of the most contentious issues especially for emerging markets in Asia where institutional settings are quite different from other parts of the world. Using an internationally accepted benchmark (OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD, 2004 ), this study evaluates the progress of corporate governance practice of Chinese listed companies. A corporate governance index (CGI) is constructed to measure the quality of corporate governance practices of the 100 largest listed firms in China during 2004‐2006. The results show that Chinese companies have been making progress in the corporate governance reform. The findings also show a positive relation between market valuation and overall corporate governance practices, as measured by the CGI, among these Chinese listed companies. Additional investigation reveals that the rights of shareholders are the main driver in the relationship.     

Board Independence and Mutual Fund Manager Turnover

This paper studies the relationship between board independence and manager turnover in the mutual fund industry. Using the Lipper 2003 mutual fund board data, we find that manager turnover is more likely to happen to funds with poor prior performance and more independent boards. Consistent with previous studies such as Tufano and Sevick (1997), our research provides new evidence in support of the Securities and Exchange Commission's approach of improving fund governance by promoting board independence.     

Corporate Governance and Information Efficiency in Security Markets

This paper investigates a neglected topic in corporate governance research; namely, do governance characteristics affect the market reaction to news? The topic is important given the emphasis by governance regulations and codes of best practice on the need for greater transparency of corporate activities. For the first time in the corporate governance literature, we show that corporate governance characteristics (particularly the presence of founding family directors and gender diverse boards) affect the market reaction to company specific news. The results of the paper point to the analysis of the impact of governance characteristics on the market reaction to news being a new and complementary research agenda within corporate governance.     

Conditional Properties of Hedge Funds: Evidence from Daily Returns*

Using daily returns on a set of hedge fund indices, we study (i) the properties of the indices' conditional density functions and (ii) the presence of asymmetries in conditional correlations between hedge fund indices and other investments and between hedge fund indices themselves. We use the SNP approach to obtain estimates of conditional densities of hedge fund returns and then proceed to examine their properties. In general, a nonparametric GARCH(1,1) model appears to provide the best fit for all strategies. We find that the conditional third and fourth moments are significantly affected by changes in the current volatility of returns on hedge fund indices. We examine changes in the conditional probability of tail events and report significant changes in the probability of extreme events when the conditioning information changes. These results have important implications for models of hedge fund risk that rely on probability of tail events. We formally test for the presence of asymmetries in conditional correlations to determine if there is contagion between hedge funds and other investments and between various hedge fund indices in extreme down markets versus extreme up markets. We generally do not find strong evidence in support of asymmetric correlations.     

公司治理与绩效关系研究最新进展

公司治理的重要性已经得到理论界和实务界的认可。本文从两个方面论述了好的公司治理能够带来的影响，一方面好的公司治理能够提高管理效率，降低代理成本，进而提升财务绩效；另一方面，好的业绩使公司在资本市场上有更好的表现，即市场绩效，体现为公司治理溢价的存在。     

Corporate Governance and Firm Survival

We explore how various aspects of corporate governance influence the likelihood of a public corporation surviving as a separate public entity, after addressing potential endogeneity that arises from competing corporate exit outcomes: acquisitions, going‐private transactions, and bankruptcies. We find that some corporate governance features are more important determinants of the form of a firm's exit than many economic factors that have figured prominently in prior research. We also find evidence that outsider‐dominated boards and lower restrictions on internal governance play major roles in the way firms exit public markets, particularly when a firm's industry suffers a negative shock. Overall, our results suggest that failure to recognize competing risks produces biased estimates, resulting in faulty inferences.     

Market Liquidity and Ambiguity: The Certification Role of Corporate Governance

We investigate how firm‐specific certification practices through corporate governance can reduce perceived ambiguity and thus enhance liquidity of a firm in the stock market. We show that better corporate governance helps reduce ambiguity. In addition, a reduction in ambiguity is significantly related to higher liquidity of firms. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and measures of ambiguity, and remain statistically significant after controlling for other known determinants of ambiguity and liquidity. Our results shed light on how ambiguity can be moderated through firm‐level certification practices and on the channel through which a moderation of ambiguity affects shareholder wealth.     

Fund Manager Succession in Closed-End Mutual Funds

Managing the succession process by the hiring and firing of key executives is one of the important functions of a board of directors. In this research we study successions of fund managers in the closed‐end mutual fund industry. The agency issues inherent in closed‐end mutual funds makes them a unique laboratory for such a study. Our results suggest that while the overall abnormal returns of these manager changes are statistically insignificant, that the returns are more positive for funds with large expense ratios and for funds trading at a discount. We also find the abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of inside director stock ownership. Corporate bond funds and international equity funds react more negatively to these announcements than other types of funds. The abnormal returns do not appear to be related to board composition, but board composition does vary across fund type, and may therefore indirectly influence the results.     

The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis

We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower‐level management and non‐chief executive officer (non‐CEO) higher‐level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks’ CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non‐CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk‐taking channel of lower‐level managers.     

Tailored versus Mass Produced: Portfolio Managers Concurrently Managing Separately Managed Accounts and Mutual Funds

Using a matched sample of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and mutual funds (MFs) with the same portfolio manager and investment style, we find that concurrently managed MFs consistently underperform their SMA counterparts and generate more negative return gaps. Fund characteristics and liquidity betas fail to fully explain the underperformance. An event‐study analysis finds that the weights placed into top (bottom)‐performing stocks increase for existing SMAs (MFs) and negative return gaps increase for the MFs after the onset of concurrent management. We find that higher compensation collected by SMA fund managers are associated with more unseen managerial actions which positively contribute to the SMA return gap. Our results suggest that when managers concurrently manage both SMAs and MFs, they favor SMA performance over their MF performance.     

The Market Timing Ability of UK Mutual Funds

Abstract:  We apply a recent nonparametric methodology to test the market timing skills of UK equity and balanced mutual funds. The methodology has a number of advantages over the widely used regression based tests of Treynor-Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson-Merton (1981) . We find a relatively small number of funds (around 1%) demonstrate positive market timing ability at a 5% significance level while around 19% of funds exhibit negative timing and on average funds miss-time the market. However, controlling for publicly available information we find very little evidence of market timing ability based on private timing signals. In terms of investment styles, there are a small number of successful positive market timers amongst Equity Income and 'All Company' funds but not among either Small Stock funds or Balanced funds, although a few small stock funds are found to time a small stock index rather than a broad market index.     

Dividend Payouts and Corporate Governance Quality: An Empirical Investigation

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate how a firm's overall quality of corporate governance affects its dividend policy. Using a large sample of firms with governance data from The Institutional Shareholder Services, we find that firms with stronger governance exhibit a higher propensity to pay dividends, and, similarly, dividend payers tend to pay larger dividends. The results are consistent with the notion that shareholders of firms with better governance quality are able to force managers to disgorge more cash through dividends, thereby reducing what is left for expropriation by opportunistic managers. We employ the two‐stage least squares approach to cope with possible endogeneity and still obtain consistent results. Our results are important as they show that corporate governance quality does have a palpable impact on critical corporate decisions such as dividend policy.     

Voluntary Listing Requirements and Corporate Performance: The Case of the Dey Report and Canadian Firms

We investigate the determinants and consequences of compliance with the Dey Committee recommendations encouraging greater board independence in Canada. Companies that acted on this recommendation appear to have done so to improve their performance and not for cosmetic purposes. Poorly performing firms that modified their boards experienced a greater increase in performance compared to those that did not. Overall, it appears that the primary function of the Dey Report was to refocus firms' attention on the quality of board monitoring, particularly those with poor relative performance.