Performance volatility,information availability,and disclosure reforms

Using the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley reform as an exogenous disclosure shock, we find that high, relative to low, volatility firms opt for lower levels of information availability pre reform and experience increases in information availability, CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity, myopic behavior, CEO compensation with a structure tilted towards more cash pay, and a reduction in firm value post the reform. Our findings suggest that mandating high levels of information availability across the board increases managerial evaluation risk and produces additional agency costs for firms with volatile performance.     

CEO incentive compensation and stock price momentum

We document strong evidence that CEO incentive compensation can predict the significance of stock price momentum through discretionary accrual and real activities manipulation. The profit of momentum strategy increases with CEO pay-for-performance incentive, but decreases with CEO risk-taking incentive. It also evaluates the effects of information uncertainty on such relationship. The evidence is more significant for firms with older and longer tenured CEOs and firms with more informed traders. The relationship between the profit of momentum strategy and CEO pay-for-performance incentive is stronger among CEOs without the risk-taking incentive. Our results are robust for different sub-samples based on before and after Reg FD and Sarbanes–Oxley Act, even after controlling for the potential endogeneity. Further, our findings are consistent with the information diffusion explanation of momentum and the agency theory that incentivised CEOs tend to manipulate information by smoothing good news, concealing mildly bad news and accelerating the disclosure of extremely bad news.     

CEO and CFO equity compensation and dividend payout over the firm lifecycle

We examine the separate and joint effects of CEO and CFO equity compensation on the dividend payout decision, taking into account changes in the relationship over the firm's lifecycle. Compensation contracts and dividend payout both are used to reduce agency costs, which change over a firm's lifecycle. Studies report a negative association between CEO equity compensation and dividend payout, suggesting a substitutionary relationship. Our results show that when the two are considered jointly, CFO equity compensation dominates CEO compensation, indicating the need for sophisticated financial expertise in the dividend decision. The relationship appears only in mature firms, signifying that agency problems are of most concern during the mature stage of the firm lifecycle.     

The effects of corporate acquisitions on CEO compensation and CEO turnover of family firms

This paper investigates the impact of corporate acquisitions on CEO compensation and CEO turnover of family firms in Continental Europe. We find that CEOs in family firms do not experience an increase in their compensation during the post-acquisition period, while there is a positive and statistically significant association between the compensation of CEOs in non-family firms and their acquisition activity. This finding is consistent with the view that controlling family shareholders provide monitoring for CEOs mitigating managerial agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control. Further, we find that the likelihood of CEO turnover declines following an acquisition in non-family firms, suggesting that these acquiring CEOs do not face a higher likelihood of dismissal while they receive a higher level of compensation. In contrast, there is no significant impact of acquisitions on CEO turnover in family firms.     

Assessing the role of option grants to CEOs: How important is heterogeneity?

This paper revisits the question of whether CEO compensation practices are in keeping with those justified by agency theory. We develop and analyze a new panel Tobit model, estimated by modern Bayesian methods, in which the heterogeneity of covariate effects across firms is modeled in a hierarchical way. We find that our specification of heterogeneity provides a significantly improved fit to the data. Our results show support for the hypothesis that companies increase option awards to their CEOs when agency problems become more pronounced. We also find that liquidity constraints matter in defining the cash–option mix of CEO compensation.     

CEO Compensation Risk and Timely Loss Recognition

Prior studies demonstrate that high CEO compensation risk encourages managers to engage in risk‐seeking behavior, thus intensifying agency conflicts between creditors and borrowers. We argue and document that accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating debt holder and shareholder conflicts over asset substitution arising from high CEO compensation risk. Our empirical results show that firms with high CEO compensation risk tend to use more timely loss recognition and this positive relationship is more pronounced for firms with high leverage. Additional results show that the positive relationship between CEO compensation risk and borrowing costs is reduced for firms using timely loss recognition, suggesting that creditors perceive timely loss recognition as a risk‐reducing mechanism. Using the passage of FAS 123R as a quasi‐natural experiment on managerial compensation risk, we find a significant reduction in the use of timely loss recognition for firms experiencing a decrease in CEO compensation risk after the passage of FAS 123R. Lastly, we show that timely loss recognition is positively associated only with the compensation risk of the firm's primary decision maker (i.e., its CEO) and not with the compensation risk of subordinates.     

Effect of mandatory pro forma earnings disclosure on the relation between CEO share bonuses and firm performance

This paper examines the effect of mandatory pro forma earnings disclosure on the alignment of CEO share bonuses and firm performance (i.e., annual stock returns). Using 6,583 executive-level observations from 986 non-financial firms in Taiwan over the period 1999–2004, we find a significant shift in the CEO share bonus pay-earnings relation caused by a marked reduction in bonus shares after the new disclosure rule becomes effective. The change in CEO compensation structure in turn leads to a closer link between CEO stock bonuses and annual stock returns. The result suggests that a more transparent earnings disclosure could positively affect board choices regarding compensation arrangements, thus inducing a better convergence of manager and shareholder interests.     

The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior

I demonstrate that acquisitions are accompanied by large, permanent increases in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation, which create strong financial incentives for CEOs to pursue acquisitions earlier in their career. Accordingly, I document that a firm's acquisition propensity is decreasing in the age of its CEO: a firm with a CEO who is 20 years older is ∼30%$\sim 30\%$ less likely to announce an acquisition. This negative effect of CEO age on acquisitions is strongest among firms where CEOs likely anticipate or can influence high post-acquisition compensation, and is absent for other investment decisions that are not rewarded with permanent compensation gains. The age effect cannot be explained by the selection of young CEOs by acquisition-prone firms, nor by a story of declining overconfidence with age. This paper underscores the relevance of CEO personal characteristics and CEO-level variation in agency problems for corporate decisions.     

Family ties,board compensation and firm performance

This study examines the effect of corporate boards with family ties on board compensation and firm performance. Family firms dominate the vast majority of enterprise forms around the world. Despite possible agency problems between large and small shareholders, family boards may contribute specific knowledge and competitive advantage to the firm. This paper shows that the excess board compensation of firms with a non-family CEO is positively related to the percentage of board members with family ties, but the presence of family boards cannot justify the outcome of firm performance, suggesting a negative entrenchment of firms with a non-family CEO. By contrast, the excess board compensation of firms with a family CEO is found to be unrelated to the percentage of board members with family ties, and the presence of family boards is positively associated with firm performance, suggesting the convergence-of-interests of firms with a family CEO.     

Boards,Executive Excess Compensation,and Shared Power: Evidence from Nonprofit Firms

We investigate how executives, the board, and excess compensation jointly affect the performance of nonprofits. Since the common measure of nonprofit performance often includes salaries, we also use expenses that directly benefit the targeted population. Our results suggest that above average compensation for executives is associated with poor firm performance. However, the negative relation of CEO pay to performance occurs for firms with only one executive, the CEO. We conclude that a powerful CEO with autonomy can harm firm performance, but other executives can mitigate these agency problems. The board also appears to monitor direct community benefits more than indirect benefits.     

The impact of bank merger growth on CEO compensation

We examine the impact of bank mergers on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation during the period 1992–2014, a period characterised by significant banking consolidation. We show that CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and non‐merger internal growth, with the former relationship being higher in magnitude. While CEO pay–risk sensitivity is not significantly related to merger growth, CEO pay–performance sensitivity is negatively and significantly related to merger growth. Collectively, our results suggest that, through bank mergers, CEOs can earn higher compensation and decouple personal wealth from bank performance. Furthermore, we document a more severe agency problem in CEO compensation as a consequence of bank mergers relative to mergers in industrial firms. Finally, we find that the post‐financial crisis regulatory reform of executive compensation in banks has limited effectiveness in curbing the merger–pay links.     

Is an M&A self-dealing? Evidence on international and domestic acquisitions and CEO compensation

We examine the effect of international acquisitions on CEO compensation for US firms from 1995 to 2016 using both domestic acquisition and no acquisition firms as benchmarks. We find that acquisitions lead to a greater increase in CEO compensation (especially incentive-based compensation), which is consistent with agency theory and inconsistent with stewardship or reputation theory. We also find that international acquisitions lead to a greater increase in CEO incentive-based compensation than domestic acquisitions, supporting matching theory given that international acquisitions are larger and more complex to manage. Additionally, we document that CEO tenure has a positive effect on CEO compensation, whereas firm relatedness has a negative effect on post-acquisition CEO compensation. This is the first study of its type based on comprehensive data, and it contributes to our understanding of the role of international and domestic acquisitions in CEO compensation.     

Non‐compliance in Executive Compensation Disclosure: the Brazilian Experience

We examine the determinants and consequences of firms’ choice not to comply with a new executive compensation disclosure regulation. We exploit a unique feature of Brazilian markets, where a change in the regulation of executive compensation disclosure could arguably lead to personal security‐related costs for executives. This major reform in executive compensation disclosure in Brazil became effective in December 2009. While some firms complied with the change in regulation, other firms explicitly refused to comply fully with the regulation by using a court injunction. After controlling for firm‐specific characteristics and both social and economic inequality measures, we find that the degree of criminality in the state in which the firm is headquartered (a proxy for security‐related costs) and the level of CEO compensation are important determinants of a firm's decision not to fully disclose executive compensation information. We also show that firms which do not fully comply with the regulation face costs in the form of higher bid‐ask spreads, suggesting investors are leery of the decision not to comply with the regulation. We discuss the potential implications of our results in the context of executive compensation disclosure reform.     

Accounting comparability and relative performance evaluation in CEO compensation

We investigate whether accounting comparability is associated with the likelihood that CEO compensation is tied to relative accounting performance (e.g., return on assets). We predict that higher accounting comparability increases the risk-sharing benefit of accounting-based RPE because peer firm performance better controls for common risk in RPE firm performance. Thus, firms that have higher accounting comparability with potential performance peers will be more likely to include accounting-based RPE as a component of the total CEO compensation contract. We find support for this prediction using (1) an explicit test design that relies on the ex ante terms of CEO compensation contracts obtained from proxy disclosures, and (2) an implicit design that relies on the actual realizations of CEO compensation. To provide further evidence, we examine the association between accounting comparability and the selection of performance peers when the CEO compensation contract includes an accounting-based RPE component. We find that higher comparability between the RPE firm and a potential peer firm increases (decreases) the potential peer firm’s likelihood of being selected into (dropped from) the peer group. Cross-sectional analyses show that this association is less pronounced, or not present, when the relative performance measure is price-based (as opposed to accounting-based), indicating that these results do not merely reflect a more general role of comparability in all RPE contracts.     

Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design

Companies can potentially use compensation peer groups to inflate pay by choosing peers that are larger, choosing a high target pay percentile, or choosing peer firms with high pay. Although peers are largely selected based on characteristics that reflect the labor market for managerial talent, we find that peer groups are constructed in a manner that biases compensation upward, particularly in firms outside the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500. Pay increases close only about one-third of the gap between the pay of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the peer group, however, suggesting that boards exercise discretion in adjusting compensation. Preliminary evidence suggests that increased disclosure has reduced the biases in peer group choice.     

Increased Disclosure Requirements and Corporate Governance Decisions: Evidence from Chief Financial Officers in the Pre‐ and Post–Sarbanes‐Oxley Periods

I study how increased internal control disclosure requirements mandated by the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) affect annual corporate governance decisions regarding CFOs. Using non‐CEO, non‐COO executive officers as a control group, I find that CFOs of firms with weak internal controls receive lower compensation and experience higher forced turnover rates after the passage of SOX. In contrast, CFOs of firms with strong internal controls receive higher compensation and do not experience significant changes in forced turnover rates. These results are consistent with the “disclosure of type” hypothesis, which suggests that the mandatory internal control disclosures under SOX are a credible mechanism that effectively distinguishes good CFOs from bad ones by revealing the firm's internal control quality. The empirical evidence thus supports the notion that mandated increases in disclosure reduce information asymmetry in the executive labor market.     

Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay‐to‐performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay‐to‐performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.     

The CEO pay slice

We investigate the relation between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS)—the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the Chief Executive Officer—and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. The CPS could reflect the relative importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extracts rents. We find that, controlling for all standard controls, CPS is negatively associated with firm value as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's q. CPS also has a rich set of relations with firms' behavior and performance. In particular, CPS is correlated with lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, higher odds of the CEO receiving a lucky option grant at the lowest price of the month, lower performance sensitivity of CEO turnover, and lower stock market returns accompanying the filing of proxy statements for periods when CPS increases. Taken together, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that higher CPS is associated with agency problems and indicate that CPS can provide a useful tool for studying the performance and behavior of firms.     

CEO compensation contagion: Evidence from an exogenous shock

We examine how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation increased at a subset of firms in response to a governance shock that affected compensation levels at other firms in the economy. We first show that Delaware-incorporated firms with staggered boards and no outside blockholders increased CEO compensation following the mid-1990s Delaware legal cases that strengthened their ability to resist hostile takeovers. Consistent with the Gabaix and Landier (2008) contagion hypothesis, non-Delaware firms subsequently increased CEO compensation when the rulings affected a substantial number of firms in their industries. We further show how these legal developments contributed significantly to the rapid increase in CEO compensation in the late 1990s.     

Corporate governance and the stock market reaction to new product announcements

This study examines the explanatory power of corporate governance mechanisms on the wealth effect of firms?? new product strategies. We show that board size, board independence, audit committee independence, CEO equity-based pay, analyst following and shareholder rights are all of significance in explaining the variations in the wealth effect of new product introductions. Our results reveal that the new product strategies announced by firms with better corporate governance mechanisms tend to receive higher stock market valuations than those of firms with poorer governance mechanisms. This study provides empirical support for the notion that enhanced governance mechanisms can reduce both agency and information asymmetry problems for firms announcing new products.