Does Deregulation Work? Reassessing the Unemployment Effects of Employment Protection

Using new data, this article examines the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on aggregate and youth unemployment in advanced economies and Central and Eastern Europe during 1980–2009. The results offer no clear support for the argument that EPL is a cause of unemployment. Although EPL reaches statistical significance at conventional levels in some models, the results are sensitive to small changes in the sample or the use of alternative estimators. While the analysis suggests some scope for complementary reforms of EPL and the tax wedge in tackling youth unemployment, the findings on the whole indicate that government efforts to tackle unemployment by deregulating EPL alone may well be futile.     

Are Interactive TV-Pioneers and Surfers Different Breeds? Broadband Demand and Asymmetric Cross-Price Effects

We consider two different qualities of broadband access, one that simply means greater access speed to Internet applications and content, and a premium version that also gives access to interactive TV services. Based on a market survey we find that potential consumers of this premium broadband access do not consider basic broadband Internet access as a substitute. The price of basic broadband does not constrain the price that may be charged for the premium broadband that allows for interactive TV services.     

Effects of perceptions on LMX and work performance: Effects of supervisors’ perception of subordinates’ emotional intelligence and subordinates’ perception of trust in the supervisor on LMX and, consequently, performance

There are few studies on how the perception of supervisors by their subordinates contributes to high-quality leader-member exchange (LMX). We thus propose that the trust perception of supervisors by their subordinates can help explain the development of high-quality LMX. Furthermore, the trust perception may interact with supervisor-rated emotional intelligence to influence the quality of LMX, and, consequently, work performance. Using a longitudinal study on a sample of 285 supervisor-subordinate dyads from a manufacturing firm in China, we found that (1) supervisor-rated emotional intelligence of subordinates (Time 1) positively predicts the quality of LMX (Time 2); (2) this relationship is stronger when subordinates highly trust their supervisors (Time 1); (3) LMX (Time 2) positively predicts work performance (Time 3); and (4) LMX (Time 2) fully mediates the interactive effect of emotional intelligence (Time 1) and trust in the supervisor (Time 1) on work performance (Time 3).     

Do Laws Influence the Cost of Real Estate Brokerage Services? A State Fixed Effects Approach

A FTC‐DOJ study argues that state laws and regulations may inhibit the unbundling of real estate brokerage services in response to new technology. Our data show that 18 states have changed laws in ways that promote unbundling since 2000. We model brokerage costs as measured by number of agents in a state‐level annual panel vector autoregressive framework, a novel way of analyzing wasteful competition. Our findings support a positive relationship between brokerage costs and lagged house price and transactions. We find that change in full‐service brokers responds negatively (by well over two percentage points per year) to legal changes facilitating unbundling.     

How Does Employee Involvement Stack Up? The Effects of Human Resource Management Policies on Performance in a Retail Firm

The impact of innovative human resource management (HRM) practices on performance is investigated using panel data for all units of a retail firm. Our rich data include measures of the operating environment, important dimensions of core inputs, and information on HRM environments, and output is measured as value added. We estimate augmented production functions, including both establishment and manager fixed effects. When employees have opportunities to participate, and receive appropriate information and feedback from their supervisors, productivity is enhanced. Thus, even in settings where employees do simple tasks and are relatively low-skilled, participatory work environments can enhance business performance.     

Well Known or Well Liked? The Effects of Corporate Reputation on Firm Value at the Onset of a Corporate Crisis

Research summary : We study how two dimensions of reputation (i.e., generalized favorability and being known) and attribution of crisis responsibility affect firm value at the onset of a crisis. Analyzing 126 corporate crises befalling publicly listed firms in China from 2008 to 2014, we find that generalized favorability serves as a buffer, while being known can be a burden, in influencing firm value. We also find that the buffering effect of generalized favorability is stronger when the attribution of crisis responsibility is low (vs. high). In addition, there is a negative interaction effect between the two dimensions of reputation such that the buffering effect of generalized favorability weakens when firms are better known. We discuss our contributions to research on corporate reputation and crisis management. Managerial summary : Corporate reputation is an intangible asset, especially at the onset of a corporate crisis. This research sheds light on the “double‐edged sword” of corporate reputation by examining the effects of two reputation dimensions (i.e., being liked and being known) on firm value. Our results suggest that well‐liked firms can leverage their generalized favorability among stakeholders to assuage firm value loss, whereas well‐known firms may have to better communicate with stakeholders to overcome the burden of stakeholders' attention that escalates firm value loss. To better cope with the onset of a crisis, firms should therefore enhance their generalized favorability and simultaneously avert stakeholders' excessive attention. In addition, well‐liked firms can further buffer against the loss in firm value by reducing the perceived intentionality of a crisis. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Estimation of the Effects of New Brands on Incumbents’ Profits and Consumer Welfare: The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case

I estimate the effects of new brands on market competition and consumer welfare in the U.S. processed cheese market. I find that an observed increase in consumer welfare was attributable mainly to an increase in the number of brands in the sample market, while the price effect, which measures welfare change caused by adding new brands to existing brands, decreased welfare as the prices of the existing brands increased in a large portion of sample markets. The price increase was most pronounced among the introducers existing brands. I also find that the data used in the paper identify a significant enhancement of consumer welfare as a result of the change in product characteristics provided by new brands even if a large portion of welfare gain is explained by the assumption on the error term in the utility function.JEL classification: D40, D60, L13, L66, H20     

Is there a “Dark Side” to Monitoring? Board and Shareholder Monitoring Effects on M&A Performance Extremeness

Research summary: W e investigate the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A ) performance extremeness using a sample of M&A deals from 1997 to 2006. Both governance research and legal reforms generally have espoused a “raise all boats” view of monitoring. We instead investigate whether monitoring may serve as a double‐edged sword that limits CEO discretion to undertake both value‐destroying M&A deals and value‐creating ones. Our findings indicate that the relationship between monitoring and M&A performance is more complex than previously believed. Rather than “raising all boats” in a shift towards better M&A outcomes, monitoring instead is associated with lower M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains . Managerial summary: M ergers and acquisitions (M&A s) are a quintessential corporate activity. There were $3.8 trillion worth of M&A deals in 2015, despite scholars and practitioners reporting that M&A s often perform poorly. We question the widespread belief that more vigilant monitoring by boards of directors and large shareholders will raise M&A performance, overall. Put differently, does monitoring constrain CEO s' discretion to pursue bad deals, while simultaneously encouraging them to pursue good ones? We find that monitoring limits both large M&A losses and large M&A gains. Contrary to widely held beliefs, our results indicate that constraining executives' ability to pursue value‐destroying M&A deals does not simultaneously encourage or enable CEO s to pursue value‐creating deals . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does agricultural trade liberalization increase risks of supply-side uncertainty?: Effects of productivity shocks and export restrictions on welfare and food supply in Japan

Agriculture is the focus of much contention in free trade negotiations. The Japanese government is against liberalizing the rice trade on the grounds that it would threaten “national food security” in the events of such shocks as crop failure and embargoes. Trade liberalization is expected to make the Japanese economy more dependent upon food imports and, thus, more susceptible to these risks. Using a computable general equilibrium model with a Monte Carlo simulation, we quantify the welfare impacts of productivity shocks and export quotas by major rice exporters to Japan and found little evidence of Japan suffering from such shocks.