Enterprise Risk Management Through Strategic Allocation of Capital

This article presents a conceptual framework for operationalizing strategic enterprise risk management (ERM) in a general firm. We employ a risk‐constrained optimization approach to study the capital allocation decisions under ERM. Given the decision maker's risk appetite, the problem of holistically managing enterprise‐wide hazard, financial, operational, and real project risks is treated by maximizing the expected total return on capital, while trading off risks simultaneously in Value‐at‐Risk type of constraints. This approach explicitly quantifies the concepts of risk appetite and risk prioritization in light of the firm's default and financial distress avoidance reflected in its target credit rating. Our framework also allows the firm to consider a multiperiod planning horizon so that changing business environments can be accounted for. We illustrate the implementation of the framework through a numerical example. As an initial conceptual advancement, our formulation is capable of facilitating more general ERM modeling within a consistent strategic framework, where idiosyncratic variations of firms and different modeling assumptions can be accommodated. Managerial implications are also discussed.     

Bank regulation and international financial stability: A case against the 2006 Basel framework for controlling tail risk in trading books

In attempting to promote international financial stability, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) provided a framework that sought to control the amount of tail risk that large banks around the world would take in their trading books relative to their corresponding minimum capital requirements. However, many of these banks suffered significant trading losses during the recent financial crisis. Our paper examines whether the Basel framework allowed banks to take substantive tail risk in their trading books without a capital requirement penalty. We find that it allowed banks to do so and that its minimum capital requirements can be notably procyclical. Hence, focusing on the way the Basel framework sought to control the amount of tail risk in trading books relative to their corresponding minimum capital requirements, our paper supports the view that it was not properly designed to promote financial stability. We also discuss alternative regulatory frameworks that would potentially be more effective than the Basel framework in preventing banks from taking substantive tail risk in their trading books without a capital requirement penalty.     

How to make regulators and shareholders happy under Basel III

In addition to the Basel II capital ratio, Basel III requires banks to respect additional ratios, such as leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio. Banks are required to be compliant with all four constraints simultaneously. Our article provides a framework for banks to help their search for an optimal transition from Basel II to Basel III. Recognizing that banks’ return and the four constraints are of linear type, this search can be formulated as a linear program and solved by standard software. Incorporating uncertainty on future defaults, risk weights and withdrawals and formulating the problem as a Chance constrained model does not only yield optimal transition strategies but also determines the internal thresholds for the Basel III-ratios. Our approach needs two standard inputs from controlling: profit margins per product and non-financial adjustment costs to expand or cut back business. The adjustment cost can be used to calibrate the model to the current business mix. This calibration can be done by bank outsiders and allows the model to be used in impact studies to replace ad hoc strategies. To highlight its practicality, we apply our model to a typical German bank with a business mix that complies with Basel II, but not with the Basel III-, capital-, leverage- and net stable funding-ratio. Assuming that its business model is optimal under Basel II, we find that this bank would achieve compliance restructuring its funding side by replacing interbank funding by capital and retail deposits. Additional uncertainty would amplify the magnitude of the changes, but would still affect the same positions. These findings are robust against alternative margin definitions and adjustment cost levels.     

EVA® FOR BANKS: VALUE CREATION, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND PROFITABILITY MEASUREMENT

This article presents a complete ranking of America's 100 largest bank holding companies according to their shareholder value added. This research, the first of its kind for the banking industry, defines an EVA measurement for banks and presents evidence of EVA's stronger correlation with bank market values than traditional accounting measures like ROA and ROE. Besides developing EVA and MVA as analytical tools for viewing the economic performance of the organization from a shareholder perspective, the authors also present a framework for calculating EVA at all levels of the organization, including lines of business, functional departments, products, customer segments, and customer relationships. The implementation of an EVA profitability measurement system at the business unit (or lower) level requires methods for three critical tasks: (1) transfer pricing of funds; (2) allocation of indirect expenses; and (3) allocation of economic capital. Although solutions to the first two are fairly straightforward, the allocation of capital to business units is a major challenge for banks today. In contrast to the complex, “bottom-up” approach used by a number of large banks in implementing their RAROC systems, the authors propose a greatly simplified, “top-down” approach that requires calculation of only the volatility of a business's operating profit (or NOPAT). The advantage of using NOPAT volatility is that it allows EVA analysis at any level of the organization in a way that captures the volatility effects from all sources of risk (credit, interest rates, liquidity, or operations). While such a top-down approach is clearly not meant to take the place of a comprehensive, bottom-up RAROC analysis, it is intended to provide a complement–a high-level “check” on the detailed, bottom-up risk management procedures and controls now in place at most banks. Moreover, for those banks that have developed extensive funds transfer pricing, cost allocation, and RAROCstyle capital allocation systems, the EVA financial management system can either be integrated with those systems or serve as an independent economic assessment of the bank's business risks and returns.     

Der Einsatz interner Modelle beim mehrj?hrigen Enterprise Risk Management

Increasing natural catastrophes, recent dynamics in capital markets, and fundamental changes in regulatory requirements (e.g., Solvency II for European Union member countries) have placed increasing challenges in management of insurance companies. While in the Solvency II framework the time horizon is one year, the strategic risk-return profile of the insurer should be set according to multi-year calculations. The aim of this paper is to introduce a multi-year risk-capital concept. This multi-year approach can help management to answer the following essential question: ??How many future years with extreme catastrophes or adverse capital market developments can the company withstand at a certain confidence level without external capital supply??? In the context of multi-year enterprise risk management a capital allocation method is needed in order (1) to set risk limitations for different segments, for example different lines of business and different years, and (2) to quantify the effect of management strategies on risk-adjusted performance indicators, defined per segment. We define a capital allocation method in the multi-year context and illustrate the use of the multi-year risk-capital concept within a simulation study.     

Valuing Companies with Cash‐Flow@Risk

The classic DCF approach to capital budgeting—the one that MBA students in the world's top business schools have been taught for the last 30 years—begins with the assumption that the corporate investment decision is “independent of” the financing decision. That is, the value of a given investment opportunity should not be affected by how a company is financed, whether mainly with debt or with equity. A corollary of this capital structure “irrelevance” proposition says that a company's investment decision should also not be influenced by its risk management policy—by whether a company hedges its various price exposures or chooses to leave them unhedged. In this article, the authors—one of whom is the CFO of the French high‐tech firm Gemalto—propose a practical alternative to DCF that is based on a concept they call “cash‐flow@risk.” Implementation of the concept involves dividing expected future cash flow into two components: a low‐risk part, or “certainty equivalent,” and a high‐risk part. The two cash flow streams are discounted at different rates (corresponding to debt and equity) when estimating their value. The concept of cash‐flow@risk derives directly from, and is fully consistent with, the concept of economic capital that was developed by Robert Merton and Andre Perold in the early 1990s and that has become the basis of Value at Risk (or VaR) capital allocation systems now used at most financial institutions. But because the approach in this article focuses on the volatility of operating cash flows instead of asset values, the authors argue that an internal capital allocation system based on cash‐flow@risk is likely to be much more suitable than VaR for industrial companies.     

Are non-risk based capital requirements for insurance companies binding?

We investigate whether insurers base their solvency margins on risk factors even when operating under a supervisory regime where minimum solvency requirements do not fully take such risk factors into account. To do this, we use a dataset of about 350 Dutch insurers from all major lines of business during the pre-Solvency II period 1995–2005. We find that the levels of insurers’ actual solvency margins are related to their risk characteristics and not to regulatory solvency requirements. Consequently, the vast majority of insurers hold much more capital than required, i.e. non-risk based capital requirements generally are not binding. Requirements are found to affect solvency adjustment behaviour, though. More specifically, below-target capital ratios are raised most rapidly by those insurers whose targets are relatively close to the regulatory minimum. One implication from our results is that, because insurers already follow a risk-based approach, the transition to the new European regulatory framework, Solvency II, is likely to be smooth.     

从公司治理角度探讨国有商业银行资金管理机制再造

建立长效的资金管理机制,对于完善商业银行内部运行机制,优化商业银行公司治理结构具有重要的现实意义.本文将国有商业银行资金管理问题置于公司治理的框架下考虑,分析了我国国有商业银行存在组织架构未能理顺、管理方式和手段落后、资金风险管理水平不高和内部转移价格体制不合理等问题.据此,提出重构资金管理新机制的基本思路,即科学设计资金营运组织架构、提高风险管理水平、全面实行资金集中管理及建立完整有效的内部资金转移价格体系,并指出对于内部资金转移价格的定价可先采取实际成本率和收益率法,再过渡到半市场化法,最终实现市场化法的定价思路.     

Banks’ capital buffer,risk and performance in the Canadian banking system: Impact of business cycles and regulatory changes

Using quarterly financial statements and stock market data from 1982 to 2010 for the six largest Canadian chartered banks, this paper documents positive co-movement between Canadian banks’ capital buffer and business cycles. The adoption of Basel Accords and the balance sheet leverage cap imposed by Canadian banking regulations did not change this cyclical behavior of Canadian bank capital. We find Canadian banks to be well-capitalized and that they hold a larger capital buffer in expansion than in recession, which may explain how they weathered the recent subprime financial crisis so well. This evidence that Canadian banks ride the business and regulatory periods underscores the appropriateness of a both micro- and a macro-prudential “through-the-cycle” approach to capital adequacy as advocated in the proposed Basel III framework to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector.     

Business groups in China

We investigate whether business groups in China act as internal capital markets, in an environment that is characterized by a high level of government intervention, a weak legal system, and an underdeveloped financial market. We study how institutional factors, such as the ultimate owner and level of market development, shape the role of these business groups. We find that business groups help member firms overcome constraints in raising external capital, and that the internal capital market within a business group is more likely to be an alternative financing channel among state-owned firms than among private firms. We also find that the internal capital market is more likely to help those affiliated firms which are private, local government owned relative to those owned by central government, or located in regions with a well-developed institutional environment. We present evidence of the role of business groups in risk sharing among affiliated firms, but find that business group affiliation has no impact on firm accounting performance. This study sheds new light on the theory of the firm and its boundaries, and provides a better understanding of China's rapidly growing economy.     

Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice

The Chief Risk Officer of Nationwide Insurance teams up with a distinguished academic to discuss the benefits and challenges associated with the design and implementation of an enterprise risk management program. The authors begin by arguing that a carefully designed ERM program—one in which all material corporate risks are viewed and managed within a single framework—can be a source of long‐run competitive advantage and value through its effects at both a “macro” or company‐wide level and a “micro” or business‐unit level. At the macro level, ERM enables senior management to identify, measure, and limit to acceptable levels the net exposures faced by the firm. By managing such exposures mainly with the idea of cushioning downside outcomes and protecting the firm's credit rating, ERM helps maintain the firm's access to capital and other resources necessary to implement its strategy and business plan. At the micro level, ERM adds value by ensuring that all material risks are “owned,” and risk‐return tradeoffs carefully evaluated, by operating managers and employees throughout the firm. To this end, business unit managers at Nationwide are required to provide information about major risks associated with all new capital projects—information that can then used by senior management to evaluate the marginal impact of the projects on the firm's total risk. And to encourage operating managers to focus on the risk‐return tradeoffs in their own businesses, Nationwide's periodic performance evaluations of its business units attempt to refl ect their contributions to total risk by assigning risk‐adjusted levels of “imputed” capital on which project managers are expected to earn adequate returns. The second, and by far the larger, part of the article provides an extensive guide to the process and major challenges that arise when implementing ERM, along with an account of Nationwide's approach to dealing with them. Among other issues, the authors discuss how a company should assess its risk “appetite,” measure how much risk it is bearing, and decide which risks to retain and which to transfer to others. Consistent with the principle of comparative advantage it uses to guide such decisions, Nationwide attempts to limit “non‐core” exposures, such as interest rate and equity risk, thereby enlarging the firm's capacity to bear the “information‐intensive, insurance‐ specific” risks at the core of its business and competencies.     

DESIGNING CAPITAL STRUCTURE TO CREATE SHAREHOLDER VALUE

In the past decade, many U.S. companies have launched aggressive share repurchase programs with the expectation that value can be created by returning excess capital to shareholders and moving the firm closer to its optimal capital structure. But how much capital does a company really need to support its business activities? This article presents an economic framework or “model” that can be used to simulate the effect of various capital structure choices on shareholder value. The fundamental insight underlying the model is that judicious use of debt can add value by reducing corporate taxes and strengthening management incentives to increase efficiency, but that too much debt can result in a loss of business and perhaps a costly reorganization. Indeed, one of the key findings of the authors' recent research is that companies with highly leveraged balance sheets suffer disproportionately large losses in market share and value during industry downturns. As illustrated in a case study of a hypothetical general merchandiser, the model makes it possible to identify an optimal debt-equity ratio (and percentage of fixed- versus floating-rate debt)—one that balances the value of the tax shield from debt against the increased risk of financial distress.     

Stock market volatility spillovers and portfolio hedging: BRICS and the financial crisis

The paper investigates the dynamic risk–return properties of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) capital markets and models potential time-varying correlations and volatility spillover effects with the US stock market. A VAR(1)–GARCH(1,1) framework contributes useful insight into US–BRICS market interactions and expands on a thin past empirical literature. A disaggregated approach pays attention to critical US–BRICS business sectors, namely the industrial and financial sectors. Significant return and volatility transmission dynamics are identified between the US and BRICS stock markets and business sectors. This is a critical input that can affect efficient global portfolio diversification and risk management strategies. Based on this empirical evidence, the study proceeds to assess effective portfolio hedge ratios and to construct optimal portfolio weights for diversified asset allocation to US–BRICS markets and business sectors.     

对城市商业银行实施新资本管理办法的调查思考

《商业银行资本管理办法（试行）》（以下简称《资本办法》）正式实施一年多来,深刻影响了我国银行业的经营发展。而实施新资本管理办法是一项复杂的系统工程,相比较大型银行而言,城市商业银行实施基础相对薄弱,面临的挑战更多、困难更大,需要主动转变传统粗放的经营理念和模式,搭建全面风险管理框架,真正实现经营转型。     

M‐PRESS‐CreditRisk: Microprudential and Macroprudential Capital Requirements for Credit Risk under Systemic Stress

M‐PRESS‐CreditRisk is a novel stress testing approach that can help authorities gauge banks' capital adequacy related to credit risk. For the first time, it combines the assessment of microprudential capital requirements under Pillars 1 and 2 and macroprudential buffers in a unified, coherent framework. Its core element is an advanced credit portfolio model—SystemicCreditRisk—built upon a rich, nonlinear dependence structure for correlated bank portfolios. The model is applied to a sample of 12 systemically important German banking groups and delivers measures for systemic credit risk and the banks' contributions to it in both baseline and stress scenarios.     

A METHOD FOR ESTIMATING GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITAL COSTS: THE CASE OF BESTFOODS

The financial management practices of many multinational corporations are at odds with both financial theory and the strategic case for global expansion. Despite the weight of academic literature, many financial executives still cling to ad hoc rules of thumb that discourage value-enhancing global growth. In particular, they tend to require large risk premiums for making foreign investments while ignoring the diversification benefits of such investments for their shareholders.
This article presents a practical method for estimating the cost of capital for use by multinationals both in evaluating foreign investment opportunities and in measuring the ongoing performance of overseas business units. The method represents a kind of "hybrid" version of the global CAPM—one that attempts to reconcile some of corporate executives' concerns about the distinctive risks of foreign investment with the finance theorist's portfolio perspective and reliance on capital market information. More specifically, the framework uses information from capital markets to determine the appropriate risk premiums for currency and sovereign risks associated with each country in an MNC's portfolio. But, at the same time, these risk premiums are partly offset by taking account of any diversification benefits that foreign investment provides for the firm's shareholders.
The method is illustrated using the case of Bestfoods, a Fortune 200 company with extensive overseas operations that recently adopted the method. For the purpose of evaluating new projects, Bestfoods produces quarterly updates of its cost-of-capital estimates for each country in which it has (or expects to have) major operations. For evaluating the ongoing performance of each country business unit, the relevant cost of capital is calculated annually (at the beginning of each fiscal year).     

The Relations among Organizational and Distribution Forms and Capital and Asset Risk Structures in the Life Insurance Industry

This article is the first step toward integrating in a single framework two previously separate lines of research on major structural decisions of life insurers. The literature has previously studied the relation between capital structure and asset risk on the one hand, and the relation between organizational form and distribution system on the other hand, without integrating them. Using life insurer data for 1993–1999, we model the four key insurer decisions of capital structure, asset risk, organizational form, and distribution system as endogenous choices in a single interrelated set of simultaneous equations. The model assesses the nature of the interactions among these decisions. The model also assesses the impact of insurers' fundamental business strategy (treated as predetermined) on these choices. The business‐strategy hypothesis views other key decisions as jointly determined and driven by the fundamental business strategy, once the latter is set in motion. Confirming previous studies, we find a positive relation between capital ratios and asset risk. We also find an association in the simultaneous context between stock ownership and brokerage distribution, which was not found in prior studies. Stock ownership is related to greater financial and asset risk taking, whereas brokerage distribution is associated with lower risk taking. These and other results are interpreted in light of several theories, including transaction‐cost economics (TCE), agency theory, and regulatory and bankruptcy cost avoidance. Deriving from these theories, the finite risk paradigm emerges as the most comprehensive interpretation of the results, as opposed to the risk‐subsidy hypothesis of the impact of guarantee funds. We also find support for the notion that the business strategy drives the capital and distribution decisions, as predicted by TCE.     

Bank capital allocation under multiple constraints

We study how a bank allocates capital across its business units when facing multiple constraints over several periods. If a constraint tightens – be it because of stricter regulation or higher risk – capital flows to the more efficient unit, i.e. the unit offering a higher marginal return on required capital. Relative efficiency helps explain how a policy measure targeting a specific business unit – e.g. imposing requirements for market risk, or ring-fencing lending – spills over to another, seemingly unrelated unit. It also helps explain the bank’s response to the tightening of a constraint that is contemporaneously slack but likely to bind later on.     

The regulations–risk taking nexus under competitive pressure: What about the Islamic banking system?

Does market power condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank risk taking? We focus on three regulatory tools: capital requirements, the restriction of activities, and official supervisory powers. Employing 10 years of unbalanced panel data on 123 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the Middle East and Asia, we arrive at the following conclusions. First, banking market power strengthens the negative impact of capital regulation on bank risk taking. Second, our empirical results suggest that the negative effect of activity restrictions on stability is diminished when banks have greater market power. Finally, we do not find strong evidence that the negative effect of supervisory power on banks’ risk taking is conditioned by their competitive behavior. In further analysis, we differentiate between Islamic and conventional banks regarding their competition, as well as their risk behavior. The results differ according to the banking business model. These findings could be useful for bank regulators in light of the accomplishment of Islamic banks’ regulatory framework. Indeed, the adoption of Basel III represents a significant regulatory challenge, given that it does not take into account the specificities of Islamic banks.