Farmers’ Preferences for New Environmental Policy Instruments: Determining the Acceptability of Cross Compliance for Biodiversity Benefits

This paper addresses the issue of farmers’ views concerning the perceived legitimacy of environmental cross compliance as a governance mechanism. Recent work on the theory of regulation emphasises the importance of the legitimacy ascribed to a regulation in determining the effectiveness with which it can be implemented. The current study outlines a rationale for why this motivational question should receive attention in economic studies of policy design and reports the results of a survey of 102 arable farmers in East Anglia, UK, which investigated the level of support for the principle of cross compliance for biodiversity objectives. It was found that two attitudinal factors, referred to as ‘Stewardship Orientation’ and ‘Technological Beliefs’, were by far the most significant in determining the acceptability of cross compliance in the sample, and that structural and socio‐demographic factors were considerably less important. The study also identified clusters of farmers according to their overall attitudinal orientation. Of the five groups thus categorised, four appeared on average likely to reject cross compliance as a general principle, leaving only the most ‘Environmental’ cluster in support. The policy implications are discussed and some conclusions drawn.     

Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Does the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme Design Reduce Adverse Selection?

The Environmental Stewardship Scheme provides payments to farmers for the provision of environmental services based on foregone agricultural income. This creates a potential incentive compatibility problem which, combined with information asymmetry about farm land potential, can lead to adverse selection of land into the Scheme and therefore a less cost‐effective provision of environmental goods and services. However, the Higher Level Stewardship (HLS) Scheme design includes some features that potentially reduce adverse selection. This paper studies the adverse selection problem of the HLS using a principal‐agent framework at the regional level. It is found that, at the regional level, the enrolment of more land from lower payment regions for a given budget constraint has reduced the adverse selection problem through contracting a greater overall area and thus higher overall environmental benefit. In addition, for landscape regions with the same payment rate (i.e. of the same agricultural value), differential weighting of the public demand for environmental goods and services provided by agriculture (measured by weighting an environmental benefit function by the distance to main cities) appears to be reflected in the regulator’s allocation of contracts, thereby also reducing the adverse selection problem.     

Semi‐Subsistence Farming: An Elusive Concept Posing Thorny Policy Questions

The massive expansion of semi‐subsistence farming in the European Union after the Eastern enlargements poses a real challenge to rural development. The problems of semi‐subsistence farms are low cash incomes and incidence of poverty, sub‐optimal use of land and labour, a lack of capital and poor contribution to rural growth. However, they play an important welfare function in some rural areas in Europe; they manage more than 11 million ha of agricultural land and deliver ecosystem services. The Common Agricultural Policy will have to accommodate this now widespread production system, through existing or new policy packages. Particularly important is support for commercialisation to incentivise and smooth the transition to commercial agriculture, and agri‐environmental payments to compensate the semi‐subsistence farmers for the provision of ecosystem services.     

Equivalence of Input Quotas and Input Charges under Asymmetric Information in Agri‐environmental Schemes

A model of adverse selection and moral hazard in agri‐environmental schemes is developed based on the input quota mechanism of Moxey et al. (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50, (1999) pp. 187–202) and Ozanne et al. (European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347), rather than the input charge mechanism of White (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, (2002) pp. 353–360), but the variable fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al. (European Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347) is used. Incentive‐compatible contracts, including the optimal probabilities of detection (and, therefore, monitoring frequencies and costs) for more and less efficient farmers, are identified. It is shown that the input charge and input quota approaches lead to identical outcomes – in terms of abatement levels, compensation payments, monitoring costs and probabilities of detection – confirming the equivalence of input quotas and input charges under asymmetric information. It is also shown that the optimal contracts are independent of the risk preferences of farmers with regard to being caught cheating.     

Presidential Address: The Visible or Invisible Hand? The Balance Between Markets and Regulation in Agricultural Policy

The recent crisis in global financial markets has brought into question reliance on markets to determine the conduct of economic affairs and generated pressure for greater regulation and government control. Neither a neoliberal nor a neoregulatory approach is likely to be able to solve pressing problems affecting agriculture and natural resources, such as a deterioration in environmental quality and the challenge of climate change. To find solutions we need to employ a more realistic behavioural model than that typically used in economic analysis, and to recognise the key role played by values in individual and collective decision making. A more devolved approach to policy formation based on collective action seems to offer the greatest chance of success. More effort needs to be directed to understanding the drivers and processes of collective decision making, and how it can be harnessed to address pressing policy issues.     

Conditioning trends shaping the agricultural and rural landscape in Africa

African countries continue to face deepening food crises that have been accentuated by the global food, energy, and financial crises. This situation is part of a long‐term structural problem: decades of under‐investments in agricultural sector and poor policies of support for smallholder farmers who form the bulk of the farming population. The inability of these farmers to achieve a supply response when commodity prices were high and market access was less of a problem suggests that there are multiple sets of binding constraints that continue to limit the potential of agricultural growth to reduce food security and poverty on the continent. This article reviews some of the historical trends that have hampered the performance of the agriculture sector. In addition, it reviews the impacts of more positive trends that could stimulate agricultural growth in Africa that could change the African agricultural landscape. The article however warns that there are more recent global developments and some continental challenges that could prevent or slow agricultural growth. These include the global financial crisis, public sector investments, inequities in global agricultural development policies, rush for agricultural lands by foreign investors, domestic commercial financing markets, climate change, and emerging carbon markets. The article argues that while opportunities for accelerated growth exists for African agriculture, new sets of policy instruments will be needed to support smallholder farmers to access new agricultural technologies, finance, reduce impacts of climate change, and adopt sustainable land use practices that can allow them to benefit from emerging global carbon markets.     

What Do Farmers Want From Agri‐Environmental Scheme Design? A Choice Experiment Approach

Agri‐environmental schemes (AES) have had a limited effect on European agriculture due to farmers’ reluctance to participate. Information on how farmers react when AES characteristics are modified can be an important input to the design of such policies. This article investigates farmers’ preferences for different design options in a specific AES aimed at encouraging nitrogen fixing crops in marginal dry‐land areas in Spain. We use a choice experiment survey conducted in two regions (Aragón and Andalusia). The analysis employs an error component random parameter logit model allowing for preference heterogeneity and correlation amongst the non‐status quo alternatives. Farmers show a strong preference for maintaining their current management strategies; however, significant savings in cost or increased participation can be obtained by modifying some AES attributes.     

The Redistributive Effects of Agricultural Policy on Scottish Farm Incomes

This paper focuses on the measurement of the redistributive effects of agricultural policy, proposing measures to characterise and quantify these effects that are based on the change in absolute value of the Gini coefficient. An illustrative study shows that the distribution of support in Scotland in 1999/2000 was regressive with respect to pre‐support farm incomes. Nevertheless, the provision of support would have had an equalising effect on farm incomes but for the resulting changes in the ranking of farms within the income distribution. Reranking not only makes ‘coupled’ support policies ineffective but also inefficient as redistributive instruments.     

Re‐evaluating the Harbinson Proposal – Prospects for the EU25: A Note

In this study, we use the Harbinson Proposal and July Framework to compare a ‘likely’ Doha scenario with a realistic baseline. The novelty of this study is that we focus exclusively on the trade‐led welfare impacts in selected EU member states. The important features of this note are the: (i) usage of the latest Global Trade Analysis Project (version 6) data; (ii) focus on EU25 regions incorporating all major Common Agricultural Policy instruments and reforms; and (iii) inclusion of binding tariff overhangs into the Harbinson tariff reductions. Results show the damping effects of tariff‐binding overhangs on welfare outcomes. This and other factors which limit the gains to liberalisation mean that the EU25 only realises 10% of its long‐run welfare gain potential, as defined by complete liberalisation.