Use of Compliance Rewards in Agri‐environmental Schemes

Ensuring that farmers comply with the terms of agri‐environmental schemes is an important issue. This paper explores the use of a ‘compliance–reward’ approach under heterogeneous net compliance costs with respect to cost‐share working lands programmes such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) in the United States. Specifically, we examine the use of a reward under asymmetric information and output price uncertainty. We examine two possible sources of financing under the assumption of budget neutrality: (i) funds obtained by reducing monitoring effort; and (ii) money saved by reducing the number of farmers enrolled. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each source of funding and analyse these numerically for both risk‐neutral and risk‐averse farmers. We also examine the trade‐off between increased expenditure on monitoring effort and compliance rewards when additional budgetary resources are available. We show that under certain conditions a compliance reward can increase compliance rates. For risk‐averse farmers, however, conditions that ensure a positive outcome become more restrictive.     

Moral Hazard,Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri‐Environmental Policy

This article extends the multi‐period agri‐environmental contract model of Fraser (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 55 , (2004) pp. 525–540) to include a more realistic specification of the inter‐temporal penalties for non‐compliance, and therefore of the inter‐temporal moral hazard problem in agri‐environmental policy design. It is shown that a farmer has an unambiguous preference for cheating early over cheating late in the contract period based on differences in the expected cost of compliance. It is then shown how the principal can make use of this unambiguous preference to target monitoring resources intertemporally, and in so doing, to encourage full contract duration compliance.     

Equivalence of Input Quotas and Input Charges under Asymmetric Information in Agri‐environmental Schemes

A model of adverse selection and moral hazard in agri‐environmental schemes is developed based on the input quota mechanism of Moxey et al. (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50, (1999) pp. 187–202) and Ozanne et al. (European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347), rather than the input charge mechanism of White (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, (2002) pp. 353–360), but the variable fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al. (European Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347) is used. Incentive‐compatible contracts, including the optimal probabilities of detection (and, therefore, monitoring frequencies and costs) for more and less efficient farmers, are identified. It is shown that the input charge and input quota approaches lead to identical outcomes – in terms of abatement levels, compensation payments, monitoring costs and probabilities of detection – confirming the equivalence of input quotas and input charges under asymmetric information. It is also shown that the optimal contracts are independent of the risk preferences of farmers with regard to being caught cheating.     

Farmers’ Preferences for New Environmental Policy Instruments: Determining the Acceptability of Cross Compliance for Biodiversity Benefits

This paper addresses the issue of farmers’ views concerning the perceived legitimacy of environmental cross compliance as a governance mechanism. Recent work on the theory of regulation emphasises the importance of the legitimacy ascribed to a regulation in determining the effectiveness with which it can be implemented. The current study outlines a rationale for why this motivational question should receive attention in economic studies of policy design and reports the results of a survey of 102 arable farmers in East Anglia, UK, which investigated the level of support for the principle of cross compliance for biodiversity objectives. It was found that two attitudinal factors, referred to as ‘Stewardship Orientation’ and ‘Technological Beliefs’, were by far the most significant in determining the acceptability of cross compliance in the sample, and that structural and socio‐demographic factors were considerably less important. The study also identified clusters of farmers according to their overall attitudinal orientation. Of the five groups thus categorised, four appeared on average likely to reject cross compliance as a general principle, leaving only the most ‘Environmental’ cluster in support. The policy implications are discussed and some conclusions drawn.     

Farmers' Preferences and Social Capital Regarding Agri‐environmental Schemes to Protect Birds

The steady decline of birds living in cereal steppe lands is a worrying situation that the European Common Agricultural Policy is attempting to remedy through the application of agri‐environmental schemes (AES). We assess farmers' preferences towards these AES, which call for a number of environmental practices to protect birds. Using a face‐to‐face survey in farming communities in Aragón (Spain), and through the estimation of an Ordered Logit model (OL), we assess the ranking of AES attributes, and obtain their economic valuation according to the farmers' preferences. We find that social factors are also important in determining farmers' decisions. In particular, the importance of social trust and expectation of compliance by other neighbours, encourage farmers to sign up to AES. These and other results may be used to design more effective AES and help to solve this important biodiversity problem.     

Optimal Design of Agri‐environmental Schemes under Asymmetric Information for Improving Farmland Biodiversity

Information asymmetry is one of the main obstacles to the effective design and implementation of agri‐environmental schemes (AES). The literature has generally addressed this issue through the use of principal‐agent models (PAM). We develop a PAM to support optimal design of a new AES for improving farmland biodiversity. We use the results of choice experiments to assess both the costs incurred by the agent for the provision of biodiversity and the resulting social benefits. We also make a number of novel contributions such as the inclusion of a non‐linear non‐compliance detection curve, a sensitivity analysis to identify which parameter estimates have a critical impact on PAM results, and analysis of the efficiency of different sanction scenarios. The results suggest that: (i) the second‐best solutions differ significantly from the optimal solutions attainable with perfect information, with farmers being strongly over‐compensated for the extra costs associated with improved biodiversity; (ii) monitoring levels should be higher; (iii) the sanction system should be tougher. Sensitivity analysis shows the need for accurate estimates of the marginal cost of public funds and the costs and benefits associated with the public goods, which represent the key parameters determining PAM results.     

The Effect of Mandatory Agro‐Environmental Policy on Farm Fertiliser and Pesticide Expenditure

EU farmers are subject to mandatory cross‐compliance measures, requiring them to meet environmental conditions to be eligible for public support. These obligations reinforce incentives for farmers to change their behaviour towards the environment. We apply quasi‐experimental methods to measure the causal relationship between cross‐compliance and some specific farm environmental performance. We find that cross‐compliance reduced farm fertiliser and pesticide expenditure. This result also holds for farmers who participated in other voluntary agro‐environmental schemes. However, the results do not support our expectations that farmers who relied on larger shares of public payments had a stronger motivation to improve their environmental performance.     

Land Heterogeneity,Agricultural Income Forgone and Environmental Benefit: An Assessment of Incentive Compatibility Problems in Environmental Stewardship Schemes

This paper examines the issue of incentive compatibility within environmental stewardship schemes, where incentive payments to farmers to provide environmental goods and services are based on foregone agricultural income. The particular focus of the paper is land heterogeneity, either of agricultural or environmental value, leading to divergence between the actual and socially optimal level of provision of environmental goods and services. Given land heterogeneity, such goods and services are likely to be systematically over‐ or under‐provided in response to a flat rate payment for income foregone.     

Bilateral Information Asymmetry in the Design of an Agri‐Environmental Policy: An Application to Peatland Retirement in Norway

Agriculture is a significant source of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. GHG mitigation through agri‐environmental programmes could be important in achieving emission reduction targets under the 2015 UN climate agreement. This study uses the principal‐agent model to examine a peatland retirement programme to reduce agricultural emissions in Norway. The focus is on the role of the government's private information in programme design. Two cases are examined. First, optimal contracts are derived when farmers have private information about the costs of implementing peat land retirement, but the government reveals its information on the resulting public benefits through differentiated contracts. This corresponds to the standard targeting strategy with one‐sided information asymmetry. In the second case, an informed principal model developed by Maskin and Tirole in a 1990 study is employed to address bilateral information asymmetry. Using the informed principal model, the government offers the same menu of contracts to farmers in order not to disclose information on the public benefits from land retirement. Empirical results show that the government can achieve a higher payoff by using a pooling offer.     

Farmer Compensation and its Consequences for Environmental Benefit Provision in the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme

The Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS) provides payments to farmers for the provision of environmental services based on forgone agricultural income. Consequently, farmers with a relatively low opportunity cost of agricultural land will be particularly attracted to apply for entry into the ESS within a given payment region. This article tests whether there exists a significant relationship between Higher Level Stewardship (HLS) Scheme entry and agricultural yields. Empirically, HLS participation is found to be negatively related to cereal yields at the farm level. This could be associated with ‘auspicious selection’ of land into the Scheme, with greater ‘value for money’ provided by the higher entry of land with lower agricultural forgone income but higher environmental benefit within the region.     

Potential Conflict and Inefficiencies Arising in Agri‐environmental Management

We characterise the welfare implications of uncoordinated policy decisions in the presence of multiple externalities, illustrated with an aquifer. We concentrate on the problem of coordination that can occur when distinct agricultural and water authorities implement their respective policies (to optimise food production and groundwater use) with environmental concerns in mind. We represent this problem as an open‐loop Nash game, which compares the game‐theoretical solution to a centrally planned solution. We show that the inefficiencies arise from differences in the account taken of relevant costs by different authorities. We demonstrate that the magnitude of the inefficiency generated by the absence of coordination of our authorities varies depending on the weights put on environmental benefits by each authority, and discuss the implications of analysis for future research and policy.     

Assessing the Forecasting Performance of a Generic Bio‐Economic Farm Model Calibrated With Two Different PMP Variants

Using linear programming in bio‐economic farm modelling often results in overspecialised model solutions. The positive mathematical programming (PMP) approach guarantees exact calibration to base year data but the forecasting capacity of the model is affected by necessary but arbitrary assumptions imposed during calibration. In this article, a new PMP variant is presented which is based on less arbitrary assumptions that, from a theoretical point of view, are closer to the actual decision making of the farmer. The PMP variant is evaluated according to the predictions of the bio‐economic farm model, developed within the framework for integrated assessment of agricultural systems in Europe (SEAMLESS). The forecasting capacity of the model calibrated with the standard PMP approach and the alternative PMP variant, respectively, is tested in ex‐post experiments for the arable farm types of Flevoland (the Netherlands) and Midi‐Pyrenees (France). The results of the ex‐post experiments, in which we try to simulate farm responses in 2003 using a model calibrated to 1999 data, show that the alternative PMP variant improves the forecasting capacity of the model in all tested cases.     

Gender and agriculture in sub‐Saharan Africa: introduction to the special issue

This special issue contributes to the literature on gender differences in sub‐Saharan African agriculture primarily by using new and innovative micro‐data. The first six articles have a strong focus on understanding the extent and drivers of gender differences in land productivity and use data from nationally representative household surveys that are implemented under the Living Standards Measurement Study‐Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS‐ISA) initiative. The LSMS‐ISA data are multi‐topic, with geo‐referenced household and plot locations, and information on production and identity of managers and owners at the plot level. The last two articles in the volume rely on in‐depth quantitative and qualitative case study data, which, in combination with the nationally representative data, allow for greater insights into the extent and correlates of gender differences in sub‐Saharan African agriculture. While there does seem to be persistent evidence of gender gaps, the studies find the sources of these gaps to vary within and across countries. This makes designing policies to address gender gaps more challenging, yet of crucial importance. What is clear is that the failure to directly and explicitly address the underlying causes of the disparities is likely to end up exacerbating the observed gender gaps.