关于政府间财政转移支付问题的探讨

关于政府间财政转移支付问题的探讨王建科政府间的财政转移支付制度，是分税制的重要组成部分，是分税制财政体制下有效的财政宏观调控制度。任何一个现代的先进国家，只要它有两个层次以上的政府，并且存在区域间经济发展水平方面的较大差距，事实上都会有不同形式的政府...     

政府间财政转移支付制度分析

随着市场、政府计划干预和人们行为习惯共同作用于社会经济的“混合经济”时期的到来，政府运用财政权力和货币权力来抑制或弥补混合机制缺陷的作用日益受到各国的重视。包括政府对个人的转移支付和政府间财政转移支付制度在内的财政转移支付制度作为发挥政府财政权力的主要工具，在西方工业化国家中广泛运用，并已积累了许多宝贵的经验。本文试图从对西方主要工业化国家政府间财政转移支付制度模式特征比较分析的角度出发，以期对我国的政府间财政分配关系改革有所裨益     

完善政府间财政关系的理论思考：兼谈财政转移支付制度的改革

完善政府间财政关系的理论思考——兼谈财政转移支付制度的改革邓晓兰一、关于事权与支出范围的界定和划分分税制基础上分级财政管理体制是市场经济国家处理政府间财政关系的通行做法。财政活动即政府活动在经济上的集中反映,而不同级次政府的活动范围是有所区别的。因此...     

政府间转移支付对地方财政努力与财政均等的影响

完善的政府间转移支付制度应当在实现财政均等的同时,有助于提高地方政府的财政努力程度。本文将据此对实行分税制后的转移支付制度进行考察。通过建立转移支付与地方政府财政努力间的理论模型,进行1994-2003年各类转移支付与各省份财政努力间的相关性分析。本文的主要结论是,现有的政府间转移支付制度不利于提高地方政府的财政努力,在实现财政均等化方面的作用相当有限。     

完善政府间财政转移支付体系的对策

一、应借鉴国外经验,将政府间财政转移支付体系纳入法制框架。将政府间转移支付体系纳入法制框架,使之规范化,改变中央单边调整中央与地方财政关系的局面,形成良好的财政收支预期。德国的《税收分配法令》和《联邦与州间财政平衡法令》对有关的转移支付操作办法做出了明确规定。日本的《地方预算法》、《地方税法》、《地方自治法》对各级政府间的财政转移支付的内容与形式都做     

转移支付对中国省级政府财政努力的影响

An ideal scheme of intergovernmental transfer should be determined by equalization and efficiency with taking account of fiscal effort of local governments. In this regard, this paper provides a comprehensive review of Chinese transfer system since the decentralized taxation system (DTS) starting from 1994. To begin with, we make numerical analysis on equalization in economic and fiscal aspects since the 1994 DTS reform. A Panel Data model is then developed to analyze correlations between each of three types of transfer and fiscal effort of provincial governments based on Chinese experience during 1994–2006. The authors further research respective situation of eastern, middle and western parts of China and finally draw a conclusion through the above analysis that the current fiscal transfer system does not tangibly contribute towards improving fiscal effort devoted by local governments. In addition to that, it even has a somewhat counter-equalizing effect.      

深化我国政府间转移支付制度改革

我国财政体制改革取得了巨大进展，但是，在预算决策和管理制度、政府间财政转移支付制度以及对财政收支监督方面仍存在众多问题，尤其转移支付制度弊端更多，需要深化改革。根据党的十六大报告所提出的推进财政、税收体制改革的精神，笔者论述了深化改革转移支付制度的必要性；建立规范的转移支付制度的目标和任务。     

地方政府建立财政转移支付制度的几个问题

地方政府建立财政转移支付制度的几个问题□刘晶推行以分税制为核心的财政管理体制，关键之一在于合理、科学地确定财政分配关系，即建立和完善中央对地方政府的财政转移支付办法，这是分税制财政管理体制的一个重要问题。过去的财政管理体制是在长期计划经济管理模式下形...     

Intergovernmental Transfers,Governance Structure and Fiscal Decentralization

We provide a model incorporating features of local public finance in Japan, including close fiscal ties between different levels of government as well as bureaucratic determinations of intergovernmental transfers. The discretionary nature of transfers softens local budgets ex post, which exerts perverse incentive effects on local governments ex ante. Fiscal decentralization that assigns more revenue responsibility to the local level serves to counteract this moral hazard incentive. The emphasis is on the endogenous nature of regional fiscal capacities at the local level. Fiscal devolution motivates local jurisdictions to become fiscally independent wherever possible. JEL Classification Number: H7.     

International Reserves and Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries

This paper investigates empirically the relationship between the pattern of fiscal policy and the demand for international reserves in developing countries, and how this relationship is associated with political risk and conditional access to global capital markets. It finds evidence that for developing countries with low political risk, countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal policies are associated with higher (lower) international reserve holdings in economic downturns. The relationship is stronger when the countries with low political risk rely heavily on external financing. For developing countries with high political risk, the link between reserves holdings and fiscal policy pattern is not clear-cut.     

Transfers and Bailouts: Institutions for Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline

The growing importance of local and provincial governments as providers of public services and the importance of those services for the overall performance of the national economy has led to a careful re-examination of how public resources are allocated by decentralized governments. While the Tiebout model promises efficient local resource allocations, the conditions necessary for such outcomes—many local governments, fully informed and costlessly mobile households, no spillovers, residential head taxes—are rarely met in practice. Lacking a sufficient number of competitive local governments, however, other institutional safeguards must be found. Four such institutions are identified here. First, a stable central government managed by nationally elected political parties or presidents capable of making (second-best) efficient interpersonal redistributions of income while at the same time denying inefficient intergovernmental transfers and /or access to non-resident taxation. Second, a mature banking system and fully integrated national capital markets to minimize the economic consequences of a single government's failure to repay its local debts. Third, informed and sophisticated municipal bond and local land markets capable of evaluating local services and finances so as to shift back onto local residents the full economic consequences of inefficient local government fiscal choices. Fourth, a politically independent judiciary capable of enforcing constitutional rules for spending and tax assignment, local debt repayment, and balanced local budgets. Efficient central governments and efficient land and capital markets are seen here as necessary institutional pre-conditions for an efficient local public sector.     

论分税制下财政转移支付与地方财政努力差异——基于功能与地区多重分类考察的另类荷兰病分析

文章主要研究分税制下政府间转移支付与地区财政努力差异的关系.通过理论模型推导和对转移支付的实证检验发现:中国现行转移支付制度在总体上抑制了地方政府的财政努力.就区域效果而言,转移支付在促进东部发达省份财政努力的同时,抑制了中、西部落后地区的财政努力;就转移支付的功能类型而言,以税收返还为主的条件性转移支付会激励地方政府努力征税,而非条件性转移支付,包括财力性和专项转移支付将不同程度地抑制地方财政努力.这就产生了挤出效应与另类"荷兰病"的问题.     

Privatization and Utility Regulation in Developing Countries: the Lessons So Far

The privatization of utilities has grown in developing countries in recent years. Privatization transactions for the utilities sector have accounted for over a third of all sales in developing countries since 1988. The introduction of privatization has not necessarily meant more competition. Consequently, utility privatization has led in many cases to the creation of regulatory structures that aim to protect consumers from monopoly abuse and to provide incentives to firms to maintain efficiency. Case studies drawing on examples from the telecommunications, electricity and water sectors indicate that creating effective regulation and a competitive environment is a difficult and slow process. The cases have shown that regulation rather than privatization achieved the largest gains. Similarly, although the variety of regulatory measures that have been introduced have made a difference, the most tangible benefits, particularly to consumers, result from the establishment of competition. The case studies have shown that privatization has preceded the development of effective regulation and competition. The development of regulatory structures is constrained by the capacity of governments to enforce regulatory rules and monitor contracts. Fostering conditions that encourage competition and lessen anti-competitive behaviour by incumbents is a beneficial but slow process.     

Substituting Distribution for Growth: The Political Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers in the Russian Federation

Given limited resources and economic realities, how do politicians distribute monetary transfers in order to retain office? Previous work has largely focused on two models – a core model of rewarding loyal supporters and a swing model of purchasing the support of easily swayed voters. Empirical results have proven mixed, however. In this article, we argue that these mixed results are due to economic factors, which condition politicians' distributive strategies. In our model, we consider that politician and voters are involved in a repeated game, where past expectations condition future strategy. Current (core) supporters who receive few benefits and perceive themselves worse off than other, less loyal, groups are likely to be less loyal themselves tomorrow. In our model, politicians avoid this by providing their supporters consumption benefits directly, in the form of transfers, or indirectly, via strong economic growth. Where economic growth is good, politicians can distribute less to core supporters, who benefit from the rising economy. Where economic growth is weak, however, politicians make transfers to their core supporters to ensure future loyalty. We test our theory using data on federal transfers from the Russian Federal government to 78 Russian Regions from 2000–2008.     

财政集权过程中的转移支付和财政供养人口规模膨胀

结合财政分权的理论文献,本文描述了中国最近10多年来政府间财政关系的演变,并分析了财政集权过程中转移支付增加对地方财政供养人口的影响。利用中国1994—2003年县级面板数据和工具变量方法,我们从实证角度确立了转移支付增加与财政供养人口规模膨胀的因果关系,并指出在我国目前的政府管理体制下,上级政府面临着无论增加哪种转移支付都可能带来问题的两难处境。要在控制政府冗员增长的同时促进公共服务的有效提供,中国需要建立一个财政上更加分权和行政管理上更有基层参与性的政府管理体制。     

Measuring the Labor Income Share of Developing Countries: Lessons From Social Accounting Matrices

This paper addresses the challenges of measuring the labor income share of developing countries. The poor availability and reliability of national account data as well as the fact that self-employed—whose labor income is hard to capture—account for a major share of the workforce and often work in the informal sector render its computation difficult. Consequently, measuring the labor share requires assumptions. I consult social accounting matrices in addition to national account data to gain information on the production structure and self-employed incomes in developing countries. The final data set covers about 90 developing countries from 1990 to 2011. The data suggest that the finding of declining labor shares of previous studies also applies to the sample of low and middle-income countries. Furthermore, I find the labor share in developing countries to be about one-half in size and hence less than the standard “two-thirds” in economic literature.     

Aid, Economic Reform, and Public Sector Fiscal Behavior in Developing Countries

This paper looks at interactions between foreign development aid, economic reform, and public sector fiscal behavior. It proposes a model of the public sector fiscal response to aid inflows, which allows for changes in structural relationships due to an exogenously imposed program of economic reform. This model is applied to 1960–99 time series data for the Philippines, which embarked on an IMF- and World Bank-funded structural adjustment program in 1980. Estimates of structural and reduced-form equations paint a dismal picture of the effectiveness of foreign aid to, and the structural adjustment program in, the Philippines so far as fiscal impacts are concerned. Both bilateral and multilateral aid inflows, and the presence of an economic reform program, are associated with decreases in public fixed capital expenditure, decreases in taxation and other recurrent revenue, and decreases in public sector saving. Multilateral aid also appears to be highly fungible.     

发展中国家对外直接投资的经验教训及启示

从发展中国家对外直接投资的历史看,最初动因都是为了获取自然资源,都经历了从依附于"贸易立国"到独立发展的过程,国内的金融、信息、人才等给予对外直接投资系统的支持,投资主体可以是大企业、大集团,也可以是中小企业.但部分国家的对外投资脱离国内经济发展水平,走得太快,脱离了主业,带来不良后果.政府在扶持对外投资方面,部分国家产生了道德风险.