Rogoff revisited: The conservative central banker proposition under active fiscal policies

The paper re-examines Rogoff's [Rogoff, K., 1985. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 1169–1189.] influential monetary policy result. It shows that responses of a conservative central banker and the resulting macroeconomic outcomes may be substantially different if interactions with (ambitious) fiscal policy are taken into account.     

The benefits of central bank's political independence

We consider a two-tier model of monetary policy where the central banker is both subject to the explicit influence of elected political principals through contracts and the implicit influence of interest groups willing to capture monetary policy. We analyze the impact of granting independence to the central banker on the scope for capture and the agency costs of delegating the monetary policy to a central banker. Political independence increases those agency costs but significantly stabilizes the politically induced fluctuations of inflation and improves ex ante social welfare.     

ON CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, WAGE INDEXING AND A MONOPOLY UNION

The Rogoff proposition (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (1985), pp. 1169–90) that it is socially optimal to delegate monetary policy to a central banker that is more inflation‐averse than society has been widely accepted and implemented in practice. However, there is a literature that argues that, if there is an inflation‐averse monopoly union in the economy, it is optimal to delegate monetary policy to an ‘ultra‐liberal’ central banker, i.e., a central banker that is interested only in output. In this paper, we examine whether introducing wage indexing into the latter models has any effect on the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness and find that, once a monopoly‐type labour union is introduced, wage indexing does not matter for the determination of the optimal degree of conservativeness of the monetary authority.     

ON THE SOURCES OF THE INFLATION BIAS AND OUTPUT VARIABILITY

Why do dynamic inconsistencies in monetary policy exist? In this paper, a traditional model with output inefficiencies is introduced, but monetary policy is allowed to be influenced by the various constituencies in the economy that pressure Congress in turn to pressure the Central Bank to adopt a particular policy stance. This paper shows that in this economy an inflation bias arises because of the lobbying pressures of outsiders. Furthermore, it shows that if lobbying pressures are high enough, an inflation bias cannot be avoided for any finite level of Central Bank independence. It also shows that introducing the realistic feature of lobbying pressures has an impact on the stabilization properties of monetary policy. When a supply shock occurs, the shock is totally absorbed by a non‐myopic trade union, which has no lobbying costs. This is independent of any finite degree of conservativeness of the central banker, who has to accept an extreme increase in price instability. It is shown that monetary policy delegation is therefore sub‐optimal in achieving price stability compared with labor‐market reforms meant to remove monopsonistic elements. However, the same structural policies will induce greater output instability by strengthening the power of conservative central bankers.     

A Graphical Exposition of the Inconsistency of Optimal Monetary Plans

Abstract: The author presents a geometrical framework in which the inability of discretionary policy (consistent policy in the sense of Kydland and Prescott) to be socially optimal is demonstrated. Policy based on a rule results in a higher level of utility. The author extends the model to demonstrate that policy of a Rogoff conservative central banker results in approaching the same equilibrium as that from a monetary rule. Finally, the framework shows that attempts to exploit the Phillips curve result in stagflation.     

Monetary Policy Delegation and Optimal Wage Indexation

This note shows that delegation of policy to a central banker who puts more weight on inflation stabilization than does the rest of society could reduce the alleged social inefficiency of private wage indexation decisions that arises in models of discretionary monetary policy.     

Socially optimal monetary policy institutions

Research on the interaction between wage setters and central banks has shown that the classical dichotomy of monetary policy models in the tradition of Barro and Gordon [Journal of Political Economy 91 (1983) 589] does not hold if an inflation motive of wage setters is introduced. In this paper, the conditions for this result are re-examined under different assumptions concerning the exact timing of the strategic game, and the consequences for the socially optimal delegation rules and incentive contracts for central bankers are derived. It is shown that the relationship between central bank conservativeness and macroeconomic performance—and hence the design of optimal monetary policy institutions—is sensitive to the modelling choice. In particular, the case for an ultra-populist central banker is valid only under assumptions that appear to be quite unrealistic.     

Distortionary fiscal policy and monetary policy goals

We reconsider the role of an inflation conservative central banker in a setting with distortionary taxation. To do so, we assume monetary and fiscal policy are decided by independent authorities that do not abide to past commitments. If the two authorities make policy decisions simultaneously, inflation conservatism causes fiscal overspending. But if fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy, inflation conservatism imposes fiscal discipline. These results clarify that in our setting the value of inflation conservatism depends crucially on the timing of policy decisions.     

Revisiting the case for a populist central banker

It is known that discretionary policy may give rise to an inflationary bias if wages are negotiated in nominal terms. In a recent issue of this Review, Guzzo and Velasco argued that this bias can be eliminated, and welfare maximized, by the appointment of a central banker who does not care at all about inflation (a ‘populist’ central banker). A conceptual flaw of the latter result is identified here. It is shown that when wages are negotiated in nominal terms the result is true only in the special case of a single, all-encompassing, union. In the more general case of multiple unions, however, inflation increases linearly with their number and a populist central bank may turn out to decrease welfare.     

Monetary control uncertainty and inflation bias

This paper offers an alternative explanation for the occurrence of an inflation bias with and without an output goal exceeding natural output. A monetary game model is developed from which an inflation bias emerges because the policymaker increases money growth in order to avoid a recession due to a possible negative control error. Whereas higher additive instrument uncertainty increases the inflation bias, higher multiplicative uncertainty decreases it. Delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central banker decreases the inflation bias for all types of control errors.     

Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games: Rules Rather Than a Conservative Central Banker

Time inconsistency in monetary policy can be addressed appointing a conservative central banker. But incomplete information about the central banker's preferences impairs the performance of delegation schemes. Firstly, the ensuing ex-ante variability of monetary response lowers welfare. Secondly, partial independence schemes may prove inadequate because reputation — not only legal arrangements — defines the actual degree of independence. The incumbent may exploit his reputation to impose too conservative policies whereas, if he lacks reputation, partial independence forces him to accommodate. As a result, simple rules may be preferred.
…I do not believe that we should always get the best man for the post; often I fear that we should not even get a tolerable man.
(W. Bagehot, The Government of the Bank of England, in 'Lombard Street')     

Optimal monetary policy revisited: does considering US real-time data change things?

The primary goal of this article is to investigate whether properly modelling real-time data and optimal real-time decision-making of a monetary planner provides new insights into monetary policy behaviour and outcomes. This article extends a variant of the asymmetric preference model suggested by Ruge-Murcia to investigate the use of real-time data available to policymakers when making their decisions and revised data which more accurately measure economic performance, but is only available much later. In our extended model, the central banker targets a weighted average of revised and real-time inflation together with a weighted average of revised and real-time output. Moreover, we allow for an asymmetric central bank response to real-time data depending on whether the unemployment rate is high or low. Our model identifies several new potential sources of inflation bias due to data revisions. Our empirical results suggest that the Federal Reserve Bank focuses on targeting revised inflation during low unemployment periods, but it weighs heavily real-time inflation during high unemployment periods. The inflation bias due to data revisions is comparable in magnitude to the bias from asymmetric central banker preferences with the bias being somewhat larger during high unemployment.     

Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence

The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank. The solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank conservatism and independence. The results show that the optimal institutional design always requires some degree of central bank independence and that there is substitutability between central bank independence and conservatism. The results also show that partial central bank independence can be optimal and that there are circumstances under which it is optimal for the government to appoint a liberal central banker.     

Is a Conservative Central Banker a (Perfect) Substitute for Wage Coordination?

In a monetary union, macroeconomic policies are strongly associated with externalities that imply the need for coordination. However, if coordination is not complete, it might be unable to cope with the externalities. This paper investigates different solutions for internalizing policy externalities. In particular, we compare wage coordination to the conservative central banker solution, which the recent literature has found able to impose wage moderation on labor unions. We also discuss some issues related to labor flexibility reforms as a solution for the unemployment problem.     

Self-fulfilling Currency Crises and Central Bank Independence

We develop a model of a fixed exchange rate peg arrangement derived from the Barro–Gordon model of rules versus discretion. It is shown that the fixed peg is vulnerable to self-fulfilling currency crises in which the unemployment rate increases, the credibility of the rule decreases, but, paradoxically, the reputation of the policy-maker improves. Delegating monetary policy to an independent central banker does not prevent this type of crisis from arising, and can even make it more costly.
JEL Classification: F 3; F 4     

INSIDE THE IMPOSSIBLE TRIANGLE: MONETARY POLICY AUTONOMY IN A CREDIBLE TARGET ZONE

This paper examines the trade-off between exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy for a target zone. Using the guilder-mark target zone in the pre-Economic and Monetary Union period as a case study, we empirically estimate how much policy discretion the Dutch central bank still enjoyed and how much had been ceded to the German central bank. The sum of these two measures is an estimate of the policy autonomy under a free float. We find that the narrow guilder-mark target zone still permitted a modest degree of policy independence. This result suggests that intermediate exchange rate regimes may offer an attractive trade-off compared to the corner solutions (free float and monetary union), which is consistent with the "fear of floating" phenomenon. ( JEL E52, F33, F41, F42)     

Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning?

In a New Keynesian model, we consider the delegation problem of the government when the central bank optimally sets discretionary monetary policy taking account of private expectations formed through adaptive learning. Learning gives rise to an incentive for the central bank to accommodate less the effect of inflation expectations and cost-push shocks on inflation and induces thus a deviation from rational expectations equilibrium. However, discretionary monetary policy under learning suffers from an excessively low stabilization bias. To improve the social welfare, the government should appoint a liberal central banker, i.e., set a negative optimal inflation penalty that decreases with the value of learning coefficient. The main conclusions are valid under both constant- and decreasing-gain learning.     

货币政策透明度指数:理论方法与实证检验

文章通过建立货币政策透明度指数,并利用我国金融市场的利率数据进行检验,认为我国中央银行在基准利率调整和准备金率改变等重大政策决策上,货币当局更倾向于采用模糊的政策操作方式,由此可能会导致市场预期的混乱,并最终对政策实施效果产生负面影响。因此,我国有必要借鉴西方国家的政策操作经验,进一步有选择地增加货币政策操作的透明度,并借以最终建立一个简单透明、效率更高的政策调控框架。     

Inflation persistence: The path of labor market structural reforms

In this paper, using a monetary policy framework where the central banker is considered as conservative, we investigate the role of labor market structural reforms in inflation dynamics. Our theoretical model suggests that a more deregulated labor market reduces inflation persistence. Using data from a large sample of OECD countries over the period 2000–2012, we empirically confirm our theoretical proposition. The main policy implication is that the reduction of inflation persistence can be addressed not only by central banks, but also by governments through the path of labor market structural reforms.     

Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects

Central banks have made great efforts to increase transparency and accountability to the public. Since then, studies seek empirical evidences about the effects of monetary policy communication over agent’s expectations. The recent literature on central bank communication draws attention to the importance of clarity of central bank communication. However, researches on this theme are still scarce, and there are few empirical studies with conclusive findings. Our study seeks empirical evidences on the relation between clarity of central bank communication and credibility of monetary policy. Estimates through different methods aim to identify whether clarity of central bank communication improves credibility. The study is the first to provide empirical evidence that a clearer communication can improve credibility. We also consider the differences between the two governors who ruled the Central Bank of Brazil in the period under analysis. The results indicate that a clear communication can improve credibility, but it depends on the commitment of the central banker with the goal of inflation control. Furthermore, estimates based on quantile regression indicate that the benefit brought by the clarity to the credibility depends on the commitment of the monetary authority with the goal guiding inflation expectations.