Bank Lending Standards and Access to Lines of Credit

This paper examines how changes in bank lending standards are related to the availability of bank lines of credit for private and comparable public firms. Overall, we find that access to lines of credit is more contingent on bank lending standards for private than for public firms. The impact of bank lending standards is however asymmetric: while private firms are less likely than public firms to gain access to new lines when credit market conditions are tight, we find no difference between public and private firms in terms of their use or retention of pre‐existing lines. We also find that private firms without lines of credit use more trade credit when bank lending standards are tight, which is suggestive of a supply effect. Overall, the evidence suggests that “credit crunches” are likely to have a disproportionate impact on private firms. However, pre‐existing banking relationships appear to mitigate the impact of these contractions on private firms.     

Fintech,Credit Market Competition,and Bank Asset Quality

Journal of Financial Services Research - This study explores bank screening incentives under credit market competition between traditional banks and a Fintech startup. The bank screening incentives...     

银行信贷、市场竞争与企业资本配置效率

市场竞争影响企业资本配置效率,银行信贷对这一竞争机制有重要调节作用.根据2007-2019年中国上市公司数据建立了投资—投资机会敏感性模型,模型结果表明:第一,市场竞争有利于提升企业资本配置效率,宽松的信贷有利于市场竞争发挥正向调节作用;第二,银行信贷调节作用明显,银行信贷与股权治理机制为替代关系,与信息披露、管理层激...     

竞争、微金融技术与银行信贷业务边界的移动

随着信息技术的改变及金融业竞争的加剧,各国大中型银行都在拓展小企业贷款领域。这个现象使得传统微金融理论的"小银行优势假说"受到质疑。本文结合中国国情,通过对小企业关系型贷款技术优势和定价理论的补充,修改了考虑竞争环境下解释不同规模银行业务边界移动规律的B-T模型,并通过统计描述和实证验证得到结论:随着金融业竞争加剧,它引致的关系型贷款和交易型贷款的利润差异,将使得大中小型银行现有的业务边界均出现移动,且这个现象在中国已经发生。大银行业务边界的移动方向和程度对来自资本市场的竞争强度更敏感;而小银行业务边界的移动方向和程度对来自于银行业内部的竞争强度更敏感。能否寻找到降低处理每笔小贷款变动成本的途径以及所降低的程度,是银行考虑是否采用和提升关系型贷款专业化水平,从而也是各类银行是否真正愿意承担起小企业贷款功能的关键。     

“跑马圈地”时代接近尾声 “领跑者”地位面临挑战——银行同业信用卡业务竞争态势及工商银行的竞争策略

基本观点 在经历了过去几年“跑马圈地”式的发卡规模扩张后，积累到一定发卡数量的信用卡行业将步入“精耕细作”时代，未来两年可能成为信用卡业务发展的分水岭。     

关系型借贷、银行竞争与中小企业融资研究述评

目前,银企关系、银行竞争对中小企业信贷融资的影响还存在争议。本文系统梳理了银企关系和银行竞争对中小企业融资影响的相关文献,从中小企业借贷可得性、成本和风险的角度,全面考察了银企关系和银行竞争的影响,同时分析了两者的相互作用。结果显示,银企关系、银行竞争会对中小企业信贷融资产生影响,且银企关系与银行竞争之间存在交互作用,但银企关系、银行竞争对中小企业融资的具体影响方向、大小存在显著的国别差异。在考察我国中小企业信贷融资过程中,需要结合宏观经济和信贷市场实际情况,区分不同理论的适用性,以期为缓解中小企业融资难题的研究和实践提供借鉴。     

Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition

Using a unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks, we provide micro‐level (within‐county) evidence linking credit conditions to economic development and find a spillover effect on crime. Neighborhoods that experience more bank mergers are subject to higher interest rates, diminished local construction, lower prices, an influx of poorer households, and higher property crime in subsequent years. The elasticity of property crime with respect to merger‐induced banking concentration is 0.18. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition.     

Entrepreneurship and Bank Credit Availability

The literature is divided on the expected effects of increased competition and consolidation in the financial sector on the supply of credit to relationship borrowers. This paper tests whether policy changes fostering competition and consolidation in U.S. banking helped or harmed entrepreneurs. We find that the rate of new incorporations increases following deregulation of branching restrictions, and that deregulation reduces the negative effect of concentration on new incorporations. We also find the formation of new incorporations increases as the share of small banks decreases, suggesting that diversification benefits of size outweigh the possible comparative advantage small banks may have in forging relationships.     

Bank Competition and Leverage Adjustments

We test whether bank competition affects firms’ leverage adjustment speeds. Using Chinese data where bank concentration varies across both years and provinces, we find that underlevered firms move to their target leverage faster when bank competition is high. Tests surrounding an exogenous shock to bank competition lead to the same conclusion. We also find that small firms and nonstate‐owned firms exhibit faster leverage adjustments when bank competition is high, which is consistent with the conjecture that bank risk taking increases with competition.     

Bank Competition and Loan Quality

We analyze the impact of bank competition on the equilibrium quality of loans in a formal model where banks do not observe the type of loan applicants, i.e. face an adverse selection problem, nor borrowers’ effort, i.e. also face a moral hazard problem. The main finding is that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and the average quality of loans. Policy implications are derived from this result and from an extension to the basic model where banks may sequentially acquire information about potential borrowers.     

Bank Competition and Financial Stability

Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative “competition-stability” view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking. Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. We test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. Our results suggest that—consistent with the traditional “competition-fragility” view—banks with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provides some support for one element of the “competition-stability” view—that market power increases loan portfolio risk. We show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.

疏通银行信用与商业信用堵点

2020年10月,IMF发布的《全球金融稳定报告》指出,流动性压力下的偿付问题导致非金融企业部门脆弱性不断上升,正成为全球经济复苏的潜在阻力.我国的金融纾困政策将银行信用、商业信用"双管齐下"缓解中小企业流动性风险作为重要取向, 2020年下半年先后出台《保障中小企业款项支付条例》《关于规范发展供应链金融支持供应链产业...     

绿色信贷、银行异质性和银行财务绩效

随着绿色经济的快速发展,商业银行逐步增加了绿色信贷投放力度,以期在满足绿色融资需求的同时开拓新的利润增长点。本文系统地梳理了绿色信贷对银行财务绩效的作用机制,并基于2007—2017年我国29家商业银行的数据,实证检验了绿色信贷对银行财务绩效的异质性影响。实证结果表明:绿色信贷占总贷款比重上升有助于提高商业银行的净息差;对规模较小、流动性水平较高的银行而言,绿色信贷对银行财务绩效的改善效果更强,但资本充足水平对绿色信贷和财务绩效的关系并无明显影响。本文研究为商业银行积极开展绿色信贷业务提供了经验依据,并且从鼓励中小银行发展绿色信贷、推动绿色信贷资产证券化和绿色金融债发行、降低绿色信贷风险权重等方面,为进一步推进绿色信贷发展提出了具体建议。     

The Effects of Dynamic Changes in Bank Competition on the Supply of Small Business Credit

We study the effects of structural changes in banking markets on the supply of credit to small businesses. Specifically, we examine whether bank mergers and acquisitions (M & As) and entry have ``external' effects on small business loans by other banks in the same local markets. The results suggest modest positive external effects from these dynamic changes in competition, except that large banks may reduce small business lending in reaction to entry. We confirm bank size and age as important determinants of this lending, and show that the measured age effect does not appear to be driven by local market M & A activity.     

国家开发银行和商业银行的竞争与合作

开发银行和商业银行的竞争是客观存在的一个现实，但随着金融市场的不断完善成熟，开发银行和商业银行可以通过合作优势互补，发挥各自的优势。因此开发银行和商业银行的合作同样具有广阔的空间。     

典当与银行信贷的比较分析

典当在人类社会经济发展中有着悠久的历史。自1987年恢复典当业以来,我国典当业的发展取得了长足的进步,已成为我国金融体系的有益补充。随着金融改革的不断深化,如何加强典当业在金融体系中承担的金融功能,支持中小企业和三农发     

Policy Uncertainty and Bank Mortgage Credit

We document that banks reduce the supply of mortgage loans when policy uncertainty increases in their headquarter states as measured by the timing of U.S. gubernatorial elections. The reduction is larger for term-limited elections and close elections. We utilize high-frequency, geographically granular loan-level data to address an identification problem arising from changing local loan demand: (i) we estimate a difference-in-difference specification with state/time or county/time fixed effects; (ii) banks reduce lending outside their home states as well when their home states hold elections; and (iii) we observe important cross-sectional differences in the way banks with different characteristics respond to policy uncertainty.     

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using a model where competition arises from falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.     

Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Market Competition

We document a link between U.S. credit supply and rising personal bankruptcy rates. We exploit the exogenous variation in market contestability brought on by banking deregulation—the relaxation of entry restrictions in the 1980s and 1990s—at the state level. We find deregulation explains at least 10% of the rise in bankruptcy rates. We also find that deregulation leads to increased lending, lower loss rates on loans, and higher lending productivity. Our findings indicate that increased competition prompted banks to adopt sophisticated credit rating technology, allowing for new credit extension to existing and previously excluded households.