Monopolistic competition and non-neighboring-goods

Summary This paper studies price games played by a continuum of differentiated producers who face demands generated by additively separable preferences exhibiting a non-neighboring goods property. The examples of exact equilibria show that an asymmetric Chamberlian outcome is compatible with nonzero profits for nonmarginal firms and also with constant average costs, contrary to long sustained views. The paper tries also to short out the structure behind this class of examples and identify as general features the presence of nonperfectly elastic demands facing individual firms and the existence of an approximate Chamberlinian equilibrium.I am indebted to J. Ostroy for very helpful comments and to L. Jones, P. Romer and W. Zame for several conversations.     

Monopolistic competition and income dispersion

We develop a model of monopolistic competition that accounts for consumers’ heterogeneity in both incomes and preferences. This model makes it possible to study the implications of income redistribution on the toughness of competition. We show how the market outcome depends on the joint distribution of consumers’ tastes and incomes and obtain a closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium. Competition toughness is measured by the weighted average elasticity of substitution. Income redistribution generically affects the market outcome, even when incomes are redistributed across consumers with different tastes in a way such that the overall income distribution remains the same.     

Monopolistic competition or spatial competition or something else: Empirical evidence

There is a voluminous literature on models of spatial and monopolistic competition but little indication of the actual importance of these models. Many markets show a large number of differentiated products, and yet it is possible that there are significant neighbor effects making the application of the monopolistic competition model invalid. The question of neighbor effects is at the core of the paper. Using data from Consumer Reports, and a definition of neighbors, 127 markets are analyzed. The pure cases of spatial and monopolistic competition theory are found to be rare but approximations may exist. There is evidence that a substantial number of markets do not conform to the prototypes suggested by theory, and a redirection of theoretical effort would seem to be warranted.     

Monopolistic competition and the stability of industrial equilibrium

We consider a two-sector economy, consisting of the differentiated-goods and the homogeneous-goods industries, where the former is monopolistically competitive with scale-economies. We show that the Chamberlinian tangency solution is unstable when the supply side is characterized by the Heckscher-Ohlin two-factor model.     

Monopolistic competition and optimum product selection: Why and how heterogeneity matters

After some decades of relative oblivion, the interest in the optimality properties of monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the availability of an appropriate and parsimonious framework to deal with firm heterogeneity. Within this framework we show that non-separable utility, variable demand elasticity and endogenous firm heterogeneity cause the market equilibrium to err in many ways, concerning the number of products, the size and the choice of producers, the overall size of the monopolistically competitive sector. More crucially with respect to the existing literature, we also show that the extent of the errors depends on the degree of firm heterogeneity. In particular, the inefficiency of the market equilibrium is largest when selection among heterogenous firms is needed most, that is, when there are relatively many firms with low productivity and relatively few firms with high productivity.     

Monopolistic competition,aggregation of competitive information,and the amount of product differentiation

Consider an industry with a large number of homogeneous firms. Each firm's profits are a function of its own strategy and the strategies the other firms select. Suppose other firms' strategies enter into each firm's profit function only through one or more statistics. For example, average price in the market may parameterize every firm's profit function. We prove that, as a general rule, the industry's firms will in equilibrium follow at most M + 1 distinct strategies, where M is the number of statistics by which competitors' strategies affect each firm's profits.     

Monopolistic competition and the cyclicality of pricing and productivity—A typology of industries

We develop a market model which explains how prices and productivity react to short-run demand variations when the number of price-setting firms is held fixed on its long-run level and profits are endogenous. We assume that for each firm the average production cost function is U-shaped, that customers are imperfectly informed about offer prices, and that customers may search for better offers.For low degrees of market transparency the long-run market outcome exhibits price dispersion with an endogenous finite number of firms. In this case, in the short run, prices and price mark-ups respond countercyclically to demand variations (while input prices are exogenously fixed) and productivity is procyclical. In the complementary case of higher degrees of market transparency, in the long run we have a single-price equilibrium. In that case, in the short run, prices are procyclical while mark-ups remain countercyclical and productivity diminishes with any deviation of demand from its long-run level.Thanks for helpful discussions go to the participants of workshops at the Winter Symposium of the Econometric Society at Warsaw 1990, at the 6th World Congress of the Econometric Society at Barcelona 1990, at the Annual Meetings of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Lugano 1991 and of its Ausschuß für Industrieökonomik in Basel 1992, and at several university workshops. Thanks go also to two anonymous referees. Financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation, grants No 12-26387.89 and 12-28722.90, are gratefully acknowledged.     

Public Information Quality with Monopolistic Sellers

We show that in markets with asymmetric information, even if there is full agreement on the choice of optimal information quality, entrusting the choice of (unverifiable) public information quality to traders who benefit from such information leads to inefficiencies. However, delegation of information quality choice to an independent agent who is precluded from sharing in trading profits results in efficient implementation. This result provides a game-theoretic rationale for current institutional arrangements where a private organization that is independent of market traders, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, determines the standards for public disclosures.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D41, D42, D82.     

A cost-benefit assessment of wholesale electricity restructuring and competition in New England

We conduct a social cost-benefit analysis of wholesale electricity market restructuring and competition in New England. A counter-factual investment path is formulated which characterizes how the wholesale power system might have evolved in New England under continued regulation. The investment and operating costs of the counter-factual case are compared with a projected evolution of actual developments under restructuring and wholesale competition. An important contributor to restructuring benefits is improved operation of nuclear plants divested from incumbent owners under restructuring and transferred to more experienced owners. We estimate net benefits over the 18-year analysis period of about 2% of wholesale costs.      

Monopolistic Screening with Boundedly Rational Consumers*

In this paper, I revisit the monopolistic screening problem with two types assuming that consumers are boundedly rational. Bounded rationality implies that the revelation principle does not apply and the choice of the selling mechanism entails a loss of generality. I show that if the monopolist restricts attention to the mechanisms that offer menus of two choices, the profits are lower than in the case of fully rational consumers by the term of order ln λ/λ, where λ is the degree of rationality of the consumers. The monopolist, however, can approximate the profits earned when consumers are fully rational by using a more elaborate message game.     

Economics of compatibility standards and competition in telecommunication networks

The pro- and anti-competitive implications of technical compatibility standards are introduced in general terms and then applied to current issues in telecommunications policy. The demand and supply for standards under regulated monopoly and the transition to deregulation and competitive entry create a tradeoff between the traditional goal of achieving positive externalities from interconnection and the alternative goal of providing enhanced service offerings that may involve sacrificing universal connectivity. We argue that this tradeoff has affected the utilization of data communication networks in the U.S. and Europe. In addition, we identify problems of competing interests that complicate the European approach to standards “harmonization” in the case of telecommunications. We conclude by noting that the nature of standards and standard-setting process can have marked effects on the incentives to conduct private research and development.     

Monopolistic security design in finance economies

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to analyze endogenous asset innovation by an entrepreneurial exchange owner in a general equilibrium model of incomplete security markets with financial transaction fees. A monopolistic market maker has the technology to introduce a new option into the economy and charge investors proportional transaction fees if they trade on the exchange. The market maker's objective is to choose the security and transaction fee that maximize revenues when opening the exchange. A computational analysis of this problem is necessary since there are no interesting models with closed-form solutions. We compute the price and welfare effects of the option introduction. Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: December 12, 2000     

Fragmentation and Welfare in Monopolistic Competition

We examine the welfare effect of fragmentation with a general‐equilibrium model of monopolistic competition. Using the efficiency property of monopolistic competition models, we develop a diagram that is used to show that fragmentation of production arises, i.e. firms in a country specialize in developing blueprints and out‐source the manufacturing of their products to the other country. Such fragmentation allows countries to benefit from trade due to two different sources: comparative advantage and product diversity. We show how these two sources result in gains from trade induced by this production fragmentation.     

Immerisizing Growth in a Monopolistic Competition Model

In models of trade with monpolistic competition, firms set prices above marginal cost. An example is provided in this paper in which, because of this, a growth in the labor force lowers welfare per capita.     

Interconnection and competition among asymmetric networks in the Internet backbone market

We examine the interrelation between interconnection and competition in the Internet backbone market. Networks that are asymmetric in size choose among different interconnection regimes and compete for end-users. We show that a direct interconnection regime, peering, softens competition as compared to indirect interconnection since asymmetries become less influential when networks peer. If interconnection fees are paid, the smaller network pays the larger one. Sufficiently symmetric networks enter a Peering agreement while others use an intermediary network for exchanging traffic. This is in line with considerations of a non-US policy maker. In contrast, US policy makers prefer that relatively asymmetric networks peer.     

Airline networks as joint goods: Implications for competition policy

This article derives a model of airline services as joint goods. Using this model, the article shows how the existence of higher fares in certain hub routes may imply the market has generated a solution to the problem of covering joint costs by having a larger proportion of those costs come from hub routes, rather than the existence of any general market failure. The model is then used to make recommendations for competition policy.     

Environmental Policy in Open Economies and Monopolistic Competition

This paper analyses the implications of international trade for non-cooperative environmental policy in the case of local production externalities. A particular focus is on the potential effects of regulations on the variety of goods and the resulting international spillover caused by trade. A tougher domestic standard negatively affects the utility of the households abroad, since such a policy reduces their variety of imports (due to fewer domestic product inventions) or their consumption of each imported brand (due to higher import prices). Ignoring the negative spillover, non-cooperative governments implement inefficiently strict standards in equilibrium. In contrast to this clear-cut inefficiency result, the impact of international trade on the state of the environment is ambiguous.     

我国垄断行业的公司治理模式改革

中国的垄断行业正处于公司化改造之中,取得了一些进展,但是仍然缺乏有效的企业治理机制。目前我国垄断行业的企业形态主要是国有独资或国家控股企业,建立有效的治理结构仍然有很长的路要走。因为这不仅是一个企业改革的问题,也关系到垄断产业重组与政府改革问题。本文通过分析目前我国垄断行业公司治理现状及其存在的问题,通过分析垄断行业公司治理的目标及其实现路径,提出了深化和完善中国垄断行业的公司治理模式改革的具体建议。