从代理理论的角度谈非营利组织治理

本文以代理理论为分析框架,考察了非营利组织的治理特征和代理问题,分析了非营利组织理事会的监管职能,讨论了代理理论对非营利组织治理的启示。     

非营利组织财务治理的经济理论分析

依据相关的经济理论提出的非营利组织财务治理的理论框架,用以弥补将这种组织形式简单地假设为一种典型的生产函数的缺陷,从而为我国如何推进事业单位管理体制改革、对非营利组织进行高效管理提供参考。     

我国非营利组织财务管理理论框架的构建

非营利组织财务管理是一项综合性的经济管理工作,是非营利组织管理的重要组成部分。无论是从事非营利组织财务管理的理论研究,还是从事非营利组织财务管理的实践工作,都必须明确非营利组织财务管理的理论框架。根据财务管理理论结构的目标起点论观点,非营利组织财务管理理论框架应包括非营利组织财务管理的目标、原则、内容与方法等四个部分。     

从善款风波分析非营利组织的治理机制

本文研究在中国经济转轨背景下,慈善类非营利组织微观层面治理机制的构建问题。研究分三部分展开：第一部分界定分析对象．认识慈善类非营利组织的基本情况;第二部分理论分析此类组织的公益产权关系与公共财务受托责任．指出需要一套新型治理机制与之适应;第三部分,基于理论剖析,提出控制权制衡机制、信息披露机制和外部监督机制相结合的治理机制．以期提升非营利组织的治理水平。     

非营利组织信息披露机制的理论框架研究

非营利组织信息披露机制解决的是组织信息透明度的问题，是提高组织的社会公信力，促进组织健康、持续发展的制度选择。非营利组织的属性决定了信息披露的自愿性。为了维护公众利益，弥补自愿性信息披露的局限，必须进行强制性信息披露。要提高非营利组织信息的公允性，必须引入中介机构作为非营利组织信息披露的有效补充机制.     

非营利组织预算会计理论探讨

非营利组织是指不以营利为目的的经济和社会组织。非营利组织的主要特征是通过文化教育、科学技术、医疗卫生等手段向整个社会或特定团体提供服务,以达到提高全民素质,促进社会经济发展的目的。我国非营利组织预算会计是以预算管理为中心的宏观管理信息系统和管理手段,是核算、反映和监督非营利机构收支预算执行情况的会计。当前,随着外部客观经济环境发生变化,我国非营利组织预算会计理论也应紧跟时代步伐,予以深化和更新。     

认识非营利组织

1．1非营利组织的兴起 非营利组织的兴起是由于第一部门和第二部门，即政府与市场的职能和力量的欠缺所致。这也是理论界的“政府失灵”和“市场失灵”说。随市场经济的发展，市场机制伸触到社会生活的各个方面，但是社会生活的复杂性是市场机制难以完全招架的，     

非营利组织对社区治理的优化

非营利组织是社区治理的主体之一,也是社区资源的供给者.在中国,非营利组织也正逐渐成长起来,并积极参与到社区治理中来.非营利组织在促进政府、 社区共同营造和谐社会方面起到了承上启下的作用.更关键的是非营利组织要在社区治理中不断加强管理的能力和创新力,将社区内外的资源合理利用,制定社区发展的方针策略,增强政策支持力度,保障社区治理活动有序进行.     

从“奖金门”事件看我国非营利组织会计监管

非营利组织披露的会计信息不足,导致对其会计监管不力。本文在借鉴前人研究成果的基础上提出从政府、市场和公众等3个角度加强对非营利组织的会计监管。     

谈谈民间非营利组织治理

美国民间非营利组织发展较早，不仅建立了较为完善的登记管理、会计以及税收制度，还形成了较为有效的治理机制。合理借鉴其成功经验，对于规范和促进我国民间非营利组织的发展具有重要意义。本文通过对美国民间非营利组织治理中的一个重要机制——审计委员会进行介绍，以期引起大家对我国民间非营利组织治理问题的关注。     

The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective

This study examines the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm. The agency literature suggests that outside directors on the board provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The agency literature indicates that other mechanisms such as managerial equity ownership, dividend payments, and debt leverage also serve as important devices in reducing agency conflicts in firms. This study argues and documents that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual firms choose an optimal board composition depending upon alternative mechanisms employed by the firm to control agency conflicts. Board composition is also found to be systematically related to a number of other variables including institutional holdings, growth, volatility, and CEO tenure.     

试论董事会财务治理

从董事会角度研究企业的财务治理问题不仅拓展了企业财务研究的范畴,对于深化企业财务制度改革也有着积极的意义.本文在明确了董事会作为财务治理主体的身份后,从治理原则和实现机制两个方面论述了董事会财务治理的基本思想.     

Ownership structure and board composition: A multi-country test of agency theory predictions

Patterns of corporate governance and control differ significantly across countries because of national differences in structures of ownership and composition of boards of directors. Based on agency theory, we examine the relationship between ownership structure and the composition of the board of directors of 390 large manufacturing firms based in Japan, Western Europe and the United States. In particular, we examine how ownership concentration, bank control and state ownership affect the percentage of outside directors on the corporate boards. The results show that, consistent with predictions of agency theory, ownership structure has significant effects on board composition.     

董事会构成与财务报告舞弊问题研究

本文收集了1999年至2003年因财务报告舞弊而被证监会处罚的上市公司的数据作为样本进行研究,通过统计分析发现,内部人控制现象严重、董事会构成不合理、监事会形同虚设、董事长与总经理两职重合都是近年来财务造假公司的重要特征。进而指出提高会计信息质量,防止财务报告舞弊,须从完善内部治理机制尤其是董事会构成做起。     

完善上市公司董事会制度的思考

文章通过分析当前我国企业董事会制度中存在的各种问题,对如何完善董事会建设提出了若干建议。     

独立董事激励探讨

独立董事制度在我国已实行三年多时间,其对公司治理的效果并不理想,究其原因主要是激励不足.独立董事的激励机制是独立董事制度的重要内容,该机制关系到独立董事"独立性"的发挥以及公司治理结构的完善.本文将从薪酬、声誉、控制权等方面探讨完善我国的独立董事制度.     

Shareholder wealth effects when an officer of one corporation joins the board of directors of another

Officers of large corporations, having demonstrated expertise in managing complex organizations, would appear to be ideal additions to the boards of directors of other corporations. Shareholder wealth effects are examined for 124 announcements in which an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another. The results indicate that the values of nonfinancial firms that send directors to other firms decline significantly, while those of financial senders increase significantly. Receiving firms of both types do not gain. The results suggest that for nonfinancial firms the added duties of an outside directorship distract corporate officers from managing their own firms or are signals to the market that managers are available to other firms. For financial senders, the benefits of networking appear to strongly outweigh any drawbacks. Cross-sectional regressions suggest that prediction errors are higher for receiving firms if they have performed poorly prior to the announcement and less negative for sending firms if they have performed well prior to the announcement. Abnormal returns are negatively related to the size of the sender, adding support for the notion that busy executives are less valuable as outside directors.     

Banks' business strategy and environmental effectiveness: The monitoring role of the board of directors and the managerial incentives

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how banks' climate strategies affect environmental performance. To extend this line of research, the carbon disclosure of worldwide banks is examined. In particular, we focus on specific governance strategies: board of director monitoring and managerial incentives. Panel data are employed on a sample taken from 330 bank-year observations in the period after the financial crisis. The results show an increase in environmental performance through the implementation of managerial incentives related to climate change, associated with the highest level of responsibility of the board of directors. Overall, the present study contributes to both the academic literature and corporate governance, highlighting the importance of banks' business strategy on climate change risks and opportunities with respect to environmental performance goals.     

重塑我国公司治理监督机制--兼论独立董事与监事会功能的协调

我国公司监事会监督不力已是不争的事实。有关法律规范对监事会职权等的规定本身存在诸多缺陷，是导致我国公司监事会监督不力的重要制度原因。在当前董事会仍为大股东或内部董事控制的情况下，引进独立董事制度不仅难以发挥预期作用，而且还会造成与监事会功能的交叉、机构重叠，为此建议借鉴德国监事会成功的经验，重整我国公司治理监督机制。     

A reformulation of the maxmin expected utility model with application to agency theory

Invoking the parameterized distribution formulation of agency theory, the paper develops axiomatic foundations of the principal’s and agent’s choice behaviors that are representable by the maximization of the minimum expected utility over action-dependent sets of priors. In the context of this model, the paper also discusses some implications of ambiguity aversion for the design of optimal incentive schemes.