Price Competition and Consumer Externalities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Information Disparities

In this paper, we extend the model of vertical product differentiation to consider information disparities about quality differences and their effects on price competition. If uninformed consumers overestimate vertical differentiation, asymmetric information is a source of market power and informed consumers exert positive externalities on high quality product purchasers and negative externalities on low quality product purchasers. Such a result is consistent with the fact that information undermines brand. If uninformed consumers are skeptical, adverse selection issues arise and market demands may be perfectly inelastic to prices. With elastic demands equilibrium prices may be either distorted downwards or reflect real quality if the share of informed consumers is suffciently high. Therefore, with skeptical consumers firms may want either to signal quality or subsidize information provision.     

Capital flows to an emerging financial market in Turkey

Increased globalization in financial markets implies that the percentage of all shares under foreign ownership in domestic stock markets has been rising. Speculative attacks on the foreign exchange market in February 2001 led to deep economic crisis in Turkey. This article will explore various indicators of the financial crisis in Turkey based on a macro-model. The foreign share of the domestic economy is a key variable to establish the degree of vulnerability during a financial crisis. An empirical investigation shows that the percentage of shares owned by foreigners on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) has been increasing since 1995 and is currently about 50 percent of the total. Furthermore, the general index of stock market prices in 1999 was at its highest level since 1995. This would imply that the general price index of the stock market is another strong indicator of an impending financial crisis. An empirical investigation of Turkish data based on a theoretical model is presented in this paper. An unexpected capital outflow would certainly cause exchange rate fluctuations, balance of payments problems, and international debt crisis. Hot money inflows boost share prices and keep the real exchange rate high. However, short-term stay of capital implies a sudden capital outflow that creates financial crisis, which results in international debt crisis. This in turn leads to a further increase in loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Relatively high stock market prices may suggest an impending financial crisis. Using Turkish stock market price data, an impending financial crisis can be statistically predicted.     

Price competition in a differentiated products duopoly under network effects

We examine price competition under product-specific network effects, in a duopoly where the products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically. We emphasize the role of consumers’ expectations formation. When expectations are not influenced by prices, the market may be shared but shares must be equal unless product qualities differ or one firm, possibly even the low-quality one, may capture the entire market. When expectations are influenced by prices, which would be the case when there is commitment, competition becomes more intense and the high-quality firm tends to capture a larger market share. Under strong network effects there is a continuum of equilibria and the higher the prices, the smaller the difference between those prices can be. Requiring continuity of expectations, however, delivers a unique equilibrium where one firm captures the entire market.     

Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition*

We consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique Bertrand–Nashequilibrium. The high‐price firm has a nonvanishing market share, however, and intuition suggests that observed prices may be positively related to this market share. This relationship is implied by a model in which players make noisy (logit) best responses to expected payoff differences. The resulting logit equilibrium model was used to design an experiment in which the high‐price firm's market share varies. The model accurately predicts the final‐period price averages. A naive learning model predicts the observed differences in the time paths of average prices.     

Financial Bubbles: Excess Cash,Momentum, and Incomplete Information

We report on a large number of laboratory market experiments demonstrating that a market bubble can be reduced under the following conditions: 1) a low initial liquidity level, i.e., less total cash than value of total shares, 2) deferred dividends, and 3) a bid-ask book that is open to traders. Conversely, a large bubble arises when the opposite conditions exist. The first part of the article is comprised of twenty-five experiments with varying levels of total cash endowment per share (liquidity level), payment or deferral of dividends and an open or closed bid-ask book. We find that the liquidity level has a very strong influence on the mean and maximum prices during an experiment (P < 1/10,000). These results suggest that within the framework of the classical bubble experiments (dividends distributed after each period and closed book), each dollar per share of additional cash results in a maximum price that is $1 per share higher. There is also limited statistical support for the theory that deferred dividends (which also lower the cash per share during much of the experiment) and an open book lead to a reduced bubble. The three factors taken together show a striking difference in the median magnitude of the bubble ($7.30 versus $0.22 for the maximum deviation from fundamental value). Another set of twelve experiments features a single dividend at the end of fifteen trading periods and establishes a 0.8 correlation between price and liquidity during the early periods of the experiments. As a result, calibration of prices and evolution toward equilibrium price as a function of liquidity are possible.     

The structural effect of cooperatives on price volatility in the European dairy sector

Theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest that high market shares of cooperatives can force investor-oriented firms to pay higher producer prices within a region. In the same vein, cooperatives may force investor-oriented firms to reduce price volatility. We use panel data from 27 European Union member states over the period 2001–2015 to investigate how the market share of cooperatives in a country affects milk price volatility. Our key finding is that a higher market share of cooperatives reduces price volatility at the national level. Volatility is influenced by a number of other variables, such as fluctuation in raw milk production, oil price volatility spillover and the number of dairy processors. Policymakers should consider that the promotion of cooperatives might positively affect price stability in the dairy sector.     

Entry in a Dynamic Model with Equilibrium Price Dispersion with an Application to the Market for Long-Distance Telephone Services

Models of entry based on the traditional models of oligopoly do not allow for price dispersions on homogenous products. Yet, such price dispersions do exist for homogenous products, and a firm does not lose its entire market share when it fails to charge the lowest price. Existing models of equilibrium price dispersion are not designed to analyze entry in a dynamic framework. A dynamic model is developed that allows an analysis of the effects of entry into a previously monopolized market. Despite asymmetric initial shares, the market shares of equally efficient firms tend to equalize over time. An application is the market for long‐distance telephone services following the divestiture of the bell operating companies from AT&T.     

Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly

Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages share ownership. Finally, under Bertrand competition neither firm shares ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages.     

On non-ergodic asset prices

We investigate the asset prices dynamics and the long-run market shares of two competing financial mediators who are selected by consumers. We demonstrate that the social interaction among consumers constitutes an endogenous path-depending source of risk in a financial market. Depending on consumers’ evaluation of the mediator’s investment, asset prices may behave in a non-ergodic manner: the price process converges in distribution but the limiting distribution is not necessarily uniquely determined, its multiplicity being characterized by the multiplicity of possible long-run market shares. The convergence of the process is sensitive to initial conditions and depends on the history of noise-trader transactions. Long-run portfolio holdings may be in-efficient since investors holding mean-variance efficient portfolios may not be identified.     

A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market

This paper studies a general equilibrium model with an investor-controlled firm. Shareholders can vote on the firm??s production plan in an assembly if they dislike management??s decision. Prior to that they may trade shares on the stock market. Since stock market trades determine the distribution of votes, trading is strategic. There is always an equilibrium, where share trading leads to an ownership structure that supports competitive behavior. But there may also be equilibria, where monopolistic behavior prevails.     

Primary market and aftermarket competition in the bicycle component industry

This study examines the bicycle component industry. This industry is characterized by one dominant firm, Shimano Inc., and four or five smaller players. Firms in the component industry produce components for sale in two related markets, the market for original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and the component aftermarket. A unique data set containing information on aftermarket prices and OEM market shares is used to determine whether or not market power in the aftermarket is a function of OEM market power. The results indicate that concentration in the OEM market is positively related to aftermarket price, while an individual firm's OEM market share is inversely related to aftermarket price.     

Efficient ‘myopic’ asset pricing in general equilibrium: A potential pitfall in excess volatility tests

Excess volatility tests for financial market efficiency maintain the hypothesis of risk neutrality. This permits the specification of the benchmark efficient market price as the present discounted value of expected future dividends. By departing from the risk neutrality assumption in a stripped-down version of Lucas's general equilibrium asset pricing model, I show that asset prices determined in a competitive asset market and efficient by construction can nevertheless violate the variance bounds established under the assumption of risk neutrality. This can occur even without the problems of non-stationarity (including bubbles) and finite samples. Standard excess volatility tests are joint tests of market efficiency and risk neutrality. Failure of an asset price to pass the test may be due to the absence of risk neutrality rather than to market inefficiency.     

财政约束与价格水平决定:FTPL的一个批判

本文在一个内生增长一般均衡货币模型中, 通过引入名义债券、实际债券、货币和物质资本, 讨论了政府财政约束与价格水平决定的关系。我们发现, 在平衡增长路径上均衡通货膨胀率完全由货币增长率决定, 政府跨时预算约束方程只是个恒等式。如果价格水平财政理论(FiscalTheoryofPriceLevel, FTPL) 成立, 则小得可以忽略的财政扰动可以导致物价水平的巨大波动, 这是无法让人接受的; 进一步的研究发现, 问题出现的原因是FTPL将名义债券市场和其他资产市场割裂开来, 孤立地讨论了名义债券市场出清的条件, 由此认为跨时预算约束方程是一个均衡定价方程; 当将诸市场统一起来考虑时, 公众可以在货币、债券和物质资本之间进行选择, 财政当局不再是一个价格决定者, 其债券发行量成为一个内生变量, 必须服从跨时预算约束方程, 后者成为一个恒等式, 从而价格水平主要由货币当局的货币发行决定。     

Consumers with differing reaction speeds,scale advantages and industry structure

The development of an industry is seen as the outcome of a differential game in which market shares flow in response to price differences. It is hypothesized that while all consumers eventually react to price differences, some are slower than others. If scale advantages have some influence on marginal costs around average market share, then, under reasonable conditions, only skewed size distributions can be locally stable steady states. In addition, and contrary to common belief, the largest firm need not eventually monopolize the industry.     

中国棉花期货和现货市场的价格关系研究

期货市场和现货市场之间的价格发现功能一直是监管部门和投资者十分关心的问题。本文借助信息共享模型、脉冲响应函数和方差分解等方法,对中国棉花的期、现货市场间的价格关系进行实证研究,定量刻划了期、现货市场在价格发现中的作用。研究结果表明:棉花期、现货价格之间存在显著的双向引导关系;二者存在长期均衡关系;期、现货市场都扮演重要的价格发现角色,期货市场在价格发现中处于主导地位。     

Internal rationality, imperfect market knowledge and asset prices

We present a decision theoretic framework in which agents are learning about market behavior and that provides microfoundations for models of adaptive learning. Agents are ‘internally rational’, i.e., maximize discounted expected utility under uncertainty given dynamically consistent subjective beliefs about the future, but agents may not be ‘externally rational’, i.e., may not know the true stochastic process for payoff relevant variables beyond their control. This includes future market outcomes and fundamentals. We apply this approach to a simple asset pricing model and show that the equilibrium stock price is then determined by investors? expectations of the price and dividend in the next period, rather than by expectations of the discounted sum of dividends. As a result, learning about price behavior affects market outcomes, while learning about the discounted sum of dividends is irrelevant for equilibrium prices. Stock prices equal the discounted sum of dividends only after making very strong assumptions about agents? market knowledge.     

A model of benefit and tax share discrimination by a monopoly bureau

This paper integrates the theory of demand for publicly provided goods in a democracy with the theory of bureaucratic supply in order to develop a model of benefit share and tax share discrimination by a monopoly bureau. The demand side of the political market is based on a utility maximizing model of voter behavior with voters' demands aggregated through a majority voting process. The supply side of the political market is based on a budget maximizing model of bureaucratic behavior. The bureau is assumed to possess monopoly power as a result of either its control over benefit shares or tax shares and, hence, implicit tax prices or its control over budget proposals placed on the agenda. Different degrees of discrimination are examined and in each case the equilibrium of the model yields a total budget for the bureau as well as distributions of benefit shares or tax shares across voters.     

Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights

We demonstrate that auctioning market licenses may result in higher market prices than assigning them via more random allocation mechanisms. When future market profit is uncertain, winning an auction is like winning a lottery ticket. If firms differ in risk attitudes, auctions select the least risk-averse firm, which, in turn, set a higher price (or a higher quantity, in case quantity is the decision variable) in the marketplace than an average firm.     

Beyond the efficient markets hypothesis: Towards a new paradigm

To go beyond the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) we suppose that the stock market can be in one of three states: (1) a fundamental state, where share prices are determined largely as in the EMH; (2) a bubble or bull market state, where share prices are above their fundamental levels but are expected to continue to rise further, and (3) a bear market state, where shares are held exclusively by irrational agents and rational agents cannot exploit the overvaluation because of short-selling constraints. Also, heterogeneous rational expectations may help explain some features of stock market behaviour.     

COMPETITIVE PRICING AND EFFICIENCY IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*

We consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium. Extending models by Rubinstein and Wolinsky and by Gale, heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition. When the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0, we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive, market clearing, price. Given positive search costs, efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies Hosios' condition and r=0. When prices are set by third‐party market makers, however, we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient.