试论美国次贷危机与我国资产证券化

20世纪70年代初期,金融市场上出现了一种新型的金融衍生品,即资产证券化,由于它具有促进资金流动和分散风险的功能,所以发展较快。但是,2008年美国次贷危机爆发,不仅导致美国经济衰退,而且也将矛头指向了资产证券化。本文首先分析了美国次贷危机中资产证券化所出现的问题,然后结合我国实际情况,提出了完善我国资产证券化的几点建议,最后简要阐述了我国资产证券化未来的发展前景。     

金融商品交易视域下的次贷危机原因及立法启示

美国次贷危机的发生无疑具有复杂性,是多因素共同作用的结果。从根本上说,次贷危机是美国新自由主义经济政策和宽松的货币政策的产物。但是,从金融商品交易的角度出发,资产支持证券等衍生性金融商品的过度发展以及金融监管制度的缺失是构成美国次贷危机的重要原因。次贷危机后,加强金融商品交易的场外监管、功能监管,增强市场透明度,增进监管合作已经成为各国监管改革的重点。     

现阶段美国次贷危机对我国金融创新的启示

美国次贷危机这场原本起源于美国房地产按揭市场的信用违约率卜升的事件,在不经意之间就已扩散到全球,造成了极大的经济恐慌.目前我国资本市场正处于转轨的关键时机,稳健推进金融创新成为战略性的课题.本文着重从次贷危机的产生和发展,结合目前我国金融创新存在的问题,对我国实行金融创新提出几点启示.     

现代金融创新风险研究——基于美国次贷危机的视角

近来,美国次贷危机通过"蝴蝶效应"引发了全球金融市场共振,其影响还在扩散和深化中。这场危机使人们意识到,以资产证券化为代表的现代金融创新在促进风险分散渠道多元化、提高市场效率的同时,也扩大了金融风险,引起了全球性的危机。现代金融创新的风险因素错综复杂,既有微观层面与宏观层面,又有内生层面与外生层面。防范金融创新风险需从金融工具、金融机构、金融政策和投资者教育等各个环节上综合考虑。     

美国次贷危机对我国房地产金融的启示

美国次贷危机的爆发,成为近期人们关注的焦点。它所产生的蝴蝶效应,不仅造成美国金融市场的动荡,而且波及全球金融市场。这场风波为我国敲响了警钟,我们应从中吸取教训,并且重新审视中国的房贷市场,反思我国房地产金融市场可能隐藏的风险。本文剖析了美国次贷危机形成的深层次原因,分析了我国房地产金融的现状及存在的问题,并在此基础上试着提出一些防范房地产金融风险的建议和措施。     

从次贷危机反思中国资产证券化

2007年在美国爆发了影响全球的次贷危机,它的破坏力之大涉及面之广引起世界各国的广泛关注。资产证券化作为美国次级债市场的重要金融工具,对次贷危机的发展有着不容忽视的推动作用,深入剖析两者的关系将对全面认识本次危机有着重要意义。虽然次贷危机对当前中国的金融机构影响还十分有限,却对信贷资产证券化在我国的发展前景提出了挑战,本文分析了次贷危机的深层次原因,结合我国实际情况,提出客观看待资产证券化的观点,积极积极推进我国的资产证券化。     

从次贷危机看中国资产证券化发展

资产证券化是当今世界金融领域发展最快的金融产品之一,也是20世纪70年代以来最重要的金融创新之一。然而从2007年爆发的次贷危机到现在仍然余威为减,肆虐全球,对美国及当今世界经济的影响将是巨大的和深远的。我国资产证券化也面临着政策、法律等方面的风险,我国应制订专门的资产证券化法律,完善信用评级制度,降低对银行担保的依赖,加强市场培育力度。     

次贷危机金融模块化

本文认为模块化作为一种解决复杂问题的思路,同样适用于金融领域并正在日益发挥重要作用.2007年-2008年美国金融系统爆发次贷危机,并最终在世界范围内引起金融海啸.用模块化的方法论能够重新解析次贷危机的产生并为未来金融产业创新和规避金融风险提出一种全新的思路.     

次贷危机下资产证券化风险控制的问题探讨

资产证券化作为一种新的金融工具开始进入人们的视线,它以其自身的优点满足投资者的需要,我国少数商业银行也展开了试点工作.然而,2008年的次贷危机给世界敲响了警钟,证券化产品在发挥其自身优势的同时,也存在着很多风险.提前偿付风险、利率风险、信用风险等都制约着其发展.文章主要以次贷危机为背景,结合我国资产证券化现状,研究资产证券化的风险,为资产证券化风险控制提出建议.     

美国次贷危机对我国资产证券化发展的启示

随着美国次贷危机负面影响的不断扩大，对资产证券化的质疑开始成为焦点。我国正处于资产证券化的试点阶段，如何才能稳健地开展资产证券化业务成为理论界和实务界所热切关注和探讨的问题。通过资产证券化与次贷危机的关系，剖析了资产证券化的双刃剑功能；结合当前我国资产证券化过程中的现实挑战，总结出次贷危机对我国资产证券化发展的几点启示。     

汇丰控股积极应对次级按揭贷款危机

多种因素导致风险积累与爆发 美国此次次级按揭贷款危机是由经济增长放缓、住房信贷增长过快、自然灾害等多种因素造成的.     

美国为什么会发生次级抵押贷款危机

引子 2007年8月9日,美国股市出现了暴跌,创下了今年第二大跌幅.到收盘时,纽约道琼斯指数比前一个交易日下跌了387.18点,收于13270.68点,跌幅2.83%,标准普尔和纳斯达克指数下跌幅度也都超过了2%.     

Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis

We examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers, focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan. Conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent, we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank-held loans when compared to similar securitized loans: across various specifications and origination vintages, the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank-held loans is 3% to 7% lower in absolute terms (13% to 32% in relative terms). There is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers. A quasi-experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results.     

Valuing mortgage loan servicing

We develop an intertemporal model for valuing mortgage loan servicing contracts. The model includes a stochastic short-term interest rate and realized inflation rate which jointly determine the current mortgage coupon rate, the mortgagor's prepayment decision, the servicer's future net cash flows, and the rate at which to discount these future cash flows. Several potential uses of the model for institutions that service mortgages and trade servicing portfolios are illustrated by the application of the model to servicing fixed-rate mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages. The model also is applicable to regulatory issues and to the servicing of other types of loans.The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Washington, D.C., the Purdue Research Foundation, West Lafayette, Indiana, and the Richard D. Irwin Foundation, Homewood, Illinois.     

Option compensation,risky mortgage lending,and the financial crisis

We examine how option compensation affects banks' risky mortgage origination and sale decisions before the financial crisis in 2008. We find that, in the period immediately before the financial crisis, option compensation has little impact on the riskiness of mortgages originated and is negatively associated with mortgage lenders' propensity to sell risky mortgages. The results are consistent with banks' incentives to maximize revenues from origination and servicing fees while managing risk exposure by adjusting the sale of risky mortgages. For identification, we use bank-year fixed effects and matched loan applications to control for both supply- and demand-side factors of mortgage lending. We find similar results when using the variation in option compensation generated by the implementation of FAS 123R.     

The income elasticity of mortgage loan demand

One explanation for the emergence of the housing market bubble and the subprime crisis is that increases in individuals’ income led to higher increases in the amount of mortgage loans demanded, especially for the middle class. This hypothesis translates to an increase in the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand before 2007. Using applicant‐level data, we test this hypothesis and find that the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand in fact declines in the years before 2007, especially for the mid‐ and lower‐middle income groups. Our finding implies that increases in house prices were not matched by increases in loan applicants’ income.     

Bank loan announcements and borrower stock returns before and during the recent financial crisis

The impact of U.S. bank loan announcements on the stock prices of the corporate borrowers has been decreasing during the two last decades with estimated two-day cumulative abnormal returns slipping from almost 200 basis points in the beginning of the 1980s to close to zero by the turn of the Century. We estimate excess returns before and after the onset of the most recent financial crisis. We find that while prior to August 2007 returns were indeed close to zero, afterwards returns jump back up to around 200 basis points. We surmise that in a booming credit market the certification of corporate borrowers by banks started to play a lesser role, while during the crisis the banks’ role was revitalized. Consistent with this interpretation we find that after August 2007 excess returns increase especially for loans with a longer maturity, and for smaller, levered, less profitable or lowly rated firms.     

从次贷危机看监管体制改革

美国次贷危机爆发至今已经一年有余,但次贷危机所造成的损失和影响却尚未见底。对市场机构监管缺位的背后,暴露出美国金融监管的体制性缺陷。面对挑战,美国人开始着手规划监管体制改革的总体思路,对整体金融市场的监管原则、监管主体、监管权限等都提出了较为详尽而有针对性的构想。其金融监管体制改革的动向,也给我们留下了某些重要的启示。     

Race,redlining, and residential mortgage loan performance

Theories of discrimination in credit markets suggest that under certain circumstances systematic lender bias may result in creditors holding minority applicants or applicants from minority neighborhoods to higher standards of creditworthiness than other borrowers. This implies lower default rates or smaller dollar losses on loans to marginally qualified minority borrowers or borrowers from minority neighborhoods, compared to loans extended to other similarly qualified borrowers. This study seeks to test this prediction by examining the default-risk characteristics of FHA-insured single-family residential mortgages. All things equal, empirical findings fail to support the theoretical predictions that observed default rates are relatively lower among minority borrowers or neighborhoods.     

Credit risk,owner liability,and bank loan maturities during the global financial crisis

We relate credit risk and owners’ personal guarantees to bank loan maturities during the global financial crisis. The findings, which remain robust to reverse causality, show that firms rated as low risk, with a strong relationship with the bank, whose owners provided personal guarantees and with large loan sizes obtained longer maturities. Banks with larger nonperforming loans provided loans with shorter maturities. Firms with low‐ and high‐risk ratings that provided owners’ personal guarantees obtained longer maturities. These findings shed additional light on the relationship between risk and loan maturities and the role of personal guarantees in reducing information asymmetries.