共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Joan Canton 《Resource and Energy Economics》2008,30(3):295-315
This article presents a combined economic–political model of environmental taxation setting. The model introduces a third lobby group – the lobby of an eco-industry – in addition to the traditional lobbies of polluting firms and environmentalists. Pressure groups interact to influence the environmental tax chosen by a regulator maximizing its chances of being reelected. The eco-industry lobby adds a new political contribution toward a higher environmental tax. The imperfectly competitive structure of the eco-industry also modifies the incentives of the usual lobbies. When the foreign environmental policy is constant, environmentalists can be in favor of a decrease in the local tax in order to reduce foreign pollution. We also discuss the formation of alliances between the eco-industry and one of the other lobbies and their potential impact. In general, the impact of lobbying activities on the politically optimal tax is ambiguous and depends on the relative concentration of each pressure group. 相似文献
2.
Over the past four decades, state investment tax incentives have proliferated. This emergence of state investment tax credits (ITC) and other investment tax incentives raises two important questions: 1) Are these tax incentives effective in achieving their stated objective, to increase investment within the state?; 2) To the extent these incentives raise investment within the state, how much of this increase is due to investment drawn away from other states?To begin to answer these questions, we construct a detailed panel dataset for 48 states for 20+ years. The dataset contains series on output and capital, their relative prices, and establishment counts. The effects of tax variables on capital formation and establishments are measured by the Jorgensonian user cost of capital that depends in a nonlinear manner on federal and state tax variables. Cross-jurisdictional differences in state investment tax credits and state corporate tax rates entering the user cost, combined with a panel that is long in the time dimension, are key to identifying the effectiveness of state investment incentives.Two models are estimated. The Capital Demand Model is motivated by the first-order condition for a profit-maximizing firm and relates at the state level the capital/output ratio to the relative user cost of capital. The Twin-Counties Model exploits both the spatial breaks (“discontinuities”) in tax policy at state borders and our panel dataset to relate at the county level the relative user cost to the location of manufacturing establishments. Using the Capital Demand Model, we find that own-state capital formation is substantially increased by tax-induced reductions in the own-state price of capital and, more interestingly, substantially decreased by tax-induced reductions in the price of capital in competitive-states. Similarly, using our Twin-Counties Model, we find that county manufacturing establishment counts around state borders are higher on the side of the border with the lower price of capital, but the difference is economically small, suggesting that establishments are much less mobile than overall capital. Extensions of the Capital Demand Model also reveal that state capital tax policy appears to be a zero-sum game among the states in that an equiproportionate increase in own-state and competitive-states user costs tends to have no effect on own-state capital formation. 相似文献
3.
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND TRADE POLITICS: CAPITAL FLOWS, POLITICAL COALITIONS, AND LOBBYING 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Michael J. Hiscox 《Economics & Politics》2004,16(3):253-285
Conventional wisdom holds that increasing international capital mobility reduces incentives for firms to lobby for trade protection. This paper argues that the effects of increased international capital mobility on the lobbying incentives of firms depend critically upon levels of inter-industry mobility. General-equilibrium analysis reveals that if capital is highly industry-specific, greater international mobility among some types of specific capital may increase lobbying incentives for owners of other specific factors and thereby intensify industry-based rent-seeking in trade politics. Evidence on levels of inward and outward investment in US manufacturing industries between 1982 and 1996, and on industry lobbying activities, indicate that these effects may be quite strong. 相似文献
4.
文章以中国上市公司微观数据为样本,运用能克服样本自选择性的计量方法估计R&D税收激励的专利效应,并以知识生产函数分析其作用机制.结果表明,与没有获得R&D税收激励的厂商相比,获得R&D税收激励的厂商并不具有更高的专利产出.从作用机制上看,尽管R&D税收激励产生了显著的额外研发支出效应,但该效应并未直接增加企业的专利产出,中国的R&D税收激励面临类似"欧洲悖论"的困境.仅在知识产权保护的调节下,R&D税收激励引致的额外研发支出能间接增加专利产出,知识产权保护缓解了R&D税收激励政策失灵的风险.前述结论通过了稳健性检验.未来,为改善我国R&D税收激励的创新效应,走出"欧洲悖论"困境,需要优化R&D税收激励政策设计和强化知识产权保护的激励功效. 相似文献
5.
《Review of Economic Dynamics》2008,11(1):133-154
Often an increase in the minimum wage is accompanied by a reduction in the capital tax. This paper analyzes the effects of interactions between the minimum wage and the capital tax in the general equilibrium framework. The analysis is conducted in an inter-temporal search model in which firms post wages. A (binding) minimum wage provides a lower support for the distribution of wages. The paper finds that the interaction of these two policy instruments significantly modify labor market outcomes and welfare cost. In the presence of a binding minimum wage, a decrease in the capital tax leads to an increase in wage dispersion. In contrast, when it is not binding, a lower capital tax may reduce the dispersion in wages. A binding minimum wage magnifies the positive effects of a lower capital tax on labor supply, employment, and output. It also enhances the welfare cost of capital tax. A policy change which involves an increase in the minimum wage and a fall in the capital tax such that employment level remains constant increases welfare and output. 相似文献
6.
Joseph E. Stiglitz 《Journal of public economics》1983,21(2):257-294
The analysis of the effects of capital gains taxation requires a careful modelling both of the details of the tax code and the imperfections in the capital market. Under the standard assumptions concerning perfect capital markets and under the standard idealizations of the tax code, there are several strategies by which rational investors can avoid note only all taxes on their capital income, but also all taxes on their wage income; these strategies leave individuals' consumption and bequests in each state of nature and at each date unchanged from what they would have been in the absence of taxes. Although certain detailed provisions of the tax code may limit the extent to which rational investors can avail themselves of these tax avoidance activities, there are ways, in a perfect capital market, by which the effects of these restrictions can be ameliorated. Accordingly, any analysis of the effects of capital taxation must focus on imperfect capital markets.If individuals face limitations on the amounts which they can borrow and/or if there are limitations on short sales, then under some circumstances there is a locked-in effect (individuals do not sell securities which they would have sold in the absence of taxation); but under other circumstances individuals are induced to sell securities that they otherwise would have held, in order to take advantage of the asymmetric treatment of short-term losses and long-term gains. A policy of realizing gains as soon as they become eligible for long term treatment dominates the policy of postponing the realization of capital gains, provided the gains are not too large.A simple general equilibrium model is constructed within which it is shown that the taxation of capital gains may increase the volatility of asset prices, and lead individuals not to trade when they otherwise would. While the analysis casts doubt on the significance of the welfare losses resulting from these exchange inefficiencies, there are circumstances in which the tax leads to production inefficiencies, e.g. terminating projects at other than the socially optimal date.Finally, we argue that the focus of some recent policy debates on the short-run revenue impact of a decrease in the tax rate on capital gains is misplaced: even when the short-run revenue impact is positive, consumption may increase (thus exacerbating inflationary pressures) and private savings may decrease (thus leading to a lower level of investment in the private sector). Moreover, there is some presumption that the long-run revenue impact is negative.Our analysis has some important implications for empirical research. In particular, it suggests that the impact of the tax is not adequately summarized by a single number, such as the ‘effective tax rate’ representing the average ratio of tax payments to capital gains. Moreover, the impact of the tax cannot be assessed by looking only at reported capital gains and losses. 相似文献
7.
Shale gas development investments are uncertain and irreversible in the initial stage in China. Flexible incentive strategy is needed for governments to guide private capital participation at different development stages. This study aims to provide analysis governments can use to encourage private investment in shale gas projects according to its plans in an extended real options framework. A social benefits variable is introduced to determine the threshold of social benefits that determine whether the government will choose a deferred or instant incentives strategy. By considering the efficiency factor, we show the optimal arrangements of two kinds of incentives: tax cuts and production subsidies, to implement incentive targets. The results indicate that current market demand and social benefits are the key factors that affect the government’s choice of incentive strategy. We also find that the optimal level of incentives, either tax cuts or production subsidies, are independent of current market demand and future market uncertainty under the delayed incentive strategy, but which affect the optimal level of incentives under the instant motivation strategy, and ignoring the negative influence of unpredictable random events on future market demand might lead to insufficient government incentives in this case. 相似文献
8.
Vincenzo Quadrini 《European Economic Review》2005,49(8):1927-1951
This paper evaluates the quantitative impact of capital liberalization on the taxation structure and welfare of the liberalizing countries when governments conduct fiscal policy optimally but without commitment (time-consistent policies). The transition from a regime of capital autarky to a regime of free mobility leads to a decrease in the long-term tax rate on capital of 13 percent and an increase in the tax rate on labor of 2 percent. As a consequence of this taxation shift, welfare increases by about 1 percent. The reduction in capital taxation induced by capital market liberalization is welfare improving because, in the absence of capital mobility, the time-consistent policies over-tax capital. 相似文献
9.
Transboundary pollution,tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated environmental regulation
Atsushi Yamagishi 《The Canadian journal of economics》2019,52(3):1165-1194
Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first‐best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution. However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum (“race to the bottom”). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve international environmental policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. The regulation is inefficiently loose in many cases, but it can be too strict if the decisive voter's capital endowment is above the average. Thus, the possibility of “race to the top” cannot be eliminated. The inefficiency result does not generally depend on the timing of policymaking, although the efficiency may be restored in the limit case where the decisive voter has no capital at all. 相似文献
10.
Ass. Dr. Hans-Werner Sinn 《Journal of Economics》1981,41(3-4):295-305
Conclusions The results indicated in Table 1 show that incomplete depreciation allowances reinforce the distortions in the equilibrium growth path brought about by an ideal capital income tax. A reduction in the deductible share of economic depreciation, like an increase in the tax rate, raises the current level of consumption, but reduces the steady state levels of consumption and capital per efficiency unit of labour.The reason for these distortions is that the tax law is able to drive wedges both between the rate of time preference and the market rate of interest, and between the latter and the marginal productivity of capital. The first wedge is created through capital income taxation as such and its size is directly related to the tax rate. The second wedge is created by the incomplete deductibility of depreciation. Its size is directly related to the tax rate and inversely to the deductible share of depreciation. For the distortion in the growth path of the economy it is the sum of the two wedges that counts. Therefore it is plausible that incomplete depreciation allowances reinforce the effects of capital income taxation.Knowing the determinants of the two wedges one can easily derive the influence of a tax reform on the marginal productivity of capital, the market rate of interest and the rate of time preference (cf. Table 2). In the short run, the system of these three interest rates is anchored by the marginal productivity of capital, and hence any measure that widens a wedge is translated into a reduction in the rate or those rates below the wedge. In the long run the system is anchored by the rate of time preference and an increase in the width of a wedge is translated into an increase in those rates or that rate above this wedge.The paper was written in association with the Sonderforschungsbereich 5 (Staatliche Allokationspolitik im marktwirtschaftlichen System). 相似文献
11.
This paper analyzes the setting of labor market reforms in the European Monetary Union (EMU), as a political compromise pressured by the lobbying of business interests and trade unions. Using a common agency model of lobbying, we model the impact of distorted and non-distorted Central Bank monetary policy on EMU member state incentives to reform its labor market. Paradoxically, a majority of citizens who do not support the reform can lead to an optimal level of reform. We also show that, in a context of EMU enlargement, inflationary policy generates a status quo if there is a majority of non-supporters. Surprisingly, inflationary policy enhances the reform if the share of non-supporters over supporters increases, and weakens it if this share decreases. 相似文献
12.
资本市场开放作为我国金融供给侧改革的重要内容,深刻改变了中国资本市场交易者结构特征,可能对上市公司的自利行为产生深远影响。本文基于沪港通这一准自然实验,研究发现资本市场开放能显著抑制企业的避税行为。影响机制检验表明,资本市场开放不仅有助于提高公司治理水平、抑制高管避税寻租动机,而且有助于改善公司信息质量、增加避税成本,从而降低企业避税水平。进一步研究还发现,这一影响对于税收征管强度较低地区的企业更显著。本文的研究结果表明,沪港通可以作为有效的外部治理机制,促进企业规范自身行为,提高税收征管效率。这为后续进一步深化金融领域开放提供了理论依据。 相似文献
13.
The conventional wisdom suggests that a stricter enforcement policy can reduce pollution emissions. Nevertheless, this present paper argues that this assertion does not necessarily hold if the stringency of environmental regulation is subject to the influence of lobbying. A stricter enforcement policy increases the polluters’ expected financial burden, and induces them to exert greater political pressure on reducing the stringency of environmental regulation, thereby resulting in a larger amount of pollution emissions. We also show that tightening the enforcement policy can reduce efficiency. We highlight the possibility of policymaking being misguided due to overlooking the political effect of enforcement policy. 相似文献
14.
The paper introduces decentralized policymaking into a game‐theoretic model with output growth through capital accumulation, and in which the determination of taxes, seigniorage and the long‐run growth rate of the economy reflects the strategic interactions between the government, the central bank and the private sector. The paper investigates, among other things, the impact on the long‐run growth rate of a higher degree of inflation aversion of the central bank and a higher degree of inefficiency in the tax system. 相似文献
15.
以北京市科技企业为调查对象,对科技金融政策促进企业发展的资源配置效率进行问卷调查分析,结果发现:各分项政策效率由高到低排序依次为财政补贴、金融监管、服务平台、税收优惠、科技保险、风险投资、科技担保、科技信贷政策;政策资源配置在不同产权类型、注册资本、行业类型、员工规模、资质类型、成立年限和年营业收入之间的均衡程度不同;政策激励偏重于创业明朗期和成熟期实力雄厚的企业、区级高技术企业以及国家战略扶持或市场需求较强行业,对创业危险期和成长转型期企业、市级高技术企业、风险较高行业激励性较弱。因此,建议政策优化时处理好以下关系:助强与扶弱、需求与供给、优先与平衡、创业与后劲、管制与放开、独立与协同。 相似文献
16.
寻求更有效的财政政策——中国宏观经济分析 总被引:28,自引:0,他引:28
中国社会科学院经济所宏观课题组 《经济研究》2000,(3)
宏观财政政策是一种公共物品 ,其有效性的标准是 ,在实现政府利益的同时 ,能够增进社会的福利。面临通货紧缩 ,政府将继续实施以财政政策为主导的扩张性宏观政策 ,在财政支出空间有限的情况下 ,就要选择能够作大投资乘数 ,提高市场效率的措施 ;同时要考虑调整税制结构 ,改变对投资征高税的税制 ,逐步变生产型增值税为收入型增值税和消费型增值税 ,并通过把内资企业税负降至外资企业的水平 ,一方面提高企业的利润预期 ,另一方面 ,消除税负不公 ,提高社会经济效率和减少资本外流 ;在运用国债政策时 ,既要重视国债的发行和使用 ,更要重视国债的交易和流通 ,推进我国金融市场的发育和功能的发挥以及促进公用事业的企业化 ,转换资源配置方式 ,从政府配置转向市场配置 ,从集中配置转向分散配置。总之 ,在体制转轨时期 ,推行一种与市场化改革相结合的财政政策 ,把短期的政策操作和长期的制度调整结合起来 ,实现政策和体制联动。 相似文献
17.
本文以新常态下创新驱动的引擎产业——高技术产业为研究对象,通过面板向量自回归方法将政府的直接补贴、税收优惠与企业的资本、人员投入及创新收益同时纳入系统框架,研究政府R&D补贴政策与企业创新行为决策之间的双向动态耦合关系,然后基于动态面板门限回归研究企业创新收益与两类R&D补贴政策间可能存在的非线性关系,并以理论模型与经验研究相结合的方式分析直接补贴与税收优惠影响高技术企业创新的机理及作用效果。研究证实企业增加创新投入是提高创新收益的根本原因;R&D补贴对企业资本投入的“挤入作用”并不明显,但税收优惠能有效激励高技术企业在人员方面的投入;政府“低补贴、低优惠”的双低策略更有利于提高企业的创新收益。 相似文献
18.
In this paper fiscal policy is examined for an open economy characterized by unemployment due to efficiency wages. We allow for capital and firm mobility in a model where the government chooses the level of wage, source-based capital and profit taxation. The taxing choices of governments are analyzed in scenarios which differ with respect to the constraints imposed on the set of available taxes and on the mobility of firms. As a general result, the welfare loss from labor market imperfections increases when tax bases become internationally mobile, which suggests an increasing relevance of domestic labor-market reforms when tax bases become global. 相似文献
19.
基于生产函数理论抽象出盈利能力和研发程度是R&D税收激励效应的两个关键因素,进而采用2012-2015年全国高新技术企业调查数据,分别检验了15%税率式优惠与研发加计扣除政策的有效性及其影响因素。实证结果表明:15%税率式优惠与加计扣除政策均能激励企业创新,而加计扣除激励效果显著优于15%税率式优惠;15%税率式优惠政策效应受企业盈利能力影响较大,而加计扣除政策受企业研发投入的作用较大;15%税率式优惠政策对高新制造业、服务业和文化产业创新激励效果不显著,而加计扣除对高新制造业和文化产业研发密集型行业创新具有显著的激励作用;15%税率式激励对成熟度较高企业创新具有较好的激励效应,而研发费用加计扣除政策对成熟度较低企业创新具有较强的促进作用。 相似文献
20.
This paper models the dynamic adjustment path of a socialist firm in transition to a market economy by a price shock that renders old capital obsolete. The firm can adjust with investment in more productive capital equipments. The optimal time paths of investment, output, and employment are analyzed and the impact of fiscal incentives like investment subsidies and a reduced corporate income tax rate are studied. Like output, the aggregate capital stock follows a J-curve. The conditions for viability of firms and the impact of variables such as wage increases on the value of the firm are discussed. 相似文献