Profit Sharing,Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment*

We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options, increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options, this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections—measured by the bargaining power of trade unions—are sufficiently strong and the benefit–replacement ratio is sufficiently high. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.     

The effects of employment protection: Learning from variable enforcement

Employment protection legislation (EPL) is not enforced uniformly across the board. There are a number of exemptions to the coverage of these provisions: firms below a given threshold scale and workers with temporary contracts are not subject to the most restrictive provisions. This within-country variation in enforcement allows us to make inferences on the impact of EPL which go beyond the usual cross-country approach. In this paper we develop a simple model which explains why these exemptions are in place to start with. Then we empirically assess the effects of EPL on dismissal probabilities and on the equilibrium size distribution of firms. Our results are in line with the predictions of the theoretical model. Workers under permanent contracts in firms with less restrictive EPL are more likely to be dismissed. However, there is no effect of the exemption threshold on the growth of firms.     

Survey Evidence on Wage Rigidity and Unemployment: Sweden in the 1990s*

We document the results of a repeat survey, which updates Agell and Lundborg (1995) , on wage rigidity in a sample of 159 Swedish manufacturing firms, conducted during the severe Swedish recession of the 1990s. It is found that not even a prolonged period of very high unemployment and quite low inflation softened workers’ resistance to wage cuts. We discuss possible reasons for this. In addition, we report new evidence on underbidding, efficiency‐wage mechanisms, and unemployment persistence.     

Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment*

This paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy. We consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment. Job search behavior is unobservable, which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance (UI) benefits intended for unemployed workers. As a consequence, pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment. We show that requiring unproductive activities (workfare) in exchange for UI benefits may generate a Pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers, and we characterize the situations where this is the case.     

Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium*

In this paper we introduce a general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms maximize profits while recognizing that the compensation package may affect the queue of job applicants and the absence rate. The analysis provides results concerning the effects of social insurance benefits and other determinants of workers' and firms' behavior. The normative analysis identifies externalities associated with firm‐provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative policies.     

The Rise and Fall of Centralized Wage Bargaining

During the three decades spanning the early 1950s to the early 1980s, the wage‐setting process in most Northern European countries was dominated by centralized bargaining (i.e., peak‐level labor and employer associations set wages nationwide). In the early 1980s, centralized wage bargaining began to collapse. In this paper, we assess a novel explanation for both the initial establishment of a centralized wage‐setting process, and its subsequent collapse. According to our theory, centralized wage bargaining was set up as a response to the spillovers created by the unemployment benefit program. Its collapse was the result of the increase in the productivity gap across workers, brought about by equipment‐specific technological progress and equipment–skill complementarity.     

Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: The French experience

This paper investigates the effect of the 2003 French pension reform on hiring, firing and employment rates among older workers. This reform increased the mandatory retirement age and simultaneously it set a tax levied on early retirement windows paid by firms to their older workers, to encourage them to leave their job early. We use a matching model with endogenous job destruction extended to account for a mandatory retirement age and we calibrate the model with data drawn from the French Labor Force Surveys for the years 2002 and 2003. We show that in the case of a high tax rate, delaying retirement raises job separation rates, which partially offsets its positive effect on job finding rates. Consequently, the combination of an increase in the retirement age and a taxation on early retirement windows may have negative effects on the employment rate among older workers.     

Labor‐market Volatility in Matching Models with Endogenous Separations*

The business‐cycle behavior of a matching model with endogenous separations is studied in this paper. We show that whether aggregate productivity shocks have a larger effect on the vacancy–unemployment ratio than in a model with exogenous separations depends on whether worker productivity stochastically increases with tenure. The difference in the response is quantitatively small, however. We also show that the cleansing effect introduced by allowing for endogenous separations can help in reconciling the model with observed fluctuations in the unemployment rate, but not with those in the vacancy rate.     

The Displacement Effect of Labour‐Market Programs: MONASH Analysis*

A key question concerning labour‐market programs is the extent to which they generate jobs for their target group at the expense of others. This effect is measured by displacement percentages. We describe a version of the MONASH model designed to quantify the effects of labour‐market programs. Our simulation results suggest that: (i) labour‐market programs can generate significant long‐run increases in employment; (ii) displacement percentages depend on how a labour‐market program affects the income trade‐off faced by target and non‐target groups between work and non‐work; and (iii) displacement percentages are larger in the short run than in the long run.     

Flexibility at the Margin and Labor Market Volatility in OECD Countries*

We study the business‐cycle behavior of segmented labor markets with flexibility at the margin (e.g., just affecting fixed‐term contracts). We present a matching model with temporary and permanent jobs (i) where there is a gap in the firing costs associated with these types of jobs and (ii) where there are restrictions in the creation and duration of fixed‐term contracts. We show that a labor market with ``flexibility at the margin'' increases the unemployment volatility with respect to one that is fully regulated. This analysis yields new insights into the interpretation of the recent volatility changes witnessed in the OECD area.     

Labor search and matching in macroeconomics

The labor search and matching model plays a growing role in macroeconomic analysis. This paper provides a critical, selective survey of the literature. Four fundamental questions are explored: How are unemployment, job vacancies, and employment determined as equilibrium phenomena? What determines worker flows and transition rates from one labor market state to another? How are wages determined? What role do labor market dynamics play in explaining business cycles and growth? The survey describes the basic model, reviews its theoretical extensions, and discusses its empirical applications in macroeconomics.The model has been developed against the background of difficulties with the use of the neo-classical, frictionless model of the labor market in macroeconomics. Its success includes the modelling of labor market outcomes as equilibrium phenomena, the reasonable fit of the data, and—when inserted into business cycle models—improved performance of more general macroeconomic models. At the same time, there is evidence against the Nash solution used for wage setting and an active debate as to the ability of the model to account for some of the cyclical facts.     

The College Wage Premium and the Expansion of Higher Education in the UK*

This paper reports estimates of the UK “college premium” for young graduates across successive cohorts from large cross‐section datasets for the UK pooled from 1994 to 2006—a period when the higher education participation rate increased dramatically. The growth in relative labour demand suggests that graduate supply considerably outstripped demand which ought to imply a fall in the premium. We find no significant fall for men and even a large, but insignificant, rise for women. Quantile regression results reveal a fall in the premium only for men in the bottom quartile of the distribution of unobserved skills.     

Prices,Productivity and Wage Bargaining in Open Economies*

According to the standard union bargaining model, unemployment benefits should have big effects on wages, but product‐market prices and productivity should play no role in the wage bargain. We formulate an alternative strategic bargaining model, where labour and product‐market conditions together determine wages. A wage equation is derived and estimated on aggregate data for four Nordic countries. Wages are found to depend not only on unemployment and the replacement ratio, but also on productivity, international prices and exchange rates. There is evidence of considerable nominal wage rigidity. Exchange rate changes have large and persistent effects on competitiveness.     

The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football*

We evaluate the effect of the recently approved transfer system for European professional football which will replace the current system (implemented by the Bosman judgment in 1995). The focus is on the comparison of wages, profits, the length of contracts and investment incentives. Our main findings are that (i) the new regime reduces a player's overall payoff because it increases the new club's renegotiation payoff, and (ii) since training generates a general skill, the new regime will also diminish incentives to invest in the education of young talents, because a new club benefits more from the initial club's investment.     

Social Interaction Effects in Disability Pension Participation: Evidence from Plant Downsizing*

We estimate the magnitude of social interaction effects in disability pension participation among older workers in Norway. The problem of omitted variable bias is addressed using the exposure of an individual's neighbors to plant‐downsizing events as an instrument for the disability entry rate among the individual's previously employed neighbors. Our instrumental variable (IV) estimates suggest that an increase of one percentage point in the participation rate of previously employed neighbors increased the subsequent four‐year entry rate of older workers by about 0.4 percentage points. Numerous robustness and specification tests appear to support the validity of the identifying assumption in our IV strategy.     

Taxation In The Two‐Sector Neoclassical Growth Model With Sector‐Specific Externalities And Endogenous Labour Supply*

This paper examines the long‐run impacts of selective (or sector‐specific) commodity, payroll, and profit taxes in a two‐sector endogenous growth model with sector‐specific production externalities, in which one sector produces consumption goods and the other produces investment goods. The novelty of the model is that it allows not only for endogenous labour supply but also for the intersectoral allocation of resources, which may together lead to indeterminacy. We analytically show that the stability properties of the long‐run equilibrium critically affect the long‐run effects of these selective taxes, which may reverse the standard results of the growth effects of distortionary taxes.     

Recent Technological and Economic Change among Industrialized Countries: Insights from Population Growth*

Cross‐country observations on the effects of population growth are used to show why differences in rates of growth in working‐age population may be a key to understanding differences in economic performance across industrialized countries over the period 1975–1997 versus 1960–1974. In particular, we argue that countries with lower rates of adult population growth adopted new capital‐intensive technologies more quickly than their high population growth counterparts, therefore allowing them to reduce their work time without deterioration of growth in output‐per‐adult.     

Adjustment within the euro. The difficult case of Portugal

In the second half of the 1990s, the prospect of entry in the euro led to an output boom and large current account deficits in Portugal. Since then, the boom has turned into a slump. Current account deficits are still large, and so are budget deficits. This paper reviews the facts, the likely adjustment in the absence of major policy changes, and examines policy options.     

Monitoring Job Offer Decisions,Punishments, Exit to Work,and Job Quality

Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part‐time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.