Austrian Economics and Game Theory: A Stocktaking and an Evaluation

I discuss the merits and drawbacks of game theory in economics from the perspective of Austrian economics. I begin by arguing that Austrians have neglected game theory at their peril, and then suggest that game theoretic reasoning could be one way of modelling key Austrian insights. However, admittedly some aspects of game theory don't square easily with Austrian economics. Moreover, a major stumbling block for an Austrian acceptance of game theory may lie in the traditional Austrian resistance to formal methods.     

投资与区域经济增长的实证分析——以新疆生产建设兵团为例

固定资产投资是新疆生产建设兵团经济增长的主动力，投资增长是促进兵团区域经济增长的主旋律。投资分配倾向对兵团区域经济增长影响较大，为促进兵团区域经济稳健增长，应有效运用投资。充分利用国家的财政政策，争取国家更多的资金支持；准确定住投资方向，合理调整投资结构，继续加大投资规模，促进兵团经济结构优化升级，提高兵团投资效益；进一步改善投资环境，有效利用外资；加强兵地合作，拓宽投资领域.     

Benford's Law as an Indicator of Fraud in Economics

Abstract. Contrary to intuition, first digits of randomly selected data are not uniformly distributed but follow a logarithmically declining pattern, known as Benford's law. This law is increasingly used as a 'doping check' for detecting fraudulent data in business and administration. Benford's law also applies to regression coefficients and standard errors in empirical economics. This article reviews Benford's law and examines its potential as an indicator of fraud in economic research. Evidence from a sample of recently published articles shows that a surprisingly large proportion of first digits, but not of second digits, contradicts Benford's law.     

旅游产品的静态博弈经济分析

改革开放以来,我国旅游业一直保持着快速增长的态势,经济效益和社会效益十分明显。旅游产品在旅游业发展中起了至关重要的支撑作用。本文基于Hotelling产品决策模型,以青岛和三亚海滨旅游产品为例进行了静态博弈经济分析,得出结论,即旅游产品差异化程度越高,旅游产品间价格竞争越弱,则城市对旅游者的垄断力越高,利润也越高。因此,突出旅游产品的差异,树立旅游产品特色,打造品牌旅游产品成为当前旅游业发展的一项重要任务。     

创业投资博弈的经济解释

本文运用改进的要价仲裁博弈模型对创业投资进行了分析,解释了政府参与创业投资的缺点并试图优化创业投资博弈,以增大博弈双方的利润。作者同时初步构建了对创业企业的激励规则,并提出了一些防范博弈风险的措施。     

Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View

In this paper, we argue that it is essential to incorporate bounded rationality into game theory. Game theory has been applied to aspects of economics such as industrial organizati on on the basis of the naive interpret ation of game theory, which requires players to be ideally rational in an extremely unrealistic way. We stress the importance of establishing the perceptive interpretation of game theory by taking boundedly rational players' inductive reasoning processes into account. We explain my recent work, Matsushima (1997), which shows that the subjective games perceived by players in the long run are entirely different from the true objective game, and are trivial games in the sense that there exists a strictly dominant and subjectively Pareto-efficient strategy profile among the set of pure strategy profiles.
JEL Classification Numbers: C70, C90, D43, D80     

基于期权博弈的战略投资决策分析

基于期权博弈的战略投资一般通过两阶段（战略研发投资阶段和商业化阶段）进行。企业战略投资的最佳时机选择本质上是对投资期权的灵活性价值与竞争战略占先价值之间进行权衡，从而实现企业价值的最大化。而企业的战略选择根据研发是竞争还是合作，研发投资的利益为竞争企业独占还是共享，以及商业化竞争是战略替代还是战略互补而有所不同。不确定性、不对称信息以及学习效应等都对企业的投资时机及投资价值产生一定的影响。     

我国社保基金投资监管的博弈分析

社保基金投资运营各方之间的博弈行为变异，导致了我国社保基金投资监管的低效，根本原因在于监管体系组织结构失衡和相关法律法规缺失。监管组织模式的调整符合我国社保基金投资监管模式的实际。     

投资决策方法选择：一种博弈

常用的投资决策方法有回收期法与净现值法。尽管净现值法在理论上比回收期法更合理,但调查结果表明前者的使用频率并未高于后者,原因在于两种方法所代表的利益不同,导致股东与管理者在投资决策方法选择上出现利益分歧并进行博弈,建立健全内部激励约束机制是提高企业投资效率的重要途径。     

我国农业投资不足的博弈分析

农业是国民经济的基础产业,是国家稳定的重要保障。农业投资是农业发展的第一推动力和持续动力。然而。由于农业的弱质性和农业发展的滞后性,使得农业产业结构调整和升级缓慢,进而引起农民增收困难,城乡收入差距持续拉大,同时导致农业可持续发展的后劲不足。     

风险投资中的控制权信号传递博弈分析

文章运用博弈论分析了风险投资中逆向选择问题产生的原因及其后果.通过引入风险企业家出让企业控制权大小这一信号,讨论了精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡存在的条件.文章认为,风险投资契约作为双方的博弈规则,对防范逆向选择具有重要意义.     

Economics as Detective Fiction

Almost all good economic analysis is structured like classical detective fiction. This relationship goes well beyond the obvious fact that both detective fiction and economic analysis involve puzzles. The economist's epistemology, presented in the form of scientific narratives, runs parallel to the puzzle-solving processes of the mastermind sleuth presented in the form of fictional narratives. The family resemblance between economic analysis and the classic whodunit becomes even more transparent by noticing another important characteristic they share: the concept of equilibrium. Examples chosen from recent economic literature bring the argument into sharper focus. In each instance, the solution to the puzzles that lie at the heart of their respective domains must be ingenious and surprising in order to be persuasive.     

投资经济管理专业定位和课程设置问题的思考

本文针对目前投资专业专业性不强,不能适应社会发展需要,提出专业的发展机遇,指出专业改造和课程设置的方向,将投资经济管理专业改造成工程造价管理专业.     

高新技术企业人力资本投资的博弈分析

本文运用博弈论的分析方法对人力资本投资进行了分析,得出结论——企业应选择人力资本投资,并且在投资后应采取激励措施,降低员工选择离职的概率,这样才能实现企业与员工双方效用的最大化。     

An Evaluation of the Use of the Marketplace Game in Junior College Economics

In the search for new and better ways of teaching economic concepts, instructors are turning to a wide variety of materials and methods. There is a need to evaluate any new technique, not only in broad general terms but in its use with a specific type of college or student. Furthermore, one cannot generalize about such things as games and simulations but should concentrate on evaluating particular pieces of material or approaches, and the effectiveness of those items with particular kinds of students. This article will raise many questions about the adequacy of the research that has been done in this field and will undoubtedly inspire others to employ similar means of testing and evaluating new materials and methods. Other educational researchers might be especially interested in the authors' use of factor analysis.     

外国直接投资作用的发展经济学观点

新古典主义、激进主义和结构主义是发展经济学的三大基本思路，在外国直接投资与发展中国家经济发展的关系问题方面，它们各自建立观点不同的理论体系。但是，国内学者只是在新古典主义的基本框架下研究中国的外国直接投资问题。基于引发理论界关于我国外资的现实作用及未来发展战略的重新审视与思考，论述了发展经济学的三大基本思路关于外资与经济发展关系的理论，并作了简要评议。     

The Real Option Game Model to the Technology Innovation Investment Strategy

The real option game theory is a new effective method to analyze the project investment decision containing uncertain factors in the incomplete competition circumstance. Based on the introduction of the development of real option game method, this paper puts forward a real option game model to research on the investment opportunity and investment strategy of technology innovation involved two competitors. The varies of the value of project bring on three kinds of game equilibrium, that is the corporate investment equilibrium strategy, the leader ＆ follower investment equilibrium strategy and the corporate delay equilibrium strategy.     

Hiring as Investment Behavior

This paper explores the determinants of hiring at the macroeconomic level. It treats the hiring decision as an investment decision, similar to the one taken for physical capital or for financial assets. At its core is a present value relation which defines the worker's “asset value” for the firm and determines optimal hiring. The paper validates this relation using volatility tests and infers the unobserved asset values by estimating it. Hiring and asset values are found to be weakly correlated with the business cycle and much more volatile. The paper also demonstrates the links between models employed and issues examined in finance and the labor market.