The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations*

We develop and analyze a structural model of efficiency wages founded on reciprocity. Workers are assumed to face an explicit trade‐off between the disutility of providing effort and the psychological benefit of reciprocating the gift of a wage offer above some reference level. The model provides a rationale for rent sharing—a feature that is very much present in the data but absent from previous formulations of the efficiency wage hypothesis. This firm‐internal perspective on efficiency wages has potentially important macroeconomic consequences: rent‐sharing considerations promote wage rigidity, internal amplification and differential responses to technology and demand shocks.     

ON THE USE OF FIRM FIXED EFFECTS AS A PRODUCTIVITY MEASURE FOR ANALYZING LABOR MARKET MATCHING

The present note evaluates the performance of firm fixed effects as a productivity measure when identified from wage regressions with two‐way fixed effects in matched employer‐employee data. This setting is frequently applied to study the matching between workers and firms. Exploiting wage and production data from a large administrative German data set, I find that the correlation between firm fixed effects (FFE) and total factor productivity is close to zero. Once TFP is used, the matching pattern is positive assortative, whereas the two‐way fixed effect technique yields the opposite result.     

TRAINING, JOB SECURITY AND INCENTIVE WAGES

This paper considers the optimal level of firm‐specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm‐specific training. Firm‐specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm‐specific training can decrease current wages because it represents a commitment to lower future labour turnover.     

Does the Choice between Wage Inequality and Unemployment Affect Productivity Growth?

Abstract. We present a non-scale continuous-time overlapping-generations growth model that provides an explanation for why economies with relative wage rigidity feature higher unemployment, but not slower productivity growth, than economies with flexible wages. The compression of the wage distribution associated with relative wage rigidity slows down human capital accumulation and growth ceteris paribus . But unemployment among the low-skilled workers strengthens the incentives to invest in human capital and, hence, growth. The two effects are offsetting, and growth is independent of the prevailing degree of relative wage rigidity. This knife-edge result is robust with respect to some modifications of the model.     

Pattern Bargaining and Wage Leadership in a Small Open Economy*

Pattern bargaining with the tradables (manufacturing) sector as the wage leader is common in Europe. We question the conventional wisdom that such bargaining produces wage restraint. In our model, all forms of pattern bargaining give the same outcomes as uncoordinated bargaining under inflation targeting. Under a monetary union, wage leadership for the non‐tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint, whereas wage leadership for the tradables sector is not. Comparison thinking might lead the follower to set the same wage as the leader. Such equilibria can arise when the leader sector is the smaller sector, and these can promote high employment.     

Survey Evidence on Wage Rigidity and Unemployment: Sweden in the 1990s*

We document the results of a repeat survey, which updates Agell and Lundborg (1995) , on wage rigidity in a sample of 159 Swedish manufacturing firms, conducted during the severe Swedish recession of the 1990s. It is found that not even a prolonged period of very high unemployment and quite low inflation softened workers’ resistance to wage cuts. We discuss possible reasons for this. In addition, we report new evidence on underbidding, efficiency‐wage mechanisms, and unemployment persistence.     

Nominal Wage Flexibility and Economic Performance: Evidence and Implications Across Industrial Countries

By considering the theoretical connection between labour and product markets, the paper evaluates the economic relationship of these markets within the contractual wage rigidity New Keynesian explanation of business cycles. The empirical analysis focuses on the short‐run cyclical behaviour of real output, prices and wages for 19 industrial countries. Time‐series and cross‐sectional regressions are estimated. Cross‐sectional cyclical correlations in the labour and goods markets are also evaluated across countries. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, aggregate uncertainty is an important factor in increasing the flexibility of the nominal wage in response to aggregate demand shocks. Wage flexibility accelerates price inflation and moderates the response of real output growth to aggregate demand shocks. Wage flexibility does not appear to be an important factor in differentiating the real and inflationary effects of energy price shocks across countries. Finally, aggregate uncertainty increases the responsiveness of output and price to productivity shocks.     

Institutions and training inequality

We analyze how firm-provided training is affected by the interaction among important institutional variables in the labor market: firing costs, minimum wages and unemployment benefits. We find that the degree of complementarity and substitutability among these variables depends on employees' abilities. Thereby the institutional interactions influence skill inequality. We derive how the influence of one of the institutional variables above is affected by other institutional variables with respect to inequality in skills arising from firm-provided training. We derive several striking results, such as: (a) the minimum wage and unemployment benefits generate increasing skill inequality whereas firing costs generate skill equalization; (b) unemployment benefits and firing costs are complements in their effects on skill inequality, (c) firing costs and the minimum wage are substitutes in their effects on skill equalization, and (d) unemployment benefits and the minimum wage are substitutes in their effects on skill inequality.     

International Trade and Collective Bargaining Outcomes: Evidence from German Employer–Employee Data

In theoretical trade models with variable mark‐ups and collective wage bargaining, exposure to international markets might reduce the exporter wage premium. We test this prediction using linked German employer–employee data covering the years 1996–2007. To separate the rent‐sharing mechanism from assortative matching, we exploit individual worker information to construct profitability measures that are free of skill composition. Our results show that rent‐sharing is less pronounced in more export‐intensive firms or in more open industries. The exporter wage premium is highest for low‐productivity firms. In line with theory, these findings are unique to the subsample of plants covered by collective bargaining.     

Work and Wage Dynamics around Childbirth

In this paper, we investigate how the wage processes of women who are well established in the labour market are affected by having children. We estimate a flexible fixed‐effects wage regression model extended by post‐childbirth fixed effects. We use register data on West Germany, and we exploit the expansionary family policy during the late 1980s and 1990s for identification. On their return to work after childbirth, the wages of mothers drop by 3–5.7 per cent per year of leave. We find negative selection back to full‐time work after childbirth. We discuss the policy implications regarding statistical discrimination and the results concerning the family gap.     

Monetary regimes and the co-ordination of wage setting

A recent literature argues that a strict monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment by disciplining wage setters, as wage setters abstain from raising wages to avoid a monetary contraction. However, in this literature the wage setters are assumed not to co-ordinate their wage setting. The present paper argues that precisely because a strict monetary regime may discipline the unco-ordinated wage setting, thus lowering unemployment in the unco-ordinated outcome, it also reduces wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate. It is shown that an accommodating monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment, via the strengthening of the wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate.     

Picking “Lemons” or Picking “Cherries”? Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions in Norwegian Manufacturing*

We compare the performance in employment, wages and productivity for domestic plants acquired by new domestic and foreign owners. Prospective foreign owners pick large, high‐wage, high‐productivity plants, while new domestic owners choose average performers of above‐average size. Employment, labour productivity, and total factor productivity decline in domestic acquisition targets before acquisitions; only wages recover afterwards. Employment, wages and labour productivity increase after foreign acquisitions. The sample selection introduced by long‐term comparisons and a focus on unique events introduces a downward bias into the results for domestic acquisitions and an upward bias for the foreign acquisitions.     

A contribution to the public–private wage inequality debate

This paper studies the public–private wage inequality in Romania. Although public sector employment is perceived as safer and offering more benefits, we find that in Romania it also offers higher wages, after controlling for experience, education and gender. This result is at odds with the negative premium uncovered in other transition economies. The public–private wage premium is increasing across the wage distribution, leading to more inequality in the public sector. Decomposing the wage premium into the effect of personal characteristics, coefficients and residuals, we show that only about half of this premium can be attributed to personal characteristics, especially in the top half of the wage distribution. We also find that the number of other public sector employees in the family is a significant driver of public sector employment, facilitating access to jobs. However, the effects of self‐selection are negligible, the premium being still positive and significant after controlling for this.     

Which Gender Wage Gap Estimates to Trust? A Comparative Analysis

The aim of this paper is to compare estimates of the adjusted wage gap from different methods and sets of conditioning variables. We apply available parametric and non‐parametric methods to LFS data from Poland for 2012. While the raw gap amounts to nearly 10 percent of the female wage; the adjusted wage gap estimates range between 15 percent and as much as 23 percent depending on the method and the choice of conditional variables. The differences across conditioning variables within the same method do not exceed 3pp, but including more variables almost universally results in larger estimates of the adjusted wage gaps. Methods that account for common support and selection into employment yielded higher estimates of the adjusted wage gap. While the actual point estimates of adjusted wage gap are slightly different, all of them are roughly twice as high as the raw gap, which corroborates the policy relevance of this methodological study.     

The welfare costs of union wage compression

This paper calculates the quantitative significance of the welfare costs of union wage compression. This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). The labor market in this model is characterized as a right-to-manage contract, which allows unions to compress wage differentials between high- and low-skilled workers, by implementing a binding minimum wage. This paper shows that when labor markets are competitive even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low-skilled workers. The effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labor, however, is rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high-skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.     

DOWNWARDS WAGE RIGIDITY,ENDOGENOUS SEPARATIONS AND FIRM TRAINING

This paper analyses the effect of downwards wage rigidity on wage setting, wage compression and firm training. It is shown that downwards wage rigidity in future periods induces a wage penalty and increases wage compression in the present period. However, contrary to previous work this is not sufficient to increase firms’ training investments. The reason lies in the endogeneity of separations, which become more frequent.     

Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high- and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy, it will dampen this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.     

Employment fluctuations and dynamics of the aggregate average wage in Poland, 1996–20031

The aggregate average wage is often used as an indicator of economic performance and welfare, and as such often serves as a benchmark for changes in the generosity of public transfers and for wage negotiations. Yet if economies experience a high degree of (non‐random) fluctuation in employment, the composition of the employed population will have a considerable effect on the computed average. In this paper we demonstrate the extent of this problem using data for Poland for the period 1996–2003. During these years the employment rate in Poland fell from 51.2 percent to 44.2 percent and most of this fall occurred between the end of 1998 and the end of 2002. We show that about a quarter of the growth in the average wage during this period could be attributed purely to changes in employment.     

Job Polarization and Task‐Biased Technological Change: Evidence from Sweden, 1975–2005

In this paper, we show that between 1975 and 2005, Sweden exhibited a pattern of job polarization with expansions of the highest‐ and lowest‐paid jobs compared to middle‐wage jobs. The most popular explanation for such a pattern is the hypothesis of task‐biased technological change, where technological progress reduces the demand for routine middle‐wage jobs but increases the demand for non‐routine jobs located at the tails of the job–wage distribution. However, our estimates do not support this explanation for the 1970s and 1980s. Stronger evidence for task‐biased technological change, albeit not conclusive, is found for the 1990s and 2000s. In particular, there is both a statistically and economically significant growth of non‐routine jobs and a decline of routine jobs. However, results for wages are mixed; while task‐biased technological change cannot explain changes in between‐occupation wage differentials, it does have considerable explanatory power for changes in within‐occupation wage differentials.     

Has the Canadian labour market polarized?

We use Census and Labour Force Survey (LFS) data for the period from 1971 to 2012 to investigate whether the Canadian wage and employment structures have polarized, that is, whether wages and employment have grown more in high‐ and low‐ than in middle‐paying occupations. We find that there has been faster growth in employment in both high‐ and low‐paying occupations than those in the middle since 1981. However, up to 2005, the wage pattern reflects a simple increase in inequality with greater growth in high‐paid than middle‐paid occupations and greater growth in middle than low‐paid occupations. Since 2005, there has been some polarization but this is present only in some parts of the country and seems to be related more to the resource boom than technological change. We present results for the US to provide a benchmark. The Canadian patterns fit with those in the US and other countries apart from the 1990s when the US undergoes wage polarization not seen elsewhere. We argue that the Canadian data do not fit with the standard technological change model of polarization developed for the US.