SPECIALISATION AND THE EXISTENCE PROBLEM IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY

When the division of labour has been once thoroughly established,it is but a very small part of a man's wants which the produceof his own labour can supply... Every man thus lives by exchanging,or becomes in some measure a merchant and the society itselfgrows to be what is properly a commericial society (Smith, 1776,p. 22).     

货币流通速度和产出变动的动态一般均衡分析

结构冲击如何影响我国货币流通速度和产出变动的动态一般均衡分析结果表明:货币、制度冲击使货币流通速度和产出基本上同向变动。短期内,技术冲击使货币流通速度下降,表明我国狭义货币具有奢侈品特征。就货币流通速度的变动而言,制度和货币冲击具有持久的正向效应,制度冲击最重要,货币冲击次之,技术冲击不重要,没有长期影响。就产出的变动而言,货币冲击产生了持久的"Tobin效应",制度、技术冲击具有显著、持久的正向效应。制度冲击最重要,技术冲击次之,货币冲击不重要。     

GENERAL AND PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY IN BORK'S ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

In applying economic theory to evaluate antitrust laws, Judge Robert Bork explicitly favors a partial equilibrium over a general equilibrium approach. He believes the general model assumes away too many real-world aspects to be usefully employed as a criterion by which to judge real-world laws.
However, Bork's partial equilibrium replacement, the Oliver Williamson trade-off model, implicitly contains many of the same assumptions as general equilibrium theory. Equilibrium prices in all industries, an absence of external effects, and well-defined demand curves are assumptions of both general equilibrium theory and the Williamson trade-off model. If one theory is judged inadequate because of these assumptions, so should the other.
Bork's analysis is more consistent with market process theory than with his own partial equilibrium approach. Market process theory assumes neither the absence of externalities, nor the presence of well-defined demand and equilibrium prices in all industries.     

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS WITH HETEROGENEOUS TIME PREFERENCES

The overlapping generations model presented herein requires incorporation of exactly three periods in which one lives, but makes intertemporal decision‐making twice, neither once nor three times. Single decision‐making at the outset, none thereafter, ignores the fact that one makes decisions every day anew as long as tomorrow exists. Incorporating such observations most simply requires decisions to be made at the first period and the second, but not at the third or last period. Our model reveals how the Mabiki (infanticides) and the Narayama (elderlycides) can occur simultaneously. We also find conditions under which child‐indulgence and parental overprotection called sunekajiri might be reckoned a virtue.     

DIVISIONS OF LABOUR, SPECIALIZATION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF A SYSTEM OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

Abstract. This paper uses a model of endogenous theft and endogenous network division of labour to formalize some of the main principles of the economics of the state and to explore related issues concerning why new constitutional rules emerge and evolve. The model suggests that fiscal competition between states facilitates important circular effects, which propel improvements in economic welfare and promote economic growth. In particular, improvements in institutional efficiency expand the demand for transactions, which in turn increases the need for further third‐party protection of property rights. We illustrate our results using the growth of the state system in Western Europe.     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY EFFICIENCY AND COORDINATION IN A MULTI‐SECTOR OPEN‐ECONOMY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL

The paper analyzes monetary and fiscal stabilization and coordination in a multi‐sector stochastic new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) model. It first aims to assess the capacity of fiscal and monetary policy to reduce or eliminate the negative welfare effects of an unanticipated productivity shock affecting some or all of the sectors in each country. Second, it evaluates the possible gains from international monetary cooperation as well as the impact of active fiscal policy on the welfare performance of monetary policy. The setup also allows for international asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks. The results show that monetary and fiscal policies are efficient tools of stabilization and under several conditions they can replicate the flexible‐price equilibrium. However, their welfare performance is not necessarily increased when both monetary and fiscal policies react to shocks at the national level. The existence of bilateral gains from monetary cooperation depends on the degree of asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks.     

MODELING THE EVOLUTION OF EXPECTATIONS AND UNCERTAINTY IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM

We develop methods to solve general equilibrium models in which forward‐looking agents are subject to waves of pessimism, optimism, and uncertainty that turn out to critically affect macroeconomic outcomes. Agents in the model are fully rational and conduct Bayesian learning, and they know that they do not know. Therefore, agents take into account that their beliefs will evolve according to what they will observe. This framework accommodates both gradual and abrupt changes in beliefs and allows for an analytical characterization of uncertainty. We use a prototypical Real Business Cycle model to illustrate the methods.     

COMPARING PARTIAL AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES OF THE WELFARE COST OF INFLATION

Reserve banks worldwide have been moving towards zero inflation policies. Confusion clouds the welfare cost of maintaining such inflation policies despite the best attempts at clarification. Monetary theory research has shifted from partial to general equilibrium economies. This shift has left the partial equilibrium estimates of the welfare cost of inflation below most of the general equilibrium estimates. Put on a comparable basis, partial equilibrium estimates compare more closely with the general equilibrium estimates. Furthermore, evidence suggests that integration under the money demand function appears applicable in general equilibrium economies. Finally, the estimates depend on the elasticities of money demand and the underlying structural parameters.     

INSTITUTIONALIZED CORRUPTION AND PRIVILEGE IN CHINA'S SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

Abstract.  This paper develops a general equilibrium model to consider the effects of corruption caused by institutionalized privilege on economic welfare, the network size of division of labour and productivity. First a Walrasian equilibrium in a market economy is computed; then we consider the effects on welfare when a privileged group is chosen to work as high-level administrators. Finally, we allow for explicit collusion between administrators by introducing an administrator's agent who acts in the interests of all the administrators. The model shows that in equilibrium (fixed point) the degree of corruption, the degree of division of labour and productivity are interdependent.     

A SIMPLISTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY OF CORRUPTION

The author's simplistic view of corruption is that all politicians and government officials—like everyone else—are constrained self-maximizers. They therefore establish or maintain regulations and controls with the intent to facilitate corruption, which then becomes a source of income for them. Under private enterprise, where resources are transferable and movable, competition limits the ability to corrupt. However, in state enterprises, limiting corruption through competition is difficult. Corruption can help offset the inefficiencies of a communist or hierarchical system, as the economy makes a transition toward private property. But the danger is that corruption will become institutionalized and develop well-defined, transferable rights. Once that happens, the economy gets stuck there, as it has in India. Thus, in reforming a communist system—as that of China—into a private property system, gradualism will not do.     

CITY EQUILIBRIUM WITH BORROWING CONSTRAINTS: STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS

This article develops a general equilibrium model of location choice where mortgage approval rates determine household‐specific choice sets. Estimation of the model using San Francisco Bay area data reveals that the price sensitivity of borrowing constraints explains about two‐thirds of the price elasticity of neighborhood demand. General equilibrium analysis of the 2000–2006 relaxation of lending standards predicts the following impacts on prices and neighborhood demographics: (i) an increase in house prices accompanied by a compression of the price distribution and (ii) a reduction in the isolation of Whites reflecting gentrification. Both predictions are supported by empirical observation.     

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AWARENESS OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS,AND UNEMPLOYMENT*

We explore the significance of general equilibrium feedback effects for wage‐bargaining. We examine a two‐sector economy and show that if agents only consider labor demand effects low real wages and low unemployment are the consequences. With an intermediate view, i.e., when partial equilibrium effects within a sector are taken into account, high real wages and unemployment result. If all general equilibrium effects are perceived simultaneously, we once again obtain a situation with low wages and unemployment. The results may explain why unemployment is high in some European countries.     

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NON‐MONOTONIC SPATIAL TRANSITIONS

The purpose of the present study is to analyse non‐monotonic spatial changes accompanying economic development. A dynamic two‐region model with endogenous human capital and converging processes to its long‐run equilibria is investigated. The main focus of the present study is to investigate how the level of migration cost influences the shape of a converging process. From the analysis of the model, population distribution draws an inverted‐U‐curve to describe economic development when the cost of migration is low enough. Also, the transition of interregional income inequalities is an inverted‐U when migration cost is at an intermediate level.     

INPUT AND OUTPUT INVENTORIES IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM*

We build and estimate a two‐sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with two types of inventories: Input inventories facilitate the production of finished goods, output inventories yield utility services. The estimated model replicates the volatility and cyclicality of inventory investment and inventory‐to‐target ratios. Although inventories are an important element of the model’s propagation mechanism, shocks to inventory efficiency are not an important source of business cycles. When the model is estimated over two subperiods (pre‐ and post‐1984), changes in the volatility of inventory shocks or in structural parameters associated with inventories play a small role in reducing the volatility of output.