Productivity and Firms’ Sales Destination: Chinese Characteristics

In the trade literature, it is often assumed that there is little or no trade cost within a country's borders, but large trade costs across a country's borders. Thus, productive firms self‐select into exporters and the less productive firms can only serve domestic consumers. This paper presents a similar but different case in China, whose domestic markets are segmented by provincial borders mainly owing to the various (hidden) protective measures favoring local firms. These discriminative measures are de facto trade barriers. It applies the heterogeneous trade theory to examine the effects of firms’ productivity on their sales choices in both the international and domestic markets, in the presence of intra‐national and international trade costs. We find that productive firms not only self‐select into exporters, but also into sales in other provincial markets. This pattern is sensitive to firms’ locations and ownerships. For foreign direct investment (FDI)‐controlled firms, increases in productivity are associated with a higher probability of selling into other provincial markets, rather than into international ones. Productivity increases for firms operating in the inland area exhibit different patterns than those in the Eastern area.     

Intra‐firm trade,exporting, importing,and firm performance

Abstract This paper examines firm heterogeneity in terms of size, wages, capital intensity, and productivity between domestic and foreign‐owned firms that engage in intra‐firm trade, firms that export and import, firms that import only, and firms that export only. As previously documented, heterogeneity between different groups of trading firms is substantial. Taking into account intra‐firm trade in addition to exporting and importing yields new insights into the productivity advantage previously established for exporting firms. The results presented here show that this premium accrues only to exporters that also import and to exporters that also engage in intra‐firm trade, but not to firms that export only. Using simultaneous quantile regressions, the paper illustrates that heterogeneity within different groups of trading firm is equally large. Some of this within‐group heterogeneity can be attributed to differences in trading partners.     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).     

Spillovers from Foreign Exporters

We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms that accounts for productivity spillovers transmitted by foreign exporters. Everything else equal, stronger spillovers increase welfare. We embed the model framework into a trade policy scenario where countries strategically set inter‐country variable trade costs for the trading partner. In the strategic Nash‐equilibrium policy, governments trade‐off welfare gains from protectionism and those that are due to spillovers from foreign exporters. The equilibrium degree of protectionism is decreasing in the strength of the spillover. Policy coordination induces welfare gains but these gains can be hump‐shaped in the spillover strength.     

Foreign acquisition,plant survival,and employment growth

Abstract This paper analyzes the effect of foreign acquisition on survival and employment growth of targets using data on Swedish manufacturing plants. We separate targeted plants into those within Swedish MNEs, Swedish exporting non‐MNEs, and purely domestic firms. The results, controlling for possible endogeneity of acquisition using IV and propensity score matching approaches suggest that acquisition by foreign owners increases the lifetime of the acquired plants only if the plant was an exporter. The effect is robust to controlling for domestic acquisitions and differs between horizontal and vertical acquisitions. We find robust positive employment growth effects only for exporters and only if the takeover is vertical.     

Market Access and WTO Border Tax Adjustments for Environmental Excise Taxes under Imperfect Competition

The literature identifies linkages between domestic environmental policies and trade, the treatment of imports being an important issue in administration of domestic environmental excise taxes. With the aim of ensuring foreign exporters do not attain a competitive advantage, border tax adjustments are used. Since most environmental excise taxes apply to intermediate goods, the relevant border tax adjustment applies to final imported goods. However, when both intermediate and final goods markets are oligopolistic, border tax adjustments may be non‐neutral. Moreover, even if market access is unchanged, border tax adjustments can still lead to redistribution of profits between domestic and foreign firms.     

Skill‐biased heterogeneous firms,trade liberalization and the skill premium

We propose a theory that rising globalization and rising wage inequality are related because trade liberalization raises the demand facing highly competitive skill‐intensive firms. In our model, only the lowest‐cost firms participate in the global economy exactly along the lines of Melitz ( 2003 ). In addition to differing in their productivity, firms differ in their skill intensity. We model skill‐biased technology as a correlation between skill intensity and technological acumen, and we estimate this correlation to be large using firm‐level data from Chile in 1995. A fall in trade costs leads to both greater trade volumes and an increase in the relative demand for skill, as the lowest‐cost/most‐skilled firms expand to serve the export market while less skill‐intensive non‐exporters retrench in the face of increased import competition. This mechanism works regardless of factor endowment differences, so we provide an explanation for why globalization and wage inequality move together in both skill‐abundant and skill‐scarce countries. In our model countries are net exporters of the services of their abundant factor, but there are no Stolper‐Samuelson effects because import competition affects all domestic firms equally.     

A model of firm heterogeneity in factor intensities and international trade

Empirical evidence suggests that exporters are, in addition to being more productive, significantly more skilled‐labour intensive than non‐exporters. In a setting that captures both these features, we show that the firm selection induced by trade liberalization works along two dimensions. First, export growth increases competition for skilled labour. This leads to the exit of some of the skilled‐labour intensive firms, while benefitting unskilled‐labour intensive ones. Second, within the group of firms with the same factor intensities, the reallocation of factors is towards the exporters. We show that the increased competition for skilled labour dampens the positive effect of trade liberalization on sector‐wide TFP and real income.     

Trade Liberalization and Heterogeneous Technology Investments

We propose a trade model where heterogeneous firms decide on a productivity‐enhancing technology investment. The model analyzes the impact of multilateral trade liberalization on firm‐ and industry‐level productivity. Freer trade increases the incentives to invest in technology by raising export profits. It also dampens these incentives, however, as profits stemming from domestic sales are reduced. Only exporters benefit from the former positive effect. The shape of the distribution of efficiency draws, the level of trade costs and the technology intensity of the industry are key elements removing the ambiguities regarding the net impact of trade liberalization.     

On the International Linkages between Trade and Merger Policies*

In a three‐country model, this paper investigates linkages between merger incentives of exporting firms and the trade policy of an importing country. When exporting firms come from only one country, the tariff response of the importing country reverses the welfare effects of a merger in the exporting country. If there exist two exporting countries, a merger creates two types of conflicting international externalities. First, a merger in one exporting country increases profits of all firms. Secondly, non‐merged firms lose if the importing country is free to raise its tariff in response to a merger of foreign exporters.     

Growing into Export Markets: The Impact of Exporting on Firm‐level Investment in Indonesia

This paper documents the impact of exporting on capital accumulation across heterogeneous manufacturing firms in Indonesia. The findings show that entering export markets significantly increases investment behavior during the year of initial entry and for as much as three years after entry. The results imply that the investment rate among new exporters is 37% higher than non‐exporters in the year of entry and 14–26% higher in the three years after entry. Using detailed data on firm ownership, the paper further show that foreign‐owned affiliates invest at systematically higher rates upon entry into export markets. The estimates indicate that domestically owned exporters are potentially credit constrained and suggest that improving credit market access may increase the investment rate among domestic exporters by as much as 40% in the year of entry.     

EXPORT‐MARKET DYNAMICS AND THE PROBABILITY OF FIRM CLOSURE: EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

This study presents the first empirical analysis of the determinants of firm closure in the United Kingdom with an emphasis on the role of export‐market dynamics, using panel data for a nationally representative group of firms operating in all‐market‐based sectors during 1997–2003. Our findings show that the probability of closure is (cet. par.) significantly lower for exporters, particularly those experiencing export‐market entry and exit. Having controlled for other attributes associated with productivity (such as size and export status), the following factors are found to increase the firm's survival prospects: higher capital intensity and TFP, foreign ownership, young age, displacement effects (through relatively high rates of entry of firms in each industry), and belonging to certain industries. Interestingly, increased import penetration (a proxy for lower trade costs) leads to a lower hazard rate for exporting entrants and continuous exporters, while inducing a higher hazard rate for domestic producers or those that quit exporting.     

Globalization,recruitments, and job mobility

Previous research indicates that firms pay a premium to poach workers from exporting firms if experience working for an internationally engaged firm reduces trade costs. Because international experience is less valuable to non-exporters, we would expect to see differences in recruitments between firms that are internationally engaged and those that serve only the domestic market. Moreover, increased openness might lead to higher job-to-job mobility if more globalization raises both the share of exporters and the number of workers with skills that make them attractive for other exporters. Using linked Swedish employer–employee data for the period 1997 to 2013, we find systematic differences between the way exporters and non-exporters recruit workers: exporters have a relatively high share of recruitments from other exporters as hypothesized. We also find some suggestive evidence that increased openness correlates positively with upward mobility for occupations that play a major role in international commerce, such as professionals and managers.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

Technology Adoption,Export Status,and Skill Upgrading: Theory and Evidence

This paper develops a model of trade that features heterogeneous firms, technology choice and different types of skilled labor in a general equilibrium framework to explain within‐industry increase in the relative demand for skilled workers. Its main contribution is to investigate the impact of firms' export and technology choice decisions on skill upgrading. Only firms in the upper range of the productivity distribution produce for the foreign market using high‐technology. Since this technology is skilled‐biased, exporters that resort to modern technologies are more skill intensive. Empirical evidence is also provided to support the model's main predictions using plant‐level panel data from Chile's manufacturing sector (1990–1999).     

ANTIDUMPING,INTRA‐INDUSTRY TRADE,AND QUALITY REVERSALS

We examine an export game where two (home and foreign) firms produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is more R&D efficient and is based in a larger and richer market. The unique (risk‐dominant) Nash equilibrium exhibits intra‐industry trade, and the foreign producer manufactures a higher‐quality product. When transport costs are low, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm arises; otherwise, reciprocal dumping occurs. For some parameters, a domestic antidumping policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the home firm becomes the quality leader. This policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases.     

FIRM HETEROGENEITY,RULES OF ORIGIN,AND RULES OF CUMULATION*

This article sheds light on the restrictive nature of rules of origin (ROO) and on the role of diagonal cumulation in mitigating the protectionist content of ROO. Empirical evidence suggests that diagonal cumulation has beneficial effects on trade—particularly among spoke countries. We show that these patterns can be reconciled with a theoretical setting where heterogeneous firms buy intermediate inputs from domestic and foreign sources. The model finds that switching from bilateral to diagonal cumulation relaxes the restrictiveness of the ROO and leads the least productive exporters to stop exporting.     

跨境贸易人民币结算失衡问题研究

跨境贸易人民币结算失衡明显,造成这一矛盾的主要原因在于以劳动密集型产品为主的出口商品贸易结构,出口企业缺乏议价能力、人民币升值预期以及人民币离岸市场广度和深度发展有限。结果是:一方面增加外汇储备资产风险暴露头寸;另一方面造成货币当局和境内进口企业福利损失。解决的方法是增强汇率制度弹性、深化人民币离岸市场和优化出口贸易结构以期完善人民币作为计价货币的市场条件。     

Import Penetration and Domestic Process Innovation

This paper develops a model of R&D competition between domestic and foreign firms that explicitly incorporates the effect of the market structure. We focus on how differences in costs modify the effects of increases in the number of foreign firms on R&D investments of domestic firms. We show that an increase in the number of foreign firms may have a positive effect on a domestic firm's R&D investment and also show that two trade policies, tariffs or quotas, could have different effects on R&D investments of domestic firms. A welfare analysis shows that greater cost advantages increase social welfare.     

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers

It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening‐up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. Using a simple example, the authors show that, in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers.