ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE COMPOSITION: OPTIMAL ADJUSTMENT USING THE GRADIENT METHOD

Previous studies have looked at how the components of fiscal spending affect economic growth. However, we explicitly enquire into how to adjust the components in order to achieve the highest rate of economic growth starting from the present shares of components, by introducing a gradient method. The resulting optimal adjustment shares are proportional to the deviations from the average over elements of a gradient vector. The optimal adjustment share is completely estimated by using linear regression with any choice of omitted variable. The paper also provides an illustrative example taken from the annual panel data for the Japanese prefectural governments.     

ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT IN HEAVILY INDEBTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The threat to the international financial system resulting from the developing-country debt problem has diminished since the initial 1982 crisis, despite halting adjustment and impaired creditworthiness in heavily indebted developing countries. The threat to the financial system has eased as commercial banks have reduced sharply the share of their assets and capital exposed to the troubled debtor countries. The countries themselves, however, are no better off. A sizable balance-of-payments adjustment has occurred in the heavily indebted developing countries, but that adjustment was concentrated–at least in quantitative terms–during the years immediately following the onset of the crisis and might have been more efficient had it been executed more gradually. Despite the adjustment that has occurred, the creditworthiness of the heavily indebted countries–as evaluated by conventional indices–has not improved. And, for reasons that this article explores, economic growth per capita has not resumed either.     

THE FISCAL POLICY RESPONSE TO PUBLIC DEBT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Theoretical models on fiscal sustainability hypothesize that indebted governments can lower their current debt by generating future primary surpluses, ceteris paribus. While both developed and developing countries struggle with the issue of debt stabilization, the latter, in particular face heightened sensitivity from creditors, which provides them an impetus to respond more strongly to stabilize their debt. Based on a panel of 53 developing countries, we examine the fiscal response of these countries to changes in their debt‐to‐gross domestic product ratio. We find evidence of a positive relationship between the debt and primary surplus and that countries adjust along both the revenue and expenditure margins at roughly the same rate. (JEL E62, H50, O11)     

THE OPTIMAL DIVISION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BETWEEN PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS

This paper examines the optimal ratio of transfer payments to expenditure on public goods, for a given income tax rate. The transfer payment is then determined by the government's budget constraint. The optimal ratio of transfers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a function of the ratio of the median to the arithmetic mean wage, and of the tax rate. Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated with reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with increases in the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to public goods, because of adverse incentive effects.     

21世纪发展中国家城市化的深层次发展

21世纪发展中国家的城市化必然向深层次发展。文章分析了21世纪发展中国家城市化的必然趋势，指出城市的区域化发展和个性化发展是城市化深层次发展的两条主要途径，重点论述了这两种发展形式的意义、基础和主要策略。在城市数目、规模、地域扩展的基础上，深层次发展的群体形态——区域化发展，应以城市体系调控为主要策略；深层次发展的个体形态——个性化发展，应以城市更新为主要策略。文章还以河南省城市体系、深圳市、上海市、吉隆坡市等为案例，对区域化发展和个性化发展进行了实证分析。     

THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN FIRMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Foreign firms are likely to attempt to shape host government policies in their favour, as the profitability of MNE foreign affiliates largely depends on the business environment in which they operate. Based on data from the World Business Environment Survey, this paper investigates the political influence of foreign firms in 48 developing countries. It is found that foreign firms derive substantial fiscal and regulatory advantages from their political influence and from their ability to negotiate superior entry conditions.     

EVALUATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE*

This article evaluates the distribution of public expenditure on subsidized goods and services over income categories. It is argued that undifferentiated application of usual measures of dispersion must be rejected when judging the distribution of these expenditures, because there are hardly any subsidized goods and services for which the government aims at equal consumption. Such an application requires a normative distribution of expenditure. The normative distribution of expenditure is derived from a normative distribution of consumption and the distribution of normative charges. Central elements are needs of consumers and their financial capacity. The normative distribution of consumption is based on government intentions with respect to the goods and services under consideration.     

THE WTO AND ANTIDUMPING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Since the 1995 inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO), developing countries have become some of the most frequent users of the WTO-sanctioned antidumping (AD) trade policy instrument. This paper exploits newly available data to examine sector-level use of nine of the major "new user" developing countries, matching data on production in 28 different three-digit ISIC industries to data on AD investigations, outcomes, and imports at the six-digit Harmonized System product level. We present economically significant evidence consistent with theory that developing-country industries that seek and receive AD import protection are responding to macroeconomic shocks, exhibit characteristics consistent with endogenous trade policy formation, and face some changing market conditions consistent with requirements of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. However, the evidence also suggests substantial heterogeneity in determinants of AD use across developing countries, which highlights the flexibility of this policy as a protectionist tool responsive to many different types of political-economic shocks.     

THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AMONG HOUSEHOLDS IN THE UNITED STATES*

This paper presents an analysis of the distributive impact of government expenditures in the United States. The analysis uses a household-level microdata file drawn from the 1970 U.S. Census of Population, with additional income and tax variables drawn from the Internal Revenue Service 1969—70 Tax File. The results are presented at both federal and local levels and include analyses of the distribution of individual benefits, as well as of overall taxes and net benefits. Since a microdata file was used, distributional effects are examined with respect not only to the “traditional” variables of income class and household size, but also with regard to the number of earners in the household and the sex and race of the household head. In a further paper in a subsequent issue of this review we will present the results of a similar analysis for the United Kingdom, and compare the results for the two countries.     

OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION,DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY,AND THE SOCIAL COST OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE*

An interest income tax and a publicly provided private good are introduced into the Hamada overlapping-generations model consisting of heterogeneous individuals where the government can use a wage-income tax, an identical lump-sum transfer, and the public debt. Two interesting problems are studied: (a) what relation exists between the optimal interest rate and the population-growth rate and (b) how dynamic efficiency affects the optimal-decision rules of taxes and the publicly provided good. We show that (i) if the government can (not) tax the interest income, then the optimal interest rate is (not) equal to the population-growth rate, (ii) without the availability of the interest tax the difference between these two rates is mainly caused by the income-distribution effect of the public debt and (iii) the dynamic efficiency effects on the optimal rules of the wage tax and the publicly provided good depend on not only such a difference but also the average substitute-complement relations among leisure, the second-period consumption and the publicly provided good.     

PROBLEMS OF DETERMINING AND MEASURING THE RELIABILITY OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Most developing countries have compiled national accounts on a regular basis only for the last few years. It has not yet been possible for them to collect many of the statistics necessary to obtain good coverage of their economic activities by methods which would generally be accepted as reliable. Consequently the checks on reliability imposed by the framework of the national accounts are often absent, and the accounts prepared contain many estimates of doubtful quality. These doubts can usually only be removed as statistics collected by better methods become available. This is proving to be a slow process, partly because of the shortage of trained statistical staff and the competing demands of social and demographic statistics and partly because of the inherent difficulties in collecting good statistics from small businesses and traditional households. The need to define traditional households as producers as well as consumers leads to our demanding extra information from this difficult sector. In addition it is often difficult for the national accounts statistician, and even more so for the user, to find out in the time available exactly how some of the statistics with which he is presented were obtained. When this cannot be done it is impossible to assess their reliability. Thus assessing the overall reliability of national accounts in developing countries for even a limited range of uses is at present largely a matter of personal judgment. The information necessary to make more objective assessments rarely exists and hence the problems which developed countries face in using such information are not yet within the experience of most developing countries.     

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS: PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC FLOWS IN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Empirically, net capital inflows are procyclical in developed countries and countercyclical in developing countries. Private inflows are procyclical and public inflows are countercyclical in both groups of countries. The dominance of private (public) inflows in developed (developing) countries drives the difference in net inflows. We rationalize these patterns using a two-sector model of a small open economy facing borrowing constraints. Private agents overborrow because of the pecuniary externality arising from these constraints. The government saves to reduce aggregate debt, making the economy resilient to adverse shocks. Differences in borrowing constraints and shock processes across countries explain the empirical patterns of capital inflows.     

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS,GOVERNANCE, AND CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

This article aims at identifying the determinants of government expenditures of developing countries by placing emphasis on the political institutions and governance variables, which have not been addressed so much in the previous literature. Using a panel data analysis for 97 developing countries from the period 1984 to 2004, this study finds evidence that controlling for economic, social, and demographical factors, political institutional and governance variables significantly influence the consumption expenditure in developing countries. Political institutional variables such as the type of political ruling and political power in the parliament positively influence consumption expenditure; on the contrary, governance variables such as corruption influence negatively. Furthermore, we find that autocratic governments with military ruling are not particularly accommodative toward consumption expenditures as the public spending significantly shrinks under military dictatorship compared with other forms of governance. In order to check consistency of our findings, we ran alternative specifications as well as conducted extreme bound tests. Our results largely survived these tests showing robustness of our findings. (JEL E01, E02, E61, E62, H2, H4, H5, H6, O11, O5)