Economic and legal institutionalism: What can they learn from each other?

The main argument of this paper is that both constitutional political economy and institutional legal theory can benefit from adopting certain central notions from each other. On the one hand, the legal notion of validity can help to clarify certain obscurities concerning the mode of existence of institutions in constitutional political economy. On the other hand, the economic notion of voluntary choice can serve as a point of departure for institutional legal theory in developing substantive criteria for the evaluation of legal systems without appealing to natural law ideas. The author wishes to thank Bob Lieshout and Bernard Steunenberg for their comments.     

The impact of institutions on financial development: Evidence from East Asian countries

This paper examines the impact of institutions on regional financial development using a panel data model of 11 East Asian countries during 1996–2017. It divides the institutional factors into six economic factors and six legal‐political factors. The analysis demonstrates that the legal‐political institutional factors have a stronger impact on financial development than the economic institutional factors in East Asia. Improvement in institutional quality such as fiscal freedom, business freedom, control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law can promote financial development. Improvements of these institutional factors facilitate the ability of enterprises to allocate resources and improve the strength of business operations, thereby reducing transaction costs and making the financial operating environment fairer and more efficient. With the improvement of institutional factors, financial development will have more opportunities to develop better. Institutional impacts are more pronounced in the financial development in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Myanmar than in the other countries such as China, Japan, Korea and Singapore.     

Institutional transformation and the origins of world income distribution

This paper presents an attempt to quantify institutional changes and examine the respective effects of de jure and de facto political institutions on the path of long-run economic growth and development for a large panel of countries in the period 1810–2000. Using factor analysis, latent indices of de jure and de facto political institutions are constructed by exploiting several existing institutional datasets. The empirical evidence consistently suggests that societies with more extractive political institutions in Latin America, South Asia, Middle East and Eastern Europe have achieved systematically slower long-run economic growth and failed to catch-up with the West. The evidence confirms the primacy of de facto institutional differences over de jure institutions in causing differential growth and development outcomes over time. It also explains why highly concentrated political power and extractive political regimes inhibited the path of economic growth by setting persistent barriers to the engagement in collective action. In the long run, institutional differences account for up to two thirds of within-country development path and up to 83% of between-country development gaps.     

The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

The political economy of legal titling

The libertarian case for legal titling is that formalization of the economic (de facto) rights of those who own land and buildings improves prospects for capitalism and, ultimately, development. Although all rich countries have private property rights, we argue that the success of legal titling depends on a certain kind of state—what we call a property-protecting state—that is often missing in developing countries. We use insights from Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics to clarify the political basis for legal titling to improve land tenure security. Evidence from Afghanistan shows that legal titling has not worked because the country does not have a property-protecting state. We suggest focusing on improving political institutions before investing in legal titling. In the meantime, it makes more sense to register land ownership at the community level, without the state.

     

New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation

ABSTRACT

Existing theories make divergent predictions about the impact of new powers on the global political economy. Some argue that a more even distribution of power will erode international cooperation, while others argue that cooperation can continue with the help of international institutions to overcome collective action problems. We argue that this debate overlooks a critical determinant of the shape of power transitions: the distribution of preferences amongst the major powers. It is primarily in the context of divergent preferences that power transitions are likely to give rise to conflict. Moreover, even where preferences diverge, the gains of cooperation provide a strong incentive to continue to pursue goals through multilateralism. This situation leads to forms of institutional change unanticipated by established theories. These include deadlock in expansive multilateral fora, institutional drift as old rules cannot keep up with the changing political and economic context, and fragmentation as countries seek minilateral solutions that reduce preference diversity. We develop this preference-based, institutional argument by examining the distribution of preferences and institutional change at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Doha Round, where the power transition is relatively advanced.     

INSTITUTIONAL TRAPS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This article's point of departure is that low-quality institutions, concentration of political power and material wealth, and underdevelopment are persistent over time. Its analytical model views an equal distribution of political power as a commitment device to enhance institutional quality, thereby promoting growth. The politically powerful coalition contemplates relinquishing of its power through democratization, weighing this advantageous consequence against the limit on own appropriative ability that it entails. The possibility of two developmental paths is exhibited: with concentration of political and economic power, low-quality institutions, and slow growth; and a more equal distribution of political and economic resources, high-quality institutions, and faster growth.     

How Important is APEC to China?

APEC is an important forum for China to show its commitment to economic openness. Concerted trade liberalisation in the APEC region reduces the adverse terms of trade effect of China's own trade liberalisation. These help maintain the momentum of reform by reducing domestic resistance. APEC is not a stepping stone to WTO membership, but it gives China an opportunity to rally international support for its early entry into the WTO. However, APEC cannot substitute for WTO membership. This is not only because the WTO framework provides greater security for market access for Chinese exports as well as potentially larger gains to the Chinese economy, but also because it imposes legal bindings on China's trade policy once it becomes a member. In facilitating China's trade liberalisation, APEC and the WTO seems to be mutually re-enforcing. APEC prepares China for the WTO and the WTO accession pushes China to go along with the APEC process. Both APEC and WTO accession push forward domestic reform.     

EU membership,institutions and growth: The case of Turkey

This paper investigates the institutions-growth relationship during the EU membership process in Turkey. The membership process is considered as a supranational anchor to further improving institutional quality. I examine effects of individual components of institutions on economic growth. I find significant evidence that institutions matter for growth. Specifically, law and order and bureaucratic quality and management of internal conflict and ethnic tensions affect growth in Turkey.     

The nexus of economic and institutional evolution

The current state of the development economics literature ascribes an indisputable central role to institutions. This paper presents a formal model of institutional evolution that is based on the dynamic interactions between formal and informal institutions and economic development; the main features of the model is consistent with the fundamental theories that shed light to institutional evolution, namely the collective action and transaction cost theories, as well as dialectics. As informal institutional quality accumulates like technological know-how, while the level of formal institutional quality is chosen by the government to maximize welfare, subject to the economic and political costs. The solution of the model yields a punctuated trajectory of formal institutional evolution. Simulations reveal that the extent of diversity in informal institutional quality across a country delays formal institutional reforms. We also observe that, both the optimal quality of formal institutions and welfare are higher the more homogeneous is the country with respect to its informal institutions or the cultural attributes.     

The Determinants of Location Choices of China's ODI: Institutions,Taxation and Resources

China has become the third largest source of outward direct investment (ODI). This paper studies how institutions in the host countries affect the location choices of China’s ODI. Based on a deal-level sample from 2002–2011, this paper empirically tests how political institutions, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and contrd of corruption in the host countries affect the location choices of China’s ODI. On top of these institutional factors, we study the effects of tax evasion and natural resources in host countries, and their interactions with institutional factors. We find that political institutions in the host countries are not major concerns of the ODI, while government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption have significant effects on the locations of ODI. In addition, China’s ODI tends to avoid countries with strict legal systems. Tax evasion and resources are also major motives of China’s ODI. General institutional quality and tax evasion are substitutes in China’s ODI location decisions.     

Do island states have better institutions?

Since the end of World War II, the number of countries in the world has increased dramatically. Many of these newly independent countries are small both in terms of population and geography, and several are islands. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of island status and country size on institutional quality, and to determine if these institutional effects can explain the relatively strong economic performance of islands and small countries. I distinguish between political institutions (Democracy) and economic institutions (Rule of Law). One of the main findings of this paper is that the relationship between island status and institutional quality is significantly positive, and that these results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables. Further, I find that country size is negatively related to institutional quality, which is in keeping with previous results. These results provide further support for the hypothesis that institutions account for these countries’ relatively better economic performance.     

WTO membership and corruption

Despite widespread belief that accession process and formal membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO) improve the quality of governance within a country, there is no convincing empirical evidence to substantiate this thought. Here, I investigate whether the WTO status of a country has a causal effect on firm-level reports of political corruption using a nonparametric partial identification approach to bound the average treatment effects (ATEs). I also analyze conditional ATEs to explore various sources of potential heterogeneity. Contrary to popular belief, I find that WTO membership is likely to have no causal effect on domestic corruption overall. And if anything, it is likely to increase corrupt practices, particularly among firms that are established post WTO membership and those that are government owned.     

How are the precedents of trade policy rules made under the World Trade Organization?

Under World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement, consistent trade policy rules are established through precedents. This study examines how these precedents are created by citations, including how the kinds of cases involved in previous decisions affect the citation frequency. We investigate three determinants of citation, namely, legal, economic, and political factors. The empirical analysis shows that cases having the following characteristics are more frequently cited: violations of WTO rules found, many claims of WTO rule violations, many third-party participants, and a heightened capacity of complainant country retaliation. These suggest that the case law on trade policy is not only generated through legal considerations but also reflects economically and politically sensitive cases, which the WTO may tend to follow in line with its previous decisions.     

How Political Institutions Determine Corporate Governance Reforms: The Polity,Law and Corporate Practices in the Case of Switzerland

The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the role that political institutions play in the reform processes of national corporate governance regimes. I argue that existing theories are limited in that they conceive of political institutions' impact on corporate governance largely in terms of a deterministic influence on the political coalitions that emerge and on the policy outcomes. Based on the analysis of the paradigmatic case of a consensual democracy – Switzerland – I show that the consensual polity does not directly determine the outcome of a reform process, but rather the direction of causality between legal changes and changes in practices as well as the nature of the changes. Consensual polities require large parliamentary majorities for legal change to happen. Therefore, corporate practices are likely to change before legal rules and less demanding forms of institutional change, such as ‘layering’, are favoured.     

How foreign direct investment promote institutional quality: Evidence from Vietnam

Using a unique dataset from a provincial competitiveness survey and the rising foreign direct investment (FDI) from joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), I find that variations in economic institutions across the provinces of Vietnam are associated with the flow of foreign investment. To overcome endogeneity problems, I use the minimum distance from each province to a main economic centre as an instrument for foreign investment inflows. The instrumental variable approach shows that the direction of influence is from greater foreign investment to better institutions. These results hold after controlling for various additional covariates, and are also robust to various alternative measures of institutions. I also find that foreign direct investment has greater short-term impacts on institutional quality in the northern provinces.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Do Institutions Cause Growth?

We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.     

Is institutional improvement possible?

A substantial literature shows that economic prosperity is dependent on the quality of economic institutions. Countries with low-quality institutions remain poor while countries with high-quality institutions prosper. Improvement in institutional quality brings with it economic growth. Poor countries must improve their economic institutions to escape poverty; so, if a poor country’s institutional structure is unlikely to improve, that suggests dismal prospects for economic growth and an escape from poverty. An examination of institutional quality over 30 years indicates that countries with low-quality institutions have improved their institutional quality, which demonstrates that poor countries are not stuck with low-quality institutions. They can improve their institutions, and consequently, can generate economic growth and escape poverty.     

Institutional development and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China

Better developed legal and political institutions result in greater availability of reliable firm-specific information. When stock prices reflect more firm-specific information there will be less stock price synchronicity. This paper traces the experience of China, an economy undergoing dramatic institutional change in the last 20 years with rich variation in experiences across provinces. We show that stock price synchronicity is lower when there is institutional development in terms of property rights protection and rule of law. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of political pluralism on synchronicity. A more pluralistic regime reduces uncertainty and opaqueness regarding government interventions and therefore increases the value of firm-specific information that reduces synchronicity.