正式制度与非正式制度如何驱动社会创业——基于效率驱动型国家的QCA研究

社会创业已成为解决社会问题的重要手段,然而对于如何驱动社会创业尚未有定论。以23个效率驱动型国家为研究样本,整合正式制度与非正式制度的5个前因条件,应用QCA方法,探讨了影响国家社会创业活跃度的多重并发因素与复杂因果机制。研究发现：①高社会创业活跃度的驱动机制分为两条路径,即政策-规范-价值观型和规范-价值观-教育型。第一条路径是正式制度与非正式制度要素间的联动匹配,第二条路径是非正式制度要素间的联动匹配;②非正式制度在影响人们社会创业选择时具有重要作用,影响程度甚至超过了正式制度;③政府政策与创业教育之间具有替代作用,即当社会规范与文化价值观水平较高时,只要拥有完善的政府政策,或者良好的创业教育,就能驱动形成较高的社会创业活跃度;④非高社会创业活跃度的驱动机制分为4条路径,且与高社会创业活跃度的驱动路径存在非对称性关系。     

Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements

While some argue that incomplete incentive contracts facilitatethe self-enforcement of informal dealings, other authors submitthat they substitute for or "crowd out" social norms supportinginformal arrangements. We use experimental evidence to testthese theories by manipulating the extent to which individualstransact repeatedly and the level of contract costs. We findthat, by enforcing contractible exchange dimensions, contractsfacilitate the self-enforcement of noncontractible dimensions.This complementarity effect is particularly important when repetitionis unlikely and thus self-enforcement is difficult. Althoughour data suggest the existence of reciprocity as an alternative,informal enforcement mechanism, we do not find evidence thatcontracts substitute for this social norm.     

On social norms and beliefs: A model of manager environmental behavior

A prevailing view in the literature states that social sanctions can support, in equilibrium, high levels of obedience to a costly norm. The reason is that social disapproval and stigmatization faced by the disobedient are highest when disobedience is the exception rather than the rule in society. In contrast, the Bayesian model introduced here shows that, imperfect information causes the expected social sanction to be lowest precisely when obedience is more common. This, amongst other findings, draws a distinct line between social and moral norms, both of which may depend on others’ behavior but not on action observability. The implications of the use of non-Bayesian belief formation rules by society, namely a representativeness rule (overweighting the signals) and conservativism (overweighting the prior), for payoff functions and equilibria are explored.     

The Social Norm of Tipping: Does it Improve Social Welfare?

Some economists believe that social norms are created to improve welfare where the market fails. I show that tipping is such a norm, using a model in which a waiter chooses service quality and then a customer chooses the tip. The customer’s utility depends on the social norm about tipping and feelings such as embarrassment and fairness. The equilibrium depends on the exact social norm: higher sensitivity of tips to service quality (according to the norm) yields higher service quality and social welfare. Surprisingly, high tips for low quality may also increase service quality and social welfare.     

Evolutionary stability of social norms in a socioeconomic equilibrium model

A hybrid of a model of economic equilibrium in two markets and a social game is formed. The link between the two is established through a social norm that conditions correct social behavior on economic variables and therefore distorts the economic equilibrium allocation. The initial endowment of an individual determines whether she gains from a social norm. The evolution of norms is examined in a dynamic model where norms are more likely to persist if they deliver higher utility to their believers. Also it is assumed that norms lose importance when they are disobeyed by their believers. Optimally coordinating norms are not necessarily evolutionarily stable, and a suboptimal norm can be the outcome of the evolutionary process.     

员工地位竞争动机、知识分享行为与创新绩效——基于嵌入性悖论视角

组织中个体创新常常面临嵌入性悖论。相对于传统地位竞争的反功能视角，人们日益认识到地位竞争尤其是威望型地位竞争，可以为个体提供创新资源和动力。有效化解这一悖论，关键在于明晰何种类型的地位竞争以及何种程度的嵌入性可以促进个体创新。对一家大型多业务单元传媒集团227名员工进行实证调查，分析结果表明：威望型地位竞争可以通过促进个体知识分享行为提升个体创新绩效；非正式地位较低的个体更有可能具有威望型地位竞争动机；正式地位与非正式地位对个体地位竞争动机有交互影响，处于高正式地位的成员如果在非正式网络中处于边缘位置，则更可能在地位竞争中表现出威望型地位竞争动机。     

Formal and informal quota enforcement

I study renewable resource use and compliance in a dynamic model with both informal and formal modes of enforcement. Agents obtain utility from both resource use and from behaving according to a norm of quota compliance. The users can exceed their quota at the risk of being detected and formally punished, but they also risk informal sanctions in the form of social disapproval and guilt. I find that when accounting for informal enforcement, there is an indirect effect of regulatory change in addition to the intended direct effect. When policy change, such as tougher enforcement, makes individuals more compliant, the norm of compliance is gradually strengthened, which in turn induces more compliant behavior. I study the implications of policy change on compliance level, quota prices, and the norm of compliance, and show how the properties of the punishment function have important implications for the outcome.     

Exploring the Production of Social Order

In this article, we consider the production of order. Social order is a product of community action, which is to say it is deliberately produced; its production can be explored with the tools of price theory. There are two categories of inputs—informal and formal, where the first involves customs, traditions and social norms and the latter involves regulation, statutes, and police. We argue that people seek to form homogeneous communities where order is produced at low cost, using informal means. Communities that can produce order at relatively low cost will use less of the formal input, unless required to do so by legislation. Formal efforts to force the production of order by a larger heterogeneous polity paradoxically can erode the ability of homogeneous communities to produce order by informal means. In our statistical examination of the relationship between homogeneity and order using U.S. data, we find support for these notions.     

Social norms and gift behavior: Theory and evidence from Romania

In many developing and transitional countries with limited public income redistribution, inter-household transfers in general, and gifts in particular, are sizable and very important. We use unique Romanian survey data that enables us to isolate pure gifts from other private transfers. We explicitly focus on the importance of community-wide social norms, and find that they indeed play a major role for both the occurrence and the values of gifts. More exactly, our results suggest that the overall predominant gift motive among Romanian households is a norm of reciprocity. Moreover, this norm seems to be dominating for gifts to middle- and high-income households. Even though poor households receive to the same extent, norms of both impure altruism and reciprocity tend to be important. Hence, although the poor may not reciprocate gifts to the same extent as the rich, they still receive, since there is a social norm to give, especially to the poor.     

Economic reform,informal–formal sector linkages and intervention in the informal sector in developing countries: A paradox

Within a general equilibrium framework of a developing economy with a foreign owned factor of production, this paper questions whether the informal–formal sector relationship is pro-cyclical/complementary – expansion or contraction in one necessarily implies an expansion or contraction in the other – when the informal sector is subject to a technological shock. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which a positive shock to the informal sector results in an emphcontraction in both the size of the urban formal sector and the informal sector. Thus, although our result shows that the informal–formal sector relationship is pro-cyclical, it nevertheless calls into question the conventional wisdom on the benefits of intervention in the informal sector of developing economies, particularly where multinational corporations sub-contract certain labor-intensive stages of production to the informal sector.     

Trust,cultural norms and financial institutions in rural communities: the case of Cameroon

The success of the operations of formal and informal financial institutions (IFIs) hinges on a high degree of trust. The pivotal role of trust warrants careful analysis regarding its formation in these financial institutions. Using the case of Cameroon, the paper interrogates trust development between formal financial institutions and their clients, and between IFIs and their members. Trust formation occurs via certain cognitive trust-building processes: calculative, prediction, intentionality, capability, and transference processes. The paper argues that trust formation through these processes is predicated upon cultural values and beliefs. It is precisely because of cultural norms that traditional leaders play a role in ensuring that loans granted by formal financial institutions are repaid, thereby serving as principal actors in the functioning of financial capitalism in rural areas. The interplay between culture and financial institutions reconfigures the financial architecture in rural zones. Culture creates a social relational anthropology that is significant for how financial institutions operate.     

Job-search and foreign capital inflow — A three-sector general equilibrium analysis

The purpose of this paper is to extend the Fields' (1989) multi-sector job-search model in a three-sector general equilibrium framework by introducing international trade and capital as input. The three sectors are the rural sector, the urban informal sector and the urban formal sector. The rural sector and the urban informal sector use one type of mobile capital while the urban formal sector uses a sector-specific capital. We find that the effects of an inflow of foreign capital in the urban formal sector on unemployment and social welfare crucially hinge on the relative factor intensities of the rural sector and the urban informal sector. We show that there is a possibility of trade-off between the government's twin objectives of improvement in social welfare and mitigation of the urban unemployment problem. These results are extremely crucial from the view point of policymaking in an unemployment plagued, low-income developing economy.     

Procedural Rationality and Institutions: The Production of Norms by Means of Norms

This paper deals with a cognitivist approach to the problem of how social and economic institutions are formed. The economic framework I use is Simon's model of procedural rationality, integrating a cognitivist approach into a game structure. In game theory norms are seen as conventions, but not all institutions can be explained by game theory models. In cognition-based approaches, the creation and maintenance of institutions is the outcome of a search for satisficing norms. According to Simon and Newell (1972), agents faced with problems to solve visualise a problem as an area of potential situations to examine in order to establish analogical problem structures. In my approach, a norm can be defined within a system of norms that form in a historical-evolutionary dimension, suggesting a path in norm-forming processes.     

Institutional obstacles to African economic development: State, ethnicity, and custom

To account for the African growth tragedy and, in particular, for its causes rooted in governance problems, the institutional legacy that African countries inherited from pre-colonial and colonial times must be considered. Three aspects are examined here. First, the relationship between ethnicity and state performance is bi-directional: if strong ethno-regional identities prevent the emergence of modern citizenship, they themselves constitute an endogenous outcome of continuous state failures. Second, the persistence of informal rules and social norms causes legal dualism, which undermines the credibility of modern statutory law. Third, social customs and norms that hinder socio-economic differentiation and individual capital accumulation lower the performance of indigenous enterprises.     

Conceptions of property rights and norms

The social norm literature in law and economics fails to account for the differences between the two major conceptions of property rights. The differences between the two conceptions affect people’s utility function by affecting how increases in property rights are perceived. This paper discusses how the modern, in rem, conception evolved from an older, in personam, conception; it also discusses how economics has absorbed the modern, in rem, conception. The paper demonstrates that if people do not perceive the benefits of modern property rights, they will follow their social norms if the government or planner imposes modern property rights on them. In the end, this allows one to make a fuller discussion of why norms economize information. This discussion has various consequences ranging from developmental economics to financial market economics and cannot be ignored.

International factor mobility,informal interest rate and capital market imperfection: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper makes an attempt to provide a theory of determination of interest rate in the informal credit market in a less developed economy in terms of a three-sector static deterministic general equilibrium model. There are two informal sectors which obtain production loans from a monopolistic moneylender and employ labour from the informal labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector employs labour at an institutionally fixed wage rate and takes loans from the competitive formal credit market. We show that an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of labour raises (lowers) the informal (formal) interest rate but lowers the competitive wage rate in the informal labour market when the informal manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the informal agricultural sector. International factor mobility, therefore, raises the degrees of distortions in both the factor markets in this case.     

Social capital as a substitute for formality: Evidence from Bolivia

The paper studies the role of social capital in the urban informal sector in Bolivia. It shows that a formal firm has about 6.4 times the sales of an informal firm with no social capital, but informal firms use their social capital to compensate for the lack of formal productivity benefits. By being formal, firms obtain permanent visibility because they can operate a shop or a visible production location and they can produce in locations with better public infrastructure. Informal firms, in contrast, sell in one place – typically in street markets in front of formal shops – and produce in another — typically in the outskirts. Social capital increases accessibility of informal firms and provides them with security benefits at their production location.     

Social norms and economic growth in a model with labor and capital income tax evasion

Empirical evidence suggests that low-income countries are characterized by high levels of labor and capital income tax evasion while the opposite is true for high-income countries. This paper proposes a model to study the relationship between economic growth and both types of income tax evasion. We show that the existence of a social norm towards tax compliance generates a complementarity between capital and labor income tax evasion which explains the decline of both the share of evaders in the population and the amount of tax evasion when countries accumulate capital. The model predicts that the level of tax morale is positively correlated with both types of income tax evasion and the level of income per capita, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Finally, a higher tax rate increases the share of evaders in the population and aggregate tax evasion.     

Appropriation,Formal and Informal Sectors,and Efficient Endowment Distribution

By adding an informal sector whose output is not subject to appropriative interactions and assuming complementarity in the inputs for market production, this paper investigates how possible asymmetries in conflict affect the allocation of resources. It is shown that when the existing gap in relative appropriative skills is being closed, more resources are allocated to appropriative activities in the economy. We are, in this case, more likely to see a reduction in market activities but an increase in home activities. A poorer party is a natural producer rather than a natural fighter, which is the usual characterization of a less endowed party in the conflict analysis. By conducting a welfare analysis, this paper shows that a market-output-maximizing initial distribution of resources endowment is such that when one party has a comparative advantage in market production over appropriation, its initial fraction of total resource endowment should be greater than its relative productivity in market production.     

Woodsy the optimal owl: Environmental campaigns, norms, and implications for public goods policy

Norms regarding private provision of a public good (e.g. cutting down on energy use, not littering) can affect the marginal gains from contributing to a public good and therefore people's decisions about contributing to the public good. A model is proposed in which norms of private contributions to a public good can be influenced by public policy, and these norms affect people's self-image, which derives from a comparison of one's own contribution with the norm contribution. In this context, we examine the conditions under which private contributions to a public good are efficient, and the conditions under which policy affecting these norms improves social welfare. We find that (1) a benevolent social planner who fails to account for private provision norms will underprovide the public good, and (2) public policy that attempts to raise the norm contribution of private provision can increase social welfare if the effect of raising the norm does not have an extreme negative effect - either extremely small or extremely large - on peoples' self-image.