Wage formation in historical perspective: the French experience

Translator's note: In this article Robert Bayer introduces thenotion ‘regulation’ as a key concept in analysesof the labour market. The term refers to the balance of social,institutional and economic forces which characte rise at a particulartime the economic system as a whole or particular parts of it.I considered translating ‘regulation’ as ‘order’,‘regime’, ‘system’ or ‘formation’;but these terms are either too static or already bear inappropriateconnotations. It was therefore decided to retain the Frenchexpression in the English text.     

Uncertainty: individuals, institutions and technology

In an attempt to refine the concept of uncertainty, this paperelaborates an ontology of the social world concentrating onindividuals, institutions and technology. It shows the strongentwinement of the ontological aspects of the conceptualisationof uncertainty and epistemological ones. It highlights the ontologicaland epistemological dimensions of different concepts of uncertainty,such as fundamental uncertainty, procedural uncertainty, ambiguityand weak uncertainty (or risk). It also comments on a few writingsthat distinguish varieties of uncertainty with adjectives suchas ‘ontological’ and ‘epistemological’or ‘epistemic’.     

Preferences, reductionism and the microfoundations of Analytical Marxism

Analytical Marxism has recommended that Marxian theory shouldconform to ‘normal’ scientific methods and thatthis should involve the development of microfoundations. Thelatter has involved the adoption of rational choice theory andits corresponding assumptions regarding agents' behaviour. Thispaper seeks to question this position and highlight a numberof problems which Analytical Marxism faces, particularly inthe domain of economic theory. The different views of scienceespoused by Analytical Marxists display a tension between ‘positivist’and ‘realist’ perspectives, and the arguments forindividualist and anti-reductionist approaches to social andeconomic theory are also argued to be problematic. The approachof Analytical Marxism, it is suggested, can involve the uncriticaladoption of many of the assumptions of standard economic theoryand, as such, it is subject to a number of substantive criticisms,some of which have been elaborated from within mainstream economictheory.     

The economic case for international labour standards

This paper explores the economic case for international labourstandards. Granting workers rights of free association and collectivebargaining confers both static and dynamic economic efficiencies.Static efficiencies refer to one-time gains from improvementsin economic practice. Dynamic efficiencies refer to gains fromimprovements to the growth path resulting from a shift awayfrom a ‘low road’ development path to a ‘highroad’ path. These efficiencies raise wages, employmentand output in developing countries, and they can also benefitworkers in developed countries. Labour standards are an institutionalmechanism for raising the quality of growth in both developingand developed countries. In this sense, they are a ‘win–win’institution.     

Price rigidity and market-clearing: a conceptual clarification

This article tests the view (derived from Hicks and Patinkin)that non-market clearance may be caused by slow adjustment (‘processrigidity’). There are models where market-rationing ispresent and derives from some form of rigidity, but this rigiditycannot be considered as process rigidity. It is similarly possibleto accommodate the idea of process rigidity within the Marshallianresearch programme. What is missing is that market-rationingmight be its corollary. The reason such a causal link is oftenbelieved to exist lies in a generic use of the concept of rigidity,used to designate alternative and incompatible phenomena: ‘exogenousend-state rigidity’ and ‘equilibrium end-state rigidity’,as well as process rigidity. It is true that these first twoforms of rigidity create market rationing. The belief that slowadjustment also generates market rationing results from theunwarranted extension to process rigidity of conclusions whichare only valid for the first two.     

Post-Keynesianism, socialisation of investment and Swedish wage-earner funds

This paper analyses the performance of one of the most controversialof recent economic policy ‘experiments’, namelySwedish Wage-earner Funds (WEFs). It examines the ability ofthe WEFs to meet macroeconomic, financial and democratic objectives.The analysis indicates a favourable financial performance, butlittle significant democratisation. Macroeconomic influencewas constrained by the limited size of the scheme and, thoughassociated with positive changes in economic variables, theexperiment was ultimately overwhelmed by the collapse of anasset price ‘bubble’. Nevertheless, the performanceof the WEFs has legitimised the concept of collective investmentfunds as an economic policy instrument.     

The concept of routines: some clarifications

The concept of an ‘organisational routine’ is centralto the evolutionary theory of the firm. However, the conceptitself is still unclear. There is not much consensus in theliterature regarding its dimensions, its characteristics andits functions. Despite increasing use of the concept, not muchconceptual progress has been made in recent years, as remarkedby several of the leading writers on the topic. The objectiveof this paper is to contribute to further theoretical developmentof the concept of ‘organisational routine’, andto elaborate the research agenda on organisational routines.Both of these measures contribute to clarifying the conceptand enabling its application in empirical research in the socialsciences, thereby unlocking its potential for understandingorganisations and organisational change. Several problems forconceptual progress are identified. Implications for the conceptualisationof ‘organisational routines’, and for the researchagenda on organisational routines are drawn.     

Is there redemption for conventions?

This article explores the concept of convention in the socialsciences. It presents the two major neo-Humean philosophicalapproaches to convention and challenges their intuitive appealand research implications. The weaknesses of these approachesare examined and a new direction is suggested for the studyof convention. The paper goes on to develop a framework forthe analysis of conventions, using the notion of ‘theexemplar’ introduced by Thomas Kuhn. An illustration ofthis alternative approach is provided using the example of the‘wage relation’.     

On Sraffa's Standard commodity: is its price invariant with respect to changes in income distribution?

In his 1960 book, Sraffa suggested using a composite commodity,which he called the ‘Standard commodity’, to solveRicardo's search for an invariable measure of value, i.e., astandard capable of isolating the price movements of any othercommodity induced by changes in income distribution. The absencein Sraffa's book of an explicit proof of the invariance propertyof this standard gave rise to many misunderstandings about itsmeaning and its role as an invariable measure of value. In orderto clear up these questions, Bellino (On Sraffa's Standard commodity,Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 28, 121–32, 2004)has proposed a ‘proper’ definition of an ‘invariablemeasure of value’, showing that Sraffa's Standard commoditydoes fulfil the requirements of this definition. He claims thatthe fulfilment of this property (but not the constancy of its‘nominal’ price) qualifies the Standard commodityas an invariable measure of value. In this paper, a proof ofthe invariance of the price of the Standard commodity with respectto changes in income distribution is given, and the equivalenceof this property with Bellino's definition of invariance isshown.     

On Sraffa's Standard commodity

The necessity of expressing the relative price of a commodityin terms of another commodity makes it impossible to distinguishthat part of any change that can be ascribed to the characteristicsof the commodity itself from the part of that change that isto be ascribed to the characteristics of the commodity of reference,i.e., the numéraire. Ricardo (1817) was the first topoint out this problem and the need to find an ‘invariablemeasure of value’, but he was not able to solve the problem.In 1960, Sraffa suggested using a bundle of commodities, thathe called ‘Standard commodity’, to accomplish thisfunction, claiming that it was a standard of value invariantwith respect to changes in the distribution of income. But inSraffa's book there is no explicit proof of this claim. Thisgave rise to many misunderstandings about the Standard commodityand its role as invariable measure of value. This paper proposesa proper definition of an ‘invariable measure of value’,and then proves that the Sraffa ‘Standard commodity’does fulfil the requirements of this definition.     

Classical political economy: the subsistence wage,and job guarantee concerns

Abstract:

In the theoretical framework of classical political economy, including the revisions of Marx and the more recent work of Piero Sraffa and others, the concept of the subsistence wage figures prominently. Here, following a recounting of this concept and demonstrating its significance not only for classical theory but also for larger social concerns, I argue that the “base wage” (as it is sometimes termed) as articulated within a “Job Guarantee” program, is (or should be) comparable to the subsistence wage but requires modification to make it (roughly) equivalent. It will be demonstrated that adherents of the classical approach did not rest their wage theory on a quasi-neoclassical supply–demand approach (with some primitive marginal productivity notion lying behind a supposed demand for labor schedule), but understood wages as socially determined where institutional and historic forces established a normative standard around which market wages gravitated. Such an approach was shared by, among others, Thorstein Veblen and John Maynard Keynes.     

The principle of institutional direction: Coase's regulatory critique of intervention

That Coase's political convictions changed from an early socialismto a later neo-liberalism stands in apparent contrast to thetheoretical consistency of his early (‘The Nature of theFirm’) and later (‘The Problem of Social Cost’)contributions to economics. Offering further evidence abouthis early views in particular, this paper takes a fresh lookat Coase's views on competition and antitrust to show that heconsistently stressed the role of what we shall call the principleof ‘institutional direction’, and that this principleinvolves an important criticism of both neo-liberal and socialistviews on regulation and state intervention.     

Keynesian theorising during hard times: stock-flow consistent models as an unexplored 'frontier' of Keynesian macroeconomics

This paper argues that the stock-flow consistent approach tomacroeconomic modelling (SFCA) is a natural outcome of the pathtaken by Keynesian macroeconomic thought in the 1960s and 1970s,a theoretical ‘frontier’ that remained largely unexploredwith the end of Keynesian academic hegemony. It does so in twosteps. First, it phrases the representative views of Davidson,Godley, Minsky and Tobin as different ‘closures’of the same (SFC) accounting framework, calling attention totheir similarities and logical implications. Second, it discussesunresolved issues within this approach and how it differs from‘modern’ theorising.     

Rationality,constitutions, and the ethics of rules

It seems clear that individuals stand to mutually benefit, in a wide variety of situations, from structuring their interactions in terms of constitutional practices. But a commitment to treat the rules defining such practices as setting real constraints on choice—a commitment to what could be characterized as an “ethics of rules”—is hard to reconcile with the standard, consequentialist theory of rational choice, which requires, in effect, that individuals regard any rule as providing no more than a “maxim” for choice. Such a theory of rational choice, then, constrains individuals to settle for a second best outcome in which choice is aligned with practice rules by means of strategies of precommitment and threats. The outcome is second best because such methods yield only partial alignment, and involve the expenditure of scarce resources, as well as a sacrifice of flexibility and freedom. To say this, however, is to identify the corresponding theory of rational choice as havingconsequentially unacceptable implications. A modified theory of choice is presented, which is still consequentially oriented, but which assesses consequences in a more holistic manner. It is then argued that this modified theory can provide a rational choice grounding for the needed “ethics of rules.” The author would like to thank three anonymous referees for their very helpful comments and suggestions.     

Naturalised epistemology and economics

The relevance to economics of naturalised epistemology (alsoknown as the naturalistic turn) from philosophy of science hasrecently been argued by economic methodologists, especiallyby D. Wade Hands (Reflection Without Rules: Economic Methodologyand Contemporary Science Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2001). This concept is held by Hands to constitute partof the ‘new economic methodology’ that consistsof the ‘interpenetration of economics and science theory’.Contrary to Hands's case, naturalised epistemology is shownhere not to represent a qualitatively new concept, to possesslittle coherent meaning, and to be incapable of charting aninnovative way forward for economics. Although there are moreissues concerning naturalism bearing on economics than are notedby Hands, three specific limitations of naturalised epistemologyare discussed. These and other limitations are related to theeconomics examples Hands proposes suggesting the usefulnessof naturalised epistemology for economics.     

How useful is the concept of the natural real rate of interest for monetary policy?

The natural rate of interest plays a key role in Wicksell's‘cumulative process’ as well as in modern monetaryequilibrium models of the business cycle. It constitutes a usefulconcept for the theoretical analysis of the interdependenceof monetary policy and economic fluctuations. However, the usefulnessof this concept for the practice of monetary policy is limited—especiallyowing to the fact that the natural real rate of interest andits law of motion cannot be measured with satisfying precision.     

Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics

Economics rightfully represents the major basis for competitionpolicy. Next to generating knowledge about competition and itswelfare effects, the currently popular ‘more-economicapproach’ is charged with a number of additional hopesand expectations. While this article highlights the benefitsof economics-based competition policy, it takes a cautious stancetowards excessive expectations, in particular regarding theidea that a monocultural, ‘unified’ competitiontheory as an exact, objective and unerring scientific approachto antitrust could make normative assessment and generalisationssuperfluous. Diversity in competition economics is advocatedin two ways. First, competition economics is empirically characterisedby a considerable pluralism of theories and policy paradigms.Second, it is demonstrated that this diversity of theories istheoretically beneficial for future scientific progress. Asno ultimate competition theory can ever be expected., the ‘more-economicapproach’ must be extended in order to embrace diversity.     

Sheila Dow's concept of dualism: clarification, criticism and development

This paper analyses Dow's concept of dualism and decomposesit into eight categories, one not explicitly identified by Dow.It is argued that Dow's original definition is underdevelopedand thereby lacking practical relevance. The paper presentsa development of Dow's definition, which allows her to attackthe splitting of polar categories. This significantly increasesthe relevance of Dow's definition of dualism and buttressesher criticisms of the mainstream. The paper also identifies‘heuristic dualism’ in Dow's work. A distinctioncan be made between Dow's ‘heuristic dualism’, whichis strictly an intermediate step in an argument, and the mainstreamuse of fixed dualistic categories.