战略性贸易政策理论实证文献评述

战略性贸易政策建立在不完全竞争与规模收益递增的基础上,是新贸易理论在政策领域的延伸与拓展,主要包括战略进口政策、战略出口政策、以进口保护促进出口政策等内容。战略性贸易政策理论被提出之后,许多学者从多方面进行了实证研究,其结论对于实际贸易政策制定颇有借鉴意义。本文对这些实证文献加以评述。     

美国战略性贸易政策的发展

战略性贸易政策最初从美国开始兴起.发展至今,如今它成为美国对外贸易的主要战略政策.本文通过对战略性贸易政策的再次阐述,时间上从二战后的美国战略性贸易跨越到特朗普时代的美国的战略贸易政策,空间上与重商主义以及幼稚工业保护政策相对比,总结得出结论,并且预测是否能在发展中国家实施战略性贸易政策.     

战略性贸易政策综述

一、战略性贸易政策的涵义 战略性贸易政策(strategic trade policy)是建立在不完全竞争、规模收益基础上的新贸易理论的重要组成部分。战略性贸易政策之所以被冠以“战略”，是因为在寡头垄断模型中，政府在制定最佳贸易政策时会把外国企业或政府的反应考虑在内。建立在完全竞争基础上的传统贸易理论不能有效地解释产业内贸易和相似国家问的大量贸易理论等现象，也没有将一些与政策相关的重要问题。     

析我国实施战略性贸易政策的必然性

战略性贸易政策为不完全竞争下的国家干预提供了理论依据，并在发达国家政策实践中取得了一定成效，但它对发展中国家的适用性一直备受争议。战略性贸易政策在我国的适用性，如何通过战略性贸易政策扶植和创造竞争优势，完善市场结构，发挥政府的宏观调控作用，通过倾斜的贸易政策保护和扶持某些具有发展潜力的战略性产业来创造和强化贸易优势，提高我国经济的国际竞争力。     

论战略性贸易政策在中国的适用性

基于规模经济和不完全竞争假说前提的战略性贸易政策作为贸易政策的新思路 ,受到极大的关注。本文分析了战略贸易政策的适用条件及其在中国的可能应用 ,文章最后提出了中国在使用这一政策的具体建议     

美国贸易政策动态性探析

在第二次世界大战之后推进建立全球自由贸易体制的过程中,美国扮演了发起人和全球规则制定者的关键角色。对外经济关系是美国整体外交关系中重要的组成部分,贸易政策则是美国外交政策中最持久的内容之一。在美国历史上,贸易政策一直占有重要地位。从自由主义的公平贸易到新贸易保护主义政策。美国对外贸易政策是美国全球战略的重要组成部分,它是美国奉行经济全球化战略的主要工具之一。二战以后,相继经历了自由贸易、保护贸易和公平贸易,进入1980年代以来,美国政府的贸易政策实际上已经变为在公平贸易前提下,不放任自流,而是采取各种行政和经济手段进行干预。这些干预带有程度不同的保护色彩,不完全的自由贸易和不断粉饰的保护贸易在该体系下动态共存,并在不同情况下发挥作用。     

战略性贸易政策对中国的适用性分析

战略性贸易政策是建立在不完全竞争、规模经济基础上的新贸易理论的重要组成部分。文章对战略性贸易政策的实用性进行评论,并对其在中国的适用性问题进行分析,最后提出在中国适用战略性贸易政策的启示。     

战略性贸易政策对中国的适用性分析

战略性贸易政策是建立在不完全竞争、规模经济基础上的新贸易理论的重要组成部分.文章对战略性贸易政策的实用性进行评论,并对其在中国的适用性问题进行分析,最后提出在中国适用战略性贸易政策的启示.     

论战略性贸易政策的经济合理性及其应用

国际经济与贸易的进一步发展,在世界范围内不完全竞争格局的事实存在,战略性贸易政策便成为一种催生事物应运而生,由于各国的贸易顺差与逆差的不平衡,战略性贸易政策在一段时间内很难达成共识。本文从战略性贸易政策的理论、实施环境、实施效果来对其进行分析,对政府干预作用重新定义论证战略性贸易政策的经济合理性;在经济贸易全球化进程进一步加快的今天,对战略性贸易政策的全球应用环境分析也是探索在中国的政策选择及发展机遇。     

战略性贸易政策的理论及其在中国的实践

战略性贸易政策是随着战后国际贸易发展而产生出来的一种新的贸易保护理论，它引入了不完全竞争的国际市场结构这一事实作为其基本假设，论述了政府的政策性介入的合理性。实践中的战略贸易政策在各个不同的国家效果不同，所以对这种政策的成功并没有达成共识。不过，有选择地应用战略性贸易政策仍然对我国的贸易政策有重要的借鉴意义。     

Merger Profitability and Trade Policy

We study the profitability incentives for merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing, even though it would not be profitable in a laissez‐faire economy. A key element is a change in the governments’ incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. National merger induces more strategic trade policy, whereas international merger does not.     

新加坡的战略性贸易政策评析

本文首先对战略性贸易政策作了简单介绍,接着重点论述了新加坡经济发展过程中对战略性贸易政策的成功运用,介绍了这一政策运用的主要内容及其特点,文章最后就我国如何借鉴新加坡的经验提出政策建议。     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

Institutionalism and New Trade Theory: Rethinking Comparative Advantage and Trade Policy

Gomory and Baumol (2000), and Samuelson (2004) have raised concerns about international trade’s future impact on U.S. national income. The focus is how globalization may affect the size and distribution across countries of gains from trade. Though their analysis is developed using a pure trade theoretical framework, it has strands in common with institutionalist thinking. Their findings spotlight the need for a new U.S. trade policy agenda aimed at maximizing the U.S. share of gains from trade, and complementing conventional Keynesian open economy macroeconomic analysis.     

战略性贸易政策应用于中国轿车业量化效果的再考察--政策工具与外国政府行为对政策实施的影响

经验分析表明,战略性贸易政策可以起到从国外企业转移利润、支持本国企业竞争和提高国民福利的作用.本文以中国轿车业为例,在以前对我国单边实施进口关税效果量化分析的基础上,进一步应用数量模型对战略性贸易政策实施过程中应注意的两个问题进行考察,一是实施战略性贸易政策应当注意与其他政策工具相配合,二是应用该政策应当注意技巧,尽量避免引发其他国家的报复,这样才能收到更好的政策效果.     

产业结构对贸易政策的影响

有别于其他讨论上下游进出口策略性贸易的文献,我们将产业结构因素加入技术领先国(外国)与技术落后国(本国)之间的贸易问题,在中间产品市场和最终产品市场都是古诺竞争的假设下,利用两阶段博弈模型,考虑当技术先进国同时出口中间产品和最终产品到技术落后国时,技术落后国的策略性贸易政策问题.文中的研究结论,可以解释我国一些产业发展中的现象,同时也可以给我国在制定上下游企业的国际贸易政策时提供一定的理论依据和参考思路.     

On the Efficiency of Green Trade Policy

The paper derives conditions for second best environmental policy when there are foreign countries which fail to implement appropriate environmental regulations. It is shown that in such cases, efficiency in the global economy will not be achieved unless domestic environmental regulations are supplemented by trade provisions. The result is independent of whether environmental problems are local or international. Furthermore, when trade provisions are implemented, efficiency requires that domestic environmental taxes are fixed at the Pigouvian tax rate. The results imply that there is an economic rationale for regulating the trade between signatories and non-signatories of international environmental agreements. Efficient trade regulations will either take the form of trade restrictions or trade promotions, depending on whether the environmental problem is created by production or consumption activities, and whether the net import of the relevant commodity is positive or negative. It is argued that an efficient climate agreement, signed by a group of fuel-importing countries (e.g., the OECD countries), should include a subsidy on the import of fossil fuels.     

Strategic Distortion of the Objectives of Trade Policy

Abstract

By employing a simple three-country model in which there are two exporting countries and one consuming country, this paper analyses the consequences of one-country strategic distortion of the objectives of trade policy. It finds that although an exporting country can benefit from strategic distortion, it would be preferred that the importing country distorts its policy. Furthermore, it is found that preferential trading agreements can emerge endogenously.     

Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution

We analyze the effects of trade liberalization on environmental policies in a strategic setting when there is transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse off. This is not due to the terms of trade motive, but rather the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution. With command and control policies (emission quotas), countries are unable to influence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable quotas, unless pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. Under free trade, internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level and strictly welfare‐dominate taxes. The ordering of internationally tradable quotas and pollution taxes depends, among other things, on the degree of international pollution spillovers.     

政策干预下我国贸易自由化的福利效应

近年来,贸易和环境问题越来越成为各国关注的焦点,传统贸易理论忽视了环境资源的合理使用和保护,给发展中国家带来了严重的环境问题。文章在揭示传统贸易理论在环境资源分析不足的同时,建立了一个政策干预下的发展中国家的自由贸易模型,在此基础上结合我国实际情况分析贸易自由化的福利效应。