浅谈我国现代企业的公司治理

近年来,公司治理迅速成为全球关注的热点。人们越来越认识到建立良好公司治理的重要性,并把它作为增强经济实力、提高经济缋效的基本手段。公司治理健全与否,是决定中国改革能否成功的关键因素,也是中国迎接经济全球化和新技术革命挑战的前提。     

我国公司治理结构的现状及对策

公司治理结构是现代企业制度中最重要的组织结构，它以董事会、监事会和高层经理人员以及职工之间的责权利关系为核心，构造一套有效的激励和约束机制。从狭义上讲。公司治理结构主要指公矧的股东、董事及经理层之间的关系；从广义上讲，公司治理结构还包括与利益（如员工、客户、供应商、债权人和社会公众）之间的关系，及有关法律、法规等。     

我国商业银行公司治理刍议

公司治理结构(Corporate Gover-nance)是属于企业制度层面的内容,其核心在于企业通过权力制衡,监督管理者的绩效,保证股东和其他利益相关主体的权利。文章通过分析我国商业银行公司治理结构的缺陷,特别研究了股份制商业银行治理结构的问题,提出了我国商业银行治理结构具体的目标模式以及路径选择,以推进我国商业银行体制改革的深化。     

公司治理与国有企业改革

公司制改革加快了现代企业制度建设的进程，但是公司治理结构不完善是一个亟待解决的问题。目前要从维护中小股东合法权益，逐步建立定位合理和投资者信任的独立董事制度，从制度上保证发挥董事会作用以及建立健全董事、经理的束激机制四个方面，完善上市公司的治理结构。     

我国公司治理结构的选择与构建设想

我国公司治理结构的选择与构建设想肖宇清建立以公司制为主要组织形式的现代企业制度，是我国国有企业改革的目标和方向。当前国企改革正处于攻坚阶段，主要的难点是构建一个什么样的公司治理结构，既能避免政府对企业的直接干预，实现政企分开，又能有效防止国有资产流失...     

公司治理结构与创业导向相关性的实证研究

利用2013年中国中小板和创业板的456家上市公司的相关数据,对公司治理结构与创业导向的相关关系以及制度环境和企业所有制对该关系的调节效应进行了实证检验。层级多元回归结果表明:高管结构越年轻化,企业越倾向于选择研发积极型创业导向;高管持股比例越高,企业越倾向于选择资产增值型创业导向。分组多元回归结果表明:制度环境对创业型企业的治理结构与创业导向的关系起差异性调节效应,并且该调节效应在相对落后制度环境下的表现强于在相对发达制度环境下的表现;企业所有制对创业型企业治理结构与创业导向的关系起差异性调节效应,且该调节效应在非国有企业中的表现强于在国有企业中的表现。     

公司治理结构的发展趋势与我国公司治理结构的现状分析

公司治理结构是我国国有企业进行现代企业制度的主要内容，是对公司进行管理和体制的体系。从公司治理结构在国际范围内被重视的原因开始分析，重点讨论了公司治理结构的发展趋势，得出讨论了公司治理结构的发展趋势，得出世界范围内公司治理结构正在走向趋同化的结论，在此基础上对我国公司结构现状进行分析，对其存在问题进行剖析和分解。     

我国公司治理难题:文化与结构的冲突

公司治理结构的研究是近年来的热点问题。中国的许多公司都建立了“貌似规范”的公司治理结构,但“形似而神不似”的现象却引人深思。每种制度的背后都有着相应的化模式在支撑,制度实施的效率也取决于制度与化的匹配程度。我们在进行公司治理的改革时必须正视我国特有的化,针对化的特点进行公司治理模式的“本土化”。     

Corporate governance structure and product market competition

This article assesses the effects of the competitive structure of a product market on a firm’s corporate governance structure. Our model demonstrates that shareholders strategically determine the corporate governance structure, including the manager’s stock ownership and his controlling power over the firm, in order to maximize their utility in the product market competition. We find that the manager’s stock ownership is lower and his controlling power over the firm is higher when the firm’s product is more profitable or when competition within the product market is more severe. The inefficiency of the wealth transfer from shareholders to the manager also affects the corporate governance structure.     

建立现代市场制度：中国的公司治理与企业改革

中国在培育现代公司治理的制度方面已经取得了长足进展，但要改善中国企业的公司治理行为，仍需要从加强市场力量和监管力量、培育机构投资者队伍以及加强银行在公司治理中的作用等三个方面推进制度建设。     

公司法人治理结构以及我国的对策

公司法人治理结构是我们一直以来强调的科学治理公司的模式,它和一般经济学或管理学上所说的公司治理含义不同,作为现代公司制度的核心,它所承载的功能主要是促使公司本身的良好运转和内部的有效制衡,它所要应对的主要问题在于大股东的滥权和代理成本,了解代理成本产生的根源才能更好地从法律层面对其有效规制.研究世界各国,特别是美国日本德国等发达国家是如何构建公司法人治理结构,对我国有非常重要的借鉴意义.     

Corporate governance as religion

This paper, examining five different corporate governance topics, considers whether certain corporate governance reforms—perhaps because of the passion with which their advocates advance them—have increasingly become articles of faith rather than matters of intellectual analysis and empirical evaluation. The paper proceeds on the premise that good corporate governance is very important, but that it is not always easy to determine whether any particular proposed reform actually constitutes good or bad corporate governance. It concludes that sound corporate governance reforms can only be forged on the anvil of close and rigorous examination—wherever that examination might lead.      

Corporate governance following mass privatization

Using vouchers to privatize state-owned firms was an innovative but controversial aspect of transition. In the Czech Republic, voucher privatization created a large group of minority shareholders who coexisted with large shareholder–managers who controlled firms. Critics allege that the structure of shareholdings and regulatory failures allowed pervasive theft of corporate assets, much of it financed by irresponsible bank lending, and led to a financial crisis and an economic downturn. I argue that neither anecdotal evidence of managerial malfeasance nor the theories of tunneling and looting provide strong evidence for this view of corporate governance in the Czech Republic. A lack of small shareholder protection seems to have imposed small costs on the economy, and it may have facilitated rather than hampered the restructuring of firms.     

Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in Germany

A new explanation of why dividends may be informative is put forward in this paper. We find evidence that dividends signal the severity of the conflict between the large, controlling owner and small, outside shareholders. Accordingly, dividend change announcements provide new information about this conflict. To test the rent extraction hypothesis and discriminate it from the cash flow signaling explanation, we utilize information on the ownership and control structure of the firm. We analyze 736 dividend change announcements in Germany over the period 1992-1998 and find significantly larger negative wealth effects in the order of two percentage points for companies where the ownership and control structure makes the expropriation of minority shareholders more likely than for other firms. The rent extraction hypothesis also has implications for the levels of dividends paid. We find larger holdings of the largest owner to reduce, while larger holdings of the second largest shareholder to increase the dividend pay-out ratio. Deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule due to pyramidal and cross-ownership structures are also associated with larger negative wealth effects and lower pay-out ratios. Finally, using Lintner's (American Economic Review 46 (2) (1956) 97-113) model of dividend determination we find corroborating results. The presence of a second largest shareholder with a considerable equity stake makes a crucial difference in the governance of the firm. Our results call for better minority shareholder rights protection and increased transparency in the course of European Capital Market Reform.     

Corporate governance in family-controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on performance in publicly traded Taiwanese firms that are controlled by founding families. Results show that when shares are owned by institutional investors, particularly foreign financial institutions, firms perform better. However, where families are the major shareholders, this is not the case. In addition, boards that are independent of the financial interests of the founding family have a positive impact on performance, whether measured by accounting ratios, operating performance or the stock market. (JEL: P52, G32)     

Corporate innovation behavior and internal governance mechanism

Innovation is a process results in new products, methods of production and forms of business organization. Innovation can vastly improve the welfare of consumers, investors, firms and the economy. However, there is relatively limited evidence of how corporate governance affects corporate innovation. In this study, the author theoretically demonstrates how internal governance mechanisms interact to affect innovation, such as internal control, monitoring and compensation contracts. Governance mechanisms are determined by firm characteristics. The ＂best＂ governance structures that can be adopted universally do not exist. However, innovative firms often share similar characteristics, and they adopt similar governance mechanisms to facilitate innovation. The ultimate purpose of such internal governance mechanism that facilitates innovation is to prevent managers＇ myopia, and this paper concludes 5 different roles in internal governance mechanism that facilitate corporate innovation behavior.     

Corporate governance structure,managerial discretion,and the R&D investment in China

This article studies the influence of corporate governance factors on firm R&D investment in a transitional economy like China. By using the data from the listed companies in China, this article statistically tests the hypotheses on the relations between corporate R&D intensity and managerial discretion of CEOs, independent outside directors, degree of share concentration, share held by the state, and share held by a manager. According to the results, the managerial discretion of CEOs has a significant and negative correlation with the firm R&D investment. The number of the independent outside directors in the board has a positive influence on the R&D investment. And as the shares held by a manager increase, the firm R&D intensity will decrease at first, and then increase along an inverted parabolic curve. All these findings show that the improvement of corporate governance and stock incentive plan, and the cultivation of active and long-term stock investors, may finally lead to the upgrade of corporate innovation capabilities.