Dividends for tunneling in a regulated economy: The case of China

Some Chinese listed companies pay out high dividends, despite the weak legal and institutional pressure on them to mitigate agency problems by paying dividends. We conjecture that such a phenomenon is caused by the differential pricing for tradable and non-tradable shares during the IPO of these listed companies. Such companies might use high-dividend payments to divert proceeds from an IPO or rights issue to controlling shareholders' pockets. The empirical results support our hypotheses, showing that companies with more differential pricing in the IPO, a recent IPO or rights issue, or more concentrated ownership tend to pay more dividends. Similarly, companies that are ultimately owned by the government tend to pay more dividends. Furthermore, a dividend increase accompanied by large IPO price discounts, a recent-year rights issue, an ROE qualified for rights issue, or great dividend variation is associated with more negative stock returns than other types of dividend increases. These findings indicate that dividends are not used purely for signaling or distributing free cash flows in China. Instead, dividends might be used by the controlling shareholders to engage in tunneling.     

Elective stock and scrip dividends

We investigate firms' decisions to pay elective stock dividends, known in the UK as scrip dividends. Scrip dividends give investors the choice between receiving new shares or the equivalent value as a cash dividend. UK firms paying scrip dividends are more likely to be financially constrained, and scrip dividends are used more when access to external financing is costly. Our results are robust to using the 2008 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to credit supply. Cash preservation is the most important corporate incentive to use scrip dividends as they tend to be distributed in combination with dividend cuts and with major corporate investments such as debt-financed mergers and acquisitions. Analysis of US dividend reinvestment plans by which investors purchase new shares confirms firms' cash-preservation motives.     

Managing Capital via Internal Capital Market Transactions: The Case of Life Insurers

The movement of capital within insurance groups is important for understanding insolvency risk management, as well as regulatory policies regarding capital standards and group supervision. Panel data estimates indicate that, on average, a dollar decrease in performance (net income plus unrealized capital gains) when performance is negative is associated with a $0.26 increase in capital contributions to life insurers from other entities in the group, and that a dollar increase in performance when performance is positive is associated with a $0.56 increase in the amount of internal shareholder dividends paid by life insurers to other entities in the group. Moreover, the sensitivity of internal dividends to performance is higher during the financial crisis than the noncrisis period. Also, insurers with low (high) risk‐based capital ratios receive more (less) internal capital contributions than other insurers, holding other factors constant.     

The role of cross-listing,foreign ownership and state ownership in dividend policy in an emerging market

In this paper, we investigate if dividend policy is influenced by ownership type. Within the dividend literature, dividends have a signaling role regarding agency costs, such that dividends may diminish insider conflicts (reduce free cash flow) or may be used to extract cash from firms (tunneling effect) – which could be predominant in emerging markets. We expect firms with foreign ownership and those that are listed in overseas markets to have different dividend policies and practices than those that are not, and firms with more state ownership and less individual ownership to be more likely to pay cash dividends and less likely to pay stock dividends. Using firms from an emerging economy (China), we examine whether these effects exist in corporate dividend policy and practice. We find that both foreign ownership and cross-listing have significant negative effects on cash dividends, consistent with the signaling effect and the notion of reduced tunneling activities for firms with the ability to raise capital from outside of China. Consistent with the tunneling effect, we find that firms with higher state ownership tend to pay higher cash dividends and lower stock dividends, while the opposite is true for public (individual) ownership. Further analysis shows that foreign ownership mediates the effect of state ownership on dividend policy. Our results have significant implications for researchers, investors, policy makers and regulators in emerging markets.     

Dividends: Relevance,rigidity, and signaling

This paper uses a dynamic partial equilibrium model to explain a puzzle of dividend smoothing. In contrast to the Modigliani–Miller theory, I show that firm value depends on payout policy. The analysis implies that firms with more stable dividend stream are more valuable. This explains why dividends are rigid over time. A volatile component of dividends is introduced to reduce the likelihood of dividend omission in bad times while keeping the same historical average dividends. I show that the empirically observed positive relation between dividends and future firm performance is a statistical artifact driven by dividend smoothing. Thus, the empirical tests of dividend signaling theory might be misspecified.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF STOCK DIVIDENDS-IN-KIND

We investigate share price reactions to announcements of dividends payable in the common stock of corporations different from the issuing firm. We find that firms that declare these dividends (typically investment companies) experience positive abnormal returns upon announcement. We also find that such dividends are more likely to be declared when the shares to be distributed have peaked in value. Consistent with this finding, we document negative announcement-period abnormal returns for firms having their shares distributed. Additional tests reveal that prices respond more negatively when the information signal is strongest, when outside ownership is more dispersed, and when management is more entrenched.     

Earnings Quality and Market Values of Indonesian Listed Firms

We find that earnings quality (EQ) is reliably negatively correlated with the market values of equity of firms listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (IDX). The financial reporting process produces earnings viewed as increasingly ‘incomplete’ for valuation purposes by the capital market despite moves towards high‐quality financial reporting standards (IFRS) during the sample period 1995–2015. Time‐series analyses reveal that EQ decreases rather than increases through time. The role of earnings in valuation is replaced by other attributes, most notably net dividends. Firms that pay out dividends are valued significantly higher, and firms that issue equity are valued lower. These results are robust regardless of other accounting, market and governance controls. Large and closely held firms are valued higher than smaller firms, consistent with some aspects of the political cost hypothesis. Shares with higher idiosyncratic risk are valued higher, consistent with option value, as are shares where the volume of shares traded is more volatile. Collectively, the results indicate that the mere adoption of high‐quality accounting standards (IFRS) and other nominal changes in capital market regulations do not automatically increase the quality of the financial reporting process.     

Payout flexibility and capital expenditure

Over the past two decades or so, repurchases have become an appealing method for disbursing cash to shareholders compared to the traditional dividends. Managerial perception as well as empirical evidence suggests that repurchases are inherently more flexible than dividends, which may account for their increasing popularity. The rigidity of dividends and the apparent flexibility of share repurchases could impact firm investments. Firms may forego profitable investment opportunities to maintain their dividend levels, while repurchases could be easily scaled back to fund profitable investment projects without fear of an adverse market reaction. We test the flexibility hypothesis of repurchases by regressing capital expenditures on repurchases and dividends in addition to other control variables. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find an inverse relationship between capital expenditures and repurchases but an insignificant relationship with dividends. Further, we find that the flexibility associated with repurchases is especially evident for firms that are financially constrained, and during the recent financial crisis period when external capital constraints were severe. Finally, we find that flexibility of repurchases with respect to capital expenditures is stronger in the more recent time period during which regulatory changes made repurchases more attractive as a mechanism to disburse cash back to shareholders.     

Dividends,Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium

A signalling equilibrium with taxable dividends is identified. In this equilibrium, corporate insiders with more valuable private information optimally distribute larger dividends and receive higher prices for their stock whenever the demand for cash by both their firm and its current stockholders exceeds its internal supply of cash. In equilibrium, many firms distribute dividends and simultaneously issue new stock, while other firms pay no dividends. Because dividends reveal all private information not conveyed by corporate audits, current stockholders capture in equilibrium all economic rents net of dissipative signalling costs. Both the announcement effect and the relationship between dividends and cum-dividend market values are derived explicitly.     

Cash Flow Volatility, Prices and Price Volatility: An Experimental Study

The value of an asset is equal to the present value of its expected future cash flows. It is affected by the magnitude, timing and riskiness, or volatility, of the cash flows. We hypothesize that if the expected values of two assets?? cash flows are equal, the value of the asset with more volatile cash flows will be lower. Furthermore, we examine the impact of the volatility of cash flows on the volatility of prices. We consider a simple experimental environment where subjects trade in an asset which provides dividends from a known probability distribution. The expected value of the dividends is identical in all experimental treatments. The treatments vary with respect to the volatility of dividends. We find that when dividends are more volatile, transaction prices are lower. We also find that the volatility of prices is lower in the treatment with highly volatile dividends. In addition, as expected, trading volume is lower when cash flows are less volatile.     

CEO mobility and corporate payouts

We examine how chief executive officer (CEO) mobility affects corporate payouts. We exploit US state courts’ staggered adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) to obtain exogenous variation in mobility. We report several findings. First, we find that firms in IDD-adopting states increase dividend payouts, whereas the effect of IDD on share repurchases is insignificant relative to firms not in IDD-adopting states. Second, the increase in dividends is concentrated on firms run by CEOs having high ability. Third, CEOs increasing dividends are less likely to be forced to leave their jobs. Fourth, the increase in dividends is concentrated on firms run by early-career CEOs rather than retiring CEOs. Last, CEOs increasing dividends receive more favorable shareholders’ say on pay votes for higher pay. Our evidence supports the notion that restricted mobility induces CEOs to choose a dividend policy that enhances their positions with their shareholders.     

Unintended Consequences of Changing Accounting Standards: The Case of Fair Value Accounting and Mandatory Dividends

A growing body of literature investigates the interaction of changes in accounting standards with institutions such as investor protection laws and corporate governance mechanisms. We examine the unintended consequences of fair value accounting in determining mandated preferred dividends. We study the case of Russian energy conglomerate UES, which had a good corporate governance track record and a consistent dividend history. Following its adoption of fair value accounting, UES reported the highest quarterly profit in world corporate history, but it subsequently omitted dividends for all its shareholders. The case analysis suggests that the transitory nature of fair value adjustments and the interaction with the investment policy were important considerations in justifying the dividend omission. The reduction in preferred dividends was not offset by any capital gains, and led to a wealth transfer from preferred to ordinary shareholders. Thus, requiring the use of fair value accounting when determining the dividend distribution base can lead to unintended consequences and increase agency costs for minority shareholders.     

The Informativeness of Dividends and Associated Tax Credits

This paper investigates the informativeness of dividends and the associated tax credits with respect to earnings persistence. After confirming that dividend‐paying firms have more persistent earnings than non‐dividend‐paying firms, we show that the taxation status of the dividend is also important. Firms that pay dividends with a full tax credit attached have significantly more persistent earnings than firms that pay dividends which carry no associated tax credit. Consistent with higher levels of tax credits identifying more mature firms, those paying dividends with full tax credits have significantly less persistent losses than firms that pay dividends with only partial tax credits. Further, market pricing tests confirm that the incremental information in dividends and tax credits contributes to reductions in market mispricing of the persistence of earnings and earnings components. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and controlling for dividend size and firm age.     

Efficient option pricing on stocks paying discrete or path-dependent dividends with the stair tree

Pricing options on a stock that pays discrete dividends has not been satisfactorily settled because of the conflicting demands of computational tractability and realistic modelling of the stock price process. Many papers assume that the stock price minus the present value of future dividends or the stock price plus the forward value of future dividends follows a lognormal diffusion process; however, these assumptions might produce unreasonable prices for some exotic options and American options. It is more realistic to assume that the stock price decreases by the amount of the dividend payout at the ex-dividend date and follows a lognormal diffusion process between adjacent ex-dividend dates, but analytical pricing formulas and efficient numerical methods are hard to develop. This paper introduces a new tree, the stair tree, that faithfully implements the aforementioned dividend model without approximations. The stair tree uses extra nodes only when it needs to simulate the price jumps due to dividend payouts and return to a more economical, simple structure at all other times. Thus it is simple to construct, easy to understand, and efficient. Numerous numerical calculations confirm the stair tree's superior performance to existing methods in terms of accuracy, speed, and/or generality. Besides, the stair tree can be extended to more general cases when future dividends are completely determined by past stock prices and dividends, making the stair tree able to model sophisticated dividend processes.     

Managerial entrenchment and the value of dividends

This study examines the effects of takeover defenses on the value implication of dividends. Using the framework of Fama and French in J Finance 53(3): 819–843 (1998), the paper shows that dividends paid by managers with strong managerial power resulting from takeover protection measures are more valued in the stock market. The results are consistent with the hypothesis of the agency costs of free cash flow built on by Jensen in Am Econ Rev 76(2): 323–329 (1986) in the sense that dividends are important to determine firm value by reducing the free cash flow that would otherwise be deployed for private benefits by entrenched managers. This paper also examines whether the incremental value effect of dividends in entrenched firms is attributable to a numerator effect (changes in the future cash flow) or a denominator effect (changes in the discount rate). The empirical results show that the dividend payout of such firms is more positively related to future performance and more negatively related to information risk, which supports both numerator and denominator effects.     

Dividends, Values and Agency Costs in REITs

This study examines the market value of REIT dividends conditional on transparency of operating structure and effectiveness of boards. Results suggest that total, mandatory and discretionary dividends are valued by the market. Consistent with agency cost theory, results provide some evidence that discretionary dividends paid by REITs with greater principal-agent conflicts have greater market value. Specific results suggest an increased value of excess dividends paid by firms with more complex organizational structures (UPREITs) and, to some degree, less independent boards. This evidence implies the equity market recognizes REITs’ substitution of discretionary dividends for stronger governance.     

Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence on the determinants of dividend policy

In the US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, and Japan, the propensity to pay dividends is higher among larger, more profitable firms, and those for which retained earnings comprise a large fraction of total equity. Although there are hints of reductions in the propensity to pay dividends in most of the sample countries over the 1994–2002 period, they are driven by a failure of newly listed firms to initiate dividends when expected to do so. Dividend abandonment and the failure to initiate by existing nonpayers are economically unimportant except in Japan. Moreover, in each country, aggregate dividends have not declined and are concentrated among the largest, most profitable firms. Finally, outside of the US there is little evidence of a systematic positive relation between relative prices of dividend paying and non-paying firms and the propensity to pay dividends. Overall, these findings cast doubt on signaling, clientele, and catering explanations for dividends, but support agency cost-based lifecycle theories.     

Taxes,International Clienteles and the Value of ADR Dividends

An alternative approach to valuing dividends is developed and applied to American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on Australian stocks. The values of ADR dividends are estimated from the period when, due to different ex‐dividend dates, the ADRs and their underlying stocks trade with differential dividend entitlements. Australian ADR dividends are valued at less than their face value and the dividends on the underlying stocks are valued at more than their face value. This suggests that ADR dividends are priced by a clientele of US investors placing little value on the imputation tax credits attached to the dividends and that a clientele of Australian resident investors, who obtain value from imputation tax credits, price the dividends on the underlying stock.     

Does geography matter? Firm location and corporate payout policy

We investigate the impact of geography on agency costs and firm dividend policies. We argue that remote firm location increases the cost of shareholder oversight of managerial investment decisions. We hypothesize that remotely located firms facing free cash flow problems precommit to higher dividends to mitigate agency conflicts. We find that remotely located firms pay higher dividends. As expected, the effect of geography on dividends is most pronounced for firms with severe free cash flow problems. Further, remotely located firms rely more on regular dividends instead of special dividends or share repurchases and decrease dividends less often.     

Leverage target and payout policy

Depending on whether the existing debt is below or above target debt level, some firms are more willing to raise debt (if needed) than others. In this article, I show that firms are more likely to both increase and smooth dividends when they have below‐target debt after controlling for access to debt. Additionally, I show that when firms have below‐target debt, they use a greater fraction of proceeds from net debt issues to finance dividends. I obtain similar results when repeating the tests with total payouts (dividends plus repurchases) instead of dividends only.