INTRADAY AND OVERNIGHT RETURNS AND DAY-OF-THE-WEEK EFFECTS

This paper examines intra-trading-day and overnight returns constructed from a transactions data base. Day-of-the-week effects are examined for firms classified by level of thin trading. Results indicate that thin trading masks day-of-the-week effects. Day-of-the-week effects are much more pronounced for actively traded stocks. The importance of controlling for thin trading in studies where segmentation of returns into distinct periods is important is illustrated through an examination of day-of-the-week effects for firms classified by size.     

TRANSACTION COSTS AND DAY-OF-THE-WEEK EFFECTS IN THE OTC/NASDAQ EQUITY MARKET

A potential explanation is examined here for the observed day-of-the-week effect in equity returns—systematic daily patterns in percentage bid-ask spreads. Using OTC/NASDAQ data over 1973–1985, strong return day-of-the-week effects are documented while mean dealer percentage spreads are essentially unchanged over the week. These results provide evidence that systematic percentage spread changes do not contribute to the observed return anomaly.     

ON STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE ANALYSIS OF DAY-OF-THE-WEEK RETURN PATTERNS

Studies show that significant differences exist among return distributions of days of the week. While these results are ubiquitous, their validity depends on the robustness of statistical procedures used. Virtually every day-of-the-week study has used mean/variance analysis despite it being well documented that daily return distributions are nonnormal. This study uses stochastic dominance analysis, which is not distribution dependent, to test for a day-of-the-week effect. Results indicate that the day-of-the-week effect is robust and that previous findings are not artifacts deriving from violations of distributional assumptions.     

THE DAY-OF-THE-WEEK ANOMALY: THE TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE EXPERIENCE

This paper studies the day-of-the-week effect employing Canadian stock returns from January 1, 1975 to June 30, 1989. The study finds that, as opposed to large capitalization stocks, low capitalization (thinly-traded) stocks tend to have a larger negative return on Tuesday rather than on Monday - possibly due to lags in the price adjustment of these stocks following the release of negative information. Two main issues are investigated in an attempt to explain the day-of-the-week effect and its persistence over time: (a) the role of dividends, and (b) the role of information flows. The study finds that firms are much more likely to go ex-dividend on Monday than on any other day of the week; however, after correcting for the dividend effect, Monday's returns are still significantly negative. With respect to information flows, we find evidence consistent with an information-flows-related explanation of the day-of-the-week effect, particularly with the idea that macro announcements cause negative Monday returns.     

A TRANSACTION DATA STUDY OF DAY-OF-THE-WEEK AND INTRADAY PATTERNS IN OPTION RETURNS

In this study common stock, call, and put option returns from 1983 to 1985 are examined by day of the week and time of day. Stock and call return patterns generally are similar, both having relatively low weekend returns and relatively high returns late in the trading day. Put options have high weekend returns, but do not have low returns late in the trading day.     

STOCK RETURNS AND CLASSIFICATION PATTERN OF FIRM-SPECIFIC FINANCIAL VARIABLES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE WITH FINNISH DATA

This paper incorporates the findings of empirical classification patterns of financial ratios to studies investigating the relation between stock returns and financial factors of a firm. The empirical results indicate that the relevant information of the investigated financial characteristics of a firm can be presented in one factor, with respect to which single financial ratios seem not to have incremental information content in the Finnish stock market. In crossindustry sample this factor is reported to be leverage. However, when studying purely industrial firms, the most important factor consists of ratios representing several a priori characteristics of a firm.     

GROUP EFFECTS AND BETA NONSTATIONARITY

Recent evidence indicates that while random diversification can lead to the elimination of the majority of systematic risk, the systematic selection of securities can result in significant group effects blocking this dissipation of unsystematic risk. The group effects associated with investment in growth, cyclical, stable and oil stocks found by Farrell and Martin and Klemkosky were reexamined while allowing for beta nonstationarity. It was found that the beta nonstationarity effect, while quite large for individual stocks and small portfolios tended diversify away quite quickly. It was further found that much of what has in the past been termed a group effect is actually the result of beta nonstationarity.     

EQUITY VALUATION EFFECTS OF WARRANT-DEBT FINANCING

Stock price reactions to warrant-debt unit financing announcements are examined and a significant two-day average abnormal return of ?1.32 percent is found. The negative average abnormal return is similar to that observed for convertible debt financing announcements in previous research. Warrant-debt financing decisions result in large increases in capitalization; on average, issuers' long-term debt increases by 84 percent, and common shares outstanding increase by 18 percent assuming full exercise of the warrants.     

THE NEGLECTED AND SMALL FIRM EFFECTS

This paper addresses the empirical question of whether the differential attention which companies receive affects the capital asset pricing process. The degree of attention was measured by research concentration rankings based on the number of analysts regularly following the firm's securities. The results suggest: (i) that there is a “neglected firm effect” in terms of superior performance for less researched companies and (ii) that the neglected firm effect persists over and above the small firm effect; namely, the excess returns are not fully attributable to size. The ex-post capital asset pricing model is unable to account for the differences in return across security research ranking. Several possible explanations for the results are considered but not tested.