The impact and politics of entry regulation on intrastate telephone rates

This paper examines the effects of regulatory barriers to the entry of the interstate long-distance carriers into the intraLATA toll service market. With these barriers, the local telephone companies can charge supracompetitive rates for intraLATA toll calls and use the excess revenues to price local exchange service below cost. We use a reduced form econometric price model to see whether these entry barriers have increased intraLATA toll rates. The results indicate that intraLATA toll rates in states that enjoin all types of long distance carriers from providing intraLATA service are about 7.5 per cent higher than in states that allow some sort of competition. In contrast, only preventing the entry of the largest facilities-based carriers does not affect intraLATA rates.     

How Applicable is the Dominant Firm Model of Price Leadership?

In this paper, we examine the usefulness of the dominant firm model of price leadership to serve as a benchmark for organizing behavior in laboratory markets. This well established model, whose origins can be traced back over a hundred years, has been recently applied to such landmark antitrust cases as Standard Oil and Alcoa and more recently to the analysis of deregulated markets for electric power. Our results indicate that in posted offer markets the dominant firm quite often produces more than the model's benchmark and sometimes at much greater prices. With sealed offer auction rules and a low elasticity of fringe supply, the dominant firm produces the theoretical output at a price greater than the prediction. However, with a high elasticity of fringe supply, the dominant firm produces more output over a wide range of prices that includes the predicted price.     

The Informational Role of Prices*

We consider a dominant firm with a competitive fringe in order to investigate the informational role of prices. The fringe is necessary for the existence of a unique, fully revealing equilibrium, in which the price reveals the quality of the good to uninformed buyers. A higher price triggers more sales on the part of the competitive fringe, reducing both residual demand and profits. We find that a larger share of uninformed buyers increases the price and reduces the quantity sold by the dominant firm, but increases the quantity sold by the competitive fringe. This, in turn, reduces consumer surplus and welfare.     

Optimal Pricing and Entry Rules When a Regulated Dominant Firm Faces a Competitive Fringe

In this paper, we study optimal regulation of a dominant firm facing an unregulated competitive fringe. First, assuming the size of the fringe is fixed, we demonstrate that the usual Ramsey Rule for second-best efficient pricing remains applicable in this context. We also examine the suitability of the Laspeyres price cap and show that it retains its desirable properties. This implies that regulators should continue to apply Laspeyres price cap regulation to the dominant firm after competition has materialized. Then, assuming that price and entry control are regulatory instruments, we characterize the efficient pricing and entry rules. We demonstrate that the free entry equilibrium number of firms will be excessive relative to the efficient number of firms, thereby providing a new Excess Entry Theorem. Finally, we suggest a modification of the Laspeyres price cap that can incentivize the regulated dominant firm to support efficient entry into the fringe.     

Price Caps and Output Floors: A Comparison of Simple Regulatory Rules

We study in this paper a simple alternative to price cap regulation. The mechanism, which we label 'output floor' regulation, requires the regulated firm to supply a given level of output. This rule is as simple as price cap regulation, and performs identically when the regulated firm is a natural monopoly; however, we show that, in the presence of a competitive fringe, output floor regulation yields lower prices and stronger incentives for cost reduction. Its introduction, however, is likely to be resisted by the industry, since it lowers managerial utility and shareholders' profits.     

Renewable Energy Policy Instruments and Market Power

Markets for green certificates allow generators with market power to squeeze the margins of their competitors, as a generator that is vertically integrated into network activities might do. We analyze this issue in a stylized electricity industry in which a dominant producer of both conventional and renewable energy is facing a competitive fringe of renewable‐energy producers. We demonstrate that whether or not a dominant firm is vertically integrated into network activities, it can disadvantage the fringe producers by distorting certificates prices, thereby inducing cost inefficiency in the generation of renewable energy. We compare green certificates to a system of feed‐in tariffs, where a similar margin squeeze is not possible.     

Dynamic limit pricing and internal finance

This paper examines a model of dynamic limit pricing with a profit-maximizing fringe constrained to finance new investment from internal finance. In a differential game, the dominant firm controls price, thereby determining the current earnings of the fringe, while the fringe chooses its optimal retention ratio. If market growth is less than the discount rate, an important feature of the solution is that price must eventually drop to the fringe long-run cost of production. If market growth is initially rapid, the dominant firm is much more aggressive in limiting fringe growth.     

Price cap regulation of a dominant firm facing competition

Price cap regulation is typically applied to natural monopolies operating with subadditive costs. Price caps are known to provide superior incentives for the regulated monopoly to pursue cost reduction and, in a multiservice/product context, undertake welfare enhancing price discrimination. It is well known that capping a Laspeyres index of the firm’s prices induces the monopoly to charge socially optimal “Ramsey” prices in the long run. This paper examines the suitability of the Laspeyres form of regulation when the regulated firm faces competition in the market for one of its services (outputs). We present the appropriately modified Ramsey pricing rule for the regulated dominant firm and demonstrate that capping a Laspeyres index of the dominant firm’s prices leads to prices that satisfy this pricing rule in the long run.     

Price distributions and competition

This paper utilizes an equilibrium search model to investigate market structure and price dispersion. In a market with one large firm and a competitive fringe, the large firm offers the highest price. Fringe firms offer a distribution of lower prices.     

RETAIL PRICE REGULATION AND THE OPTION TO DELAY

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper examines a two-period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the underlying overall welfare output. In a regulated environment, we consider a monopolist who faces no downstream (final good) competition but is subject to retail price regulation. We identify the welfare-maximizing regulated prices when the unregulated market outcome is set as the benchmark. We show that if the regulator can commit to ex post regulation – that is, regulated prices that are contingent to future demand realization – then regulated prices that allow the firm to recover its total costs of production are welfare-maximizing. Thus, under ex post price regulation there is no need to compensate the regulated firm for the option to delay that it foregoes when investing today. We argue, however, that regulators cannot make this type of commitment and, therefore, price regulation is often ex ante – that is, regulated prices are not contingent to future demand. We show that the optimal ex ante regulation, and the extent to which regulated prices need to incorporate an option to delay, depend on the nature of demand uncertainty.     

Telephone pools and economic incentives

We identify the incentive structure for a firm that participates in a pooling arrangement. These pooling arrangements have been common in the telecommunications industry, both in the United States and in Canada. We identify alternative mechanisms, including cost caps, yardstick competition, transfer prices, and fixed revenue allocators. A pooling firm has inferior incentives for cost reducing innovation, truthful reporting of costs, and avoidance of abuse relative to alternative mechanisms. These incentive problems are similar to those that arise under rate-of-return regulation. Notably, transfer/access pricing, does not rectify the poor incentives embodied in pools. However, pooling does facilitate demand enhancement, due to its ability to internalize potential network effects.The authors wish to gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Southwestern Bell Telephone in the preparation of this paper. The views expressed are those of the authors and not those of Southwestern Bell. We are grateful for comments received at the 14th Annual Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries, Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University, and valuable suggestions by Michael A. Crew and the referee.     

On the simultaneity of innovations and market structure

This paper examines the determinants of innovations and market structure within a simultaneous framework. From a competitive fringe model, quasi-conditional factor demand functions are derived that explain product and process innovations in terms of factor prices and market structure variables such as relative firm size, market size, and the concentration ratio where the latter set of variables result from the same optimizing process.Empirical evidence is gained from a cross section of 2276 West German firms in the manufacturing sector. In contrast to many other empirical studies, product and process innovations are measured by two dichotomous variables. An exogeneity test for the probit model is worked out and the conditional maximum likelihood estimator that emerges from this test is applied. The results show that simultaneity does matter, even if innovations are explained by market structure variables at the firm level. Accounting for endogeneity and cross-equation restrictions changes the results substantially.     

Human Capital and Growth: New Evidences from African Data

Assuming that all firms have rising marginal costs, merger between a dominant firm and one of the firms in the competitive fringe is considered. The effects on market price and output, profits and market power are shown when the dominant firm operates as a two-plant firm after merger and output arises from both plants. It is proved that if merger offers no efficiency gain, then market price always rises; and if merger results in efficiency gain, then market price falls if and only if there are sufficiently large number of firms in the fringe. In any case, there is profit incentive for merger to take place. [611]     

Regulation and the vertically integrated firm: The case of RBOC entry into interlata long distance

Congress is considering telecommunications reform legislation that would allow the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) to enter the interLATA long-distance market. A concern is that a vertically-integrated RBOC would be able to discriminate against its rivals. A proposed remedy would require the RBOCs to reduce their access market share as a precondition to interLATA entry. We show formally that such a precondition likely contributes to higher long-distance prices and enhances the risk of discrimination. Furthermore, the lower the share of access profits retained by an RBOC, the weaker are its incentives to lower long-distance prices.I thank Timothy Brennan, Barbara Cherry, Alfred Kahn, Alex Larson, David Sappington, David Sibley, Lester Taylor, and Steve Wildman for insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also grateful to the editor, Michael Crew, and an anonymous referee for a particularly careful reading of this work and for many constructive suggestions for revision. The usual caveat applies.     

Permit markets, market power, and the trade-off between efficiency and revenue raising

This paper focuses on an emissions permit market dominated by one firm and with a government concerned about social efficiency and permits revenue. In this setting, it is shown that the dominant firm's market power reduces the opportunities for the government to raise non-distortionary revenue from permits without loss of consumer surplus. Since the government's objectives are thus hampered in auctioning permits, the dominant firm should be excluded from the auction. Specifically, the regulator should sell permits directly, through bilateral negotiation, to the dominant firm, and auction off the remaining permits to the fringe firms.     

The strategic nature of advertising in segmented markets

We develop a simple model in which firm-specific advertising has cooperative and predatory effects. Our model is set in a static market where firms are naturally segmented into two distinct submarkets: several large firms located in the core, with small firms operating as a fringe. We test the net effect of opposing market size (cooperative) and market share (predatory) effects of both fringe and core firm advertising on the advertising decisions of large firms in several US consumer industries. Empirically, fringe firm advertising leads to an increase in advertising efforts by large firms, implying strategic complementarity. On the other hand, increased advertising by core firms in an industry decreases advertising expenditures of other core firms, indicating they are strategic substitutes. Our findings imply that equilibrium levels of advertising can be greater with asymmetric, rather than symmetric, strategic interactions.     

Profit taxes and the growth of fringe firms

In this paper we examine the optimal taxation of corporate profits in a multi–period limit pricing model where a dominant firm faces expansion by a competitive fringe. The optimal policy requires tax rates to vary both intertemporally and across firm sizes, and balances the benefit of fringe growth in eroding the market power of the dominant firm and the cost of displacing the dominant firm's output with the higher cost output of the fringe. The results are relevant for assessing the policy of giving preferential tax treatment to small firms, as practised by several OECD countries. JEL Classification: H32, L11
Impôts sur les profits et croissance des entreprises périphériques. Ce texte examine la fiscalité optimale des profits des sociétés dans un modèle de tarification limite à plusieurs périodes quand une entreprise dominante fait face à l'expansion d'entreprises périphériques qui la concurrencent. La politique optimale requiert des taux d'imposition qui varient à la fois dans le temps et selon la taille des entreprises, et cherche un équilibre entre les avantages d'une croissance à la périphérie qui entame le pouvoir de l'entreprise dominante, et le coût d'un déplacement de la production de l'entreprise dominante vers des entreprises périphériques dont les coûts de production sont plus élevés. Les résultats de l'analyse sont pertinents pour l'évaluation des politiques accordant un traitement fiscal préférentiel aux petites entreprises, comme c'est le cas dans plusieurs pays de l'OCDE.     

Anger and Regulation

We study a model in which agents experience anger when they see a firm that has displayed insufficient concern for the welfare of its clients (i.e., altruism) making high profits. Regulation can increase welfare, for example, through fines (even with no changes in prices). Besides the standard channel (i.e., efficiency), regulation affects welfare through two other channels. (i) Regulation calms down existing consumers, because a reduction in the profits of an unkind firm increases total welfare by reducing consumer anger. (ii) Individuals who were out of the market when they were angry in the unregulated market decide to purchase once the firm is regulated.     

Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry: a Choice between Commitment and Flexibility

This paper presents a model of stochastic oligopoly with demand uncertainty where firms endogenously choose entry timing. We examine two extreme types of market structure and show that the equilibrium correspondence that connects them is continous. With two identically sized firms, there are symmetric, Cournot type equilibria where the probability of early entry declines with greater uncertainty, and for low uncertainty two asymmetric equilibria. With one large firm with a continuum of nonatomic firms, there is a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. We conclude that the behavior of a dominant firm with a finite fringe can be approximated by Stackelberg equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers?: D21, L11.     

The welfare economics of dominant-firm acquisitions

Conclusion The main results of this paper provide some analytic underpinning for a strict horizontal merger policy relating to dominant firms. However, even under standard assumptions, examples have been demonstrated where dominant/fringe firm mergers increase welfare. Most of these examples imply shutting down acquired facilities, a practice regarded as unfavorable evidence by the court in theStandard Oil case; consequently, they do not by themselves seem to offer much hope for raising economies as an antitrust defense. Finally, it should be noted that this paper has considered only single-product economies; economies of scope arising in multi-product (and multi-market) contexts could be large enough to justify dominant/fringe firm mergers⁹.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Economic Policy Office seminar, Antitrust Division, U. S. Department of Justice. The author is grateful to Marius Schwartz, other seminar participants and an anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments. M. Daniel Westbrook and Brian Flynn kindly arranged for the calculations reported in Appendix C.